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J. Fitz Gerald *Yeats's Irish Traditions*
F. Montesperelli *I segni dell'indicibile. Emergenze dell'inconscio nelle fiabe di Oscar Wilde*
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Thomas Frank

On Lexical Innovation

Linguists have traditionally devoted little attention to the problem of lexical innovation. The reason for this is not far to seek: lexical innovation, as indeed the whole study of lexis, has an apparently dubious status within linguistics, contradictory as this may sound to the non-linguist, who assumes somewhat naively that linguistics is concerned with "words", and that therefore the study of "words" — individual lexical items — should be the prime concern of linguists. It is only fairly recently that the study of meaning has become, as it were respectable within linguistics. The structuralists were from the beginning highly suspicious of a scientifically valid study of meaning. Here is what Bloomfield has to say on the subject:

The situations which prompt people to utter speech, include every object and happening in their universe. In order to give a scientifically accurate definition of every form of a language, we should have to have a scientifically accurate knowledge of everything in the speaker's world. The actual extent of human knowledge is very small, compared to this. We can define the meaning of a speech-form accurately when this matter has to do with some matter of which we possess scientific knowledge [...] but we have no precise way of defining words like *love* or *hate*, which concern situations that have not been accurately classified and these latter are the great majority. (Bloomfield [1935], p. 139)

Together with the study of semantics, the structuralists largely abandoned the systematic study of lexis and concentrated their attention principally on such subjects as phonology, morphology

Textus II (1989), pp. 113-140.

and the grammatical structure of language in general. Nor did this emphasis change greatly with the advent of transformational generative grammar in the late fifties. The generativists too privilege structure rather than meaning, and more recently phonology, and it is not until fairly recently that linguists working within the general framework of generativism have taken an interest in the study of lexis, and in particular in word formation. Semantics too has made a come-back, looking for support either to formal logic – as for example in Lyons's seminal work on the subject (Lyons [1977]) or to linguistic pragmatics, an approach which has found a great number of followers in recent years.

1. The tendency on the part of linguists to shy away from the study of lexis is easily explained if we consider the typical methods and the epistemological status of linguistics ever since the origin of a "scientific" study of language during the nineteenth century. I do not mean by this that either etymology or lexicography have been neglected, for enormous advances have been made in both these fields – witness for example the compilation of the great *Oxford English Dictionary*, with its four volumes of Supplements, the last of which was published as recently as 1986. But then, perhaps there is a sneaking suspicion that lexicographers are not really linguists at all, since what they are concerned with is a mass of separate lexical items, disparate and apparently unstructured pieces of language, not systems or sets of rules. I hope to show in the course of this paper that this view of the nature of lexicography is only partly justified.

Linguists, in the strict sense of the term, whether their main field of interest is synchronic or diachronic analysis, are largely interested in systems, in regularities: language, in the terminology of the generativists, is a rule-bound activity. Historical linguistics, for example, has been very largely concerned with the regularity of sound changes, in formulating rules that account for the known phenomena. The linguist is primarily interested in relating input to output by a series of determinable and predictable rules, and this is true for the neo-grammarians of the nineteenth century, of the structuralists of the thirties and forties as well as of the generativists working within a Chomskian framework of reference. These

successive approaches to or models of historical linguistics are well illustrated in Bynon [1977], Part I. Very different though the types of rules formulated, and indeed the very conception of a "linguistic rule" may be, these approaches all have one thing in common: a deep-rooted conviction that language is an ordered system "ou tout se tient", in Saussure's words, and this is of course equally true whether we are dealing with the historical development of a language or its analysis, either in terms of phonology or syntax, in a purely synchronic dimension. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that linguistics as a humanistic discipline is founded on this basic assumption. The lexicographer, intent on amassing apparently unrelated separate items, somehow does not fit into this picture, in the same way as the collector of linguistic curiosities and oddities would probably not be considered a fully-fledged member of the family of linguists.

Language being an ordered system, it is only natural that linguists should not only seek to establish valid taxonomies – undoubtedly a very important aspect of linguistic inquiry, as we shall see shortly in dealing with certain aspects of word formation – but also explanations, especially as regards diachronic phenomena like sound changes, e.g. phenomena like Grimm's Law or the Great Vowel Shift in late Middle English. It should however be added that the quest for valid explanations is not confined to diachronic linguistics, since, I think it is fair to say, the whole of transformational-generative grammar is based on the assumption that the rules which generativists establish have an explanatory, not merely a descriptive value. The problem of "explanation", which is not central to our concern in this paper, has been dealt with amply by Lass [1980], in which the author comes to the conclusion that explanation, in the very strict sense in which he uses the term, is impossible in linguistics, and that much of what passes for explanation in linguistics is either probabilistic or of an *a posteriori* kind: in other words, given that we know the output, we somehow reconstruct the input, basing our arguments on the most likely way things must have happened, not on a strict, logically unexceptional condition that the explanation offered is the only valid conclusion that can be reached on the basis of the empirical facts at our disposal. Clearly connected with this is the problem of the pre-

dictability of linguistic change. Some authors maintain that, within certain limits, predictability is a valid concept in linguistics (see for example Aitchison [1987b], but also Lass [1987] for a highly critical view of the predictability hypothesis). For a fuller discussion of these questions, see Frank [1989].

2. At this point the reader might ask himself what these theoretical problems have to do with the subject of this paper, which deals with lexical innovation in English. I hope to show that they are relevant to many of the issues that will be raised in the course of this article. Let us now look at the various kinds of lexical innovation found in natural languages. A first rough division is between changes due to external causes and changes due to internal causes. The latter can be further divided into semantic changes of a given lexeme which do not alter its form but shift, enlarge or restrict its meaning, and changes which either add new lexemes to the language on the basis of pre-existing forms, or alter the grammatical status, and consequently the meaning of an existing lexical item. These latter innovations are generally treated under the label of word formation. In the rest of this paper we will deal with each of the various categories listed above in turn.

The principal innovations due to external changes that affect lexis is the phenomenon known as "borrowing". This traditional term is strictly speaking a misnomer, since "borrowing" implies that the object in question will be returned to its previous owner, which is certainly not the case with lexical borrowing or loan words. It is therefore more accurate to talk of "adopting" a word, but since I do not wish to enter into terminological controversies, we will content ourselves with the traditional term and talk of borrowing. This very widespread phenomenon, present in practically all known languages, is particularly important for the Middle English period, when thousands of French words entered the language; but the adoption of foreign words is a process that goes on under our eyes every day. Perhaps the most recent examples are *perestroika* and *glasnost*, two Russian terms to be found in English-language newspapers (but also of course in the Italian press) practically every day, for obvious reasons not yet recorded in the Supplement to the OED, or other recent dictionaries, but clearly

already part of the language. On the whole borrowing is a phenomenon of little interest to the linguist, and in particular to the historical linguist, as opposed to the historian of the language¹, since, as we have seen, the linguist is interested in systems and regularities and nothing could be less amenable to systematic analysis, let alone to any hypothesis of predictability, than lexical borrowing. It is of course of considerable interest to the historian, and in particular to the historian of cultural interaction, since it testifies not only to a significant relationship between two cultures, but also to the semantic fields involved, which are clearly perceived to be predominant in relation to the language which borrows a word from another language. Typical of this is the very widespread use of English terminology in science and technology, and in particular perhaps in information science, to be found in a large number of European languages, and probably in a great many non-European languages as well. This is not to say that the "lending language", the language from which the term is adopted, is necessarily considered to be culturally predominant or superior, though this is the most common pattern, since we find numerous terms adopted from languages considered to be "culturally inferior", e.g. languages of peoples colonized by the European powers from the 16th century onwards and therefore of subject peoples. To cite just a few examples, we have *thug* and *loot* from Hindi, two words that have entirely lost their association with their Indian origin (the same is true of *punch* < Hindi and *pyjamas* < Urdu), whereas terms like *pukka* or *nabob* preserve their Indian association and are not generally used outside an Indian context. Similarly *moccasin* and *totem*, borrowed from two different North American (Red Indian) languages, have their origin in referents peculiar to the cultures of "subject peoples": the knowledge of a new referent carries with it very frequently the adoption of the original term. The specifying phrase "very frequently" is indicative of why the linguist *qua* linguist has little interest in borrowing, however fas-

1. For the distinction between these two categories, see Varvaro [1972-73]. Personally I am convinced that far from being two separately identifiable disciplines, historical linguistics is part of the history of the language, which I believe must be primarily a *linguistic* rather than a *cultural* discipline.

inating the phenomenon may be to the layman interested in linguistic matters or to historians of culture: borrowing is a casual, unsystematic, entirely unpredictable process, not amenable to rules or regularities. Let us take a very simple example: English *potato* (like Italian *patata*) derives indirectly, i.e. via Spanish from Haitian, a typical case of the significatum, or object, being adopted from an alien culture together with the signifier, or original term. But whereas this is true for English, Spanish and Italian, it is not true for French, which uses a native formation (*pomme de terre* = "apple of the earth") to denote the same object. There is no plausible "reason" or "explanation" why French should use its native resources, resources internal to the language, as opposed to resources external to it, as in the case of English, Spanish or Italian. This is of course true also of native German compounds like *Fernsehen* = "television" or *Fernsprecher* (but this has tended in recent years to be replaced by the "international" term *Telephon*). Whether we attribute such phenomena to genuine semantic gaps in the borrowing language or to cultural fashions or any other reason, the fact is that the way different languages cope with new significata is entirely unpredictable, and though different languages may prefer an internal rather than an external solution, the output can never be related in a principled way to the input. In other words, the lexicographer has to use different instruments and techniques from those of the linguist concerned with systems and it is therefore true to say that their respective disciplines operate using different methodologies precisely because of their different epistemological status.

3. Change, enlargement and restriction of meaning are entirely internal to the language, since these movements are only very rarely determined by outside causes. They typically form part of the province of lexicography, of which they are perhaps the most significant aspect. The enormous wealth of information provided in this field by the great OED demonstrates perhaps better than anything else how language is inherently unstable and meaning essentially open-ended. No definition can be definitive, no particular meaning of a lexeme defined once and for all. Indeed, the very concept of different, identifiable meanings, and the assignment of

any particular occurrence to one of the categories established is open to serious doubt. Meaning in natural language is essentially indeterminate, and indeed one might argue that this indeterminacy, or open-endedness as we have called it above, is a characteristic trait of human language, as opposed to simpler semiotic systems, like the "language" of bees, etc. Still, for practical purposes we accept the categorizations provided by dictionaries, especially great scholarly works like the OED, since they provide a necessary framework for the interpretation of texts and for the study of how a particular lexical item changes in the course of time. This is why I find a recent review of the second edition of the OED in the *TLS* (Hill [1989]) profoundly unjust, for the author seems to expect definitive answers to his quest for meaning, and particularly takes the compilers of the dictionary to task for treating somewhat summarily the lexical innovations of G.M. Hopkins, whose highly idiosyncratic use of language is perhaps only paralleled by Joyce. Apart from the fact that a dictionary like the OED cannot be mistaken for an exegesis of a difficult poet like Hopkins, there remains the fact that in many cases the interpretation of a particular use of a word in a certain instance can never be absolutely certain. We may have excellent reasons for excluding certain meanings, which the dictionary tells us were not yet current at the time when the text was composed, but this sort of negative proof cannot be turned into a positive demonstration that the word *must* have had a certain meaning at the time of writing, even admitting for the sake of argument the highly debatable hypothesis that meaning can be thus encapsulated and defined in absolute terms. Let us take two simple examples from Shakespeare. When we read in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* (III, i, 81-82)

There is a lady of Verona here,
Whom I affect; but she is nice and coy

no attentive reader of Shakespeare could possibly interpret *nice* in this instance as meaning "pleasant", "agreeable", "inspiring sympathy", which are some of the most common meanings (or should I say paraphrases?) of the word today, meanings which according to the OED arose during the 18th century. At first sight the context might warrant a reading in the modern sense of "agreeable",

"pleasant", though in that case the phrase would sound extremely feeble, but more careful consideration, as well as a knowledge of the history of the word definitely excludes such an interpretation, though it does not of itself guarantee the exact meaning of the term in context, which might vary between "excessively scrupulous" or "fastidious" and "shy", in which case "coy" and "nice" are near synonyms, a solution which is certainly possible on the basis of our knowledge of Shakespeare's youthful style. The second example is rather more tricky. In *Romeo and Juliet* (II, ii, 98-99) we read

In truth, fair Montague, I am too fond,
And therefore thou mayst think my haviour light

This use of *fond* is perfectly compatible with the modern meaning "affectionate" as in "fond of", a meaning we already find in Shakespeare in the shape of *fond on*. Nevertheless, the general consensus seems to be to interpret the term *fond* in this context as "simple-minded", "foolish", not only because this is a current meaning of the word in the 16th century, but also because it yields more satisfactory sense. But this is an entirely subjective criterion, very necessary in the exegesis of texts, but quite untestable according to objective criteria. In other words, also in the invaluable and highly necessary minute charting of meanings and their changes in time, the lexicographer is working along lines that can hardly be defined as linguistic in the strict sense we have applied to this term in the opening part of this paper. Obviously this is no slur on the activity of the lexicographer, which is not only valid, but indispensable in its particular field. What I mean is that we are dealing with outputs, the inputs of which are determined *a posteriori* and are in no way predictable and still less so the necessary result of some determinable rule, as is the case when we are dealing with matters of phonology or syntax. The history of words like *nice* and *fond* look perfectly reasonable and even explicable when seen from the vantage point of hindsight, but there is no necessary condition why *nice* (ultimately from Lat. *nescius*) should come to mean "pleasant", "agreeable", "inspiring sympathy" from the wide range of meanings attested ever since its adoption at the end of the 13th century and right down to the 17th century. The internal history

of words, like the external history of lexical borrowing, is not rule-bound, but subject to casuality, if not downright whim, a condition which stimulates the insatiable curiosity of the lexicographer, but may irritate the linguist in search for rules and regularities.

4. The other movement entirely internal to the linguistic system is what is known as form formation, that capacity which all languages have of enlarging their word stock by such means as derivation and compounding. There has been a good deal of controversy about whether word formation should properly be assigned to the grammar or the lexis of a language. The question is discussed among others by Kastovsky [1982]. The controversy between those who favour a lexicalist solution, favoured by Chomsky himself, as opposed to those who propend towards a transformational solution is neatly summarised in Bauer [1983], pp. 75-82, and there seems no point here in rehearsing the arguments. What is certain is that it is undeniable that word formation contains strictly grammatical elements, i.e. is subject to certain generative rules which relate input to output, though as we shall see shortly the relation between the two frequently breaks down, especially on the semantic plane. As Kastovsky observes in the article already quoted, "in the description of word formation, it is even more difficult than elsewhere in the grammar, to keep apart competence and performance, synchrony and diachrony" (Kastovsky [1982], p. 195). These are clearly two distinct, albeit related questions: if the distinction between competence and performance is blurred, it is because not all possible inputs have in fact outputs actually realized in the language, so that the number of possible new lexical items is considerably greater than those actually realized in the language. We shall have occasion later on in this paper to examine a number of cases where such restrictions occur. As to the blurring between synchrony and diachrony, we may note that all new formations are necessarily a feature of diachrony, in so far as a new item is added to the existing word stock and this alters the relationship that previously held between lexical items in a particular semantic field, as Saussure so aptly demonstrates in his well-known comparison between the successive states of play in chess and the successive synchronic states of the language. But these new formations are the

result of a series of strictly synchronic rules, like those that govern derivation in English, which, for example, permit nominalizations from verbal stems by the addition of the suffix *-ation*, e.g. *relate* → *relation*, *educate* → *education*, *symbolize* → *symbolization*, in which we note the double derivation: *symbol* → *symbolize* → *symbolization*. It is the presence of recursive, ordered rules, like those outlined by Bauer [1983], p. 69 that induce us to treat derivation as part of the grammar, not of the lexis. As Bauer points out, the suffixes *-ation*, *-al*, *-ize* are ordered and recursive, and each realizes a different grammatical category ("part of speech"):

1. *-ation*, as we have seen, realizes $V \rightarrow N$
2. *-al* realizes $N \rightarrow \text{Adj.}$
3. *-ize* realizes $N/\text{Adj.} \rightarrow V$.

At whatever point we begin the derivational process, the order will be that indicated above, though the rule must also incorporate certain phonological features, which allow us on the one hand to derive *education* from a truncated base *educ-* and on the other certain vowel changes, explicable in terms of what Chomsky & Halle call laxing rules, which permit derivations like *reveal* / i: / → *revelation* / e / or / /. *Inform-ation* represents the regular derivation, without truncation or phonological change. The cyclical nature of the process can be seen in forms like *educ-ation-al* (1 + 2). It is not easy to find actually realized forms that incorporate 1 + 2 + 3: *denominationalize*, suggested by Bauer, would be perfectly grammatical, though the word is in effect not registered in the OED: the meaning of such a word would be "to make denominational", "to treat things in denominational terms". Compound derivations realizing 2 + 3 + 1 are easier to find, e.g. *industrialization*, *institutionalization*², etc., whereas the sequence 3 + 1 + 2 gives us examples like *organizational*, *civilizational*, etc. A second series of derivational suffixes cyclically ordered consists of

2. *Institutionalization* is an interesting example, since the derivational suffixes are in English essentially transparent, whereas the base, as far as English speakers are concerned, is entirely opaque. Not so if we look at the etymology of the word, since it derives from Lat. (via O. Fr.) *institutionem* < *in-statuere* < *stare*. These components are lost in the act of borrowing, so that what in Latin might be considered at least a potentially transparent base, becomes completely opaque in the adopting languages. This phenomenon characterizes many words borrowed directly or indirectly from Latin.

1. *-ic*, realizing $N \rightarrow \text{Adj.}$, e.g. *poet* → *poetic*
2. *-al*, realizing $N \rightarrow \text{Adj.}$, e.g. *industry* → *industrial*
3. *-ist*, realizing $N/\text{Adj.} \rightarrow N$, e.g. *monarch* → *monarchist*.

In this series too we have compound derivations, e.g. *nationalistic* (2 + 3 + 1), whereas forms like *realistic* show a combination of suffixes 3 + 1.

I have dealt at some length with one small aspect of derivation, because it seems to me to demonstrate very clearly that suffixation rules are part of the grammar and comprise not only recursive rules for the addition of the suffix, but in some cases also phonological rules, which can be formulated in terms of Chomsky & Halle's generative phonology. What is more, the output is generally entirely predictable, both on the purely grammatical level and on the semantic level, since we have seen that certain suffixes realize transformations from one grammatical category to another, e.g. $N \rightarrow V$, while, semantically speaking, the meaning of the resulting form is pretty well predictable; in other words these derivational processes are rule-bound and in this sense form part of the grammar of the language.

Clearly not all derivations are equally productive. Let us take an extreme example: *long* — *length*, *strong* — *strength*, *broad* — *breadth* and *wide* — *width* are all easily recognized as being the adjectival base form and the derived abstract noun. These forms are certainly no longer productive, in the sense that no modern English noun is derived from the adjective by means of vowel change.³ In a purely synchronic analysis it would probably be more convenient to treat these forms as fully lexicalized. Certain derivational suffixes, though clearly recognized as such, are today no longer productive, or at most very moderately productive, as is the case with *-dom*, e.g. *free* — *freedom*, others like *-ation*, as we have seen above, are highly productive. It is of course true that not all possible, or shall we say perfectly regular derivations are realized in the language. As Adams ([1973], p. 200) points out,

3. For the historical linguist it is interesting to note that whereas the first three owe their vowel alternation to an OE change known as i-mutation, the vowel alternation in *wide* — *width* goes back to ME vowel shortening in certain contexts, plus a change of the suffix *-ness* to *-th* by analogy with *breadth*.

there is no nominal derivation from the verb *despise* → **despise-ment* (and there are certainly quite a number of similar cases), and though this could be attributed to the presence of near synonyms like *contempt* or *disdain* which can be said to fill the gap, this seems a rather weak argument, given the wealth of synonyms in English, and especially as in other cases we find two derived forms from the same base, e.g. *clear* → *clarity/clearness*, so that the phenomenon must be attributed to some linguistic idiosyncrasy not otherwise explicable. On the whole it is probably true to say that most prefixes are still productive. Bauer ([1983], p. 217) distinguishes between class-changing prefixes like *be-*, e.g. *befriend*, *bewitch* (N → V), or *en-*, e.g. *enslave* (also N → V), and class-maintaining prefixes, which form the great majority of cases, e.g. *un-*, *dis-*, *de-*, as in *happy* – *unhappy*, *like* – *dislike*, *regulate* – *deregulate*, etc. To return to the question of productivity: a suffix which is no longer productive can hardly be said to form part of the grammar of the language, nevertheless we clearly recognize that historically speaking we are dealing with a base and derived forms. In other words, though generally speaking we no longer use *-dom* to derive nouns from adjectives (Bauer gives some exceptions to this tendency), we cannot treat forms like *freedom* as anything but derived forms. But we must distinguish processes that are no longer productive, as it were fossilized derivations, from possible forms, which are not activated in the language. Productivity does not mean that any one well-formed derivation (but the same is obviously also true of other aspects of word formation) will in fact be part of the language. There is a notable gap between theoretically well-formed words and forms that common usage has incorporated into the word stock of a language. Clearly words are coined every day by native speakers all over the world, and such new formations are strictly rule-bound, i.e., the speaker forms them analogically according to some accepted model, but whether the new formations actually enter the language is in part dependent on whether the new form fills a semantic gap in the language, a semantic gap which can of course be due to such contingent reasons as new technical developments as well as to more general reasons. In part the incorporation of a new coinage in the language is quite frankly due to chance. Clearly words, and therefore also new words, must

stand for something really existing in the world or at any rate in our universe of discourse: words that have no referent in the real world (nonsense words) are hardly likely to survive for long. This condition is known as the hypostatization requirement. But not all possible referents have in fact words to stand for them, since all languages have a number of semantic voids, which may be filled by new formations, but may also remain voids for many centuries. The philosopher Locke (Locke [1961], vol. II, p. 39), in arguing that we recognize as different species objects or actions for which the language has a separate term, observes that English has a word for killing with a sharp, pointed instrument (*to stab*), but no specific term to indicate killing with a sword or a hatchet. This semantic void can of course always be filled by some other means, since we may take it as axiomatic that any language is capable of expressing any conceivable idea, though it may do so more or less economically, e.g. “to stab” as opposed “to kill with a sword”. A semantic void must therefore be interpreted as the absence of a specific lexical item to express an idea, not the theoretical impossibility of expressing the idea as such. But since we are here concerned with word formation, Locke’s observation is clearly relevant. Let us take two other examples. Until not very long ago, English had no single term for “brother or sister”, i.e. a term unmarked for gender (cfr. German *Geschwister*), until the “invention” of the word *sibling*, still largely confined to sociological discourse, which filled this gap. English has a word for “to cut off a person’s head” (*decapitate*), but no specific term for cutting off any other part of the body, for example the hands (*demanuate?*), which might be useful in referring to Islamic Law which provides for cutting off a thief’s hands as a punishment.⁴ It is probably true to say that the principal function of the formation of new words is to fill such semantic gaps, to express more economically what would otherwise have to be expressed by a circumlocution, and this clearly also applies to such very widespread phenomena as nominalization, which occupies a conspicuous place in the derivational process.

To return briefly to negating prefixes, we note that whereas we

4. Quite frankly, I do not know whether Arabic has such a term or not.

have *happy* — *unhappy*, *miserable* — **unmiserable* is not permitted, and the same is true of *clean* — *unclean*, but not *dirty* — **undirty* or *like* — *dislike*, but not *hate* — **dishate*. The words capable of taking a negating prefix may be considered unmarked forms, which are clearly felt to be more “basic” to the lexis than the corresponding marked negated forms. In other words our point of departure, as it were, is *like*, of which *hate* is the polar opposite, which contains a semantic component “negation”, and is therefore incapable of being in its turn negated, so that it would appear that the component “negation” is non-recursive, just as generally speaking prefixes are non-recursive. The forms with prefixes are generally felt to be less powerful than the lexical item representing the polar opposite, so that *dislike*, which in strictly logical terms is a synonym of *hate*, on a pragmatic plane is certainly not the equivalent of the prefixed form, which is perceived to be altogether less powerful and decisive. Not all unmarked terms permit negation by means of a prefix. Orwell’s well-known nonce-word *ungood* for *bad* is clearly meant to be an example of the corruption of the language which he calls “newspeak”. The example of *good* — **ungood*, as opposed to *happy* — *unhappy*, shows the irregularity and unpredictability of this phenomenon, so that whereas it is certainly true to say that only unmarked terms permit negation by means of a prefix, this does not imply that all unmarked terms are subject to this rule.

What are the theoretical implications of all this? Even derivation, which at first sight would seem to be the most regular of the various word formation processes, is by no means entirely predictable and rule-bound. Words derived by a regular derivational process frequently assume idiosyncratic characteristics (we shall see that this is much more frequent in processes like compounding and conversion), and are “lexicalized”, i.e. are no longer explicable by synchronic word formation rules, so that their formation must be accounted for no longer in the grammar, but in the lexis. Not all scholars accept the term lexicalization for this process (for discussion see Bauer [1983], pp. 48-50). Lyons, in his section on compound lexemes (Lyons [1977], pp. 534-550), devotes ample space to the subject and talks of “fossilization” and “petrification”, but it is probably preferable to subsume both these processes under the traditional term lexicalization, also be-

cause in this way we can establish a clear opposition between lexicalization and grammaticalization, the one an opaque, the other at least potentially a transparent process. We shall return to these concepts in the next section. At this stage it seems to me important to distinguish between lexicalization and institutionalization: the former concerns lexical items whose composition can no longer be explained in terms of productive synchronic rules, the latter the full acceptance by the language community of a particular term and its consequent incorporation into the established lexicon of the language. This is however not such a painless process as the above observation would seem to indicate, for new lexical items, or new meanings of established lexical items, often encounter fierce resistance from certain sections of the language community (these persons are generally branded as “purists”), although such opposition is often entirely irrational, for certain innovations are accepted without the slightest demur, i.e. the purists do not seem to be aware that they represent an innovation at all, whereas in other cases they arouse fierce controversy, with letters to the press, often couched in indignant moralistic tones. At a certain point these protests seem to die down, at which stage the item in question can be said to be fully institutionalized. To give just one fairly recent example, going back perhaps five or six years: the extension of the meaning of the adverb *hopefully* to signify “it is to be hoped”, e.g. *hopefully, we shall be back by five o’clock*, where the adverb modifies the whole clause, in addition to its traditional meaning “with hope”, e.g. *it is better to travel hopefully than not to travel at all*, where the adverb modifies only the verb phrase, aroused very considerable controversy in Britain some years ago and generated a good deal of heat, but has now completely died down, so that it is fair to say that today the new sense of *hopefully* has been fully institutionalized. We may therefore say institutionalization is an entirely unpredictable process, subject to social pressures which frequently escape any rational explanation. For example, the general acceptance by speakers of British English of “Americanisms”, i.e. lexical items or syntagma which originate in the United States, is a fascinating chapter in the social history of English (the extension of the meaning of “hopefully” cited above is an example of an “Americanism”), for whereas some terms re-

main obstinately confined to the category of Americanisms in British English (the incidence of "Briticisms" in North America is probably much lower than that of Americanisms in Britain), in other cases no problems seem to arise, a case in point being the very phrase *no problem*, which originated in America and has now spread beyond the English-speaking world, as is testified by the Italian phrase *non c'è problema*, clearly a calque on the American original. In conclusion, we might say that both lexicalization and institutionalization, the latter in a much more extreme form than the former, represent the supremacy of pragmatic factors, in our case accepted usage, over purely grammatical ones. In other words, in the very narrow terms in which I have defined linguistic processes, they fall outside linguistics proper.

5. At first sight the very widespread phenomenon of compounding, i.e. the process whereby two independent lexical items are joined together to form not a simple noun phrase like *a good dinner*, but a new unit, would appear to be the ideal candidate for almost complete semantic transparency: meaning 1 + meaning 2 = meaning 3. Such a theory however breaks down almost immediately on closer examination. In the first place it is not always easy to distinguish clearly between noun phrases with the structure Adj. + N and compounds. Adams [1973], p. 57 for example maintains that phrases like *a good (bad) loser/shot* should be treated as compounds, not as sequences of Adj. + N. The same problem is discussed by Vendler [1968], pp. 88-89 in a somewhat different perspective, when he points out that the adjective *beautiful* in *a beautiful dancer* may have two sources of derivation, i.e. either *the dancer is beautiful* or *she dances beautifully*, so that the phrase cited is basically ambiguous. The adjective *good* and others similar to it seem to have a peculiar status: it could be argued that since *king* is a hyponym of *man*, *a good king* = *a good man*, but this is of course a logical fallacy, since *a good king* may well be *a bad man*, i.e. the scope of the adjective refers to the peculiar attribute of *king* (= *good as a king*), not to its superordinate term. The same is clearly true of *a good (bad) loser/shot*, so that it would appear to be more illuminating to treat Adams's example in terms of the scope of the adjective and the status of the noun it refers to, rather

than distinguishing between a noun phrase and a compound in this case.

But let us return to more central questions concerning compounds, taking a simple example of a compound like *bed-room*. We may ask ourselves to what extent the meaning of the compound is derivable from the sum of its parts, supposing it is legitimate to treat the question in these terms, which is doubtful, since it is difficult to see in what sense the meaning of the two terms can be added together. There is clearly a syntactic relationship between the two items, which we might roughly identify as "locative", so that a *bedroom* can be rewritten as *a room with a bed in it*. We may note in passing that a similar relationship obtains in German, in which *Schlafzimmer* can be derived from *schlafe im Zimmer*, even though the first element in English is a nominal, whereas in German it is a verb. The French and Italian equivalents must however be treated as phrases rather than compounds (*camera da letto*, *chambre à coucher*), in which the prepositions realize a "purposive" rather than a locative relationship. We may note in passing that the semantic structure of the French phrase is parallel to the German compound (*schlafen* — *coucher*), whereas Italian and English use a nominal (*bed* — *letto*), but this is purely by the way. The point seems to me not so much how the compounds are generated, but how they are decoded by the speaker, and this is where we run into considerable problems. The question has been dealt with extensively in the literature: Adams [1973] treats it very largely in taxonomic terms and sets up a large number of categories to account for the variety of types found and the same is true of Warren [1978], who concentrates specifically on compounds having the structure N + N, basing herself on a considerable corpus of actual examples culled from various contemporary sources. Levi [1978] and Bauer [1983] use a transformational approach to explicate the structure of compounds in English. Clearly all we can do in the present context is to mention these studies (which by no means exhaust the bibliography on the subject), rather than discuss them at any length.

But let us return to the problem of decodification. If we assume, as I think we must, that there is some sort of syntactic relationship between the two elements of the compound, just how do we recog-

nize exactly what this relationship is? It is tempting to apply a form of extended case grammar model, as we have done implicitly above in using such labels as "locative" and "purposive", in which the case relationship is in some way embedded in the lexical items in question. Or probably a more accurate way of putting this might be to hypothesize certain semantic components in each particular lexical item concerned, which allow us to attribute the compound to a particular category. Tempting though such a theory may be, it breaks down on further examination, or at best explains only part of the phenomenon, and hence fails to meet the requirements of an explicative theory. If *country* contains a component locative (*a country house = a house in the country*) and *shop* a semantic component "that sells", what of a *country bumpkin*, which certainly does not mean "bumpkin in the country", but one who is characterized by his rural origins (the compound is, of course, very strongly institutionalized). It is probably feasible to interpret *cup* in *a coffee cup* as some kind of instrumental ("an instrument used for drinking") and *cream* in *coffee ice-cream* as comprising a component "containing", but why is a *paper doll* one made of paper, rather than, shall we say, one stuffed with paper, or something similar? Taking even such very elementary examples, it is obvious that the interpretative problem can hardly be solved in the way we have adumbrated. More complex examples will show that in a very large number of cases we must suppose a considerable degree of lexicalization, and hence opaqueness, in compound forms.

At this stage it is perhaps worth while looking more closely at a few examples of more complex types of compounds. Compounds like *sun-glasses* or *mosquito net* clearly comprise a semantic feature which we might define as "protection against" or perhaps simply "against". But this semantic feature is in no way recoverable from the particular items that form the compound. For example, *sun* enters into the compound *sunbathe*, in which we have a kind of locative (*bathe in the sun*), whereas for the second element, i.e. for the head of the compound, *glasses*, we have forms like *reading glasses* (not to mention *whisky glasses* in the other sense of the noun), so that the semantic feature "against" can in no sense be said to be inherent in the individual items that make up the compound, but are pragmatic features, in the sense that they form part

of our knowledge of the world. In other cases the compound has a purely figurative meaning, or at least, one of the components is used figuratively. To the first category belong compounds like *bottleneck*, which in common usage has nothing to do either with *bottles* or *necks*; in the second category I would include examples like *eyeball*, in which I take *ball* to be a metaphor, or *bookworm*, which has something to do with *books*, but nothing, in the literal sense, with *worms*, and in order to know what is meant by the term *banana republic*, we must have some knowledge of the socioeconomic structure of certain, particularly Latin American, states. In other cases the compound is so opaque, in strictly synchronic terms, as to defy decodification on the basis of its constituent elements: for example, what has a *station wagon* to do with either of its constituent elements? We hardly use *wagon* for a motor vehicle today, although this meaning might be guessed at, and as for *station* this is no doubt to be connected with the American usage of *station* (the compound itself is originally American) in the sense of "an agricultural unit", e.g. *a cattle station*. The same concept is reflected in the more particularly British term denoting the same object: *estate car*, i.e. a car used on an estate, in the sense of "an agricultural holding", whereas the synonymous term *shooting brake* (with a rather curious second element, which I will not comment upon here) indicates the sporting origin of this type of vehicle. But none of these elements are pertinent to a correct decodification of *station wagon*, since they once again involve our knowledge of the world, and indeed of a rather restricted or particular "world", so that in fact we "learn" the term as a unit, rather than as an aggregate of individual meaningful items.

In other cases we need to recover some item that is not present in the compound in order to arrive at a correct interpretation, even though perhaps this type of opaqueness is less common than the *station wagon* type. Let us take a few examples. In *telephone directory* we have to recover some form of *number*, or perhaps *subscriber*, for a *telephone directory* is not a "directory of telephones", but of "telephone numbers (or subscribers)". Similar considerations apply to other terms indicating lists, e.g. the *Law List* is a "list of people working in the Law, i.e. of lawyers" and in *pass list* we have to recover both "candidates" and "examin-

ation", since a *pass list* is "a list of candidates who have passed an examination". The compound *airport* is more opaque than it looks: it is not "a port for or in the air" but "a port for aircraft", so that the latter half of the compound *aircraft* has to be recovered, and once again, it is only through our knowledge of the world that we are able to make sense of these compounds. What is true of N + N compounds, which we have been principally concerned with so far, is of course equally true of other types of compounds, shall we say V + N (e.g. *breakwater*) or the very common Ving + N compounds, such as *walking stick*, as well as others. Let us take one final, rather curious example. *Take-away*, as in a *Chinese take-away*, an increasingly common feature in most British urban centres, represents V + Adv. → N. Here too we have to recover some hidden element, but what we take away is food, whereas the noun as commonly used indicates a place where food is sold, i.e. a form of restaurant, so that we really have to recover both senses before we can adequately decodify the new formation, so that the term is to a very large extent opaque, and yet a *take-away* is certainly a very recent formation.⁵ There seems little point at this stage of the argument in giving examples similar to the ones cited above for the typology N + N. The above considerations lead one to conclude that very many, perhaps the majority of compounds in English are strongly lexicalized and that the speaker stores them in his memory as separate lexical items, rather than encoding or decodifying them every time he uses them, whereas for the foreign learner of the language they represent items to be learned, rather than the result of regular grammatical rules which he can apply to them. They are, shall we say, in their input part of the grammar, but in their output part of the lexis of the language.

Does this not put an intolerable strain on the speaker's memory? Genuine grammatical rules are, as it were, memory saving: we don't

5. A personal anecdote well illustrates this opacity. In a recent conversation with an American, I had occasion to mention the word in question, perhaps slightly out of context. The lady I was talking to looked completely blank for a moment until I explained what the term stood for in Britain, in other words she completely failed to decodify a new compound she had never come across. The corresponding term in America is *carry-off*, which is however not used as a noun to designate the place where food is sold, as is the case with *take-away* in British English.

have to learn every regular past tense formation separately, but only those of the irregular verbs, and even here there are certain generative rules that apply. But if the majority of compounds are separate lexical items, they must form part of our general word stock, not part of our knowledge of the rules (in the Chomskian sense) of how sentences are generated. This is of course eminently a psycholinguistic question. Aitchison ([1987a], pp. 5-7) discusses various estimates that have been made as to how many "words" the average speaker can store in his memory. These vary widely between 50,000 and 250,000, but the source the author finds most convincing gives a figure of 150,000. Significantly this estimate takes into consideration not only simplex items, but all items listed in a dictionary, hence also derivations and compounds. In a subsequent chapter the author discusses the problem of word formation in psycholinguistic terms, but though it is undoubtedly true that such processes as compounding must greatly facilitate the capacity for word recall, which Aitchison is largely concerned with in her book, this clearly does not mean that compounding is necessarily self-explanatory, as I hope to have demonstrated above. We come back to the inescapable fact that the new creation of words is almost invariably more than the sum of its parts.

6. It seems somewhat odd that the very common and extremely productive phenomenon known as conversion (some scholars, like Adams, prefer to talk of "zero derivation", thus treating what is traditionally known as derivation and conversion as one complex process) has attracted comparatively little attention in the literature. The greatly reduced morphological structure of English clearly favours a process whereby a word form can change its grammatical function without altering its morphological shape. In a language like Italian this phenomenon has a distinctly marginal importance, whereas in English we find examples of conversion ever since Elizabethan times, although it is probably true to say that it is only in more recent times that conversion has assumed the importance it has in present-day word formation. In this case too, as with compounding, what would appear at first sight to be a straightforward and basically transparent process presents considerable problems at an interpretative level. Conversion is an area in which the

creative ability of speakers, and particularly of writers, is extremely active, although clearly not all the hundreds of new coinages that seem to sprout up every year are destined to become part of the permanent word stock of the language. A certain type of journalistic prose seems to favour new conversions, though clearly a great deal of further study would be required in order to understand exactly in what registers and contexts conversion is most productive.

Although practically all parts of speech are subject to conversion, we will concentrate for the present on $N \rightarrow V$, which is perhaps the most productive. But what exactly does it mean in semantic terms, to say that a word changes its grammatical function? Let us take a simple and somewhat obvious example. Clearly the noun *water* and the verb *to water* belong to the same semantic field, and although the meaning of the verb is by no means entirely predictable from the noun from which it derives, it is probably fairly obvious and less subject to restrictions than many other conversions: we can isolate at least two distinct meanings, as in *to water the garden* (= "sprinkle with water") and *to water the horses* (= "give them water to drink"), but although rain consists of water, we can hardly talk of **the rain watering the ground*. In most cases very much more severe restrictions apply, so that frequently the resulting verb has only a remote resemblance to the noun. Let us take a few examples from what might roughly be described as a semantic field "the house and the furniture associated with it". By no means all parts of the house have institutionalized conversions: we do not find **to door* or **to window*, though from a purely theoretical point of view there is absolutely no reason why such words should not exist and they may well enter the language at some later stage. We do find *to floor*, but this does not mean "to lay down a floor", as might be expected, but is in fact a metaphor derived from boxing "to reduce to the floor" and hence more generally used to mean "to reduce to impotence" or related meanings. The verb *to house* is a rather special case, for it looks like a conversion, but is in fact a derivation of a special kind, since instead of having a derivational affix, the derivational marker is purely phonological /s/ → /z/. Both *to table* and *to chair* have very severe restrictions attached to them, since they both derive

from the language of public meetings: you can *table a motion*, but hardly anything else, and *to chair* derives from the metaphorical or secondary meaning of the noun "presidency". In recent usage *chair* (noun), in order to avoid the sexist overtones of *chairman*, has come to be used of the person presiding at a meeting, not simply the place he/she occupies. You can therefore *chair a meeting*, but hardly anything else. These two examples show not only how strongly lexicalized the converted verbs are, but we might say how they become fossilized to the extent that it would be fair to say that there is a lexical unit *to chair a meeting/assembly/committee*, etc., rather than a verb *to chair*. This type of highly restricted meaning is extremely common, and it is often the metaphorical meaning of the noun that gives us the meaning of the verb, although this represents a tendency rather than rule. Let us take a few more examples. *To paper* does not mean generically "cover with paper" (and still less "to wrap in paper"), but cover with a special type of paper namely *wall paper*, so that you can *paper a room*, but not, for example, a book. The verb *to book* has, in its common meaning, very little to do with the ordinary meaning of the noun, and is in fact entirely unpredictable and opaque, since it derives from no recognizable meaning of the corresponding noun. A similar case, but with an even more restricted meaning of the verb, is that of *to beggar*, which has nothing to do with a mendicant, and is indeed more similar to the case of *to chair* in that it forms a single lexical unit with its object: *to beggar description*. In other cases conversion is associated with the formation of phrasal verbs: OEDS gives *to bunch* as "to crowd together" (but not to make bunches of flowers, as one might naively expect) and more recently (first quotation given 1959) *to bunch up* with the same meaning: it is common to talk of *cars bunching up on a motorway*, and talking of cars, two conversions not yet recorded in the OEDS are *to inch* or *to nose one's way out of a narrow lane or parking site*, both used in conjunction with the particles *out of*, thus forming what Quirk calls "phrasal-prepositional verbs". This is only to cite a few of the hundreds of examples that a detailed study of the phenomenon would reveal, since, as we have observed above, this is an area in which new coinages are particularly frequent.

If conversion $N \rightarrow V$ represents perhaps the most common type, it is probably fair to say that the majority, if not all parts of speech are subject to the process. $V \rightarrow N$ is found in well established examples like *a walk* or *a ride*, whereas more recent formations are often associated with the verb *have*, which functions in these cases as a general verbal operator, e.g. *to have a go*, *to have a try*, *to have a shave*, etc. One fairly recent type of conversion has a phrasal or prepositional verb as a base, though the noun frequently has only a very tenuous relation with the meaning of the base, e.g. *this discovery represents a breakthrough in cancer research* can hardly be derived from the verb *to break through*, since a sentence like **the scientist broke through...* is entirely devoid of sense in English. Similarly *sit-in* could conceivably be derived from a sentence like *the students sat in the campus courtyard*, which however conveys an entirely different meaning, whereas it is difficult to see just what the verbal base of *teach-in* might be, since this noun is clearly formed by analogy with *sit-in*. Both transitive and intransitive phrasal/prepositional verbs are subject to conversion. To the former category belong examples like *make-up* \leftarrow *she made up (her face)* or *mark up* \leftarrow *they marked up (the prices)*. To the latter category belong nouns like *take-off* \leftarrow *the plane took off*. Once again we note the extreme opaqueness of some of the new coinages.

7. In conclusion I should like to make a few observations on phrasal/prepositional verbs. Unlike conversion, these are amply treated in the literature, e.g. in Palmer [1965] and very fully in Bolinger [1971]. Makkai ([1972], pp. 135-148) treats phrasal verbs as a kind of idiom, a view which implies not only a very high degree of lexicalization, but extreme inflexibility, in that they represent the most petrified items in the vocabulary, since idioms are in most cases unadaptable and must be treated as self-contained and entirely autonomous pieces of language and hence the most opaque part of the lexis. Dixon [1982] in a stimulating, but unfortunately not easily accessible article, fuses the two categories of phrasal and prepositional verbs, which most other scholars treat separately, affirming that the difference between the two is purely semantic (he talks of a semantic cline) rather than syntactic, which is the usual interpretation of the difference. This is clearly not the place

to expound Dixon's arguments and conclusions in any detail, but one or two observations may be of interest. He points out that phrasal verbs are generally of Germanic origin and frequently substitute Romance verbs, which generally belong to a more learned register than the equivalent phrasal verb, *to discover* vs. *to find out*, to take a very elementary example. This much is of course common knowledge. The author then establishes three categories: perfect correspondence between the phrasal verb and its single verb equivalent, e.g. *to go in/to enter*, approximate equivalence, e.g. *let out/disclose*, and cases in which it is not easy to find a single verb equivalent, e.g. *to hold against*, as in *he held it against me that...* (Dixon's examples). The author talks of two underlying structures, prep. + NP and NP + prep., which seems to contradict his contention that the difference between what are traditionally known as phrasal vs. prepositional verbs is basically semantic and not syntactic. He then sets up six types of phrasal verbs, according to the ordering of the elements N (really NP) and prep. These are

1. p: *set in, pass out*
2. p + N: *take after (X), come by (X)*
3. N + p: *put (X) off, take (X) on*
4. N + p + N: *hold (X) against (Y), take (X) for (Y)*
5. p + p + N: *take up with (X), go in for (X)*
6. N + p + p + N: *put (X) down to (Y), let (X) in for (Y)*.

What is significant from the point of view adopted in this paper is the extreme heterogeneousness of the formations in question, not to mention their absolute unpredictability. For example we might ask ourselves why *he takes after his father* should mean that he resembles him, or why *put off* should mean "delay". Yet it is a well known fact that such formations are on the increase and that in many cases we have a simple as well as a phrasal form of the same verb, e.g. *to check* vs. *to check up on*, cases in which it is sometimes far from easy to distinguish between the two forms from a semantic point of view. I would therefore be inclined to say these verbal forms are lexicalized practically at the same moment in which they are coined, and far from being an aid to memory, impose an additional burden on our capacity to recall a particular lexical item. But, as we have seen, this is equally true of other as-

spects of word formation.

Conclusions. As we have seen, most aspects of lexical innovation fall outside the very narrow confines of what I have defined as strictly "linguistic" analysis. This is clearly an unsatisfactory and entirely unacceptable conclusion, since if linguistics is not about "words" it is difficult to see exactly what it *is* about. We must therefore surely enlarge our definition of linguistics and its methodology to include not only strictly systemic and abstract relationships, which characterize such areas as phonology and syntax, but also the ever expanding (and to some extent at the same time contracting) word stock, which constitutes the primary material for the study of language and without which even the most refined and theoretically satisfactory of grammars is devoid of significance. Indeed it has been plausibly claimed (e.g. by De Mauro [1974]) that indeterminacy is the basic feature that distinguishes natural languages from artificial languages and other closed semiotic systems, whereas natural languages are essentially open-ended. Indeed the fact that human languages have a diachronic dimension and are subject to evolution (though I do not want to imply by this that languages "improve" or in any way necessarily become more efficient) is surely the best demonstration that this is so. Languages have a history, i.e. they are congenitally subject to change: we have already referred to phonological change, which constituted the *pièce de résistance* of 19th century linguistics, and recently there has been an upsurge of interest in syntactic change, and change implies an inherent instability in the system. But it is of course single lexical items, words, that are most instable, meanings as well as forms change in the course of time, so that words can never be defined once and for all, and it might be argued that there are as many meanings as there are uses of a word, though for the practical purposes of day-to-day communication we content ourselves with rough-and-ready definitions. It is these definitions that the untutored layman desperately goes in search of when he reaches for his desk dictionary ("the dictionary", whose authority is almost always unquestioned) to make sure just what a particular word means. Nevertheless, his basic intuition that the study of language is primarily about words, surely represents a

fundamental insight which the professional linguist, with his legitimate desire to construct systems and establish rules, cannot fail to take into account. Just as bricks do not make a house, but there are no houses without bricks, linguistics without the study of the multifarious and at times chaotic reality represented by words becomes a science devoid of significance unanchored to the world in which we live and of which language is the symbolic representation.

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Cesare Gagliardi

Per un'analisi fonostilistica del testo inglese

Tra i ricercatori che si occupano di fonostilistica inglese, intesa come tecnica di intervento sul *text* per l'analisi del modo in cui il livello fonetico intonativo si struttura in funzione di un certo *context of situation* e di un preciso *attitude* del parlante, si distinguono G. Brown, D. Brazil e J.D. O'Connor¹. Tutti tre, con motivazioni e metodologie diverse, isolano dei parametri di riferimento la cui presenza, valutata sia sul piano qualitativo che su quello quantitativo, consente di classificare lo stile fonico di un testo. Com'è noto, G. Brown si è dedicata soprattutto allo studio fonostilistico della conversazione (*conversational analysis*) individuando le due varietà linguistiche denominate *slow colloquial speech*, ossia la lingua ritmicamente rallentata per uso didattico, e *normal informal speech*, la lingua della normale conversazione. D. Brazil ha invece codificato la relazione che lega la tipologia intonativa e l'interazione tra parlante/scrittore e ascoltatore/lettore sulla base della dicotomia *new information* e *common ground*. J.D. O'Connor infine è l'ideatore, anche con la collaborazione di G.F. Arnold², dell'*attitude ap-*

1. Le opere di questi autori che più specificatamente trattano le problematiche inerenti l'analisi fonostilistica sono G. Brown, *Listening to Spoken English*, Longman, London 1977; D. Brazil, M. Coulthard, C. Johns, *Discourse Intonation and Language Teaching*, Longman, London 1980; J.D. O'Connor, *Better English Pronunciation*, C.U.P., Cambridge 1967.

2. Cfr. J.D. O'Connor, G.F. Arnold, *Intonation of Colloquial English*, Longman, London 1961. Ad integrazione dei contenuti di questo volume, ormai ritenuto il testo base dell'*attitude-approach*, si vedano anche J.D. O'Connor, "The Fall-Rise Tone in

Il comitato editoriale di *Textus* pensa di interpretare i sentimenti di tutta l'Associazione Italiana di Anglistica ricordando la figura dell'amico e collega Thomas Frank, prematuramente scomparso mentre questo articolo era in corso di stampa.