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**Politics for the Masses: the
Discursive Construction of Populism in UKIP**

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Introduction

To associate populism with the new radical right political movements is an accepted habit in Europe. However, a new concern is related to the fact that this late anti-globalisation form of populism is no longer confined to a sort of small voting district of the far right groups. As a matter of fact, the populist's dissatisfaction with mainstream politics and the perception of a disordered internationalisation – e.g. uncontrolled mass migration, absence of delimited national borders - is reaching to large segments of the middle class electorate. That being said, it would be the best option to relate the trend of neo-populism with an open, non-specific appeal to protest citizens, to the so-called *Modernisierungsverlierer*¹, or people who have lost out in the modernisation process.

The purpose of this research is to offer a contribution to the study of the growth of anti-establishment political groups in the UK, specifically, the United Kingdom Independence Party (henceforth UKIP), a typically perceived right-wing political movement whose main belief is the separation of the UK from the European Union. Founded in 1991 by Alan Sked as an anti-EU single-issue party and as an organisation for disgruntled Conservatives, the party has become controversial lately due to an increase in popularity against mainstream politics, and a large amount of media attention given to its leader Nigel Farage.

The present dissertation is divided into six chapters for my reader's perusal, each of them dedicated to a specific aspect concerning national populism and the discursive construction of

¹ https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-531-92496-0_5

UKIP's communication, mainly set up under the aegis of its longest leader Farage. The first chapter presents a theoretical approach, socio-political in the first instance and linguistic afterwards, through a critical literature review in order to settle a methodological framework. The second section consists of a report concerning Brexit, Euroscepticism and societal changes associated to the phenomenon, with a literature review orientated in this connection.

The third chapter will discuss the theoretical framework and methodology, anchored on a completely qualitative interpretation and presenting how the case study was conducted, as well as the rationale behind it. The methodology section is focused on a Critical Discourse Analysis approach and its interdisciplinarity. Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA), especially designed to investigate the construction of political conflict in times of crisis, (Wodak et al. 1999, 2009; Van Dijk, 2001; Cap 2013 and the proximization theory) has been adopted to deconstruct UKIP lexical representation of the rival players on the battlefield, the British people against the European Union. Moreover, discourse in this context combines varied patterns including approaches from sociology, political sciences, linguistic and classic rhetoric for a kind of analysis approaching texts as part of a social interaction process (Fairclough 1989: 24). CDA focuses on language as a social practice in the framework of social, cultural and political perspectives, thus emphasizing the great importance of the connection between textual structure in a social context and society.

A fourth brief section deals with the genres that were selected for analysis, the way the whole corpus is organised, its composition and the time span under investigation according to the explanatory tables reported. The fifth section explores the texts and debates the findings in order to answer the research questions and verify the hypotheses. Therefore, the elements of the analysis under scrutiny consist of constructive strategies (the linguistic processes which authorise a national 'we-group' – in this case, Britons - and alienate the 'other' groups or sub-groups); continuation and justification strategies (economic migrants are viewed as a danger to the national security); forms of positive self-presentation coming

upon through manifestos, public speeches and the British press (mainly tabloids), and multiple forms of negative other-presentation (e.g: the EU, Muslim migrants).

The sixth and last chapter shows to what extent Farage and UKIP discourse could be defined as a discourse of uncertainty, ever-growing anxiety and well-judged 'mild racism', featuring a heavy Self–Other distinction and organised techniques of Othering. The construction relies on discursively created threat and fear generation devices, investigated thanks to the graft of the proximization theory approach and in order to detect how and when nat-populist language performs a coercive function.

Chapter 1

Populism: in search of a definition

1.1 Commonly-known Features about the Term “Populism”

As explained in the introduction of this work, the earlier marginal right-wing populist UKIP has turned out to be the fastest growing political party in the country (Arak, 2013: 45). Therefore, the political group is not an overnight success anymore: people are disappointed by the conventional party policies, their incapacity to put a limit on immigration and to protect the disappearance of British identity. This support comes from the popular sectors of that part of the society made of those left behind, whose life is marked by labour and strive to make ends meet, those who are exploited by the establishment, the unexamined elites and even by organizations such as the parties and the “official” trade unions (Pasquino, 2005: 8). Thus, we have the stereotypical contraposition between the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, which “argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 544).

From a historical point of view, the fight for the political narrative has for long concentrated competition in the hands of the two main parties. Nevertheless, in this new multipolar socio-political perspective, the term “populist” still suffers a negative connotation. This reveals to be quite surprising considering the fact the term originates from the Latin word “populus”, a simple reference to people. A rhetorical populist speech is anyway

commonly retained to address the emotional rather than the rational side of our minds, with the second considering fact-checking and the search for a compromise.

1.2 Euroscepticism

From the point of view of a populist/eurosceptic politician, Europe is seen as a bureaucratic system that encourages economic mismanagement with no prospect of long-term viability. That means the sooner the wealthy nations get out of the EU, the sooner the whole system crumbles, and the better that will be for everyone. According to the results obtained in the Brexit referendum, British people have held to be true that getting out of the EU could be the first step on the path to national renewal.

Significant would be a distinction between two types of Euroscepticism, what Szczerbiak & Taggart (2000: 7) term ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, in order to find a definition that works in twenty-eight national contexts. In the light of the above, Soft Euroscepticism can only be said to exist in a significant way where a party employs the rhetoric of disagreement over the European issue as part of a broader political repertoire, but this is not the type of scepticism of interest for this case study. On the other hand, if we want to delineate the concept of “hard” Euroscepticism, it can be found where there is a moralistic opposition to the EU and European integration, and therefore it can be observed in political movements according to which their countries should retire their membership, or whose policies towards the EU are equivalent to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Ultan & Ornek 2015: 50).

There are two simplified methods of determining whether a party is ‘hard Eurosceptic’. The first way is to check if a party could be defined as a single anti-EU issue. We presume that a party would entirely be ready for action against the EU if it were hostile to it on principle. The second way is to ask whether the opposition to the EU is framed in language

that underlines the supranational is too capitalist/socialist/neoliberal/bureaucratic; whether it depends on ideological stance (communist/conservative/socialist/populist); and whether it demands an indispensable renovation in order to call into question their country as an EU member, defined as unsuitable with the existing course of the European project.

1.2.1 Euroscepticism Against the Integration Process

The voters for Brexit were motivated by a series of reasons, among them concerns that echo across the European mainland: imaginative desires about the national past; unease with multiculturalism and changing social norms regarding gender equality and the LGBT dispute; and vague beliefs that a return to ‘nation’ will produce better outcomes than economic integration (not all populist movements anyway). Not to mention, within that, the regional discrepancies in people’s employment and wages, as they then feel united with bitterness against the ‘metropolitan elite’. These individuals are discontent with the mainstream party policies, their failure to block immigration and preserve from the disintegration of national unity and British identity. In other words, it seems to be a question of *blood* and *soil*.

Among the features of a Eurosceptic Party it is considerable to put into the foreground some of them which will have important consequences for the European Union itself.

The first element is the dispute between False vs. True Europeanism ². From this point of view, the idea that a centralized authority, in our case the Political Union, is necessary for free trade and is seen by mainstream parties as mere reverie, and false Europeanism, for the reason that the European Union cannot stand, in the name of Europe, independent States not inclined to submit to Brussels. The second issue under scrutiny in this paragraph is ‘decentralization’. According to this definition, it has always been Britain that came to the aid of Europe to

²<https://mises.org/library/european-union-anti-european>

interrupt up the power of empires on the continent in recent history. The question for Eurosceptic supporters was whether the UK would have played its historical role on June the 23rd against the imperialistic European Union. The answer is yes, but only on paper for the moment. The third and last element worth mentioning is re-thinking the UK following a Post-European scenario. What comes out in those first Brexit phases is that stricter entry rules will likely be applied to incomers. That means Britain is intent in building up barriers to lower-skilled migrants while simplifying prerequisite for high-skilled arrivals from outside the EU. Indeed, this will provoke consequences hitting Eastern European migrants in particular, while encouraging North Americans citizens to work in Britain.

1.3 Ethnic Pluralism

«As far as the English are concerned, all of life's greatest problems can be summed up in one word – foreigners». This sarcastic quotation from Antony Miall's "*The xenophobe's guide to the English*" (1999) could be the starting point for a key to the interpretation of cross-cultural feature of ethnicist and nationalist patterns of perception of others. Usually, 'mudslingers' define a Eurosceptic programme as a combination of anti-political establishment populism, with a quest to return to the status quo ante (including the importance to preserve the priority of national identity), and welfare chauvinist racism and xenophobia. In other words, these forms of political protest concern *ethnos*, rather than *demos* (Albertazzi & McDonnel, 2008: 16). So, *Nouvelle Droite* is to replace the old, biologically based concept of racism with the one of 'ethno-pluralism' that contributes to the foundation of the so-called 'new racism' (Barker, 1981) or 'cultural racism' (Wieviorka, 1995: 32).

Ethnopluralism is a new right European opinion on multiculturalism: the progressive notion of difference is the point of departure on which the *philosophy* of multiculturalism, based on the assumption that migrants should preserve their right to practise religions and

traditions of their home countries, should be replaced in favour of a more reasonable ‘ethnopluralism’ attitude in order “to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated” (Rydgren, 2005: 427). Hence the notion is in contrast with left multiculturalism: it refers to the necessity to safeguard the right to cultural differences, highlighting the fact that the mixing of diverse ethnicities leads to cultural extinction. Extreme-right populist parties are frequently able to convey xenophobic and racist public opinions without being branded as racists. However opposed to the traditional idea of racism, the dogma of ethnopluralism is not hierarchical, since different ethnicities are not necessarily considered as superior or inferior to each other, only distinct and incompatible. The concept of ethnopluralism declares that in order to protect the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated.

Certainly, the debate is that the electorate is xenophobe, not the politicians, or the political and media communication they create. Established parties notice their voters being fascinated by radicals and populist far-right, which profitably encourage the concerns and uncertainty of honest working-class for political advantage. Philomena Essed has currently investigated this notion of “entitlement racism”³, consisting in actions adopted by politicians and media that are distinctly abusive and/or discrediting of minorities, but are exactly legitimized by right to “freedom of speech” and the necessity of public discussion. Following Rydgren (2003), these parties exploit four specific arguments: 1) immigrants represent a threat to the ethno-national identity, 2) immigrants constitute one of the causes for criminality or other kinds of social insecurity; 3) immigrants are a reason of unemployment; and 4) immigrants are nothing but profiteers who take advantage of a compassionate Welfare in Western democracies. This new form of racism described by Taguieff, for example, as “differentialist racism” (1990) (see the aforementioned cultural racism introduced by Wieviorka), underlines the irreconcilable

³ *Entitlement Racism: A Public lecture with Professor Philomena Essed & Professor Martin Parker*, on the CBS PP Platform's cluster on Diversity and Differences, 19/04/2016.

differences between ethnic groups culturally defined, which are in turn delineated in cultural terms without reference to explicitly racial criteria. Rydgren's hypothesis is that the discourse on insecurity and national identity is functional for the ethnicization and racialization of social conflict. However, it would appear the language of UKIP is a language of both power and diversity, of hybridization between nationalist and populist ideas, a strong "pessimistic and reactionary force" (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015: 221).

1.4 Populism: a Contemporary Overview

It is by now confirmed that in a fair number of political cultures and languages the definition of "populism" brings with itself negative rather than positive implications (Canovan, 2005; Andersson, 2009), despite the fact the history of the word, descending from the Latin noun "*populus*" that is the people, communicates an independent and/or legitimized connotation. In 1969, Wiles maintained the term was more proper to be defined as a syndrome and not a simple doctrine, in other words a response to different political groups and beliefs rather than an ideological baseline per se. Furthermore, the difficult task of determining what populism is has in part something to do with the fact this word has been employed for the definition of political leaders, groups, ideologies, movements throughout a multitude of ideological and historical backgrounds. As Arter expressed in 2010 (490), it is possible to notice a "general agreement in the comparative literature that populism is confrontational, chameleonic, culture-bound and context-dependent". For what concerns Europe, since the 1980s there has been the existence of a growing, restrictive alternative populism taking aim at immigration and national border controls (Mudde, 2007).

However, the academic knowledge on populism is noticeably scarce and many scholars have surrendered on the possibility of employing the word in any significant manner. For example, in the European circumstances the term has been applied to portray anti-immigration

and anti-EU parties like the French National Front (FN), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) or, indeed, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Part of the terminological disorientation stems from the fact that people and organisations marked as “populists” hardly recognize themselves as such. The term is alternatively attributed by others, most often as a precisely negative label. Moreover, the definition of populism is adopted with negative connotations in the European media to indicate such different events as a grassroots organisation, a careless economic plan, or a deceitful form of politics. Thus, populism adheres to the ranks of other ‘burdened’ terms in the social sciences that miss a generally approved interpretation. When talking about migration or refugees, for example, European populists reply with a common sense apology of the native people opposite to a demeaned out-group, that is to say immigrants. Crime and terrorism would be supplementary cases of how the populist politics of emotions opposes the establishment politics of facts.

For a long period of time, right-wing fanaticism and populism were marginal phenomena of not more than 10% of the voters, but they have now moved from symptoms to alternatives and what is more, even in cases where it has been far isolated from actual power, have succeeded in influencing the political agenda resolutely, as the UKIP revealed during the Brexit vote.

An increasing number of right-wing parties now jointly use the same design and contribute to a critique of the corrupt elite and praise of the ordinary people that constitute the nation. For instance, populist organisations throughout Europe have economised to an “Us first!” aura of nationalism clearly evident in their mottos, such is the case of Nigel Farage’s “we want our country back”. It should not be considered as a revelation that a flexible ideology like populism is absorbed by a variety of political groups wanting to use a disruptive rhetoric. Their diffusion, however, has been made caused by a stagnant economy and incessant migration emergency, but also by the capacity of populists to cultivate captivating strategies adequate to achieving large support. Consequently, we should maintain populism is the direct

result of globalisation and its undesired repercussions: outsourcing of contract work, ruthless automation, unemployment and stagnant middle-class wages.

It is important to stress, anyway, the fact that it is too common misconception to portray populist voters as simple losers of the modernisation process with an erroneous feeling of blame ascription. In fact, reasons alluding to austerity and salary distribution may explain animosity and discontent, but they need to be counterbalanced with the key function of ideology and an investigation of the desire of populist leaders to achieve power and modify social reality. This perspective implies that populist parties are not simple aftermaths of socioeconomic transformations, but they actively create their future.

A real interesting note to point out when discussing populism is its message, which in part resonates for it is based on the democratic assurance of honouring the will of the people. That is why the anti-establishment message generates positive sentiments. Furthermore, a growing number of voters is disappointed with the system of capitalism and liberal democracy and has validated concerns such as social injustice, stagnation, uncontrolled migration, political distrust. This scenario paves the way to populists who take the chance to present themselves as the spokespersons for those left behind by the post-modern economy, and call for a direct legitimisation from their connection with the 'sovereign' people. Populism also furnishes a moral storytelling in which the pure and the corrupt fight against each other. This moralistic idea of politics is extremely negative towards elites, who are defined morally inferior, and generous in relation to respectable common citizens. Besides this anti-elitist attitude, their nativist conservatism implies a renationalisation of politics which disputes the project of a European political union. By adopting nationalist claims as leverage, populists have acquired support in different European nations, also because of an intrinsic crisis being externally fed, that is to say by the menace of Salafi jihadism and a non-stop flood of migrants and refugees.

1.5 The Elite vs. The People

According to the recent political results in the Western World, it seems that modern establishment is affected by a “political malaise”. Moreover, people’s profound dissatisfaction with ruling elites represents a fruitful ground for populism coming to light. Populism parties try to install democracy in people, and in a manner they are challenging contemporary representative democracy in western societies. Some scholars relate the emergence of populism with the signal that some democratic regimes are not working correctly. This is a sign of alert about deficiencies, limits and vulnerability of a representative system. Meny and Surel (Meny & Surel, 2002, Ch.2), among the political factors which have an impact on this phenomenon, mention: the crisis of the structures for what concerns a political intermediation; the “customisation” of political power and increasing role of media in political life. Among the elements that contributed to this “State” of crisis, we can mention the weakening in party membership as first consequence, lack of interest and suspicion in politics and politicians, raising number of uncommitted and let down voters ready to radical alternatives (for example, extreme right-parties), have to be considered as symptoms of this “democratic disease”. On the contrary, some kind of media in this situation are no help, for the way in which they present facts and opinions generates even more anti-political atmosphere and encourages to popularization of populism parties (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 1). Those parties assume that a traditional intermediary institution should be removed and replaced by a direct connection between government and electorate (Decker, 2003: 50). Not surprisingly, the doubt has been instilled that populism arises in crisis of intermediate institutions, when ordinary citizens are compelled to adapt to a severe new situation where unemployment, weakness, uncertainty are everyday reality, and where identity crisis and social exclusion are spreading (Gilly, 2005: 38). Probably, some countries were or still are giving rise to the feelings of insecurity, fear and desolation among Europeans. This situation has been exploited

by populist parties which pledge popular desires of security and predictability (Betz, 2008).

Populism may emerge because of an out-of-balance state between two factors: liberal constitutionalism and democratic majoritarianism, between an idea that law should be inferred as a supreme authority and a concept of will of majority as primary cause of legitimization. Albertazzi and McDonnell observe that populists perceive themselves as ‘true democrats’ who give voice to true popular opinions, to complaints regularly neglected by authorities and they struggle to reclaim people sovereignty from elites in power (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 4). In addition, they realise the vision of new rights along with guarantees and liberties which will be introduced once gained enough power in the Parliament to legislate (Mudde, 2007: 279). For this purpose, populists are aiming at special target voters and, as a consequence, need to adopt a specific language, simple and direct. This way, they highlight the discrepancy between them and bureaucratic politicians jargon, which can hardly be understood by ordinary people.

Their typical voters are usually identified as people feeling social and political alienation, who do not belong to anything related to culture, religion or professional organizations, people who have difficulty in finding their proper place in capitalistic, post-industrial reality, the so-called “losers of globalization” (Pasquino, 2005). As Margaret Canovan maintains, it is possible to notice in populist discourse three enticements to the “people”: the first concerns *united people*, that is a country or nation in opposition to portions and parties intent to division; “our” *people* counter posed to the “others” who do not take part in our group (e.g. immigrants) and *ordinary people*, who are lined up against an extremely competent, cosmopolitan elite. There are two groups that have been distinguished as populists’ enemies: the “top” elites, and “bottom” immigrants, or other groups believed to instill fear into the unity of a community.

However, these hybrid parties/movements do not want to abolish democratic system as one would think. They want, in fact, to reinstate and improve it in a way that will re-establish the main principle of its existence – direct sovereignty. 21st century populism has been challenging established structures of power, elites and their out of touch values. Their activists accentuate the role of people in a political decision-making process. According to this point of view, those in charge deceived people trust by nurturing their own interests and objectives, ignoring the original intention for what they were elected and who they are supposed to represent. These days, people seem not to be interested in politics. Therefore, they are willing to find a charismatic head who “knows” them and give voice to those who cannot speak. A populist leader is perceived as a man of destiny, anti-political, who can supply simple, clear solutions to problems experienced by ordinary citizens (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 5, 25). This leader is connected to the figure of a “charismatic strongman”, ruling on the basis of “a cult of a leader” and is usually portrayed as masculine and potentially violent (Mudde & Rovira Kaltmwasser 2017: 63).

There is an emphasis, therefore, on the audacity to take difficult decisions which depends on anti-intellectualism, and it is often accomplished by stressing a stereotyped leader’s virility, the use of simple and straightforward language, and leader’s charisma (ibid: 64-68). Moreover, basic law on individual and civil rights, confidence in conspiracy theories, sharing some themes recalling communism and fascism, and above all else foreign policy grounded on isolationism can be seen identified as a threat for democracy maintenance (Held, 1996: 63-65). Usually, it is a further sign that association between citizens and government is not operating in the proper way and as a result, sufficient space is created to populist entrepreneurs (Akkerman, 2003: 156-158). It has been argued that this prospective beneficial effect can be detected as functional for a healthy democracy because it compels elites to open doors to party competition and expand their political agenda (Akkerman, 2003: 156-154). Nonetheless, one can presume that populist parties will cease to exist once the task is

completed, for their “*raison d’être*” disappear. Actually, in the specific case of right populist parties, reality appears different. Those national-populist movements started to play a regular role in the political debate, thus attracting a broader electorate than mainstream parties (Decker, 2003: 49). Their political agenda has been developed trying to get the balance right between limiting their plans and becoming accepted by the established system, or remaining extreme and dealing with restrictions and isolation, however strengthening hard-core members.

1.6 The Politics of Fear: Form – Content – Renationalisation

It is important not to overlook that right-wing parties are not only connected to form, but also to content. In their speech, there is usually a perpetual fear depending on numerous real or made up) perils. They do in fact supply the scapegoats accused of damaging their societies: economic migrants and the EU. That is why we have leitmotifs such as “take back control of our border”. This politics of fear according to Ruth Wodak is “very strong in persuading audiences who don’t have much information to vote with their gut feeling, which is where rational discussions don’t find a space” (2015: 186). Wodak, furthermore, maintains that a populist leader is portrayed as a sort of a frontman recalling pop-culture: really charismatic, apparently down to earth, connected to people and the new media system (e.g Twitter). He is, in addition, context-dependent: there is a specific selection of meeting places, attention to the clothes they wear – even if Farage cannot be identified as a cross dresser like the Italian Matteo Salvini or Beppe Grillo; an accurate selection of accompanying performers on stage intro music, ranging from Europe’s “The Final Countdown” to Robin Hood soundtrack (examples related to Farage’s “Say No to Europe Campaign” Tour”.

1.7 The Language of Populism

In linguistics, populism has not been as exhaustively studied as in social sciences. Even so, discourse analysis can grant productive understanding into the communicative techniques and operations used by politicians and parties (see Wodak 2013, 2015). Some interesting features related to specific linguistic methods, in particular figurative language, personal pronouns and prosodic marking, are employed in populist discourse amid disparate communication types such as public speeches or interviews, with the purpose of conceiving a persuasive portrait of fear.

In the first place there is the idea of “the people” as a (frequently racial) “pure” community, introducing the anachronistic image of the nation as a “body”. This nation, the argument goes, has to be both re-established and preserved against negative entities both internal (establishment, opposition groups) and external (economic migrants). The inland or “heartlands” a large number of these campaigners profess to fight for are allegedly under menace from numerous outsiders, leading among them “elites”, ethnic or religious groups, immigrants and refugees⁴ (Wodak, 2015).

Furthermore, it is presumed that populism is increasing, both in the rhetoric of politicians and in their media depiction, and this can be explained by the growing anti-immigration attitude among voters (Kriesi et al., 2006). In this view, populism is an anti-establishment and anti-political image, where the elite is said to disregard the homeland and its purity, let alone the worries of the people. Others define populism as a more clever rhetoric “designed to tap feelings of *ressentiment* and exploit them politically” (Betz, 2002: 198), policies that are acutely (ethno-)nationalistic, anti-European amalgamation, often tyrannical, xenophobic and usually focused on the noticeable examples of globalization and immigration (Kitschelt, 1997; Rydgren, 2005). Such policies, in a certain way, epitomise and legitimise dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.

⁴<http://theconversation.com/right-wing-populism-is-surging-on-both-sides-of-the-atlantic-heres-why-47876>

Given that the label ‘populist’ is frequently adopted in a belittling sense and hardly accepted or welcomed by those thus named, the issue with populism is that one is usually dependent on its definition in the media. We could however observe a common wish to restrict the law of immigrants in right-wing populist speeches throughout Europe (Ennsner, 2012). As these requests are for the most part expressed employing a popular democratic equal grammar through a mention to the signifier “the people,” it should be supposed that they, in turn, will be discredited and condemned as populists. Thus, populism arises as an empty signifier *par excellence*, and as a consequence a ship capable of containing a surplus of heterogeneous connotations, turning into the synecdoche of *an omnipresent evil* and associated with all its conceivable manifestations: absurdity, demagoguery, viciousness, dishonesty, destruction, and irrationalism (Stavrakakis, 2014: 510). In relation to this theory, it has been argued that populists use hidden prejudices to stir up fear: fear of being deprived of jobs, fear of “foreigners” and their culture, fear of losing national supremacy, fear of new gender positions, fear of being left behind.

Basically, right-wing populism prospers by imagining and attempting to create existential fights between “the people”, “the elite” and “others”. Right-wing populists flourished by injecting anxiety on numerous tangible or made-up dangers, and especially by blaming specific communities or groups for frightening or really harming “our” societies. While various available political orientations count on attacking different groups to a certain degree, right-wing populists adopt this strategy in a precise and bold way. As a matter of fact, they usually captivate voters by breaking taboos, giving voice to “those who cannot speak”. These movements claim to speak for “the people”, anyway promptly delineated. Their supporters, in turn, appreciate not being treated with arrogance. Similarly to what mainstream politicians do to a certain extent, they provide oversimplified answers for complicated problems with clear rebellious quotations, and profitably focus on different groups with tailored programmes to fulfil everybody’s demands.

On the first level, populism originates from the integral polysemy which indicates the category of the people in contemporary European languages. The term people refers to the entirety of a determined political community, to citizenship as a homogeneous body politic (hence the copious references to the American Constitution's "We, the people"), and defines "the poor, the disinherited, and the excluded" (Stavrakakis, 2014: 506). To put in other terms, it refers to the losers alienated from political life, left out from the dignity of political rights and economic compensation. However, it is fundamental to point out the populist style has nothing to do with the idea of unimportant or summary, but is actually necessary to comprehend populism's stance in modern political scenario, in addition to its flexible and eclectic inclination. That of populism is an essentially performative political style in which the leader is identified as *the performer*, the people as *the audience*, crisis and mass media as *the stage* whereupon populism enacts (Moffitt, 2016).

However, the linguist is not a sociologist or a political scientist, but he/she has the opportunity to take a look at the way words are employed, in order to contextualise the use of vocabulary with the purpose of obtaining all the information available for a proper interpretation. Shapiro indicates an interesting viewpoint when illustrating the distinction between language and discourse: "poststructuralist modes of analysis emphasize 'discourse' rather than language because the concept of discourse implies a concern with the meaning and value producing practises in language rather than simply the relationship between utterances and their referents" (Shapiro 1989: 14).

Discourse analysis concentrates specifically on the manner in which diverse kinds of social processes are represented as being features of a characteristic named "globalization", and the manner political parties plan to build up their consensus against this phenomenon. As a matter of fact, UKIP reproduces several central parts of the traditional globalization discourse. The nat-populist party indeed uses as resource the same list of words about globalization in a way that presents the European Union in quite a distinct light. In addition, politics on the negatives

of migration has been a consequential role of its charm in recent years, and linking that stance with a refined debate about globalization's importance for regional orders has been a test bench.

There has been a need from UKIP, at a certain point, to surpass the appearance of regressive isolationism, especially for the purpose to take distance from the extreme-right British National Party. This interpretation believes in their adoption of the usual rhetorical strategy with the purpose of employing this type of discourse to communicate modernity and to limit disagreeing voices. In other words, this modern times theory is a statement that globalisation is a new though radical fracture from the political economy of a time gone by, depicted as a new world where traditional models of life and governing cannot be retrieved.

UKIP's peculiar discourse of Europe and globalization can loosen this sense of anxiety by presenting the Eurosceptic purpose as the appropriate concern of an up-to-date, scrupulous party. This characteristic appeal to globalisation contextualized as a question of common sense, which is well-known with the party, can be understood with the fact UKIP has tried to reorganise the debate on Europe in a way that its withdrawal orientation is no longer associated with an old aggressive nationalism. In sum, the plea of globalisation can be interpreted as a crux attempt to texture a distinctly modern additional twist according to Fairclough's terms (Ford, 2015: 35).

A distinctive trait concerning populist *style* is the use of 'highly emotional, slogan-based, tabloid-style language' (Mazzoleni et al., 2003: 5), exaggerations and 'verbal radicalism' (Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 2). However, despite the fact populists are hesitant about politics, with the country defined in desperate situation they accentuate a feeling of acute political pressure. Their style is considered as straightforward, highlighting determination and attacking others for their purported self-satisfaction. In addition, the populist style is marked by its antagonism to the existing order and its association with the common people, whose language they employ to reject the elitist complex language of representative politics (Mudde, 2007: 88).

Moreover, this straightforward style turns into a frequent characteristic in party propaganda, whose key message results into an anti-establishment stance and a discourse of exclusion. The supposed ascent is said to be spot in the media, particularly in popular press and certain kinds of talk-shows, fascinated by the frank style and the policies claiming to the turning back to the status-quo ante. Moreover, straightforward style and anti-immigration rhetoric are considered as typical characteristic of right-wing parties.

Rhetoric is a potent instrument employed by populist activists. Populist rhetoric, it has been argued, relates not only to making supposed vacant demagogic tactics. Their discourse is built on denial and explicitness and its most powerful element is found in emotion. Moreover, populists often invoke to dangers and connected pledges in order to properly defend the “people” from real (or made up) perils. From the moment populism rests on basic norms originated from the common sense of the people, its rhetoric could be adorned with mentions to national heritage and customs since opposed to the so-called “multiculturalism” attributed to the elites, and eventually linked to nationalism even if not forcibly comparable to it. The presence of a charismatic leader who acts as a firebrand with his/her straightforward mottos appears to be essential: he/she incites indeed feelings of resentments, fears and possibilities, and offers quick and easy solutions to complex social and political issues. Somehow, the charisma of populist leaders allows a powerful and prosperous kind of rhetoric. We hold to be true that subjects who declare discourses are not independent entities, but rather actors who are constituted by (and authors of) discursive processes. So, the subject’s declaration is always something belonging to beforehand constituted linguistic unit in a language, and as a consequence the action of the subject in language is necessarily historical and ideological (Coutinho, Carvalho Lopes & do Nascimento 2017: 685). As Bakhtin maintained, every single discourse is impregnated of scraps deriving from other discourses, linguistic units that may be expressly marked out or blurred with other enunciated. As a matter of fact, a line of discourse may absorb, negate, refuse or repeat other discourses.

The concept of populism does not have to be labelled as necessarily negative nor necessarily positive since it entails a series of antithetical expressions. Hence the enormous multiplicity of populist mixes in the global area: anti-institutional (customized, autocratic, dependent on a charismatic leader) and institutional (elaborating new institutions of direct democratic involvement and representation, working as means for the claims of ruled out components of society), brutally antagonistic and agonistic, right-winger and progressive, polished and blue, democratic and anti-democratic; street-populisms and populisms at power, top-down and bottom-up, etc. (Panizza, 2000: 190). Following again what Ernesto Laclau asserted, I would move to the next chapter with the assumption that populism “is not a fixed constellation but a series of discursive resources which can be put to very different uses.” (2005: 176).

1.8 The Discursive Construction of National Identity

Identity never indicates something stagnant, unvarying or essential, but rather often an element positioned on the flowing time, continually mutating, a component involved in a process. That being said, the various discursive constructions of national identity are shaped in different ways depending on the context and on the public in which they come to notice, each of them can be recognised with reference to subject matters, plans and argumentative models, and based on how they linguistically realised. Moreover, a national culture is a series of discursive construct identities by producing significance about the concept of ‘nation’ with which persons can recognise themselves (identify).

Following Wodak, we can come upon three national identities as distinctive patterns of social identities, which are produced and re-produced, as well as modified and discursively deconstructed. For Frank Robert Vivilo (1981: 55), we identify the word ‘culture’ as an organized approach of norms and basics for appropriate behaviour, comparable to language grammar, which set the parameters for ‘proper’ speaking. This feature strives for a perception

(well displayed in discourses) of national character as a monotonous, uninterrupted and unvarying being. According to Hall instead, national identity is depicted in narratives of national culture as the authentic identity already existing in the nature of all elements, but sometimes latent and in need to be awakened from inactive periods:

‘People are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the nation as represented in its national culture. A nation is a symbolic community ...’
(Hall, 1996: 612)

When dissertating on national identity and its construction we cannot leave out a necessary prerequisite, that is the “historical memory” or “collective memory” as called by Halbwachs (1996) or Peter Burke (1989). However, from the viewpoint of Kolakowski (1995), whether the content of historical memory is full, partially true or invented is a question of relative importance. The more the actual or imaginary memories goes back into the past, the more firmly national identity is sustained. Wodak (2009: 34) indeed reports a quote from Kolakowski that says ‘Some nationalities which have formed just recently invent an *ad hoc* artificial relation to the past without the existence of real, verifiable connections’ (Kolakowski 1995: 33). This is a clear mention to globalisation and its deviation, needless to say the consequent perils of a drop in national independence and pride, all concerns massively present in contemporary nationalistic narratives. In sum, we can notice how context, origin, the relationship between continuity and tradition, nation and transform-nation, eternity and anticipation are significant ordering standards for the construction of an effective narrative in nat-populist parties.

1.9 The Construction of UKIP Identity: In-Group Out-Group

In-group and *out-group* constitute an analytical dichotomy with a considerably long history of theory, which originates in the areas of sociology and psychology. Communicative

strategies of constituting in- and out- groups have an important part in EU-negative populist discourse, for the reason they can elicit particular emotions like fear and rage.

We suppose that given linguistic resources are employed to form an in-group - principally being conceptualised as *we* - and an out-group, differentiating from the in-group and depicted as threatening to its inner members. Most important, linguistic elements mirror principal referential strategies adopted in a corpus to construe the in-group on the discursive plan. When dealing with a nationalist party, in-groups and out-groups usually correspond to the dichotomy *us* vs. *them*. When dealing with a researcher, it is more supposed to be a differentiation between two different *they*.

De Cillia et al. stress certain aspects which could be related to common culture, a common historical belief system, a common (small) territory and a common language as the glue that manages to keep an in-group together (1999: 149). The in-group analysis deals with the parties' portrait and understanding of themselves and each other. On the contrary, the out-groups refer to all those who are clearly identified by all parties as persons not belonging to the in-group and the analysis mainly deals with the parties construction of their immigration discourses. This is significant inasmuch separation between constructions of "US" vs. "THEM" or "SELF" vs. "OTHER" - could it be on the inside or among nations or, in addition, between several economic, religious or ethnic groups – still results to be a considerable political dare.

When studying closely discourse aforementioned representations of self against other, Hansen (2006) employs a methodological approach of searching for two procedures that work together in order to build identity: a positive procedure of connection and a negative procedure of distinction. For what concerns the case of populist parties, the "Other" could possibly include political élites who, according to their rhetoric, are distant from and operating against people's interests these groups declare to represent.

That being said, Farage asserts that only by quitting the European Union could “we get back the ability to strike free trade deals” (*The Spectator*, 2013). This way, Farage considers the EU as an Other that limits Britain from progress. It is therefore clear that configuring “us” against “them/other” is a serious element in using identity and difference.

What I am going to realize in the chapter dedicated to corpus analysis is, among other things, to investigate the allocation of word forms concerning self-representation in UKIP manifestos/programs/speeches and how the party’s preference of the *we* pronoun can be defined as an indicator of heightened self-confidence and as an attempt to separate themselves from the established parties, which furthermore stresses collective rather than individual course of action (De Fina et al., 2006). Linguistic elements mirror principal referential strategies adopted in a corpus to construe the in-group on the discursive plan.

Chapter 2

The Brexit Case

2.1 Brexit: a “Prophecy”

There was a ‘prophecy’ a considerable period of time before the first 1975 referendum to become a member of the EEC. As a matter of fact, in January 1963, General Charles de Gaulle held a press conference to explain his motivations for refusing the British application for EU membership. Some, although not all of his statements, could still find their reasons of being today. The point is Britain is closed to outside influence, maritime, connected to its trade, markets, foodstocks with Commonwealth and in many cases very distant countries. In addition, its sector is basically industrial and commercial, not agricultural. As de Gaulle pointed out in his speech:

“She has, in all her work, very special, very original, habits and traditions. In short, the nature, structure, circumstances peculiar to England are very different from those of other continentals. How can Britain, in the way that she lives, produces, trades, be incorporated into the Common Market as it has been conceived and functions?... It is predictable that the cohesion of all its members, which would soon be very large, very diverse, would not last for very long and that, in fact, it would seem like a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction, and that is not at all what France wanted to do and is doing, which is a strictly European construction” (De Gaulle, 1963).

It is important to say British governments have been charged with responsibility for this situation, for the reason they have not rarely employed their leverage to slow down the

process of European integration. In fact, Britain excluded itself from the Euro and Schengen zone, and obstructed the expansion of certified majority voting into foreign, tax, policy and defence sections. It has been argued (by the Bruges Group⁵) there was no reason to think that this attitude would have changed in the future. Nonetheless, it has been stressed for years that in Britain, various EU rules are supposed to be construed as a vicious assault on the British way of living. It has been furthermore asserted that “Britons are afraid of the European Union because they are forced to adapt their specific cultural and institutional rules and values towards what emerges as a common European norm, which they dislike.”⁶ This quote refers to the concept of being European in the English sense, where British identity is threatened with the prospect of flattening to the same level of other already phagocytized countries.

The first UK referendum in Europe was held in 1975. Back then, Conservative Prime Minister Ted Heath announced a referendum to placate European discontent in his party. In 1975, immigration hardly surfaced as an issue of relevance. In fact, according to a BBC report, only 41,000 people left Britain, let alone those who came into the country. At the time, the economy was failing if contrasted with Europe, which was far richer and certainly more successful than Britain. Comparing the referendums of 1975 and 2016 demonstrates how British politics has changed in essence. After joining the Bloc in 1973, many Britons had the impression their island nation — a former imperial power with strong links to the United States of America — was definitely different from its European neighbourhood. Less than a year after joining, Britain was requesting a total reform to the common agricultural policy (CAP) and in 1975 a Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, called a referendum. In its first nation-wide decision on whether to stay within the EEC or to leave, Britain opted in this case to remain in the Community.

⁵ The Bruges Group aims to promote discussion on the European Union and to advance the education of the public on European affairs.

⁶ Behnisch, A. J. For Britain, joining Europe was associated with national decline and loss of great power status. *New Statesman*, 16.12.2002. Online 10 September 2015 <http://www.newstatesman.com/node/144445>

The degree of British Euroscepticism has naturally changed over time: for example, British refused to participate in the Schengen agreement and significantly dismantled border controls with other EU countries. Moreover, Britain has been experiencing a large increase of nativist sentiments for at least a decade, and this attitude certainly provided a boost for the Brexit propaganda and resulting Leave victory.

UKIP's leader Nigel Farage has widely come to light as the architect of the Leave movement. Patriotic commander of disappointed revivalists, Farage has been in those years the partisan of a figurative battle between the elites and the masses.⁷ And the average UKIP voters' discontent is not merely narrowed about policies, but on a general sense of anxiety about where society is heading and how they do not feel fit for it. However, it is important to highlight that UKIP declares itself as an "evolved", "moderate" nationalist political group as well as a Right Libertarian Party. It rejects hard xenophobe nationalism and claims to be "open and inclusive to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain, regardless of ethnic or religious background" (UKIP, 2010). Farage's capacity is to offer a comforting and often humorous narrative of an English-inflected Britishness in an era surrounded by uncertainty, crisis and change (Yates, 2015: 105). That is in part because Farage is most likely one of the few British politicians able to incite public opinion. Nonetheless, the former UKIP leader's achievement is a case study of how economic downturn is facing old certainties and transforming European politics.

2.2 UKIP and the Brexit Campaign

It is a fact that populism in Britain has spread in a softer manner if compared to other right-wing parties in the rest of Europe. The case of UKIP is indeed an unprecedented phenomenon, even if their former leader's speeches have been branded as the product of mere chauvinist

⁷<http://www.firstpost.com/world/we-have-done-it-meet-the-architect-of-brex-it-ukips-nigel-farage-2853280.html>

anti-establishment cheap talk. Founded in 1991 by Alan Sked as the Anti-Federalist League of Conservatives let down by the Maastricht Treaty, it has lately become a primarily anti-EU organisation which throughout the decades focussed for people who firmly believe that the social and financial solidity of Britain in the future will only be guaranteed by ethnopluralism, rather than integration of immigrants, and taking back more power once withdrawn from the EU. The formerly negligible right-wing populist UKIP has become the most rapid increasing political party in the United Kingdom, and is becoming headlines because of its anti-EU and anti-immigration rhetoric not limited in their country but all over Europe, thus generating anxiety among the mainstream parties and corroding their support base.

In addition, over the last half-decade UKIP's image as a single-issue party has been transformed as they more extensively spotlighted onto issues such as economy, taxes, instruction, health, *etc.* in addition to its predominant questioning platforms of immigration and the EU. Farage often asserted in his public speeches or editorials that before becoming part of the union, England was acknowledged as "the land of liberty". The Eurosceptic leader indeed considers the EU as an undeveloped-economic union.

For the first time Britain, regularly an uncomfortable member in the European Union, becomes in 2014 topic of the day as the United Kingdom Independence Party reached the top of the national poll and triggered crisis within media and political class. Since then, the national populist party has started to take part as container of common discontent on a national scale while construing a polarising story of what is going wrong with Great Britain and solutions to fix the situation. However, the way UKIP has dulled old politics together the ability of catalysing fears and emotions of let-down citizens is widely disputed.

The request for a referendum to determine a withdrawal from EU is an extension of a certain unusual attitude, which evokes in turn "British superiority" (Gifford, 2010: 329). Noticeable is the fact the success of Euroscepticism in contemporary Britain has meant a ceaseless debate over the EU in essence entrapped in wearying calls for a membership

referendum where the result in theory appeared much less certain than in 1975. From this viewpoint, the United Kingdom Independence Party made terrific progress in 2014 European elections, indeed coming first with 28% on a programme combining distrust in EU with the aim to contain immigration. In this perspective, the UK is far from exclusivity, as a fair amount of Eurosceptic parties across Western Europe are gaining popularity with equivalent meaning, therefore giving contribution to the fragmentation of party systems (Hanley, 2015), even by exploiting the weakness of centre-left parties that traditionally built their electoral base on working class votes. As the end result of the 2015 General Election proved - which recorded a pronounced trend to vote for UKIP in traditional left-wing constituencies in England and Wales - Labour in Britain tends to become particularly vulnerable when dealing with immigration-EU concerns that UKIP seems to easily manage.

This kind of situation represents the perfect subject for a peculiar feature that was obviously not present in 1975, that is a populist opposition to the EU prepared for action in the form of a professionalized and financially supported Eurosceptic political party, namely UKIP. Its nationalist Euroscepticism is of course typical from populist organisations, as it is combined with an anti-elite disapproval of established parties. Eventually, the double anti-elite/anti-EU blend is more electorally potent today than ever (Glencross, 2014).

However, UKIP has been widely described by left-leaning media as a right-wing British nationalist party, encouraging a narrative of deterioration and disloyalty from the elite, devoted to make Britain independent from the European Union and uncontrolled immigration, fond of traditionalism and officially non-racist, though often crossing the borderline of racist prejudice in a manner we could define as “para-racist”. As a matter of fact, in spite of these attacks from mainstream parties, to Nigel Farage the UK will only be far better out of the European Union than remaining in an organisation with unelected bureaucrats ruling ‘their’ country, as he has often claimed. Actually, it has been the UK Independence Party – also unofficially defined as the right offshoot of the Conservative party highly committed to

withdrawal from the European Union – that has taken advantage of this increase in popularity of anti-politics and played a key role both in obtaining the referendum and helping to swing the vote towards the Leave side. The outcome of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom on whether to stay in or leave the European Union resulted in a win of the leave side by 51.9%.

UKIP's narrative in anticipation of a Remain/Leave outcome is portrayal of a language targeted to what was regarded as "anti-politics". This new societal setting depicts a widespread disaffection in indirect democracies, expressed in low levels of satisfaction with Westminster's behaviour by left-behind citizens, loss of confidence in politicians, and the impression they have no say in matter when is their life the Government is discussing about. Anyway, the party led by Nigel Farage has come out to be a particular crossbreeding between Populism and Nationalism, and even though it takes no concrete measures because it is cut off for the First Past The Post System (in Britain), it comes out its effectiveness in employing media pressure to obtain a Referendum considered as a chimera only few months before the official announcement given by the former Prime Minister David Cameron.

We will see through the narrative built in the "Say NO to EU" campaign how in this last period UKIP has grown in reliability, fetching in most cases disillusioned voters yearning for a populist party that claims to give voice to those who cannot speak, and will comment upon the UK has voted to leave the European Union following a referendum on its membership and succeed in taking "their country back". The data analysed for this thesis show reasons that led to quit a "supranational political union" appear to be complex and multi-faceted: issues of immigration, finances, healthcare and stolen sovereignty clearly came into play throughout the campaign, with the Brexit strategy plan evidently more successful than Bremain (at least in England and Wales), specifically when it focused the question of the uncontrolled migration and the construction of a combined threat discourse. As a matter of fact, while

UKIP continued to distance itself from racism, the party did take a more restrictive position on immigration (Gardner, 2006; 176).

However, it is important to highlight that UKIP declares itself as an “evolved” nationalist party. In fact it rejects pejorative labels of hard xenophobe nationalism and claims to be "open and inclusive to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain, regardless of ethnic or religious background" (UKIP, 2010). According to their manifestos and speeches, the European Union is nothing more than a cartel of governments that tries to gain power by harmonizing the fiscal and regulatory legislation in every member State. This is a feature one can find in all these new populist parties across Europe, that is their distrust of and firmly strong opposition to the influence of the EU on their own domestic politics. In addition, a negative image of Brussels is what unifies UKIP and parties of whatever wing throughout Europe.

For what concerns UKIP and their policy, Farage advocates direct democracy in contrast to ‘representative politics’. Although not an exclusively populist party (Whitaker & Lynch, 2011: 5), UKIP presents itself as wanting to give power back to the people via local democracy and the use of referenda. Strong is the rhetorical emphasis on British citizens opposed to European Bureaucracy defined as a Jaggernaut, a threat which weakens the sovereignty of States. Populist stances usually support people and their fight against the elite-machine, and their elements comfortably merge into Nationalism, where the UK will profit, according to Farage’s vision, from acting independently to the benefit of the country rather than collectively focusing international goals.

In the end, the pivot-stance for what concerns immigration and multiculturalism might evoke racism for progressive minds, even though firmly within the limits of respectable language. Farage himself has indeed been given by British popular press and tabloids a plain support, despite regularly exposed UKIP candidates or his (uncertain) links to xenophobe and

racist parties as the Northern League in Italy, the Front National from Marine Le Pen in France and the Finnish nationalists.

2.3 Societal Changes

Some of the motivations for the UK's referendum result to leave the European Union (51.9%) are vague and complicated but mostly ascribed to political, economic, and social decline. The UK Referendum campaign, exactly like EU policies, has drawn attention to the economic consequences of Brexit while not giving massive consideration to its prospective social impact, even though the economic and the social are so firmly bound. As a matter of fact, there is a new cliché proposed by non lined-up media defining right-wing populism to be a kind of politics that splits the world into a battle between “us” and the powerful elite “them”, where the “elite” is identified as cause of all problems.

The habit of tagging movements as populist constitutes a bias that they are morally inferior to the unpopular elite. According to their detractors, the so-called ‘Brexiters’ represent nothing but resentful ‘Little Englanders’ who do not tolerate the country's successful globalisation control, old bigots who reject the prosperous multicultural society that Britain has become, xenophobic losers who want to destroy what good has been done in the country or at best a bunch of uneducated, simplistic and narrow-minded people who have proven to be easy lure for unscrupulous demagogues. The Leave victory has been reported in most aligned press as a victory of the people of yesteryear over the people of tomorrow, young and cosmopolitan. This has partly been the outcome of extensive macro-changes which include, for example, a process of changing from industrial to postindustrial society, and a pervasive globalization that have caused higher chance of stress, frustration and disenchantment among those whose situation has become compromised as a result of these changes.

Their starting point was the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. With the aftermath of this passage, new social organizations followed that cut across traditional class divisions. Betz (1994) focused on a new type of lower class, social groups that were in particular exposed to the economic turnarounds. Significant is the birth of a new request for innovative technology and cultural competences in the labour market, while conventional labour abilities lost competitiveness. In fact cultural codes, and ability to accommodate to a new continuous stream of technological progresses, became more effective than muscle, physical ability to last and mechanical know-how. A considerable part of the industrial labour force have indeed turned its back on socialist and social democratic parties and chose the right by voting nationalist parties.

For what concerns socio-demographic aspects, these have been properly summarised by Givens (2005, ch. 3). However, the most noticeable trait of the extreme-right vote is that it is predominantly male (Mudde 2007: 111-118). Moreover, extreme-right voters are inclined to be young, working, under or lower middle class and occupied in the private sector. Reports of racist or far right political parties have frequently maintained that their supporters come from borderline groups, such the unqualified white working class who live in impoverished areas that have experienced direct question of immigration, which again encourages the assumption that this kind of politics have the power to attract groups out of the mainstream, whose social conditions have induced them to disclosed extremist beliefs.

2.4 Crowd Manipulation – Rudiments of Propaganda

Speaking of icons, imagination and narration are fundamental ingredients in populist politics. The populist rhetoric is centred on the charging of a person or a concern with symbolic relevance in order to unite different storylines around a face or a slogan. Notwithstanding, without imagination, a leader cannot persuade the people – which is a

requirement for populism. People tend to recognize themselves in certain rhetorical figures introduced to them such as the working-class, taxpaying, and the decent people. In particular, just because of his ambiguous attitude, populism can be an advanced technique for gathering heterogeneous electorate with heterogeneous necessities.

However, a certain amount of components of the community are excluded from “the people” and from political recognition as effect. The development of images and storytelling places, through negative identification, specific groups out from the community. Those groups are identified as “constitutive-outside”. In an essay by the French philosopher Althusser titled “*Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*” (1970), this process of ideological manipulation has been described as “interpellation”, whose implementation happens during people’s ideological shaping: they feel intimately appealed and addressed by an ideological discourse they closely support. Interpellation stands for recruiting process through which symbols and storylines are used to be suitable for people’s ordinary world in order to fit into specific political frameworks by portraying existing situations in words.

When referring to the people, populists are actually only talking about their supporters or, as Nigel Farage clearly stated, “the real people”: in this case, 52 percent who voted to leave the EU. The ability of populists about performing crisis has been believed to allow them to separate the people from the elite and to related Others in order to thoroughly facilitate the political landscape, and to show resolute leadership and easy solutions as means for containing or preventing the crisis. The conception of crisis may be considered as something not absolutely external to populism, but as an inner component of populism itself since it represents a political style. This interpretation displays that while crisis may constitute an efficient step for populists, it is a constant they play an influential role in “setting the stage” themselves by advocating and performing crisis (Moffit, 2016: 1).

2.5 British Euroscepticism

The Brexit vote, paired with the ascent of Eurosceptic parties, was a strong memorandum that not a few Europeans view the EU as unwelcome, with its little understanding of ordinary citizens. Basically, a spineless economic condition and a prevailing sense of supranational subjugation made it nothing but a burden. Democracy is anyway always respected, but the Brexit outcome confirms how the level of dissatisfaction about its essence has arisen since the 2009 crisis. All those conditions have been employed for cryptic reasons in the semi-rebel rhetoric of alternative organisations determined to provide direct solutions to issues like immigration, political discontent, globalisation and, of course, the European bureaucratic system.

As a matter of fact, Euroscepticism parties gather these key issues through connections between opposition to immigration, rage and apprehension about the flood of asylum-seekers, bitterness about the power that the EU exerts over national policies and concerns about the new EU statute. The feeling that economic migration, asylum-seeking and Europe were out of control was deeply perceived. For example, it is now a fact that there was in a consistent part of British citizens a strong feeling that there was little or no of migration-control and a pervasive supervision 'Europe' was accused of exerting over UK policies. Britain, according to Farage, was seen as a 'weakling' down there in mainland while there was a certain esteem for the French and Australians systems who in different context defended their national interests. Public statements from Eurosceptic groups disclosed a sense of frustrated nationalism, and their own industrially depressed areas described as the fault of a 'cheerleading' political class that refuses to accept the dangers of immigration and European domination over national freedom.

Anyway, from the position of economic, political and intellectual elites in the Eurozone, Europe and populism are viewed as the two opposites of a drastic contrast. Needless to say, the return to national pride, the overemphasis on nation's principles go together with borders control, restriction of foreign imports and, in some radical groups, with a hostile xenophobic

social atmosphere. As a matter of fact, populist parties discredit all supra-national alliances no matter whether in government or in opposition. However, not all populisms could be placed on the same level, nor do they consult the same people, or share same characteristics and prerequisites. Moreover, it is impossible to think of an unchanging Europe from a diachronic standpoint. We observe therefore a reverse of traditional terms: the so-called post-democratic Europe is a version of Europe which has become part of the problem and not a solution anymore, taking more and more the shape of a tyrannical monster, a dangerous transformation that only the return of the popular seems able to dominate. Today the main source of concern with regard to ECE migration is along the lines of social welfare and labour market. Powell (1968), similarly, expressed concern for British nationals being made “strangers in their own country”, not being able to get jobs, “obtain school places” and seeing their “neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition”⁸, which is also expressively articulated by UKIP leader Nigel Farage, but increasingly also by other political figures in the country.

On the contrary, European elites have seemed to invest their political future in the formulation of an extreme anti-populist programme. It is a fact Europe has not yet become a united territorial entity with a unique culture or history. Therefore, the risk is that it will still remain for many years doomed to be perceived as a rather detached and artificially made concept, not a mere identity for the countries who joined this abstract idea. The truth is, at present, that attempts at boycotting populism by destabilising the anti-populist programme do not prevent from its coming back, even by overruling its stigmatization.

2.6 Populism: a debated concept

In academic research there is a good amount of questions that still seek answers, such as the reason why populism has apparently proliferated so quickly across the world.

⁸<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html>

Moreover, what these disparate demonstrations of populism do share or whether populism really constitutes a menace to democracy. And lastly, maybe the most fundamental question of all, what we are actually arguing when we employ the term “populism” today. The erudition on populism is unusually inadequate and many scholars have quit on the potential action of employing the term in any relevant manner. However, in the opinion of different left-wing scholars, populism must be classified as nothing more than a pathology that is day by day affecting democratic governments worldwide. This argument has been indeed advanced by a growing number of both experts and academics. However, it is important to mark a distinction between what is defined as popular and what as populist instead. In fact, this is exactly the reason why contemporary political scholars or populism analysts (e.g. Laclau, 2005) prefer avoiding attributing either a solely positive or negative association to populism.

Needless to say, being populist has for long been (and still continues to be) perceived as a political stigma. Populism is a phenomenon definitely difficult to conceptualize and put in a single box, mostly because it is unavoidably context-dependent. Paul Taggart tried to make the concept of “people” clearer by introducing a term, “heartland” (2000: 96), which stands for an idealized understanding of the community and reveals the values and system of beliefs belonging to ordinary people. The heartland is grounded on emotions and sees populists building nostalgic recollections in an attempt to re-create what has been lost in the current time. The conflict, he added, is being fought between delegates of a society ready for change, and key actors of a divisive culture of exclusion who demands a return to a uniformed society. Populism is in effect able to operate as either a *corrective* or a *threat* for democracy, obtaining both *inclusionary* and *exclusionary* articulations (Stavrakakis, 2014: 514). Today, this comeback is becoming more intense and has perhaps reached its highest point with its centre being for the moment placed after the outburst of the financial crisis in 2008 and spatially, within the Eurozone, particularly in those countries that have been put under supervision like Greece (*ibid*: 505).

Populism reacts amongst other things to the downfall of the electoral backing for politicians, the rise of electoral abstention, the electoral instability, the increasing extension of the political spectrum, the gradual appearance of specially-made social movements not represented by classic political groups, and the creation of single-issue or radical movements.

However, it should be necessary to begin at first by positioning populism within the changing global media scenario. The present era is one that shows a growing omnipresence and easy access of communication technologies, together with the unrestrained growth in the velocity and objectives of communication and information networks. We are well past the point when experts were dealing with the romantic concept of the populist speaking straight to the people from makeshift platforms. Modern times have been now witnessing a new type of sharp populist heads who know how to employ new media technologies, including the rise of the Internet and social networking, to their advantage (Moffitt, 2016: 1). In particular, Rocha utilizes the expression to make reference to a rhetorical political style intended to prepare for action the electorate against the power structure and whose legitimacy is basically supported by the people and against the elites (2012: 9).

It is confirmed the term ‘populism’ is as used as abundantly contested (Roberts 2006; Barr 2009). From several theoretical point of views belonging to social sciences, evident is an opening to new ways of approaching populist politics. As a matter of fact, we can appreciate the high incidence of the concept in recent social science research, also because “populism does leave an imprint on important political phenomena” (Hawkins 2010: 49). Moreover, the ability of populist politics to drive new forms of political commitment is particularly important in an era of refusal to take part in political activism such as adhesion to party membership (Skocpol & Williamson 2012: 197). These days, populist politics assumes a fundamental role in political restoration, a situation in which moral limits between groups are redefined and categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ emerge (Laclau, 2005; Fella & Ruzza, 2013).

Some of the questions literature has been trying to provide an answer to can be connected to see whether in populism we could observe an underlying unity, or does one name conceal a large number of unconnected tendencies (Gellner & Ionescu, 1969: 1). As Arter stated (2010: 490), “there is general agreement in the comparative literature that populism is confrontational, chameleonic, culture-bound and context-dependent”. What is important now to comprehend is how culture and context influence populism and how populist politics in turn has an effect on political transformation.

For what concerns the situation in Europe, a restrictive right-wing form of populism came to notice in the 1980s and has grown in strength concentrating their energy primarily on immigrants and wage dumping. There are some conceptual approaches that come to light within socio-political literature on the theme: they define populism as an ideology, a discursive style, and a form of political mobilization (Moffitt & Tormey. 2013; Pauwels, 2011). However, it is still important to stress that “which ideological features attach to populism depend upon the socio-political context within which the populist actors mobilize” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2011: 2).

To categorize populism as an ideology has specific consequences on how research on the topic is accomplished. If populism is considered primarily as a group of ideas, it follows that empirical studies should mainly address their focus towards assertions made by political actors having a planned approach, acting upon the latter as fundamental units of analysis. Therefore, primary investigation in this tradition pay attention on party literature, which could present itself in the shape of official manifestoes or transcribed speeches so as to evaluate the political actors (e.g Nigel Farage) involved. On the contrary, if we take as example UKIP and its politics, we could observe that populism is built on the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’, so not an ideology that registers the fundamental beliefs of the leader/political actor, but a certain style of political expression that is rigorously and strategically applied in a broader perspective by both right and left, alternative and mainstream parties.

The most significant implications examine the units of analysis and levels of measurement employed in the investigations on populism. Targeting this concept as a discursive style makes it available to its operationalization as a progressive property of specific examples of political expression (Bos et al. 2011) rather than a basic feature of political movements and their respective leaders that can be caught by an uncomplicated populist/non-populist dichotomy, especially because political actors can mould and re-mould their rhetorical style in a simpler manner than their official ideology.

This difference about populism, if tagged as ideology or style, is caught by Deegan-Krause & Haughton (2009: 822), who maintain that the comprehension of the term as distinguishing feature of political talk as preferred to an identity of political actors “shifts our assessments from binary opposition— a party is populist or not—to a matter of degree—a party has more populist characteristics or fewer” (Rooduijn et al. 2012). In addition, the amount of populism a certain political actor use may change over time and contexts, while in contrast the actor’s unambiguous ideological beliefs are probably supposed to be more consistent. Populism proves to be a form of politics rather than a constant peculiarity of political actors. Among distinctive characteristics, we can observe a paranoid style consisting in dramatic exaggeration, a tendency to suspect and catastrophic conspiracy theories. Hallmark attributed to the paranoid style the concern about menaces to take control of the independent nation and overturn its most fundamental values. For Laclau, the metaphorical separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, keystone of populist discourse, constitutes an example of relational ‘empty signifiers’ that can compete against each other on several subjects, according to social context. These categories acquire significance thanks to a process of “identification”, through which given social groups are recognized as ‘the people’ (us) and put in competition against threatening ‘others’ (them). As Panizza clarifies (2005: 3), conflict is thus construed as method of identification in which the connection between the people/form as signifier and

people/content as signified is conveyed by the naming process, that is to settle who these enemies of the people are and to give it a credible explanation.

In differing from traditional theories, Laclau (1977) considers populism as appropriate for the political stage. As a matter of fact, society is separated into two battlefields, and populism shows up when those from “below” consult power. This is usually concurrent with moments of hegemony crisis, when social demands do not get acceptable resolutions from the institutions. The populist creation of the “people” necessitates a procedure that presents the plebeian as the entire *populus*. This creation is entrenched via hostility between two sectors of the society: the “people” versus the “elite”. The populist reasoning strategically encourages a social division by adopting favoured signifiers that frame the whole field into two diametrically opposed sides: for the antagonist we have the “regime”, the “oligarchy”, the “dominant groups”; for the abused we can observe the “people”, the “nation”, the “silent majority,” and so on. Since the 1970s, Laclau’s strategy has accordingly emphasised two pivotal aspects of all potential populist discourses, in spite of its definite political orientation and content: a) the mention to the signifier “the people” and its struggle against the dominant ideology.

A few important question to ask ourselves is whether we should perceive populism only as a menace to liberal democratic system or a provocation that once (and if) overcome can even lead to a stronger stability in western democracy. Moreover, one should wonder if populism can be defined as a dysfunction of the democratic system, or their demands concerning renewal of democracy could start a salvation for elitist and a bureaucratic system which is no longer felt as representative by its citizens. As Cas Mudde stated, “maybe the arguments of populist are true and that could explain why they are so successful” (Mudde, 2004: 553). Notwithstanding, “a certain shapelessness in ideas and organization is inherited in populism” (Held, 1996: 63). It is in fact fundamental not to forget that the word “populism” originates from Latin “*populus*”, meaning “the people”, and that entails strong correlation to democracy

itself. As a consequence, one could assume that where there is democracy, there is populism. (Decker, 2003).

Populism is a very frequent tactic also employed by so-called “respectable” parties which use populism’s strategies to their benefit, but do not set a threat to constitutional democracy. Is it equally possible to understand populism as a social movement. It mostly arises from the protest of social groups, can use similar strategies, and conducts its political activity via petitions or referendums, which are the official channels provided by political system (Meny & Surel, 2002). Similarly, Crick asserted (2005: 626) that the only tool considered useful is direct democracy consists in referendum or elections. In sum, we cannot label populism either as a pure social movement, or as a political party.

Eventually, it is worth mentioning that Etienne Balibar⁹ talked of a form of “positive populism”, that is likely to ensure the support of a vast portion of the electorate. The plan may well be long and certainly intricate. However, without it, revitalized belief would be complicated. A failure project could even expand further the relations of inequality, feeding popular dissatisfaction/alienation from politics thus allowing far right, old-line populism to present itself as the exclusive possible choice, regardless the opportunistic nature of the strategy.

⁹<https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/giorgos-katsambekis-yannis-stavarakakis/populism-anti-populism-and-european-democr>

Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

3.1. An Interdisciplinary Approach

A study of populism solely based on one theoretical frame would not be considered appropriate, since it would give a monotonous and insufficient answer and exclude the context in which the discourse develops. Therefore, an integration of different approaches has been chosen in order to determine the way in which media texts are posed with the purpose to define an organised text analysis, to clarify their meanings and to determining the way discourse is involved in the media document and be adequate to provide answers to find out how discourse operates. That is why four main discorsal features that directly affect the formation of ideological patterning in editorials are here investigated:

1. Words, phrases and sentences that reflect UKIP's Eurosceptic ideology
2. Lexical choices that reflect "Us" vs. "Them"
3. Words, phrases and sentences that implicate extra meanings
4. Polarization patterns

One of the first quotes to underline is that discourse analysis "has become part of the accepted canon of approaches when analysing international politics" (Diez, 2001: 5). Critical Discourse Analysis is useful to unveil controlling *manœuvres* in politics and mass media, which work towards linguistic homogeneity or a discriminatory selections of humans, and to increase the

awareness of the rhetorical strategies which are used to command in the adoption of certain political convictions, belief systems, and objectives. As a matter of fact, each single example of language has an effect on a society and its culture, and “no language use is possible without a social cultural background” (Tischler, 2001: 180).

As a result, it follows that Critical Discourse Analysis is not confined to discourse operation, but has to consider cultural and societal backgrounds in addition to that. What is important to underline is that discourse does not occur in emptiness, it is actually set inside a definite context. For that reason, a discourse cannot be inferred without acknowledging its specific background. This theme is essential in pragmatics and originally theorised by Wittgenstein. The latter asserted that utterances acquire signification exclusively in circumstantial, cultural and historical context (Wodak, 1996: 19). According to this interpretation, CDA assigns a key role to context analysis, as well as intertextuality has a prominent function because of the importance of past and present discourses in the CDA perspective.

Within the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), strong attention is paid to the crucial role political élite plays in the production, diffusion and legitimisation of racist discourse through time. Norman Fairclough (1999) and Ruth Wodak (2008) have set up techniques of Critical Discourse Analysis to penetrate the language of common sense discrimination. Furthermore, Fairclough describes CDA as dismantling the political employment of narratives for electoral politics on a “terrain of hegemonic structure” (1998: 145).

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is holistic by combining several branches of learning. It consists of a number of various theoretical strategies to the micro-level analysis of text and talk that concerns the social and/or political context. These disparate methodological strategies are gathered, however, by a macrolevel social analysis which asserts that social inequality may be instituted, supported and authorized through elite language use, discourse (Hart, 2009: 106).

Social reality, according to Pandey, is frequently depicted in dichotomous terms, a juxtaposition of *Us* versus *Them* (2004: 155). Moreover, he maintains that “Othering” is a specific word employed to define the way social group divisions are expressed via language. Generally, for the Critical Linguist, it is in and between linguistic preferences that writers encrypt their meaning position, that is, their critical position. For that reason, for the critical linguist (see Fairclough, 1994), the connection between language and the social distinction reproduced in this kind of language is personal and bi-directional.

A few research questions raised in this case study will need the support of a multifaceted critical approach:

- How does UKIP linguistically legitimise a politics of exclusion?
- What are the dynamics that govern the party’s political/rhetorical strategies

The framework of ideas of analysis being used in this study comes from the arena of Critical Discourse Analysis combining several branches of learning, whose dominant priority is the study of “the intricate relationships between text, talk, social cognition, power, society and culture” (van Dijk, 1993: 253). That kind of technique assesses the extent to which social beliefs and impressions are reproduced and supported in the small structures of text, words and expressions, and the degree to which language as employed by politicians helps express and support social imbalances. Therefore, CDA reveals to be useful to unveil controlling manoeuvres in politics and mass media, which work towards linguistic homogeneity or a discriminatory selections of humans, and to increase the awareness of the rhetorical strategies which are used to command in the adoption of certain political convictions, belief systems, and objectives.

Given the multidisciplinary of CDA, a blend of approaches can be appropriate to critical analysis of texts. In addition, a combination of different approaches would be very important in order to achieve an acceptable form of multidisciplinary CDA.

British immigration discourse is considerably a discourse of doubt and constantly growing concern, as well as xenophobia and hostility, affecting a steady Self–Other discrimination and coordinated processes of othering. It depends on discursively created threat and fear generation systems, such as proximization, which perform a coercive function (Cap, 2016: 14). Proximization Theory, developed by Cap (2013: 294), is described as a “new cognitive-pragmatic development designed to account for strategic regularities underlying forced construals in political discourse.” Proximization Theory evokes the closeness of the external threats to ask for people’s consent. Fundamentally, the alien Outside Deictic Centre (ODC) crosses the space to invade the home territory identified by the Inside Deictic Centre (IDC). From this point of view, Discourse Space peripheral entities (the economic migrants) are unifying physically and sometimes overlapping upon the Discourse Space central entities (the speaker, the addressees).

A different construction of the nation, which is interestingly meaningful for immigration discourse, entails metaphors through which the nation is conceptualised as a *house* (Chilton, 1994). According to Werth (1999), where mental spaces are the theoretical constructions which encourage the discourse process, a discourse space is a representation of the “narrative” created in the discourse - the “text world”. Following again Chilton (2004: 58), it is

“not that we can actually measure the “distances” from Self; rather, the idea is that people tend to place people and things along a scale of remoteness from the self, using background assumptions and indexical cues.”

The analysis of Farage’s Euroscepticism will be placed under such a multi-layered analytical perspective (communication, political science and linguistics). However, I will focus on apparently harmless and neutral discourse, which undergoes a CDA “dissection procedure” dominated by the pivotal presence of *Us* vs. *Them* Polarization in constructing ideological discourses:

CDA			
US vs Them	Ingroup/Outgroup Constructions	Epistemic/ Deontic Modality	Proximization Theory

Metaphor is a specific variety of linguistic manifestation which inspires the construction of a certain number of mental spaces. Following Hart and Lukes (2009: 109) in the metaphor example, mental spaces constructed during discourse endure a precise conceptual mixing operation whereby they are blended in an incorporated network, manufacturing inferential structure. That being said, metaphor is a linguistic and conceptual characteristic of certain importance for Critical Discourse Analysis.

It is in this way that Discourse Space Theory probably presume mental space theory: the deictic centre is the secure point of the discourse event, where speakers are situated as a logical consequence.

3.2 CDA and Rhetoric

The awareness that language and politics are elaborately intertwined has been indispensable to rhetoric studies and many fronts of discourse research, Critical Discourse Analysis in particular. As a matter of fact, rhetoric is still adopted as an analytical approach for the investigation of texts in both classical and contemporary forms, and this procedure includes political speeches (for instance). On the other hand, however, there have been requests for academics to a great extent to better examine the benefits that both rhetoric and discourse analysis obtain if employed together in an interdisciplinary way. It would be not inaccurate, I would say, that rhetoric combined with CDA can spotlight both the persuasion and power distinctions behind a speech, a manifesto or a newspaper article.

Critical methods applied to discourse have been used indeed to investigate variety of discourses, and they acquire a relevant role in relation to political studies. If we think about the development of political structures, where single entities need to be influenced to cooperate to the benefit of all, it seems to count on the employment of a system based on symbolic communication. What is certain is that the power of rhetoric, the declamatory ability of language manipulation for persuasive intentions, was perfectly understood in classical times. Rhetorical language, as well politics, is evidently not always sincere. For this reason, it may be employed to conceal or misrepresent the truth in the same way. As a consequence, political rhetoric is fabricated to guide its public to a pathway of definite thoughts, assumptions and eventual reaction. The aim for politicians is not primarily to present facts, but to be persuasive (Kazemian & Hashemi, 2014: 1180).

For what concerns this case study, I will highlight the accurate strategy in which Nigel Farage, by inflaming the wistful and nationalistic fire in the ‘virtual’ or real crowd, successfully uses the polemic allure of *pathos*. This dodge can be compared to Aristotle’s concept of emotions, since Farage provokes discontent or even animosity in the crowd by

referring to the three hot topics well-known by now: immigration, anti-establishment and EU. In fact, Aristotle argued that if an item has importance, people will get angry in the end.¹

So, we will see in the next chapter the way it works UKIP/Farage's rhetoric - specifically on lexical items suitable for persuasion - interlinked with the CDA approach, which works on those linguistic elements aimed at the exercise of power.

3.3 Corpus Collection and Composition

The corpus collection analysed for the present study is made up of three sections, where Farage explains the reasons why the UK should withdraw from the EU and vote to leave Europe in the Brexit Referendum: 1) UKIP electoral manifestos (2005-2015); 2) online editorials (2015-2016); 3) speeches (2015-2016).

The then UKIP leader has maintained that the authentic concerns of voters have always been swept under the carpet and never discussed. Explanatory examples can be found from the developments towards immigration-centred discourse in manifestos besides Nigel Farage's public declarations. These daring declarations are proclaimed in the midst of local elections and largely in advance of the European Parliament elections in 2014 and the general election of 2015, all of which definitely brought satisfying results due to UKIP's unexpected

¹⁰ See <http://www.european-rhetoric.com/ethos-pathos-logos-modes-persuasion-aristotle/>

growth in the British political terrain and increasing appreciation among the wider public regarding the party as well as growing feeling of apprehension and turmoil within the country.

Immigration, for instance, is a considerable segment of Farage's discourse, in which he asserts that immigration "is the biggest single issue facing this country" and has an effect on many other difficult tests facing Britain.

These tests, all associated to immigration, help Nigel Farage to build up notions of the self and other. This refusal by main politicians to give attention to left-behind voters interests has left a political gap the anti-establishment party pledges to fill, and promises given to the electors with UKIP will be kept. Farage indeed breaks former codes of presidential discourse and knowledge. In that, he dimmed traditional interactions between "discursive genre and socio-pragmatic function in the public sphere". Moreover, he practically questioned the connections between "linguistic standards and the legitimacy of political authority," defying in this manner "boundaries normally taken as stable and well-defined by traditional socio-political and sociolinguistic orders" (Doerr & Lee, 2013: 33).

From a general point of view related to previous political experiences, the far-right has been considered competent to craft a narrative, based on nationalism, xenophobia, and chauvinism, elements who are strongly understood with the public elite "them", where the elites are emblem of all problems, we can appreciate in the upcoming corpus analysis.

3.4 The role of British Media in Nationalist Populism

It is fundamental not to omit that of the approximately 30 million readers of a daily newspaper in Britain, three-quarters read papers (mostly tabloids) that are firmly resolved to make British citizens dislike the EU. In fact, tabloids and/or popular newspapers are more persuasive than quality newspapers to share the anti-establishment stance in force in populist parties, and they have a particular inclination to 'customize' politics. Popular press is implied

to deal with themes of direct relevance to ordinary people, in order to show off an anti-elite prejudice and concentrate on contrast and drama. In this perspective, the popular press is considered capable of offering an advantageous discursive opportunity framework for populist parties by addressing the political influence of tabloids and sensationalised communication, where at the same time rivals and defenders tend to associate tabloids with populist politics. In addition, by giving strong attention to excessive drama, infotainment, rants and anti-elitism, tabloids are supposed to provide a platform for populist (counter) politics (Sparks & Tulloch, 2000). Both popular press and populist movements share comparable expressive styles. Anyway, the existence of a widespread circulation does not preserve tabloids from competition with huge media such as television. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that these tabloid-quality ranges from “exclusive attention to sports, scandal and popular entertainment in the true tabloid to exclusive attention to politics, economics and society in the ideal quality newspaper” (Sparks & Tulloch, 2000: 11). Common view asserts that popular newspapers concentrate more on local crime and immigration than quality newspapers. In the end, tabloids share an anti-establishment position with populist parties and a strong orientation against elites while exhibiting proximity to the people. Quality newspapers, on the other hand, are inclined to be more aligned with the status quo and supportive of political elites (Mazzoleni et al., 2003: 8).

The ownership of the UK print media is similarly well-delimited. There are four newspaper groups – the Daily Mail and papers controlled by Rupert Murdoch (*The Sun* and *The Times*), Richard Desmond (*The Express* and *The Star*) and the Barclay brothers (*The Daily Telegraph*) – possess about 75 per cent of daily newspapers sold, and generally dictate a strictly Eurosceptic policy on their journalists. Those circumstances have been fertile ground for anti-EU propaganda over many years, having profoundly pervaded into Britain’s political culture, and have provided a major contribution to the swing in British public opinion since the late 1980s, since the country has become more Eurosceptic (Grant, 2008: 6).

3.5 Three Discourse Genres of Political Communication in UKIP

Populist parties such as UKIP frequently embrace political platforms that diverge from their more mainstream antagonists, and analysing their specific versions of political truth should confirm illuminating (Røren & Todd, 2014: 24). Volosinov (1973) suggests the presence of an organised set of discourses defined as processes which are cohesive organisations-of-content: "each period and each social group has had and has its own repertoire of speech forms for ideological communication in human behaviour. Each set of cognate forms, i.e., each behavioural speech genre, has its own corresponding set of themes". In this occasion, I will focus on three main styles of political genre which will perfectly blend in the corpus analysis we will see in the forthcoming chapter. However, I find significant to here specify the material collected for my research study and the more or less evident peculiarities of each one, just because the analysis will work for an harmonisation in order to focus on the three main issues concerning UKIP ideology and the Brexit campaign.

3.6 Election Manifestos

According to the Oxford dictionary, a manifesto refers to

A public declaration or proclamation, written or spoken; esp. a printed declaration, explanation, or justification of policy issued by a head of state, government, or political party or candidate, or any other individual or body of individuals of public relevance, as a school or movement in the Arts.

Election manifestos play a significant function in British campaigning. Their printing, which in contemporary times has frequently been combined with massive media distribution, supports an archive of "authoritative statements of what the party plans to do in government" (Dale, 2000: 7). In most cases, manifestos can also hit a popular emotion, as in Labour's 1945 and 1964 manifestos which pledged "social and economic reconstruction" and "modernisation of the economy" respectively (Kavanagh 2000: 7). In addition, by way of

their textual prominence, manifestos often establish the aspect and arguments of discourse in campaign, and they are employed as a starting point by the party and/or its political adversaries after elections, and by the media also to corroborate that their promises have been realized, or to declare that they have not been honoured. The influence and authority observed in this type of written communication has no comparison. This is the reason why there is no wonder manifestos have drawn the attention of discourse analysis' academics inclined to politics (see Pearce 2004, Edwards, 2012).

In this study, we will investigate UKIP's populism by drawing discourse samples from their manifestos (collected from 2005 to 2015).

Date	Title	N. Pages
2005 ¹¹	We Want our Country Back	8
2010	Empowering the People	16
2014	Create an Earthquake (European Parliament elections)	8
2015	Believe in Britain	76

Table 1: UKIP Manifestos 2005-2015

The first thing to stress is the considerable amount of effort invested into campaigning. As a matter of fact, a crucial element of campaigning is the adoption of manifestos to delineate in detail the concept and models of a political group. Models of democracy are set inside liability. A manifesto indeed serves as a significant criterion for evaluating the efficiency of a government, assuring furthermore its responsibility to voters with attention to the programs and promises conceived in the text. Manifestos have been for a very long time an indispensable script of political management, since significant references of information relate to a party's position on an ample sphere of advancing arguments. It would be reasonable to

¹¹Back in the days, Roger Knapman was the leader.

keep in mind though that, in an attempt to obtain power, manifestos may usually include high standards and impractical programs. The limits between politics and national ambitions are becoming unfocused in several manifestos being published. It is important not to forget a manifesto is a meaningful document deserving analysis in a democratic environment. However, it may also be plausible to affirm that when programs for development assume political hues, it becomes hard for subsequent governments to look for recognition of their reasons by employing the ideals preserved in a text, even if the topic treated had an encompassing subject of national importance.

Election manifestos propose the concepts and principles of parties concurrently, at a specific time point. Following Budge (1994), manifestos are produced on a regular basis, and this tendency makes them an important source to research position shifts over time (Laver & Garry, 2000). The first element to highlight is how distinct is the widespread presence of promotional language and market-influenced vocabulary into the field of manifesto writing. Moreover, the employment of metaphors seem to be the instrument for the creation of the party image pictured through the manifestos. A restricted generic information can also be constructed from the outcomes founded on the structure and the ideas contained in the manifestos. One hypothesis is that there is a given structure basically followed by any manifesto and, therefore, it could be possible to enlarge specific descriptions to include an area which could be defined as the genre of political manifestos. In particular, generic outcomes such as the use of the exclusive 'we', the absence of certain basic parts of argument structure, the adoption of the future tense and the present progressive feature can provide to the definition of the genre of manifesto writing.

What is also important is that different question areas – which may interest aspect such as immigration, economy, welfare and Europe - are organised under a subheading which will present the topic area. This subheading delineates one definite group of policy where details and goals are elucidated. Most certainly, they would not consist in an explicit "Vote for us",

since the electorate is able to implicitly realise that this is the function of these category of texts. However, their “manufacturing” is not for sale as we can observe in promotional writing: what they –seek to - sell is an ideology, their own vision of the world, and an ideal society that can be realised via voting the party into power (Savola, 2008: 111).

3.6.1 The Genre of Online Editorials

I will take into account in this study a number of online editorials by Nigel Farage that attempt to mobilise people by relying on planned controlling strategies in order to determine the way media documents are presented. The editorials were all collected during Brexit campaign, which is to say from July 2015 until June 2016.

Date	Tabloid/Quality Press	Title	Tokens
31/07/2015	Farage for Breitbart	It's time to start the EU Referendum fight	653
09/08/2015	Farage for Breitbart	Calais Chaos will get worse rather than better	482
18/09/2015	Farage for Breitbart	The EU Juggernaut uses the migrant crisis to expand powers	677
04/10/2015	Farage for Breitbart	Universities are rife with EU propaganda. Join my campaign against it	793
11/10/2015	Farage for Breitbart	Hollande and Merkel come to Srasbourg, and more on the 'Leave' Campaign	812
16/10/2015	Farage for Breitbart	The Turkey-EU migrant deal verges of 'Insanity'. A new tides awaits Britain	643
26/10/2015	Farage for Breitbart	Government green commitments means energy	853

		double price germans	
08/11/2015	Farage for Breitbart	Why does Barack Obama's White House hate the United Kingdom	890
13/11/2015	Farage for Breitbart	Europe can't put the migrant champagne cork back in the open border bottles	761
26/11/2015	Farage for Breitbart	Need For A Robust, Flexible and Value For Money. UK Defence Industry Is More Critical Than Ever.	771
06/12/2015	Farage for Breitbart	After Oldham, I'm Adding Voting Reform to my Bucket List	899
10/12/2015	Farage for Breitbart	UK Universities Hotbeds Of EU Propaganda – Stories From Breitbart Readers...	766
20/12/2015	Farage for Breitbart	UK Migration Cover Up: The Government Must Release The REAL Figures Immediately	774
31/12/2015	Farage for Breitbart	Brussels Is Targeting UK Fishermen Like Me, And The UK Papers Ignore It	777
12/01/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Pan-European Migrant Rape Story Response Highlights. The Continent's Unconditional Surrender	724
17/01/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Cameron Fiddles While EU Plans Massive Power Grab	696
22/01/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Labour Think Its 'Racist' To Blame The Cologne Attacks On Migrants	808
05/02/2016	Farage for Breitbart	'Vote Leave' Campaign Are Talking About A 'Double Referendum' – We Can't	346

		Allow It	
13/02/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Why for the first time in 29 Question Time appearances I applauded another member of the panel	691
29/02/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Hurrah For Boris! The 'Double Referendum' Idea Must Surely Now Be Dead	854
13/03/2016	Farage for Breitbart	The SNP Is NOT A Nationalist Party, And That's Why They'll Campaign To Give Scotland To The EU	517
20/03/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Is Cameron REALLY Going To Get A 'Victory' On The Tampon Tax? Don't Be So Sure...	534
05/04/2016	Farage for Breitbart	The Unseen Referendum: Tomorrow's Netherlands' Litmus Test On The European Union	704
10/04/2016	Farage for Breitbart	The Designation Is This Week... Now Let's Unite And Fight!	548
22/04/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Let's Get Real: Would Obama Unconditionally Open Borders To Mexico As We've Done With The EU? No Chance!	674
15/05/2016	Farage for Breitbart	The Immigration Figures Scandal Shows How Powerless We Are Inside The EU	453
29/05/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Hidden Plans EU Army command center leaked ahead Brexit vote	649
01/06/2016	Farage for Breitbart	Leave Tories. Now back	392

		UKIP Immigration Policies. This means we can win.	
05/06/2015	The Telegraph	Join my campaign to leave the EU and get our country back	833
16/06/2015	The Telegraph	It is 'bonkers' to stay in the European Union	944
06/07/2015	The Telegraph	Greece votes No: The European Union is dying before our eyes	597
14/07/2015	The Telegraph	We will all be like Greece if the EU gets its way	1036
29/10/2015	The Telegraph	Britain will be flattened if it stays in the EU	751
02/12/2015	The Telegraph	Ukip will wipe out Labour in the north – just as the SNP did in Scotland	922
06/04/2016	The Telegraph	The Dutch referendum shows how the internet is taking back power from our Europhile elites	565
05/06/2015	Express.co.uk	Farage on Friday: EU referendum a chance to create a better Britain for future generations	591
12/06/2015	Express.co.uk	Farage on Friday: There's little doubt UKIP is the most demonised party in Britain	505
19/06/2015	Express.co.uk	Farage on Friday: David Cameron is whistling in the wind with pitiful EU reform attempts	615
03/07/2015	Express.co.uk	Farage on Friday: The EU does NOT care about what is best for Greece	326
18/07/2015	Express.co.uk	Farage on Friday: Britain	954

		would not only survive but THRIVE out of the EU	
31/07/2015	Express.co.uk	Farage on Friday: We need to be less frightened of France to tackle Calais chaos	363
21/08/2015	Express.co.uk	Farage on Friday: The day of reckoning is coming for Greece and the European Union	452
25/09/2015	Express.co.uk	Together we can free ourselves from the EU's shackles, says Ukip leader NIGEL FARAGE	905
10/10/2015	Express.co.uk	EU's "come one, come all" is causing an exodus of biblical proportions, says Farage	307
30/10/2015	Express.co.uk	Nigel Farage: It's official...Britain's population surge is TOTALLY out of control	418
15/12/2015	Express.co.uk	'The tide has turned' Nigel Farage says poll shows British public want OUT of the EU	400
29/12/2015	Express.co.uk	Fishing farce shows why we must vote to leave EU	439
03/02/2016	Express.co.uk	Farage slams PM for 'utter surrender' to EU dictatorship	443
08/02/2016	Express.co.uk	Nigel Farage: It costs £55 MILLION a day to be an EU member – and for what?	770
11/02/2016	Express.co.uk	Britain must leave the EU and control own borders, says Nigel Farage	480
26/02/2016	Express.co.uk	Nigel Farage: Debate	326

		Britain's broken borders with me, Theresa May	
27/04/2016	Express.co.uk	The EU's green ambitions have cost thousands of jobs in the UK, says Nigel Farage	435
11/05/2016	Express.co.uk	Nigel Farage's EU diary: 'Leave campaign MUST woo Labour voters to win referendum'	466
18/05/2016	Express.co.uk	Farage's EU diary: Time to liven up the debate	310
22/05/2016	Express.co.uk	Turkey joining the EU would be a total disaster for Britain, says Nigel Farage	305
01/06/2016	Express.co.uk	Stop migrants trying to reach Britain by boat or face more chaos, says Nigel Farage	277
21/06/2016	Express.co.uk	Nigel Farage: Why we must vote LEAVE in the EU referendum	1046
20/10/2015	UKIP	This Referendum is not about leaving Europe. It is about our EU membership	230
10/11/2015	UKIP	Nigel Farage responds to the Prime Minister's speech on the EU	88
12/04/2016	UKIP	Farage calls out the IMF - It's only protecting its own as it always does	282
03/05/2016	UKIP	Farage and Boris clear favourites to represent Leave in TV debates	284
09/05/2016	UKIP	UKIP Leader Nigel Farage responds to the PM's EU speech	166

26/05/2016	UKIP	UKIP response to latest immigration figures	364
19/04/2016	The Sun	THIS is how we should control our borders, says Ukip leader Nigel Farage	595
20/06/2016	Mirror	Britain should be a proper democracy and the only way that can happen is Brexit	409

Table 2: Online editorials by Nigel Farage (July 2015-June 2016)

Apparently, online versions of newspapers present the use of language which is fresh, topical and current. The purpose is to develop a systematic analysis of the texts, understanding their meaning and determining the level of implication of discourse in media texts and be capable of providing interpretation as to why and in which manner discourse operates. Following Van Dijk (2006), since “manipulation is usually discursive, and involves power abuse, it should be studied by Critical Discourse Analysis”. It is therefore a calculated discourse that is mainly conveyed to foment people having determined reactions functional to the writer’s political doctrine. Ideology, in fact, has a fundamental role in taking people to the same field of national support and of opposing, insulting and blaming the ‘Other’. For the academic, in addition, manipulation is studied through a triangular methodology: social, cognitive and discursive. Eventually, it will be significant the effect of lexical choices in finely nuanced persuasion and the relevance of schematic organization of editorial discourse (Scollon, 1998).

3.6.2 Political Speeches

As Schäffner affirms, in political discourse “political speech analysis can be successful when it relates the details of linguistic behaviour to political behaviour” (1996: 202). As a consequence, reading the surface of political speech may not make the speaker’s purpose

obvious. With the lack of awareness about context and discourse, people may only be able to comprehend his/her speech in a micro-level perspective.

UKIP political speeches by Nigel Farage were recorded during the above mentioned Say No to Europe Tour from September 2015 to March 2016 and posted online. For the purposes of this study, eight speeches were transcribed, as reported below:

Date	City	Tokens
06/09/2015	Yeovil	3207
14/09/2015	Belfast	5785
12/10/2015	Gateshead	4262
23/10/2015	Swansea	3341
20/11/2015	London	4157
27/11/2015	Basingtoske	4113
16/03/2016	Peterborough	4120
18/03/2016	Bath	3200

Table 3: Political Speeches by Nigel Farage (September 2015-March 2016)

Speeches can be used to question or strengthen dominant cultural, political and beliefs. According to Uvehammer (2005), the primary intention of political speech is to persuade the audience of the public speaker by selecting the most influential linguistic instruments. Thorne (1997) asserts that a good quantity of people hold to be true that language manipulates thought. Therefore, from the moment language is manipulated, so are the real mechanisms of thought. It follows that when the listeners feel that their opinions are accepted and sustained, the speaker instituted linkage to the principles that they aspire to communicate.

CHAPTER 4

Populism as Discourse

4.1 Investigating the Two Sides of a Message

A key element to keep in mind when investigating a (nat)populist discourse is that a populist party has a dissenting and opposing message on purpose, often alleged to be alongside the working class while deprecating the commonly named ‘elites’ of society who are operating against their interests. This way, these parties are believed to be profiting from the dissatisfaction of the general public for political gain (Betz, 1993). In addition, the fact that populists feel certain to have an autonomous powerbase means that they feel entitled to react to elite anger not by retracing their steps or showing diffidence, but with provocation and indeed accentuation of their first observation. Furthermore, for the reason they are not aspiring to impress the ‘best people’, the language they employ could be easily defined as direct, straightforward and without nuance.

A considerable number of scholars have noticed that right-wing populist parties’ leaders are more inclined to state hostility opinions through a rhetoric of exclusion, *which is ingrained not only in the explicit but also in the latent language they use (Riggins, 1997; Wodak, 2003). As expected a good part of discourse remains unspoken, and this kind of latent information may be figured out by the addressees from shared knowledge or mental outlooks and thus created as part of their mental models of the event or action represented in the discourse (van Dijk, 2000).

As a matter of fact, metaphors and other figures of speech are not infrequently used by politicians in political communication as instruments to help people to make sense out of the political sphere (Edelman, 1964).

In view of that, I will display in this chapter, through a merely qualitative content analysis, how both clear and hidden language is adopted to communicate hostility stances and their outstanding features. Nonetheless, this multi-genre inter/multi-disciplinary corpus analysis will disclose an atmosphere saturated with skepticism and doubt that various contemporary studies have recognised this mood to constitute an increasing aspect of advanced neoliberal societies. This discourse investigation will seek to uncover the way a speech, an editorial or a manifesto exploited the precariousness and worries of those Farage and UKIP claimed to represent the “ordinary, decent people” of the post-industrial North-East, South-West, Wales and eastern coastal depressed peripheries, so much confined by the global market economy they were desperately looking for scapegoats. And a supplier.

4.1.1 In-Group Favouritism and the Negative Other

The UKIP party in general and their Leave campaign especially self-styled themselves as a “people’s revolution”, ready to “take back control” from oppressive, yet distant, elites (Smith, 2016: 64).

(Us vs. Them) Polarization; *Derogation*; **National Self-Glorification**

1) “The EU’s (them) open borders make (us) less safe. As a bureaucratic club (them) it makes (us) poorer. Membership of this union stops us acting in **our own national interest**, forcing (us) to be represented by unelected old men in Brussels”

2) “And *our weakness, the weakness of our leaders* has actually allowed in our country the creation of a parallel society. “ (Basingstoke 16/10/2015)

3) «And actually what we’ve seen from our political leaders, in this case a radical Islam, is we have seen appeasement, we have seen *gutlessness*, we have seen a total failure of leadership. » (Basingstoke 16/10/2015)

4) "David Cameron (them) is one of the *biggest cheerleaders* in the whole Europe for full Turkish membership of EU" (Express 21/06/2016)

5) "This is yet another example of how our own citizens (us) are once again suffering due to *the foolish stupidity of the pro-EU political class* (them)". (Express 11/02/2016)

6) "Frankly (plain speaking), it is not strong to say that we've (us) actually been betrayed by our political class (them) who in the name of us, of telling a betrayal agreement, have given away our birthright..."

7) "We have to reach out way beyond Westminster and in particular reach people who generally do not vote at all. For them, the arguments that most are likely to convince are about **pride in our country** and the total necessity to control our borders." (Breitbart 09/10/2015)

CDA inspects the power relations, ideological manipulations, and hegemony (Rahimi & Sahragard, 2007: 1). As a significantly influential academic research, it has stressed the fact that beliefs manipulations are articulated, executed, maintained and, sometimes, indoctrinated through discursive frameworks. According to van Dijk (1983: 10), macro-strategies like the negative other-representation that are strictly bound with Polarization and Us vs. Them have turned out to be very detailed criteria for the assessment of certain political positions. On a micro-level, it comprises of course language and discourse. Us – them polarization was one of the most widespread methods of ideological manipulation in UKIP politics: it reflects the conflict between us – oppressed nation and them – the supranational power detained by the European Union based in Brussels. Us-them polarization we can see, for instance, in "The EU's open borders make us less safe", reveals the existence of particular antagonistic ideologies that groups generate and employ for recognizing and identifying themselves within the organisation of societal structures and affiliations. Conflicts between us and them in sentences like "we've actually been betrayed by our political class", serve also as a method of self-determination and identity making.

Nationalistic energies have been relighted thanks to a compelling rhetorical combination of nostalgia, resentments and imagined destiny (Parry, 2016: 63). Analytical classifications such as national self-glorification constitute the schemes adopted for positive self-presentation. Positive references are usually employed to praise for their own country, its values, history and fundamentals. In other words "our own national interest". Sonia Rocas and her

colleagues have currently perfected this distinction into a more largely suitable scale that distinguishes between in-group connection (related to patriotism) and in-group glorification (related to nationalism) (Roccas *et al.* 2006: 698). That means the more in-group glorification, the more apology for the misconducts, and the less guilt (Castano & Sorolla, 2007: 810).

In political discourse, derogatory words are part of the semantic component of any language to reach specific responses from the audience. For what concerns the semantic macro-strategy of derogation of out-group, it is necessary to highlight it is a semantic device to deemphasise (van Dijk, 2000). In fact, the process of derogation may entail prejudiced opinions such as in the phrase “by unelected old men in Brussels” and ideological conflict. Derogation has been largely used for materialising the primary ideological purpose of Negative Other Representation vs. Positive Self-Representation. Farage shows political subjects on a spontaneous platter by downgrading his political enemies (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 274). This stratagem, quite noticeable in “*the biggest cheerleader in the whole Europe*” – referred to former PM David Cameron - frequently confirms to be valid and profitable when he is affecting the delicate issue of political frustration not only among companion politicians, but also among the elective public. It is important not to overlook that the characterisation of Cameron as a cheerleader discloses how much British politicians are portrayed as eunuchs – “gutlessness” - according to the former UKIP leader, completely enslaved to a German-European bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the characteristics associated with men in western culture (grouped under the term ‘traditional masculinity’ by many writers) combine to form an *active* role, as opposed to the typically *passive* qualities often associated with females (see “our (their) weakness, the weakness of our leaders”). Moreover, by seeking to gain scores with voters being disillusioned with mainstream-politics, politically indifferent ones and the ‘decent’ people, Farage’s plan of a straightforward and offensive language to obtain approval might actually result extremely effective

Another efficient strategy noticeable in Farage's Brexit campaign is the one of "victimisation", in which 'the people' are presented as the unfairly expiatory victims enduring the repercussions of the political elite's false decisions (Lee, 2006: 363). Telling bad stories about nations such in the examples "open borders make (us) less safe. As a bureaucratic club (them) it makes (us) poorer" or blaming "for full Turkish membership of EU", constitute methods to focus on their bad nature and represent the consequence of in-groups and out-groups in polarization.

4.1.2 Repetitions

Repetition is a frequent tool in political rhetoric. It consists in the repetition of the same word or group of words at the start of various subsequent sentences, to underline an image or theory, or to persuade the reader or audience. As a matter of fact, politicians regularly use it to stimulate audiences or readers to keep in mind critical features of their speeches. Repetition has an effect of accretion and insistence, therefore it focuses and emphasizes on what the speaker needs his audience to remember (Chimbarange *et al.* 2013: 282):

8) Our message in last June's euro-election was simple: *SAY NO to European Union*. But we also *say NO to the culture of paperwork*, performance targets and spin, *NO to uncontrolled immigration*, *NO to a society in which everything is regulated* and dissent is suppressed by fear and political correctness. (2005 Manifesto, R. Knapman)

9) "*Outside the EU, we can manage our borders* and decide who we want to come and live and work in the UK. EU rules stop us from doing this. **Reducing Fuel Poverty:** *Outside the EU, we can abolish EU laws* that add hundreds of pounds to household energy bills." (Euro Manifesto 2014)

10) "So I get *why big companies*, I get *why big business* and in many ways I get *why big politics* likes the European Union."

11) "You know, *look in your passport. Look in your passport*. Apart for the fact it has changed colour everybody used to be, one of the *two words on the British passport* it says *European Union*. And *that passport* is now held by *four-hundred eighty-five million people* and any one of them at any time has the ability and free access to come to our country."

12) "But to make sure that we can win this Referendum and to hand on our children and grandchildren the liberties and freedom that we were born into and wish to maintain. We can win this Referendum, we can beat the establishment." (Swansea 23/10/2015)

13)” And *I had planned, I had planned* to ask him who the hell he thought he was, *of why anybody have ever voted for him, and why we didn’t have the power to remove him, and why he was being payed more money than Obama.*” (Belfast 14/09/2015)

14) “*We will work with anybody, we will share platform with anybody. We will do whatever it takes, we want our country back, we don’t want to stay members of the European Union and we recognized and understand that we won’t win this Referendum unless we get significant numbers of people from the centre-left of politics to vote to leave the EU as well*” (Yeovil 06/09/2015)

Repetitions help to set the crucial ideas in the public’s thinking, but they also highlight the leading themes favourite to the speaker. The frequency of words is an ordinary characteristic of Farage’s speeches that sometimes bring to a sort of chant (Pierini, 2016: 280). As expressions of ideologies, discourses shape individual and collective consciousness, and awareness persuades people’s processes. That is, through the repetition of concepts and assertions, discourse solidifies knowledge (Jäger & Maier, 2009) and manifests, forms and facilitates social reality. In addition, repetition of the pronoun we as in “we can win this Referendum”, “we don’t want to stay members of the European Union” or “we can manage our borders”, can be considered as calculated manipulation determined to coax any free and proud British into conveying and demonstrating a sense of self-respect and patriotism.

4.1.3 Number game and Epistemic Modality

Number game is one of the measures that intend to underscore objectivity, hence enhancing credibility (Hart & Lukes, 2007: 103). Following van Dijk (2000: 75), numbers represent the fact against mere opinions and impressions. Numbers, as we can observe in figures like “that passport is now held by 485 million people”, are utilised with the precise aim to achieve a more powerful impact in politically experienced catchphrases. For Bos et al. (2011), instead, number strategy refers to how well-informed a politician is about the political topic discussed. In theory, voters base their electoral choice on solid grounds such in “400,000

net per year or even half a million”, although how quantitative evidence will turn out convincing is still a limited component for a successful persuasion:

15)“Even more money will be saved by scrapping EU red tape on business, which cost **£106 billion in 2008** and **will cost £356 billion by 2018** (according to a 2009 estimate from Open Europe). “ (UKIP 2010 Manifesto)

16)“The 2008 Climate Change Act costs an estimated £18bn per year – **that’s more than £500 for every household in the UK**. We will scrap this Act...” (Euro Manifesto 2014)

17)“Raise the threshold for **paying 40 per cent income tax to £55,000** and introduce a new intermediate tax rate of 30 per cent on **incomes ranging between £43,500 and £55,000.**” (2015 General Election Manifesto)

18) “Home Office figures up to 2013 show us **that in the previous ten year period there were 240,000 main applicants**, not including dependents. Of those, **83,000 were granted asylum** or given some form of humanitarian protection.” (Breitbart 07/08/2015)

19)“And that passport is now held by **485 million people** and anyone of them, at any time, has the ability and free access to come to our country” (Swansea 23/10/2015)20)“The ONS figures assume that from 2020 onwards net migration per year **will be running at 185,000**. That seems awfully low given the current level we are running at is **330,000 per year.**” (Express 30/10/2015)

21)“... net migration would be (high probability) even higher, perhaps up to **400,000 net per year** or even half a million each year.” (Express 21/06/2016)

Discourse on immigration in the UK, as in most part of Western Europe, is characterized by an increasing politicization of immigration as we can infer from all those number reports. The term “politicization” (Colombo, 2013: 170) is taken to mean the steady rise in importance of the immigration question, until it becomes a central part of the political agenda (Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2009).

For what concerns the definition of epistemic modality, we are referring to a modal verb adopted to express the speaker’s opinion about a statement. Epistemic modality concerns the class of knowledge the speaker or writer has about what he is saying or writing. It deals in fact with what the speaker or writer is aware about the world. Besides, it entails that the speaker evaluates the probability that the proposition is true in terms of the modal certainty, probability or possibility (Downing & Locke, 1992: 332). Seven modal auxiliary verbs are generally employed to communicate epistemic modalising meanings: *can*, *could*, *may*, *might*, *need*, *will*, *would* (Garzone, 2001: 169). Specifically, epistemic modality expresses prediction

(e.g. *will*, *would*) and/or probability if considered what Farage states in example number 7, that is “net migration would be even higher”. Within CDA, modality is retained to affect the writer’s (or speaker’s) approach towards and/or certainty in the proposition being presented. In sum, the future events referred to were in UKIP former leader’s rhetoric definitely likely to happen.

4.1.4 Deontic Modality and Negative Politeness

As UKIP’s spokesperson and charismatic leader, Farage proposed policy actions that are considered indispensable to accomplish this Europe-free desired world through linguistic expressions of deontic modality indicating degrees of essentiality, attractiveness, and immediate necessity of proposed policies and change. Deontic language consists in a semantic category that illustrates “the degree to which an assessor [...] can commit him- or herself to the state of affairs in terms of certain principles” (Nuyts et al. 2010: 17). In addition, deontic phrases often indicate some kind of process apropos that ideal. According to the approach followed by Palmer, deontic modality is involved “with the expression by the speaker of his attitude towards possible actions by himself and others” (1986: 121).

The exaggerated description of the highly deontic auxiliary verbs - such as ‘must’ - is notably interesting for the intention of party positioning as they reveal degrees of attractive quality and necessity:

- 22) “The only way for Britain is UKIP’s way: we must leave.” (2005 G.E. Manifesto)
- 23) “Religious school materials must not teach hatred of the western world and must be congruent with British values. Sharia courts must not override UK law.” (2010 G.E. Manifesto)
- 24) “We do not have to be members of the EU in order to trade with the EU, or any other country.” (2015 G.E. Manifesto)
- 25) “...but what I do see as an issue is that we must absolutely make sure that we do nothing to encourage people to seek refugee’s states in this country who come from Mediterranean.” (Yeovil 06/09/2015)
- 26) “If you want to do those things then you have to say NO to European Union, take back control of our country, take back control of our borders and perhaps get back some of our pride and self-respect that those generations who went before us had.” (Gateshead 12/10/2015)

27) I firmly believe the EU should follow the example of Australia which, in 2008, made it clear that migrants arriving by boats would not make Australia their home.” (Dailymail 28/06/2015)

28) “These measures are utterly disproportionate and wrong. And George Eustice, our minister in charge of Fisheries, should hang his head in shame for not standing up to the Brussels bullies.” (Breitbart 28/12/2015)

For what concerns the connection between speech acts and politeness Leech (1999: 117) chooses to call Searle’s ‘directive’ acts ‘impositive’, with the purpose to define the ‘competitive’ nature of these illocutions. ‘Negative politeness’ describes this competitive class of acts, whose most explicit linguistic phenomenon is constituted by the imperative mood. Its use entails the absence of alternative for the listener/reader apart that to obey. According to Larreya (2004: 743), the use of ‘must’ – deontically modalized future - is specifically present in very formal registers such as political speeches (e.g. “that we must absolutely make sure that we do nothing to encourage people to seek refugee’s states in this country”). He suggests furthermore that the high frequency of ‘must’ in political discourse, in particular construction types and other formal registers reflects a particular formula of the genre, which we can see in certain pragmatic effects.

Moreover, in the reported examples from the General Election’s manifestos and speeches, it is interesting to notice that besides the adoption of the inclusive ‘we’ in “we do not have to be members of the EU in order to trade with the EU” and “If you want to do those things then you have to say NO to European Union”, Farage relies on his politeness plan of ‘including’ the audience in an act of justice on the actual necessity ordered by an extrinsic authority – which is Farage itself in this case - that the modal ‘have to’ expresses. As a result, the audience is recognised as able to decide for themselves on the same page of the speaker’s political doctrine. On a general point of view, contemporary UKIP politeness strategy has always signified appearing moderate and boosting the interlocutor’s negative reaction against their common enemy. What it comes out is that the mitigation of the directive illocutionary force relying on the use of modal such as ‘should’ (see the last two examples from editorials

reported) can be attributed to the deontic significance of the modal: it communicates moral obligation (advice), resulting in being less peremptory than ‘must’.

4.1.5 Blends: Proximization Theory

ODC’S Inevitably Fast Growth ; Construction of threat listing specific consequences

The performance of crisis, essence of any potentially menacing implications, is a compelling strategy in political debate. Farage indeed linked together a number of recognised failures as symptoms attributed to a “crumbling” and “failed” EU such as a reckless immigration policy of migrants from Northern Africa, inadequacy of British independence in global trade negotiations, the “destruction of British liberty and freedom” by adopting European human rights. (Bossetta, 2014. 4). The first two of the main features of the Proximization Theory concentrates on the main principles of fear project construction through language:

29)“But perhaps one of the consequences of our being part of the European Union that maybe will dominate this referendum more than any other is *the consequence of us now having a total open border to nearly half a million people*” (Swansea 23/10/2015)

30)“A future inside the European Union would mean our population rising ever faster at a completely out of control and irresponsible rate.” (Express 21/06/2016)

Discourse Space Theory is *de facto* absorbed within Proximization Theory: it consists in linguistic references to evoke closeness of the external threat to ask for consent (Cap, 2013: 294). Sometimes these quotations stimulate a mental threat where ODC crosses the space to invade the IDC. As a consequence, Discourse Space peripheral entities (*economic migrants*) are predicted to physically unify upon the Discourse Space central entities (speaker, addressees).

4.1.6 Exaggeration, Dramatisation, Dystopia

It is frequent politicians intentionally adopt stratagems like exaggeration to emphasise certain concepts and to intensify eloquence when rhetorically predicting dystopian situations:

31) "If we Remain our country **will never be the same again**. Our public services **will be pushed to the point of failure** and our national security **will be greatly weakened as EU open borders expand further still.**"

Albertazzi (2007: 335) defines "dramatisation" the "need to generate tension in order to build up support for the party (...) by denouncing the tragedies that would befall the community if it were to be deprived of its defences". With a Remain outcome the country "will never be the same again" since social Welfare "will be pushed to the point of failure" (we could also reconnect to the prediction in epistemic modality). Farage of course refers to a (perceived) crisis to build up a dystopian narrative in case of an IN victory in the referendum. It appears clearly stated in example n.11 that the polarization implied by the former UKIP frontman preferably affects sub-categories of outgroups (the EU in this case) in order not to directly blame human beings but rather elites wicked immigration policies.

4.1.7 UKIP Narrative and Dystopic Consequences of a Remain Future

The performance of crisis, root of any potentially threatening implications, is an effective plan in political debate. As a matter of fact, Farage linked together a number of perceived failures as symptoms attributed to a "crumbling" and "failed" EU such as an irresponsible immigration policy of migrants from Northern Africa, a scarcity of British independence in global trade negotiations, the "destruction of British liberty and freedom" by adopting European human rights. (Bossetta, 2014: 4). The first two of the main features of the Proximity Theory concentrates on the main principles of fear project construction through language:

Dystopia (anti-utopia) – ODC'S Inevitably Fast Growth

32) "To Remain would mean not just net migration at the current **record high levels**, but at rates even **higher in the future** as the likes of Turkey and others become **full EU** members"

By narrating every single sentence as a future world in agony (hence dystopian), where the victory of the Remain side is envisaged as nothing but one with a pessimistic outlook, there are in these examples typical highlights of the populist's policies grip on the country's social and cultural environment (Kurlat-Ares, 2016: 431).

Construction of threat listing specific consequences

A national-populist party pursues an agenda which is firmly opposed to the European Union or other institutions of supra-national governance, a depicted situation where countries have irretrievably lost control of their domestic power:

33) “With a population of 80 million, open borders with Turkey would be **a total disaster** for our country”

According to Cap (2013: 208), to specify the effects of a permanence within the Political Union concretises the ODC in terms of its verified ability to hit IDC's territory from all sides, even on (apparently) long distances.

Verbs in the progressive (spatial) and Dramatisation

34) «Sharing a land border with Syria, Iraq and Iran (referred to Turkey) **would be madness**»

The presence of verbs in the progressive (sharing) suggest the closeness of the threat (spatial and temporal proximization), and the employment of modal auxiliaries (would) pave the way gradually for a change from the secure past (*states quo ante*) to an obscure future.

Verbs in the progressive (spatial and temporal), number game, outgroup

35) “Security bosses have warned that **ISIS** are already entering Europe in large numbers”

36) “**Net migration** now regularly running at over **300,000 every year**”

37) “Invest an extra **£12 billion into the NHS**; **put £5.2 billion more into social care**; build a dedicated military hospital and abolish hospital parking charges” (2015, G.E Manifesto)

38) «**The same Eu** that is expecting an influx of an additional one million migrants this year alone, with the EU's owns officials warnin an imminent catastrophe”

In the list of sentences reported above the ODC has already invaded the IDC, hence the emphasis on the emergency situation about net migration. Particularly significant for the campaign the game will be the numbers game: this refers to how knowledgeable a politician is about the political topic discussed. Theoretically, voters base their electoral preference on substantial grounds even though whether quantitative evidence could be convincing is still a partial element for a successful persuasion. Moreover, clearly stated in the example n.6 is the polarization implied by the populist party which also affects sub-categories of outgroups (the EU in this case) in order not to directly blame human beings but the wicked immigration policies.

39) “**British people** (US) who are keen to work, but whose **lives have been made** so much harder by our **irresponsible political establishment** (THEM) who have opened up our borders and have the ability to limit the number of those coming from the Eastern Europe.”

40) “We must once again become a self-governing, independent nation that controls our borders.”

In a polarized construction, in-group actors often present themselves as victims. This kind of self-pity linguistically turns into Farage’s report of unwilling other-directed subjects through the use of passive verbal forms to prove how the Others downplay the “good-people” for self-centered purposes.

Diachronic Strategy

In a kind of speech that refers to mostly sceptic and unorganized followers, it is easy to find historical flashbacks and a narrative build-up of the current situation, which both engage proximization strategies (Cap, 2013: 297):

41) “It’s very good that **in 1940** we had politicians with genuine patriotic courage. **This time** it is not the politicians that can save this country but the people, **if they have self-confidence** and believe in Britain”

In this example, Farage works on a diachronic level: he evokes situation of a remote past proximized to underline continuity, thus linking the current policy. Once again, the mark on inclusive operation working on polarization of US vs. THEM (as aforementioned) reveals to be strong in the framework of national-populist parties.

4.1.8 Proximization Theory Analysis

The final part of this chapter dedicated to Farage editorial's analysis will be based on the axiological proximization, or the ideological construction of a clash between Discourse Space ICD's Central Entities – Western Civilization and Discourse Space OCD's Foreigner – Islamic Countries. But before exploring this thorny issue, it is primary to highlight that UKIP has been reporting for years about a damaging downgrade to 'racism' by mainstream parties and lined up media. The MEP certainly complains that immigration has made parts of the country appear 'unrecognisable' and like 'a foreign land' (2014). In particular, he links EU adhesion to increased immigration from Islamic countries thus linking its policy of Euroscepticism, which usually has less public significance, with the concern of immigration, which has a much higher salience among the electorate (Tournier-Sol, 2015: 146):

42) "What about the treatment of **our women** by **refugees** and **immigrants**?"

43) "She (Margot Parker, UKIP's MEP) rightly went on (straightforward talk) to say that our open door policy to people from countries where **women are treated** as **second class citizens** had directly led to increase in sex assaults."

Abundant pluralization of the effected entities

44) "If **we** remain in this Union we will be even more vulnerable to terrorism (dystopia) and to the **kinds of scenes** that **we saw** in Cologne on New Year's Eve"

The crystal clear reference to the Cologne train station's attacks to the detriment of about 80 women who reported sexual assaults and robbery by Arab men on New Year's Eve and the angry reaction to the episode presented a space where ODC overlapped the IDC and the pivot of the fear construction built on scaremongering attributed to UKIP and populist parties on a wider framework in academics studies.

Central national vs peripheral – international interests

All of the negative events of the last years, according to editorials which constitute only a marginal part of a much wider and diversified corpus campaign, are caused by the UK permanence within the EU which follows their own aims and goes to damage Britain's sovereignty. The solution and leitmotiv offered by the (former) UKIP leader belongs to a direct causation easy for the public to understand:

45) "The alternative to all of **this** is that we vote **to Leave, take back control of our democracy and take back control of our borders**"

46) "**We must leave the European Union so** that not only can **wages increase** for **British** workers but **so** that **living standards** rather than declining can **start going up**"

47) "The **jobs of British people** - and the jobs of the five million Europeans who work here – **are not dependent on EU membership and will be safe when we leave the EU**"

By these last reported examples it comes to light that in right-wing parties, the implementation of the notions of a 'third way', of an alternative between left and right are cautiously adopted to present themselves as the only anti-establishment force in support of the *volonté générale*.

4.2 Self-Identification in UKIP

Several studies have demonstrated the way of escalation about social taboos against publicly declared xenophobic opinions has contributed to an advancement of discursive strategies that show negative idea of 'outsiders' as tolerable while securing the speaker/writer from accuses of racism and chauvinism. First of all, it is primary to put out that UKIP has been complaining for years of a prejudicial reductionism to 'racism' by media opinion and parties: their manifesto has been labelled as a political programme combining anti-political establishment populism, a quest to return to the status quo ante (including the priority to preserve the national identity), and welfare chauvinist racism and xenophobia. As the following selected samples from Gateshead and Bath 's transcription, and a Breitbart's editorial, report:

48)“I said to you earlier that those that rubbish us and said we’re anti-European. There was even a former Tory Chancellor the other week he was incredibly snobby about us and he said we’re xenophobes. We don’t xenophobes! We’re not against anybody but we recognized that immigration into Britain in the 1950’s , and the 1960’s, and the 1970’s, and the 1980’s, and the 1990’s until Mr. Blair got into power...but for that half a century we had as a country an open mind about control migration into Britain.” (Gateshead 12/10/2015)

49)“And I am not against, we’re not against a sensible balanced immigration policy. But I wanna win this referendum so that we have stopped an open door to half a billion people as so that we can put in place and Australian-style point system so we can decide who comes to Britain.”(Bath 18/03/2016)

This defence from overplayed accusations employed by political opponents constitute part of a peculiar type of biased position that identifies racism with something but compulsory and physically violent. A sort of amiss intolerance coming from the out-grouped establishment, where political parties and their supporters seek to position themselves as ordinary, normal and reasonable (Ashe, 2015: 15). In addition, ‘race talk’ and opposition to immigration has been usually considered an undeniable element of extreme right-wing parties, but UKIP could be rather defined as a slightly nationalist right-wing movement which succeeded in intercepting Northern England’s let down Labour voters for the Leave Victory.

As a matter of fact, *populists rhetoric expresses* issues in a ‘frank’ method, and Farage’s solutions are most of times *straightforward* so as the discursive practises employed:

50) “For too many years any criticism of immigration numbers or its effects on society have been shut down by the loud cry of “racism”. (Breitbart 22/01/2016)

51) “And frankly, to have opened up the doors irresponsibly to countries where the minimum wage is a tenth of what it is in this country...you didn’t have to be a rocket scientist did you to work out what was going to happen.” (London 20/11/2015)

52) “And frankly I think it was wholly irresponsible of our politicians, of our governments to have allowed this to happen.”(Gateshead 12/10/2015)

His speeches can be explained as attention-getting, blunt and highly straightforward, which not usually follow the rules of politeness and diplomacy.

4.2.1 Victimization as Self-Representation

In the examples previously reported and analysed it is possible to notice, between lines, that when the ‘others’ tend to be depicted under a negative point of view, especially when

associated with threats, then the in-group is in turn represented as a victim of this ‘proximized’ threat. The partial representations encountered in this point of investigation are used to ‘delegitimize’ (van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) the other’s ideologies and legitimize their own stances reflected in the social memory (van Dijk, 2000) of the group. More to the point, the speaker/writer tends to alter or deceive the manipulative intention of inclusion and exclusion. Such an alteration generates positive or negative beliefs on the part of the listeners/readers.

This is exactly what occurs when Farage applies the move of *Inversion* in order to emphasize that it is not the Others who are discriminated against, but *We* and *Our* ‘inside deictic-center’ (Cap, 2013: 294):

53)“Our political class over the last few decades have lost confidence in this country, have lost confidence in our people, they don’t think we’re good enough to stand on our own two feet, to govern ourselves, to make our own laws, to make our own trade deals and to control our borders.” (Basingstoke)

54)“But the real point is this: at that I turned to look at Nick it were no point in the whole of the two hours ever turned to look at me and I said to him, I said “The trouble is you don’t think we are good enough, do you?”. And I could see I actually cut him to the quick because that’s what it’s all about ladies and gentlemen ever since so is the people in Westminster have just not thought this country was good enough, just did not believe we were capable of running our own lives without being part of some giant undemocratic European club.” (Belfast 14/09/2015)

During his public statements, the UKIP leader has often resorted to a deceitful inclusive operation as part of a populist strategy where the singular first person pronoun *we* does not refer to Farage and the audience itself, but to the Juggernaut EU and/or the British Parliament and their mistaken political choices:

55)“Since 2004, when we’ve mistakenly opened the door to countries that are not long escaping from Communism, countries that were incredibly poor, net migration even on the official figures it was running at ten times per annum what it did from a Post-War period. And I am not against, we’re not against a sensible balanced immigration policy.”

56)“And now we have agreed to send them six billions on a vane promise they would stand the flow that’s coming across the Mediterranean every single day. But it get worse than that! What we’ve agreed today in Brussels is that they will be by the summer of this year Visa-free access for seventy-seven million Turks to come into the European Union.” (Bath 18/03/2016)5757)”But we wanted the relationship with the Europe to be one of

neighbourly coexistence, not one where we signed up to that currency, not one where we surrendered total control of our borders and not one where our laws are made somewhere else and where the Supreme Court of our land can be overruled by a court in Luxembourg or Strasbourg.” (Belfast (14/09/2015)

58) “By restoring British tax sovereignty, which we lost when we signed up to the EU...” (2015 General Manifesto)

59) “How can it be right that we have opened up our borders totally and unconditionally to the EU, allowing anyone with an EU passport to come?” (Mirror 19/06/2016)

So, when Nigel Farage maintains that “we” have mistakenly opened the door to people who were not escaping from Communism anymore, that “we” agreed to send six million billions (to Turkey) to contain mass flood because “we” have opened “our” borders unconditionally to EU, he is employing the three core-issues of the party altogether: anti-immigration, anti-establishment and, of course, anti-EU.

4.3 Threat Construction of a Negative-Other

In this eternal fight which sees lined up the people versus their antagonistic ‘other’, according to van Dijk (2000: 222), the overall strategy of most of the so called minority political discourse is to emphasize positive properties of us against the rivals. For example, polarization of US vs. THEM has been implied by the populist party which also affects sub-categories of outgroups (the EU in this case) in order not to directly blame human beings but weak immigration policies:

60) “So, those arguments but uncontrolled mass immigration I think I made, made well understood but ladies and gentlemen this is now all taken a very new, and I’m gonna suggest to you potentially very dangerous risk because what we saw in April of last year was Mr. Juncker, the Commission President, announcing that we’re going to embark upon a European Union common asylum policy.” (Peterborough 16/03/2016)

61) “**Immigration is not about race; it is about space. Immigrants are not the problem; it is the current immigration system that is broken.**” (2015 G.E. Manifesto)

62) “At the moment, the European Union’s common asylum policy has absolutely no means whatsoever of checking anybody’s background and **I would say that we must not allow a compassion to imperil our safety.**” (Yeovil 06/09/2015)

In any event, the very first characteristic affixed to whatever kind of migrants coming to the country is in terms of their figures: the exaggeration of prospective uncontrolled migration

threats incoming to the UK from the rest of the world, the so-called scaremongering speech to national citizens, the threat construction of metaphors concerning floods of immigrants and the tactic to blame the EU and their elites as responsible for insecurity in the European mainland, and of course in their own country:

63)“When ISIS say they will use the migrant tide to flood Europe with five hundred thousand of their own jihadists I think we’ll better listen. **Five hundred thousand may not be realistic** but what if it’s five thousand, what if it’s five hundred and already, one of the ISIS terrorists’ suspects who committed the first atrocity against all the Americans in Tunisia has been seen getting of a boat onto Italian soil.” (Yeovil 06/09/2015)

64)“ISIS have said they will use the migrant tide to flood the European continent with half a million of their jihadists. Now, even if that figure is wrong I would suggest even fifty-thousand is too many. Even if only one percent of that figure is right, I would suggest five-thousand is too many, I would suggest five-hundred is too many. It only took eight to cause that destruction in Paris the other night so we need to be careful.”

65)“To the point is that open door immigration even to those who are not really particularly interested in politics or self-government or sovereignty. Every one of us can see how fundamentally society has changed over the course of the last twelve years. **And who’ve been the winner from this? Well I’ll tell you! It’s been the big multinational companies** because they now have access to unlimited cheap labour and what that has done to the lives of millions of ordinary decent British families, it’s driven down their wages and it’s driven down their living standards and for government, for Labour and Conservative they’ve presided over a fall in the living standards of ordinary decent taxpaying law-abiding people in this country, is in my view a complete and utter disgrace.”

(Peterborough 16/03/2016)

To legitimate actions and policies (only policies for UKIP), the speaker proposes to neutralize the negative impact of foreign and antagonistic entities (Cap, 2013: 293). Moreover, it is possible to observe, through the samples reported above, the menace outlined by the high numbers of immigrants perceived by the population, the sense of loss of national identity and, on the other hand, “the competition for the economic and social resources and the state investment destined to immigration” (Checa Olmos J.C, & Arjona Garrido, 2013: 118).

4.4 I-n Group Pronouns

As stated in the previous chapter on methodology, the strategic adoption of pronouns, address terms and personal mentions merge to further highlight the speakers' individual political ideas and moral positions. In addition, it is important to say that in politics the concepts of ideology and identity are closely bound with the use of pronouns. As a matter of fact, pronouns can indicate (or hide) community and individuality (Fairclough 2003), or they can be employed for 'self' or 'other' referencing or as a way to divide representations of in-groups and outgroups (Van Dijk, 2001). The meaning of pronouns is deeply conditioned by "the social and political 'spaces' within which people and groups are positioned or position themselves" (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997). Eventually, third person pronouns can underline closeness and/or distance in connection with 'self' and 'other' referencing and its distance from the 'deictic centre' – of which "I" and its variations can be defined the centre – of the distancing scale (Cap, 2013; Chilton, 2004; Wilson, 1990):

66) **I** am a party leader that takes Northern Ireland seriously and **believes** it is a must remain and integral and valued part of the United Kingdom (Belfast 14/09/2015)

67) **I** suspect the reality of all of this is that Britain's population overall is several million higher than the official figures would have us believe (FFB, 13/05/2016)

68) **I** urge you to vote for us and elect UKIP members to our national parliament (2005 Manifesto R.Knapman)

69) **I** regret to say, that my prediction of this mild attempt to make this genuine debate in the General Election failed totally (Yeovil 06/09/2015)

70) When **I** still say that **they want to flood our continent with half a million Islamic extremists** they mean it.

71) **They are using a series of threats to make you think that you're not good enough and we're not good enough** to survive on our own (Express 07/02/2016)

72) Yet all the old political parties remain firmly committed to the EU. They still pretend that, despite the experience of 30 years of 'negotiating', **it can be shaped in Britain's interests**. (2005 Manifesto R. Knapman)

73) The current political elite - 'the LibLabConsensus' - need to hide this massive surrender of power from the voters. **They employ tactics** such as introducing EU laws as obscure statutory instruments and regularly **deny the reality of who actually runs our country**. (2010 Manifesto)

74) **They say that the EU is the future**, and that we couldn't survive outside it: but we're the world's 6th largest economy, and while the EU share of world trade is shrinking, our prospects are very good indeed. (2014 EU Manifesto)

75) Other political parties will promise to control immigration, but while **they continue to support the UK's membership of the EU**, they are not being honest with the electorate.

4.5 Different Outgroup Representations Through Different Rhetorical

Devices

According to scholars such as Sauer (2003), in the analysis of – for instance – a speech we can find both an effort to persuade and an effort to transform discursive practices by the UKIP leader to offer British people a new way to consider nationalism and populist thinking. That is why, in this part, I will be proposing how Farage, as spokesman of this minor party, mixes in his language “the paradigm of classical rhetoric and modern political communication” (Fairclough, 1996: 286).

Farage asks questions he knows the answers to. Repeated rhetorical questions that reproach, inveigh or express grief are classically called *erotema*¹² or *epiplexis*¹³. As instance, an adequately structured *erotema* will guide the audience to the opinion that the speaker needs them to come to. Moreover, two or three questions can be strung together in quick series for additional effect:

76) **This project** – yeah I’m sure you’ve seen it, I can’t stand that flag **what about you?** – this project has been funded by the European Union. Yuppie! **Isn’t that marvellous?** Wales has been the recipient of European Union money, **ain’t that wonderful?** (Swansea 23/10/2015)

77) Well I ask you: “Do you in the light of what has happened in Paris last week; do you in the light of the fact they’ve decided to continue the open door to the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans; **do you feel safer as members of the European Union or do you think like us that is time to say no?** To take back control of our borders and to make sure that never again do we have unprecedented immigration into Britain without our ability to check whether people have criminal records, **whether they have traits and skills** to bring to this country, **whether they’re bringing their own medical insurance?**” (Basingstoke 16/11/2015)

78)This referendum is: “**Do we wish** to be British? **Do we wish** to govern ourselves? **Do we wish** to be the masters of our own destiny?” (Bath 18/03/2016)

By evoking negative connotation, peculiarity of a fear-driven discourse, the use of emotive language in words such as ‘British’, and ‘masters of our destiny’ is deliberately employed to touch emotionally the audience’s objective perception of the situation (Castello, 2013: 13).

¹²New Latin, from Greek, from *erōtaein* to ask.

¹³ Latin reproof, from Ancient Greek to strike at, reprove.

Moreover, the distinct stress on “they” is symptom of how outgroup social actors – migrants – and their actions are implicitly put under an umbrella of common concern (unskilled, NHS sponger).

In rhetoric, *epiplexis* consists in an interrogative figure of speech in which questions are asked with the purpose of condemning or discrediting rather than to obtaining answers. In a broader sense, *epiplexis* represents a form of verbal fight in which the speaker pursues his intent to embarrass the opponent by using a specific point of view. In other terms, this rhetorical device can be described as a peculiar form of a rhetorical question where a critic or an attack is asked as a question:

79) "You have the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk. And the question that I want to ask [...] that we're all going to ask, is: **Who are you?** I'd never heard of you. Nobody in Europe had ever heard of you. I would like to ask you, President: **Who voted for you? And what mechanism?** Oh, I know democracy's not popular with you lot. **And what mechanism do the peoples of Europe have to remove you? Is this European democracy?** Well, I sense, though, that you're competent and capable and dangerous. And I have no doubt that it's your intention to be the quiet assassin of European democracy and of the European nation states." (Belfast 14/09/2015)

10) Why do you think we have a housing crisis? **How on earth can you plan for health provision? How on earth can you plan for primary school places if you haven't got a clue** in the next five or ten years how many people were actually living in the country? **And what about the effect of that?** (Gateshead 12/10/2015)

81) "Ask yourself a question '**Would you buy a used car from this Commission?**'...The question that I want to ask, the question that we're gonna ask is '**Who are you? Who voting for you?**'" (Basingstoke 16/10/2015)

As we can see in the two examples above reported, the pronoun “you” is both referred to an hypothetical audience (would you buy...) and a different kind of “you” which discloses his *real* purpose: to berate the E.U. president and the process of his selection.

This third and last rhetorical device employed by Farage in his speeches prominently here reported is the *hypophora*. It may be interesting to point out that technically, *hypophora* is the question, while *anthyphora* is the answer. Nonetheless, *hypophora* is commonly adopted to indicate both question and answer. The question or questions in a *hypophora* will frequently be used to create a long answer, which is the objective the speaker aspires to make:

82) You give me 20 quid, I give you ten quid back. You tell me how much better off you feel about that deal, alright? Because, because that is actually what is going on. We pump in 55 million pounds as a membership fee to this club and we get less of half of it back. Much of what comes back comes in the form of agricultural support and subsidy. (Belfast 14/09/2015)

83) That is what laughingly is called a British passport. You all got one, but you know what the first two words on there are? It says European Union. And that passport is now held by nearly five-hundred million people all of whom have the freedom to come to Britain, to work in Britain, to use the social security system in Britain and frankly, that's not good enough. (London 20/11/2015)

84) And who've been the winner from this? Well I'll tell you! It's been the big multinational companies because they now have access to unlimited cheap labour and what that has done to the lives of millions of ordinary decent British families, it's driven down their wages and it's driven down their living standards and for government, for Labour and Conservative they've presided over a fall in the living standards of ordinary decent taxpaying law-abiding people in this country, is in my view a complete and utter disgrace (applause). (Peterborough 13/03/2016)

85) **What do we wish to achieve** from our negotiations with the EU? **Our objectives are clear:** Firstly, **we will secure** trade agreements with the EU, the 40 nations with trade agreements with the EU and other nations of interest to us. As a G7 member, a leading world economy, the fifth largest by GDP, this will be a rapid process in most cases. (2015 GE MANIFESTO)

86) How can it be right that **we have opened up our borders totally and unconditionally to the EU**, allowing anyone with an EU passport to come? It's led to a huge migratory flow the likes of which our country has never seen before. And though **the rich** may have benefited from cheaper nannies and chauffeurs, **British workers** have seen their wages fall and their quality of life diminish. (Mirror 19/06/2016)

As it is possible to back up in the excerpt from the Mirror tabloid, there is a frequent Otherness pictured "in disguise" through apparently an inclusive pronoun as "we". The reference is linked not to the writer and his audience, but actually to the Government and its despicable choices, such they are depicted by Farage. Eventually, the rhetorical enhancement of these appraisals, express the nature of ideological ingroup/outgroup polarization in discourse -see also the social inequality highlighted by "the rich" vs. the "British workers" - namely by enhancing 'Our' good things and 'Their' bad things (van Dijk, 2006: 20).

The question present in the General Election's Manifesto reveals the inclusive intent to engage the readers/potential electors into the changing project: what do we, as citizens of the United Kingdom, wish to achieve by leaving the EU? The hypophoric answer turns out to be

a long list of promises guaranteed by the party as typical of a written platform the manifesto is.

4.6 Islam, Muslims and Racism Ambiguity

As reiterated multiple times in this research work, CDA is characterised as a multidisciplinary and multi-methodological approach rather than an isolated practice on its own. That being said, in ambiguous circumstances with regard to the presence of discrimination (Corny, 2010), it is not uncommon to affirm that a scholar who reaches to conclusions where discrimination has (or has not) occurred always constitutes a thorny issue. In fact, he/she may state or point out the attitudes and ethnic prejudices of white-group speakers in sociopolitical and in specific ethnic stances of politicians, in the plan of actions of their agenda and in the creation of the ethnic consensus, in the midst of a large number of other methods of the politics of immigration and ethnic affairs. Moreover, in both communication involving different cultures and text-and-talk about ethnic (or non-Western) minorities, so the majority group speakers, or mainly people in the West, he/she may involve in the local production and reproduction of white, Western group supremacy, in conveying generalizations and largely in the reproduction of social, cultural, or political dominion. As generally recognised, CDA is implicated in unethical issues which examines supremacy group of people whom are subjected to discursive inequality.

In this section of the chapter dedicated to corpus analysis, we will notice how a negative ideological representation builds stereotypes which cast an unfriendly light upon the Muslim community. Animosity towards Islam is indeed employed to legitimize discriminatory attitudes against Muslims and their consequent exclusion from mainstream society:

87) And today, today **Theresa May**, the Home Secretary in the House of Commons in her statement responding to these appalling events in Paris **said that Isis has nothing to do with Islam**. Well, I'm sorry, but **again we have to be frank; every single of one of those killers believe they were doing what they were doing in the name of Islam.**

88) And I'm afraid there is, we have to be honest and frank about this, and talk about these things without being fearful **that is a problem with some of the Muslim community in this country.**

89) It is deeply worrying that after the Charlie Hebdo attack earlier this year, in Paris, when polled **27% of British Muslims expressed some sympathy** with the motives that carried out that massacre, **11% of that three million** said that **the people who produced those cartoons of Muhammad actually deserved to be attacked** and amongst **the 16 to 24 years old there are about a third of young Muslims in Britain** who've got very split and divided loyalties

90) And we've reached the point where **we have to admit to ourselves** in Britain, in France and much of the rest of Europe **that mass integration and multicultural division has for now been a failure.**

91) But if we're talking, if we're talking about the encouragement of **different groups within our societies, within our communities.** If we're talking about the encouragement of them to be as different as possible and to integrate at all then **we have a problem**

(Basingstoke 16/10/2015)

92) "Sweden has a huge problem **with sexual assaults and rapes carried out by young male Muslim migrants.**

93) It isn't difficult to recognize the problem that there are tens of thousands of cases of female genital mutilation that take place in this country every single year and to date there is no single one prosecution. 18%, 18% of marriages that now take place, **Muslim marriages that now take place, take place completely outside English Civil Law, and if it come to divorce the women find themselves with absolutely no rights at all.**

(London 20/11/2015)

As one could notice, a good amount of examples on this issue comes from a transcribed speech held in Basingstoke, in Hampshire, a large town full to the brim with blue-collar workers and nostalgic pensioners who had backed the party most (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015: 160). At a first sight, it seems that all the stereotypes and popular prejudices about Islam and its Muslim Community have been summarized for the left-behind citizens in a "frank" talk that is typical of a nat-populist talk.

First of all, there is the assumption that the Paris killers "believe they were doing what they were doing in the name of Islam". It comes out then that Islam is nothing but a religion of terror and supporting terrorism. Secondly, the accuse of complicity of British Muslim community with Islamic terrorism through a number game as highlighted in "27% of British Muslims expressed some sympathy" or "11% of that three million said that the people who produced those cartoons of Muhammad actually deserved to be attacked" that cannot be

proved wrong via real fact checking because of the nature of the genre. In closing, attention on more general human rights, or precisely against them, is the signature song of the London speech, a city disinclined to biases: a narrative made of “Muslim marriages that [...] take place completely outside English Civil Law” and women who “find themselves with absolutely no rights at all”, has the specific intent to convey an image of a religion against the human rights which has inhuman rules, against freedom, a religion of tyranny and violence against women and their rights.

Since the renowned media in the West occupy the highest step in representation, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, those examples are representative of the iconographic stereotypes most often used by the western media, as well as being rhetorical devices not uncommon to find in a right-wing populist discourse.¹⁴

Actually, the overarching narrative of the discourse is connected to a "time of political change" of which UKIP attempted to be a positive part, but the main exception was primarily expressed in its campaign by the menace of Islamic radicalization on the "home front", clearly portrayed and recounted with pathos (Pareschi & Albertini, 2016: 20).

It would not be proper to define flat out the nature of the examples as typical of a race talk. Anyway, this kind of linguistic indeterminacy (explicit or contradictory) is indicative of contemporary forms of racism in a post-civil right era because an explicit, direct form of racism would be en masse demonized in a society made of anti-discriminatory social norms (Guess, 2006).

¹⁴Mahdizade SM. Media theories. Hamshahri (in Persian); 2012.

Chapter 5

Further remarks

5.1 About ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Farage as the Saint Patron of ‘Losers’

Kriesi et al. (2006: 922) argue that the processes of expanding economic competition, of expanding cultural competition, which is in addition connected to massive immigration of non-European groups who are considerably different from European inhabitants, and of growing political competition between nation-states and supranational or international political actors, generate new groups of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This means that the probable winners include businesspersons and experienced entrepreneurs in sectors open to international competition besides all types of cosmopolitan citizens. The likely losers, on the other hand, concern entrepreneurs and efficient employees in traditionally secured areas, and unskilled workers and citizens who vigorously identify themselves with their national community.

What comes out in the first place from the corpus analysis is that the UKIP campaign, time after time focussed on European, National or Referendum goals, shows some interesting models. For instance, it distinctly reveals a populist attitude, which is in particular articulated in a craving for ‘taking back control’ over Britain’s own sovereignty, laws and of course borders. Furthermore, discourses have a strong strategic spirit, echoed in a request for an unbiased system where EU juggernaut bureaucrats no longer have an all-encompassing influence, but the control will be taken back by the elected people from the UK. The majority

of the quotes disclose nationalist views with a specific interest on the popular will and the voice of those who cannot supposedly speak.

Focusing on Nigel Farage's speeches, they clearly manifest disagreement with political order. To begin with, Farage uses spatial dimensions of identity to distinguish between "normal, decent people" in the so-called "Little England" and the London district. Farage asserts that these decent people are detached from the other mainstream political groups. These methods of linking and distinction proceed when Farage claims that UKIP members originate from across the political spectrum and from all social classes. They are, indeed, "the people". One aspect that connects people around the country, according to Farage, is discontent with the politicians based in Westminster (sometimes renamed "Westmonster" by the Eurosceptic politician). The categories of 'the workers', the 'young people' and the 'unemployed' emphasise the exclusive nature of the people from one point of view, while defining actors in favour of whom the 'Us' is active in the other one. Indeed, the actions attributed in documents to the UKIP are mainly of the reactive-defensive, that means against the ruling Conservatives most of the time.

What is important not to forget is that *text* and *talk* are here interpreted as *discourse* in written and spoken form each in order, where *discourse* is employed in its real sense to mention to actual examples of language use situated in time and place (Hart, 2008: 124). Following Hart & Lukes and one of their instances of analysis according to discourse space theory, it is interesting to highlight the two inclusive pronouns "we" and "our" which hint at the hearer to place themselves with the speaker at deictic centre of the discourse space. Analogously, linguistic structures such as the ethnonym "the native British people" and the toponym "Britain" are placed at the deictic centre of the discourse space whereas "immigrants" are located at the remote end of the spatial axis. (2009, p. 119)

5.2 On Identity and Discourse Space Invasion

According to Wodak (2003, 2007), the extreme-right is increasingly sharp when expressing its support for racism. In her opinion, anti-immigration stances are usually justified from arguments (*topoi*) related to job protection, abuse of social benefits or incompatible cultures by focusing their attention, for example, on Muslims and the so-called “Islamisation” of Europe. Racism and discrimination show themselves on the discursive plan in a way that opinions and racist beliefs are produced and re-produced within discourse. So, through discourse, discriminatory and exclusive practises are prepared, proclaimed and validated (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 1). The use of pronouns, particularly first person plural pronouns, are necessary to help interpreters to conceptualise identity group as internal. Moreover, the plural first person possessive pronoun “we” suggests participation as group members and it establishes the referents to which they are referred. In this case, anybody who identifies him/herself with the nation, the so-called “British People”. It is possible to find in Farage’s speeches how Prime Minister David Cameron is depicted as not only inactive for what concerns the defence of national identity against the migration threat, but even as a rival. His texts are structured in a way that UKIP issues are perceived as the only ones rational and deserving legitimacy about debate on national identity and instability. Strategies of argumentation as a whole consist in supporting the idea there is a public space invasion in order to imply this invasion is illicit and endorsed by mainstream parties who were supposed to fight against this situation, with no regard for residents’ rights. Needless to say those residents who are constrained to accept this troubled circumstance are the British citizens.

5.2.1 Modality and Ideology: a Short Consideration

Political discourse contains a variety of distinguished features: it is often very attentively produced, every slight difference accurately examined, and is conceived for a larger electoral constituency than the immediate hearers/listeners. In addition, political communication intends to influence with exhortative purposes, it favours rhetorical routines, and above all it

deals largely with unrealized hypothetical future situations. Consequently, the particularly high frequency of the modal verb ‘must’ in Farage’s speeches and UKIP manifestos, at a time when ‘must’ is declining in an age of political correctness promoted by mainstream and left-media, is due to discourse-marking uses to “signpost” discourse, and the imperative modal verb is employed widely across epistemic (predictive) and logical necessity contexts as well as for obligation, with no evident connotations of positive speaker/writer stance, rather the opposite (Lewis, 2015: 171).

5.3 The same ‘Other’ in Different Ways

A conspicuous number of instances reported in the previous section shows how multiculturalism has been declared dead by the former UKIP’s leader who, furthermore, straightforwardly declares that the experiment of integration is a complete failure (e.g. “we have to admit to ourselves [...]that mass integration and multicultural division has for now been a failure”). What he makes through his multi-genre announcements, as perfect incarnation of a strong charismatic nat-populist leader, is persuading the hearers and readers to widely accept an image of the migrant as that of a troublesome ‘bloke’ not willing to integrate in society. Farage utilizes ethical aspects of identity to discriminate immigrants as the ‘other’ who project to take advantage of the British system. He maintains that immigrants provoke pressure on public services (e.g. hospitals, school places, accommodation) leading to a decrease in wages through unskilled labour. Consequently, migrants have been regarded as cultural ‘other’ who have to adapt to the cultural mainstream to integrate. Therefore, nationalism is essential to protect the existing nation of ‘real’ British citizens and territorial border control. As regards to the latter, a new supplementary factor of the *topos* of criminality is the mention to illegal migrants caught at UK border. Since “The EU’s (them) open borders make (us) less safe”, this situation has developed a parallel narrative of ‘the

border' as a key way of resolving the crisis and the issues concerning current migration into Europe. So, the solution seems quite simple and straightforward as distinctive of populist discourse : "If you want to do those things then you have to say NO to European Union, take back control of our country, take back control of our borders" moreover: "...To take back control of our borders and to make sure that never again do we have unprecedented immigration into Britain without our ability to check whether people have criminal records". According to Lakoff (2006: 141) direct causation, which means approaching a problem via direct action, seems not to be the best option to solve problems. Empirical research has pointed out that conservatives – and right-wing political movements – are capable of inferring with direct causation, and do not seem to see the considerable difficulties and alarming consequences of such actions due to the complexities of systemic causation, which they do not take into account.

However, within the discourse elaborated by the party leader, it is possible to deduce at least three categories attributed to migrants – contributing to their image as an out-group. As stated in 1.2.1, new populism has been favouring the notion of ethnic pluralism when addressing to minorities for some time: in the optic of CDA we may say the social power by itself may not be negative in the first place, but what in fact is of significance to CDA is the inappropriate use of power (Rashidi & Souzandehfar, 2010: 56), which would create inequality in the society placing specific concepts cloaked in a veil of suspect:

"To state sponsored multiculturalism, by which I mean encouraging division in society actually welcoming ghettos growing up in many of our cities and towns, that actually through that process we've finished up in many parts of the UK today in a bad place." London (20/11/2015).

The debate on these two civilizations in conflict provided relevance to the migrant considered as cultural 'other', having obsolete values and a different religion (Lutz, 1991; Razack, 2004). Referring to Muslim people in Great Britain, Farage maintains that "They

seemed to be ashamed to the fact that we have a Judeo- Christian culture in this country and we, and we should actually be saying [...] of this defective groups there's a lot about this country that's great: liberty, freedom, democracy, the presumption of innocence before guilt, our right to trial by jury". As a discursive style, the ex-UKIP leader seems to adopt the typical populist political expression based on dichotomies in order to depict Muslim groups by actually framing them culturally and religiously fundamentalist, that is a serious threat to Westerns culture, religion and justice. As a matter of fact, the representation of the migrant as menacing 'other', as we can notice in "Sweden has a huge problem with sexual assaults and rapes carried out by young male Muslim migrants", has come to be used notably after 9/11 in relation to public security (Haynes, 2007: 13). As pointed out in 5.6 about Muslim marriages in the UK, which take place "completely outside the English Civil Law", patriarchy repressing the women is associated with the Arab or Muslim backdrop of the men to whom a distorted sexual behaviour is ascribed to. In any case, the opinion that the migrant is a peril to public integrity and safety has been proved to gain particular sustain, probably due to the multiple terrorist attacks in Europe in recent history.

In the context of a failed multiculturalism discourse not limited to Muslim community, the concept of cultural 'other' has been strengthened and fomented by the idea of the migrant as criminal 'other' (Baldacchino & Sammut, 2015) as it is possible to infer in some interesting references to the previous favourite 'scapegoat' of UKIP anti-immigration's narrative, Romanians :

"I recommend they all go and visit Page Hall, a suburb of Sheffield. Over 800 Roma people have been moved into the area. The overall state of decline, the rising crime and the closure of local businesses has to be seen to be believed." (Express 27/04/2016)

Much more than manifestos, online editorials and public speeches are drafted for ordinary party followers who are supposed to recognise the populist language. In the last years, the

political movement has built the image of immigration as an unstoppable force by using, for example, repeating water metaphors (e.g. “the migrant tide to flood the European continent”). What it comes out from the corpus is, however, that emphasis has moved from Eastern European immigration to mass Third World, mostly illegal, flood or invasion. Overall, the analysis shows that Farage use language broadly to distinguish between in-groups and out-groups in quite fine-tuned parameters.

5.4 Populism and the Reinvention of Nat-Populist Rhetoric

From a rhetorical point of view, the last Referendum Campaign saw the Leave side using the fascinations of *pathos*, while the Remain side invested more on reasoning directed by *logos*. This important distinction built the kind of topics both positions would employ. As for example in “the future as the likes of Turkey and others become full EU members” or “open borders with Turkey would be a total disaster for our country”, we see that by appealing to pathos Farage was able to use fear of immigration and the possible dangers of Turkey entering the European Union in order to spread a sense of apprehension for the future. It is important not to forget that characters like Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage relied on credibility. They constructed a persona that gives the impression to be sympathetic and transparent while representing, on the other hand, David Cameron and ‘Remainers’ such as John Major and Tony Blair as detached establishment. The precondition that surrounds this rhetorical strategy involves persuading the audience (or reader) that their experiences and competencies echo their own. For the ‘distant’ supporters of Remain, cosmopolitan qualities accentuate the benefit of open national borders, mutual multicultural qualities, diversity of peoples and lifestyles in outward looking and inclusive societies (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 7). For what concerns the Leave case instead, by maintaining that “we’ve (us) actually been betrayed by our political class (them)”, Farage claims to understand and sympathise with the voters and

their concerns. Given the higher tendency of the older sections of the voters at ballot box, the Leave side tried to demonstrate the worries of the ‘baby boomer’ era. As a matter of fact, “If we Remain our country will never be the same again”, he argued: the EU is an obscure power that weakens British identity and the scourge of immigration has swamped the UK with alien customs and/or ideas (Crines & Heppell, 2016: 62).

That being said, in this analysis I observed a kind of ‘innocuous’ nationalism far from the BNP¹⁵ violent ideology, in the sense that it affects the feeling of ease in the physical and traditional backgrounds of a person’s nation as well as acquiring pride – “about pride in our country” - in the positive achievements of one’s nation or of fellow nationals (Cunningham, 2007). However, this harmless chauvinism seems to be opposite to the idea of multiculturalism, and nat-populism within this research study should be considered as promoter of the defence of a territorial state as centrally affiliated to one ethnic-cultural body and passionately active in protecting and disseminating its principles.

¹⁵British National Party

Conclusions

Before the – unexpected – 2016's Brexit outcome, the concept of protest was on its way of becoming a permanent part of the British electoral composition. UKIP has represented such a consistent portion of unrepresented public opinion (i.e. the left-behind 'Little Englanders') that he has remained for a considerable period of time a real challenge to the other parties and how they communicate.

This study has investigated the in this research project the ways in which UKIP in general and Nigel Farage in particular employed language and their persuasive effect on the audience about national populist issues. This macro-theme has been furthermore divided into three different subthemes: resentment against the subordination of the UK to EU (symbolized by Brussels bureaucrats), resentment against economic migration, and the third essential reason and theme of hostility, that is to say against the internal political establishment. What comes out, amongst other things, is how encouraging people to have the audacity to bid for freedom calls for more flowery language, impressive metaphors and a stirring partisan spirit than a supported by government campaign (such as the Remain campaign) which simply affirms that the maintenance of the *status quo* is simply the best option to choose.

As stated repeatedly in the course of this study, the object of Critical Discourse Analysis is to reveal the ideological inferences that are covered in the worlds of a written manifesto/editorial or oral speech. Consequently, with CDA as methodology, this type of political discourse has been analysed to determine what are the peculiarities appearing in the

discourse, and how those peculiarities are important for the re-construction of the idea of the migrant as the 'Other'. An interesting issue is, for example, how analysis essentially shows that the event of leaving in Brexit-related productions is presented as a promise while the event of remaining is presented as a danger. This is based on an intertextual connection to the Leave campaign's leitmotiv 'We want our country back'. The slogan has the power to attract voters who would have an interest on certain arguments like immigration to be contained and generally recalls the aversion for the concept of supra-nationalism in the EU, under which Britain loses all its 'proverbial' sovereignty.

A separate mention should be made for the notion of 'independence', which is worth of a separate treatment. As a matter of fact from a campaign perspective 'independence' is, of course, a powerful word highly touted by the United Kingdom "Independence" Party itself, and a word strictly twisted together with the deep principle of democracy. Claiming indeed the UK needs to restore its independence not only makes the 'Leave' crusade to look more attractive, but it further emphasises the negative features attributed to the EU and makes EU authority seem notably inequitable and dictatorial. Moreover, nominating the Referendum day "Independence Day" lends it the status of a historic moment and produces a profound symbolic connotation to the vote in the face of the British people and British glorious history of their fathers. For that reason, the verbal struggle for independence acquires the implication of constituting a noble cause of courage and integrity.

Against this backdrop, the idea of Nation in Farage and UKIP is delineated by the respect towards old British Empire. However, the multi-genre discourses here analysed do not seem to contain a real racial ideology. From a certain point of view, it would be proper to distinguish the term 'prejudice' from 'racism' since the last one is a sort of 'prejudice plus power'. And prejudice, with the lack of political or economic support, would be unable to spread as a phenomenon related to culture, institution and society in an extensive way. The corpus investigated shows UKIP's most charismatic leader Nigel Farage presenting himself as

a 'reasonable' figure, always communicating arguments without ever crossing the 'border' of extremism, constantly relying on common sense. Given the above, UKIP and Farage's communication style has no distinguishable racial theory in their narrative. It follows that their anti-immigration stance is more connected to the economic issue, which is found within conservative political doctrines whose position have always been well-tied to Nationalism, that means that such discourses are familiar with construction tropes of fear mongering and scapegoating by choosing the subject of the day.

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