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MANAGING NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: IDEOLOGICAL AND AXIOLOGICAL DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES IN THE LANGUAGE OF FOREIGN POLICY

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…any speaker is himself
a respondent to a greater or lesser degree.
He is not, after all, the first speaker,
the one who disturbs
the eternal silence of the universe.
(Bakhtin 1986: 69)

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The context and the aim of the research

Embracing Fairclough's perspective that transformations in social life are led by discourse (2006a: 24-25), this study explores the specialized 'realm' of diplomacy as expressing the foreign policy of the British country. This research is especially an investigation of the communicative strategies used by the three foreign ministers (Cook, Straw and Beckett), during Blair's government, to pursue their ideological design and to construct a positive image of their country's policy by claiming unity.

The issues contemplated in their speeches, the only text-typology considered in this study, imply the construction of complex ideological and axiological discursive positions, which stem from a web of unavoidably superimposed emotional and moral evaluations, often interwoven with logical observations. This study takes up an interpersonal perspective on discourse outlining the ways speakers negotiate solidarity with their audience by 'naturalizing' a variety of ideological positions.

In a speech given on March 20th 2007, at a conference in London, the British Foreign Minister, Margaret Beckett, points out how diplomacy is undergoing a process of transformation and she also stresses the changing profile of the Foreign Commonwealth Office (henceforth FCO):

It has continued to adapt to new priorities and new ways of working that better fit the rapidly changing global environment. The global environment is now so complex, so interwoven and so fast-moving that now need a '360 degree diplomacy', with the *freedom and flexibility* to demonstrate initiative and to work with partners across different governments, across the broadest spectrum of British Society" [emphasis added]

This citation sets the context of this study which concerns a changing diplomatic scenario and reasons for these changes are due to a far more demanding environment as well as to a narrower distance between domestic and international setting (cf. Hocking 2007).

When dealing with international relations either political or military or business issues, governments communicate in a strategic way trying to build up a positive image of their nation, above all, trying to construct solidarity and consensus. Popular perception, or the way in which we notice and understand the image, values and motivations of a country, can create an enabling or disabling environment and, "perceptions of Western motivations as imperial or self-interested can damage the chances of success" (Leonard 2002: 49). All transactions - whether promoting ideologies and values or selling products - are a way to feed off the general representation of a nation, and strategic communication helps in that direction, increasing appreciation and influencing people's behaviour. Thus, the analysis of the organization of ideological contents is not a secondary aspect with respect to the political action, but on the contrary, communication is an integral part of the political action, it is action itself (cf. Marrone 2001: 222).

In the context of diplomacy, language choices, which carry significant communicative intent, are regularly made "to galvanize the audience to achieve a commonality of purpose" (Burhanudeen 2005: 37) through the enactment of specific linguistic mechanisms.

Looking at these mechanisms, the present work has two main areas of interest: linguistic and institutional. From the linguistic point of view my interest concerns those lexical and grammatical patterns which express the point of view of the speakers (Stubbs 1996: 20), namely their way of projecting the world, their way of persuading and positioning their audience to accept what they say.

For this reason, this research involves the study of identification of those discursive strategies through which people represent the world that is also a part of how they identify themselves (cf. Fairclough 2003), with particular reference to the discourse of 'security', seen as the top priority issue in the political agenda. Furthermore, another linguistic interest concerns the diachronic evolution of the keyword *security* across the ten years under investigation (1997-2007).

From the institutional point of view, as Partington (2003: 5) maintains, it is crucial to determine "how is discourse organised" to "appear factual, literal, objective, authoritative" (see also Stubbs 1996: 97).

1.2 Justifying the choice of foreign ministers' speeches

Language is an essential component in the construction of individual and group identity and it finds its further "refinement as a medium of communication" in diplomacy (Abu Jaber 2001: 49) in which formalisation into fixed patterns aims to "oil the joints of relationships between people and nations" (ibid.). In outlining the reasons for the drastic changes in diplomacy, Rana (2001: 111) maintains that foreign ministry has overcome its former role due to the ever-increasing networking and also to the participation of non-state actors into the external relationships of each country. He uses the term 'democratisation' to sum up this process.

In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the UK

worked in the United Nations to implement more intensive action against terrorism. The enactment of the conflict and the drawing up of some strategies to counter such a global phenomenon require a significant degree of political and social consensus. It is here that foreign ministers come on the scene, namely when dealing with their task of explaining clearly the tactical choices made with respect to international issues, such as terrorism, human rights and climate change.

Foreign Ministers' role is thus delicate in that they "are located at the interstice of a complex transformation in the external and domestic environment in world affairs"[1] and, when illustrating their foreign policy strategies, they also aim to persuade people at home and abroad that they are working in a particular way for the good of the country. This means that in turn "consensus and knowledge require the deployment and manipulation of language" (Jackson 2005: 16). Moreover, in their attempt to legitimate their choices the ministers reflect the image of their country:

> few would contest that the foreign policy of any country must necessarily, in some sense, be a reflection of its own sense of its identity. Foreign Secretaries and their advisers must have some motion of 'Britain' and 'Britishness' even if they are not very explicit about it. And historians have recently been stressing the fact that a country's image of itself is often confirmed by its image of 'the Other' - that Britain is emphatically different from France, Germany or the United States in particular [2]

In the light of these remarks, diplomatic speeches were chosen as focus of the analysis because they are representative of the interplay between the foreign policy purposes and the discursive strategies personally employed to achieve those aims. In line with Miller's viewpoint (2002: 121), these

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[1] International Conference: "Foreign Ministries: Adaptation to a Changing World" – June 14-16, 2007 – website: www.diplomacy.edu/conferences/MFA2007

[2] from: 'Britishness and British Foreign Policy' (14/05/97) Event: 1997 FCO Annual Lecture Location: FCO London Speech Date: 14/05/97 Keith Robbins –website: www.fco.gov.uk date of download 23.03.2007.

speeches constitute a site of 'engagement' which can be approached as sites of 'substantive reasoning' (Toulmin 1958) that are also seen as framing 'ideological, culture-encoding concepts' that aim to legitimate and preserve specific socio-political views and value systems (see Miller 2002: 222).

1.3 Research focus and outline of the study

The overall purpose of this study, namely providing insights into the distinctive linguistic features of the discourse of diplomacy from a phraseological perspective, can be sketched out in the following points:

1. to study the diachronic evolution of the concept of 'security' across the speeches delivered by the three foreign ministers of Blair's government (1997-2007);

2. to determine and marshal the ways of meanings used to construe the 'speaker orientation' (Lemke 1992) with regard to the matter being debated, in particular with reference to the discourse of 'security'. Put differently, the work will focus on the linguistic mechanisms used by speakers to 'naturalise' their value positions and in so doing construing a positive image of their country.

3. to see if the speakers manipulate the language introducing elements of subjectivity.

Following the aim of answering these questions, the present study entails an examination of areas of research such as evaluation/appraisal as the key to the study of the value system of a society. Moreover, differences among the three Foreign Ministers' construction of the stance will be highlighted. At the level of logical meanings or meta-argumentative, I shall touch upon some aspects of the structure of persuasive reasoning.

After the outline of the literature background of this research in

Chapter Two, attention is turned to the data and the methodological choices in Chapter Three. Chapter Four introduces the new scenario of an 'active' diplomacy and reviews the definition of diplomacy according to the new trends. This chapter also starts the analysis of 'security' as a keyword and its associated words across the three ministers' speeches. Chapter Five concentrates on the application of the Appraisal Theory, in particular the system of 'Engagement', in order to 'denaturalise' the speakers' ideological positions. Chapter Six deals with the analysis of the most frequent cluster, *I want to,* compared with the same cluster having *we* as subject in order to highlight the reasons which determine the shifts from one perspective to the other. Chapter Seven presents conclusions and implications for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

MAPPING THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 From Evaluation...

Placed in the Bakhtinian (1981; 1986) tradition of 'dialogism', this study sees any text as both ideological and axiological (i.e. Halliday's complementarity of ideational and interpersonal meaning) where the bonding of 'sense' and 'emotion' shapes discourse and moves the world (Lemke 1990). To put it another way: "ideologically speaking a text unfolds as rationality – a quest for 'truth'; axiologically it unfolds rhetorically – an invitation to community" (Martin 2004: 327). According to this perspective every 'voice' constructs an evaluative position with respect to other voices.

Meanings are negotiated on different levels, through evaluative and argumentative formulations, multimodal choices and pragmatic expedients. Evaluative meanings are all ubiquitous in language, they are interwoven in the fabric of text and their examination is significant to identify ideology or values underlying a text (Hunston 1993; Hunston and Thompson 2000; Martin 2000; Biber & Finnegan 1989). Hunston (1993: 58) sees evaluation as "anything which indicates the writer's attitude to the value of an entity in the text". Given the nature of evaluations of being organized by norms and values in society, a strong connection between ideologies and evaluative beliefs such as attitudes may be postulated and, thus, a connection between ideologies and values is also posited (Van Dijk 1998: 10). Drawing on

Hofstede (2001: 5), values indicate the inclination to "prefer certain states of affairs over others" which deal with oppositional feelings such as good/bad, dangerous/safe, ugly/beautiful and so on and so forth. A relevant aspect is the distinction between the 'desired' (what people wish) and the 'desirable' (what people think they ought to desire) in that the former appertains to pragmatics the latter to ideology.

If studies on evaluation demonstrate that it is an individual phenomenon (Hoey 1983), it is also true that the value system entailed is institutional or social and may be expressed in 'metaphoric non-personal terms' (Hunston 1993: 58). In their thorough overview on evaluation, Hunston and Thompson review the plethora of terms expressing opinion, which go from 'attitude', 'connotation', appraisal' to 'modality' and 'stance'. They prefer to sort to 'evaluation' as an umbrella term which encompasses the two different perspectives of study they talk about: the 'separating' and the 'combining' approach. The former, represented by Halliday (1985), differentiates modality from attitudinal meaning which, on the contrary, converges into the latter mainly epitomized in Biber's expression of 'attitudinal stance' (Biber and Finegan 1989). Set within the parameters of Halliday's approach, Martin and White's work takes 'attitude' as focal and moves beyond emotions so as to look at full-scale feelings through resources of 'affect', 'judgement' and 'appreciation'.

Evaluation can be decoded in two ways, conceptually and linguistically (Hunston and Thompson 2000: 13). From a conceptual perspective, evaluation may be pointed to by some indicators such as comparison, subjectivity and social value. When somebody makes an evaluation a social or cultural activity is carried out and thus, this phenomenon consists essentially in anything that can be contrasted with what is accepted as the 'norm' or in a reaction to a situation or in entities

which contain judgements of value (ibid.). As Dressen observes (2003: 274), the core of evaluation "can be seen as a manifestation of the community's normalising process".

Linguistically speaking, evaluative identification can be based on lexis, grammar and text. This research will be based on lexico-grammar features, or rather on individual lexical items as they are embedded in stretches of text and on the value-laden nature of evaluation. Of the three functions of evaluation identified, expressing opinion, constructing relations and managing discourse, they all appertain to this research in that ministers' use of evaluation preserves the system value of the British community and is also employed to organize discourse.

Further complicating the picture of evaluation is the research on 'metadiscursivity' (Hyland 1998; 2000; 2005) which provides a comprehensive and integrated way (stance and engagement) of how interaction is construed in academic genre looking at overt markers in discourse. 'Metadiscourse' is "the cover term for the self-reflective expressions used to negotiate interactions in a text, assisting the writer (or speaker) to express a viewpoint and engage with readers as members of a particular community" (Hyland 2005: 46). Hence, this phenomenon is relevant to the construction of the relationship with the audience.

All these studies contribute to point out those elements in a sentence which, working in a complementary way, construct evaluation in a text and cannot be captured systematically. It is here that Martin's appraisal comes into the picture by providing a framework which investigates also those resources which are hidden in language. This means that evaluation cannot be completely identified through "decontextualized examples" (Martin *et al* 2003), an issue already raised by Stubbs (1996: 21), who argued that texts "help to construct social reality. And textual analysis is a perspective from

which to observe society: it makes ideological structures tangible."

Evaluation positionings play a crucial role in the discourse of diplomacy, since it is via them that a model of the social and moral order according to what is socially acceptable or not is organised (cf. White 2006: 38). Given the institutional character of the diplomatic discourse (Abu Jaber 2001) we might expect these attitudes to be expressed in a more impersonal way, couched in attitudinal lexis for instance, which lead the audience to accept the value system of the discourse community. It goes without saying that the less conspicuous evaluation is more manipulative the text will be.

2.1.1 The Appraisal Theory

Developed within the framework of Systemic Functional Grammar, the Appraisal Theory seems to be more germane to Biber's concept of 'stance'[1] whereas its concept of 'engagement' shows similarities with that of 'evidentiality' in literature (Chafe & Nichols 1986). This model of study concentrates on what is traditionally known as 'Mood', 'Modality' and Attitudinal Lexis and is mainly concerned with those wordings by which speakers "negotiate and 'naturalize' subjective, and ultimately ideological, position" (Miller 2002: 120). For this purpose, the Appraisal framework explores how judgements on people, on facts, on others' utterances are expressed in texts and how they may be more indirectly implied, presupposed or assumed. Thus, the main reason for adopting this framework relies on its capacity to offer a comprehensive analysis of implicit as well as explicit speaker's attitude. In other words, it helps to a better understanding of how micro-level linguistic choices contribute to the

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[1] Biber's definition of stance is concerned with "the expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message" (Biber and Finegan 1989: 93)

construction of evaluative stance in discourse semantics. For instance, Coffin's (2000) appraisal analysis in the genre of history has shown how the subjective nature of interpretation is largely obscured. In her analysis of the US President Bush's speech to the UN dated September 12th 2002, Miller (2004) shows how the Engagement resources used in the text construct what she calls a 'solo' stance, adopted by the USA to gain consensus on the Iraqi war in the name of 'legitimate defence'. Relying on this system of analysis, Bevitori (2007) has demonstrated how in a corpus of "parliamentary events", gender is a variable, among the others, which affects the choice of patterns at the level of discourse.

The Appraisal model proposes three dimensions of evaluative meaning which, adopting Martin and White's terminology (White 2003; 2005), are 'Attitude', 'Engagement' and 'Graduation'. The sub-domains of 'Attitude' are 'Affect', involving emotional reaction, 'Judgement', referring to assessments of human behaviour, and 'Appreciation', which looks at resources for constructing assessments of artefacts, texts, natural objects in terms of how they are assigned value socially. The second dimension, 'Engagement', covers the resources which position the textual voice intersubjectively and, finally, 'Graduation' is concerned with all those resources for 'up- or down-grading' the intensity of the speaker's meanings. This category subsumes what are traditionally known as intensifiers, amplifiers and emphatics.

The core system –as we read in Miller (2007: 163) is Affect "with Judgement and Appreciation as its institutionalized versions, having been re-contextualized – Judgement with a practical view to controlling what people do and Appreciation, for discursively valuing what they achieve." When the attitudinal positioning is explicit it is labelled 'attitudinal inscription', conversely, it is known as 'attitudinal token' and, in this case,

evaluation is construed through mechanisms of 'association' and 'implication'. Martin (2000) points out that the expression of attitude is a truly interpersonal issue in that it does not simply relate to the speaker's opinion about the world but to the aim of eliciting a reaction of solidarity (see Figure 2.1 for an overview of the Appraisal Model).

Each system redounds with systems in other parts of lexicogrammar and this leads to the distinction between 'inscribed appraisal', explicit instantiations of evaluation and 'invoked appraisal' which refers to all those mechanisms that 'provoke' attitude (Martin 2000: 142).

The final point worth highlighting is that appraisal works as an ongoing cumulative process so that the interpersonal structure of language reveals its prosodic nature. In Halliday's terms (1979: 66-67):

> The interpersonal component of meaning is the speaker's ongoing intrusion into the speech situation … Interpersonal meanings cannot easily be expressed as configurations of discrete elements … this interpersonal meaning …is strung throughout the clause as a continuous motif or colouring …the effect is cumulative … we shall refer to this type of realisation as 'prosodic', since the meaning is distributed like a prosody throughout a continuous stretch of discourse.

Figure 2.1 – Overview of Appraisal (from Martin and White 2005: 38)

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2.2 ...to Ideology

It is a truism that "language is not a clear window, but a refracting, structuring medium" (Fowler 1991: 11) and that categories are not objective but anything said or written about the external world is always subject to a process of interpretation, namely articulated from a position.

Although ideology has been differently and extensively defined, a common view seems to be that ideology has potentiality for creating different worldviews. Modern research has demonstrated two main tendencies of ideology: one considers it as a false representation of reality (Marxist tradition) and the other sees it as part of all thinking and acting (Van Dijk 2001; 2002). Within the Marxist framework, ideology as 'false consciousness' aims to guarantee the dominant power of the ruling classes through discursive strategies that fulfil a mystifying function in society (cf. Van Dijk 1998; Garzone/Sarangi 2007). This negative notion of ideology has been dominant in social sciences as traditionally opposed to scientific knowledge.

Neglecting this approach, this work will be placed in the tradition which privileges three main approaches (cf. Lassen 2007: viii): Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach (2000), Wodak's emphasis on social structures and finally, Fairclough's 'social-constructionist view' (1995; 2006a). Adopting Halliday's theory, Fairclough, views language use as 'social practice' meaning that language is socially and historically situated and finds itself in a dialectical relationship with other aspects of the social.

The term *discourse*, which generally encompasses any form of language use in society, (Van Dijk 1997; Fairclough 1993) is a way of behaving which considers people as members of specific social groups. As Kress observes: "Discourses are systematically-organised sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution" (1985: 6-7). The

main concern is to investigate formally these 'sets of statements', starting from the assumption that language is a phenomenon through which society reflects itself. Discourse is crucial to all studies of human interaction in the political sphere because it "is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped" and "social transformations in contemporary social life are extensively 'discourse-led', in the sense that it is discourses which change first" (Fairclough 2006a: 27). Social changes, namely transformations (e.g. globalisation or in our case the new regime of international security) include change in social practices and, drawing on Jessop (2000), we can see these transformations on the dimension of 're-scaling' that is the transformation of security between the local, national and global scales of social life.

In Fairclough's version of Critical Discourse Analysis, ideologies are analysed from the perspective of 'mediation as the movement of meaning' from one text or discourse to another (2006a: 22). They are seen as contributing to the constitution, reproduction of social relations of power and domination. This critical concept of ideology is included in a reformulated version of CDA as an approach which entails a particular view of interdisciplinary research. This approach, called 'transdisciplinary', assembles diverse disciplinary resources for particular research projects and it also aspires towards a dialogue between disciplines or frameworks.

Accepting the theory that ideologies are socially shaped, Van Dijk emphasizes their cognitive aspect, considering them as system of beliefs performing identifying tasks and representing the basic social characteristics of a group such as their objectives, values and norms. In other words:

> ideologies are localized between societal structures and the structures of the minds of social members. They allow social actors to 'translate' their social properties (identity, goal, position, etc.) into the knowledge and beliefs that make up the concrete models of their everyday life experiences, that is the

mental representations of their actions and discourse. Indirectly (viz., through attitudes and knowledge), therefore, ideologies control how people plan and understand their social practices, and hence also the structures of text and talk (Van Dijk 2000: 21).

According to Van Dijk, some underlying syntactic, semantic or pragmatic discourse structures give birth to surface realisations and it may happen that some meanings do not encode ideology explicitly but these surface structures may reveal such hidden meanings (ibid.). Foucault's influence is conspicuous here (Fowler 1991: 42), in that he maintained that ideas crystallize as to what is right or wrong, permitted or prohibited.

Subscribing to this theory of ideology, we need to attend to those features of discourse that signal opinions, perspectives, interests, evaluation. Furthermore, ideological representations are structured along the '*us* vs *them*' dimension (Van Dijk 2002; 2007) by which a community presents itself in positive terms and 'the other' in negative terms. Lexicalization is the major domain of ideological expression and persuasion and thus, various labels may be employed to refer to the same person or groups or social issues according to the different discourse genres, social and cultural contexts.

In the corpus interrogated in this research, the foreign minister Jack Straw, for instance, positions the audience to take a negative view of *terrorists* via a covert instantiation of authorial viewpoint (Martin 2000) by sorting to the negative attitudinal 'inscription' *extremist* as in *Extremist fanaticism is based on a denial of these values and of the humanity of others.* As White has shown (2006: 44) the term 'extremist' has a stable negative meaning in that always associated "with allegations that groups or individuals have been involved in non-state sanctioned acts of political violence".

Following Fairclough-Van Dijk-Wodak trend, but also Kress and

Hodge's conjecture of being manipulated while informed (1979), all kinds of discourse are potentially ideologically un-neutral, even those which fit in the specialized communication and which are supposedly subjectively free or completely 'referential' (cf. Garzone/Sarangi 2007: 22-30). This point may be illustrated by looking at that bulk of research aimed to unmask the ways of encoding the speaker's attitude towards the topic debated (Martin 2000) by investigating those language resources which instantiate evaluations, opinions and judgements in specialized communication such as corporate discourse (Pocini 2004) political discourse (Miller 2002) and legal field (Mazzi 2008). In particular, Mazzi's study (2008: 379) has shown how Boudon's concept of ideology as a "complex doctrinal system of representations based on scientific argumentation" has proved instrumental to demonstrate how judicial decisions are far from being impersonal and impartial.

Against this backdrop, this study gives insights into how 'particularist ideologies' and choices mapped to broader ideologies are worded in the language of diplomacy, which, more than any other fields of specialized communication, rests on the traditional claim to be objectively constructed.

2.3 The interplay of argumentation

The issues debated in the national and international fora are certainly controversial and multi-faceted in nature hence, they involve ideological positions (entailing emotional and moral evaluations) strictly interwoven with logical and legal considerations. The speaker's voice tries to build consensus on the basis of a more or less dialogic orientation towards contrasting or shared positions.

The texts included in the corpus of diplomatic speeches under investigation can be considered argumentative in that they are created with

the ideological functionality of endorsing and promoting the natural particular systems of values and beliefs of the 'discourse community' they refer to. As Stati maintains (1997: 9), "we consider texts with prevalently persuasive and therefore rhetorical function to be argumentative". A diplomatic speech aims to persuade the audience of a certain point of view and, therefore, it can be considered argumentative in that other voices are quoted to be endorsed or rejected.

According to van Eemeren and *et al*'s definition (1996: 5):

> argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aiming at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.

If this definition allows concentration on those discourses with an argumentative purpose, other approaches (Perelman, 1969; Ducrot, 1988) take into account the argumentative orientation and dimension utterances. Indeed, the argumentative force is a constitutive part of the meaning of an utterance, which for this reason is 'orienting'. The perspective embraced in this research, in line with the Bahktinian dialogic view, mirrors Plantin's argumentative standpoint, in that any formulation aims to act upon the recipients so as to affect their way of thinking (1996: 18).

Rather than focusing on the structure of the arguments made in the diplomatic speeches, this research looks at arguments in the text which are relevant to construct the speaker's ideological position with reference to other voices which are supported or contrasted.

For the purposes of this line of inquiry we will consider Toulmin's terminology which includes: the 'claim' (a statement containing an opinion which needs support); the 'data' (constituting the backing for the claim); the

'warrant' (which links the claim and the grounds); the 'backing' (support for the warrant); the 'modality' (which considers the degree of certainty showed in offering the argument); finally, the 'rebuttal' comes out from exceptions to the initial claim. All the moves which guarantee the transition from the data or 'premises' to the arguer's opinion are also known as *topoi*.

2.4 Looking at subjectivity

Subjectivization involves the structures and strategies that languages evolve in the linguistic realization of subjectivity. Research in this area of the language has been carried out by scholars working in different fields. As observed (Bühler 1934; Jakobson 1960; Mushin 2001), speakers do not just neutrally and mechanically describe states and affairs in the world sorting to objective and prefabricated linguistic formulations, but their personal identity sometimes crops up through a range of viewpoints. In his discussion of linguistic subjectivity, Benveniste (1971: 225) maintains that: "Language is marked so deeply by the expression of subjectivity that one might ask if it could still function and be called language if it were constructed otherwise". He explains subjectivity in terms of the ability of speakers to view themselves as subjects and, in his view, the first personal pronoun is the grammatical category that contributes to this expressive capacity of speakers. Lyons goes beyond this and employs the term 'subjectivity' (1982: 102) to refer to the way in which "natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent's expression of himself and of his own attitudes and beliefs". Lyons' interest was mainly focused on the examination of the degree of subjectivity by looking at modality, tense and aspect across languages. Looking at the role of the perspective of locutionary agents, their expression of affect, modality and at the effects of these phenomena

on the formal shape of discourse he demonstrates how central subjectivity is to human discourse.

The definition of subjectivity which concerns in particular this work is provided by Finnegan (1995: 1) who sees it in terms of the "expression of self and the representation of a speaker's […] perspective or point of view in discourse – what has been called a speaker's imprint."

2.5 The diplomatic language

Diplomatic communication is a social activity that aims to ensure information of foreign policy and speakers try to manage information and their country' image in such a way as to give the best possible slant on the government's representation whether it be to a home or foreign audience. For this reason, speakers need to organise their discourse into meaningful patterns for their audience and this implies familiarity with the conventional discursive practices of a 'discourse community'. This notion, introduced by Swales (1990: 29), refers to "a group of people who share certain language-using practices. These practices can be seen as conventionalized in two ways: stylistic conventions regulate social interactions both within the group and in its dealing with outsiders".

Strictly connected to the notion of diplomacy is that of national reputation or branding, namely the others' opinion about one nation's culture, policy and conduct, that is also part of a nation's 'soft power' and diplomacy has a critical role in it. In marking the importance of a country's branding, Simon Anholt, Author, Researcher and Independent Member of the FCO sets up a comparison with the business company's image:

> When I started writing about an idea I called 'nation brand' more than twelve years ago, my observation was a simple one: that the reputations of countries are analogous to the brand images of companies and products, and are equally critical to the progress and prosperity of those

countries because of their influence on the opinions and behaviours of each country's 'target audiences': foreign investors, tourists, consumers, students, entrepreneurs, trading partners, the media, other governments, donors, multilateral agencies, and so on.[2]

In his work of setting the stage for diplomacy, Girardin (2001: 140) states that the three dimensions of language that are interpretation, persuasion and respect have some implications in diplomacy. Considering language as "prior to any diplomacy, shaping its world, setting the rules of the game", interpretation is constantly at work in diplomacy. Based on the skill of convincing people to perceive things your way, diplomacy blends logic and science with the "gift of proper language packaging and presentation necessary to convince others" (Abu Jaber 2001: 53). This means that diplomacy cannot be separated from persuasion, which is overwhelmingly active during negotiations. The aim is to "weave discourse into fabrics than others perceive as true" (Harris 1991: 289). The last dimension, seen as ingrained in diplomacy, involves ethics namely the respect for the other which can be expressed in terms of a strong care for a sense of impartiality.

A survey of the literature on language of diplomacy suggests that research in this field has followed different directions, from the exploration of the impact of computer-based communication in diplomatic documents (Kurbaljia 2001) to the cross-cultural implications in the field of translation for negotiation purposes (Rana 2001). Closer to the aims of this research is the literature that looks at the plethora of language mechanisms and choices which make diplomatic language the property of a 'discourse community' (Swales 1990).

Whatever the object of study, or the choice of methodological

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[2] Available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/national-reputation. Date of download: February 6th 2007.

approach, a common thread characterizing the previous literature on the language of diplomacy (Cohen 1995; Hofstede 2004; Matos 2004) resides in its main essence that is the conducive manner "to the construction and sustenance of consensus and collaboration among nations" (Burhanudeen 2005: 36). According to this research, five main features typical of this type of discourse have been unanimously identified (ibid.):

(i) a positive emphasis on 'what to say';

(ii) a use of diplomatic language in terms of 'peace-building, peace-making and peace-promoting force';

(iii) avoidance of potentially aggressive and hostile language;

(iv) a cautious and strategic communication;

(v) a constructively expressed position of attitudes, beliefs and emotions.

If the last point constitutes the main focus of this dissertation, the 'strategic communication' is also taken into account above all when speaking of ambiguity as one the main resources in diplomatic communication.

Cohen (1981: 32-35) has described 'courtesy', 'non-redundancy' and 'constructive ambiguity' as devices, which feature prominently in the language of diplomacy. If courtesy is achieved through a set of formulaic expressions or ritualized phrases which enable diplomats to express unpleasant meanings tactfully, non-redundancy implies that "a diplomatic communication should say neither too much nor too little because every word, nuance of omission will be meticulously studied for any shade of meaning" (Cohen, 1981: 32). 'Constructive ambiguity' aims to avoid discontent by ensuring open alternatives or a margin for further interpretations with the purpose of facilitating conflict resolution.

By investigating rhetoric in diplomacy, Pehar (2001) focuses of the

role of analogies in diplomacy and points out how 'historical analogies' serve the function of marking diplomats and politicians' positions to strengthen their arguments.

Due to the aim of investigating the multi-faceted word of 'security' in next chapter, a short survey of the tool of ambiguity is illustrated in the following sub-section.

2.5.1 Ambiguity in diplomatic discourse[3]

Words are polysemic and semantic differences imply different interpretations of reality. In Pehar's words (2005: 155) ambiguity can be defined as:

> a pattern of language which potentially carries a number of different meanings, and one is undecided as to which of the meanings is actually conveyed. But, this is not all. The concept of ambiguity is especially interesting because an ambiguous sentence, word, or a text, opens the possibility of different, and, more importantly, incompatible meanings.

Another definition (Berridge and James 2004) stress the function of this tool by giving the example of how 'constructive ambiguity' "might be employed not only to disguise an inability to resolve a question on which the parties remain far apart but to do so in a manner that enables each to claim that some concession on it has actually been obtained"[4]. These two definitions point out two different faces of the same coin: ambiguity exists in language because it is a product of human cognition but at the same time it is instrumental to buy room for manoeuvre. Language may be compared to a piece of clay that can be moulded into form, be this precise

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[3] Most of the considerations in this sub-section come from the insightful lessons of dr. Biljana during my course in "Language and Diplomacy" at the University of Malta (July –October 2008).

[4] From: (with Alan James), 2nd edn, Palgrave-Macmillan: Basingstoke and New York. http://grberridge.diplomacy.edu/Teaching/display.asp?Topic=Dictionary

or merely suggestive. In other words, ambiguity is an asset and a design fault at the same time, inevitable and indispensable, depending on what language areas it involves and on the addresser's intentions. Starting from the assumption that ambiguity cannot be compartmentalised, because it arises in a number of ways, two main macro categories can be distinguished: 'narrow' and 'broad' ambiguity. The former, known as 'categorical' arises when phenomena like homophony, polysemy and sentence structures are implicated. On the other hand, semantic vagueness, connotations, parataxis and implications are the sources of the 'multivalent' ambiguity, intended as giving rise to different interpretations due to multiple meanings. Since some of these elements are unavoidable, as homophony in speaking, a cline could be suggested starting from those inherent elements of language, which bring about inescapable ambiguity, to deliberate (mis)uses of words or sentences.

In the light of this difference, it might be added that 'narrow ambiguity' results in an unequivocal preference and is easier to be solved, whereas 'broad ambiguity' entangles us in connotations and implications and it is awkward to come to a consensus over. It goes without saying that context helps to disambiguate meaning. Communication is mainly an inferential process; therefore "Anyone involved in a communicative act will practically never be faced with a totally new phenomenon" (Taylor 1998: 75). This is because a word or sentences are not isolated entities, they exist as part of a text, namely they are linked to their environment.

As Edelman maintains (1988: 103 the phenomenon of ambiguity is pervasive in language, more particularly in diplomatic language, and it is mainly due to humanity accumulation of knowledge. To put it another way, when new terms enter the language new meanings are piled on older ones, which are, at first, ambiguous but then they abandon this 'dressing' only

through usage and consensus. A case in point is given by the word *security* in the Diplomatic corpus in that it sometimes becomes ambiguous due to its multifaceted aspect as it will shown in chapter four. Let us now turn to the description of the data and the methodology used in this research.

CHAPTER THREE

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Building up a corpus of diplomatic speeches

The research described in this analysis will be conducted on a corpus of
553,462 running words downloaded from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office website (henceforth FCO), where they were available for inspection.
What I call Diplomatic Corpus (henceforth *DiCo*) includes one main genre
type, namely speeches gathered over a period of ten years, from the
beginning of Blair's government, May 1997, to the end of it, June 2007,
through the tenure of the three foreign ministers Robin Cook, Jack Straw
and Margaret Beckett[1]. I will refer to their speeches as sub-corpora or

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[1] **Robin Cook** (1946-2005) was born in Scotland where, after his studies in English Literature, started his
career as a local councillor in 1971. In 1974 he became Member of Parliament and in 1997 he was
appointed Foreign Secretary. Under Blair's government he dropped previous commitments to unilateral
disarmament and a Eurosceptic approach. In 2002 he was replaced as Foreign Minister and became
Leader of the House, but resigned in 2003 as a sign of protest against the British policy in Iraq.

Jack Straw was born in 1946 and was educated at Leeds University. He was Deputy Leader in 1973 and
worked as a barrister for two years. Elected to Parliament in 1979 he served the Opposition front bench
until 1997 when he became Home Secretary. In 2001 he was appointed Foreign Secretary serving in the
post until 2006. In 2007 he became Secretary of State for Justice after spending a year as Leader of the
House of Commons. Today he is the Secretary of State for Justice and continues to be a major figure in
the Labour government.

Margaret Jackson Beckett was born in 1943 into a working-class family. She qualified as a metallurgist
at the University of Manchester. She started her political career in 1973 when she was selected as a
Labour candidate for Lincoln but she did not win. In 1974 she became Member of Parliament and only in
1992 she was elected Deputy Leader of the Labour Party being the first woman to serve it under John
Smith. After his death she remained leader until 1994 then, under Blair's leadership, she had different
roles: from Shadow Secretary of State for Health to the shadow President of the Board of Trade. After
the General Elections in 2001 she held the position of Leader of the House of Commons then, replaced
by Robin Cook, she was appointed Secretary of State for Environment until 2006 when she became
Foreign Minister. She is one of the longest-serving Labour frontbenchers.

simply speeches. By virtue of their position, foreign ministers have all powers to represent their governments in the international fora as contemplated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.

The criteria behind the corpus are in line with the principles stated by Wynne (2005: 5), in that the contents were selected "without regard for the language they contain, but according to their communicative function in the community in which they arise". Table 3.1 gives an overview of the corpus (for further details see Appendix One):

Foreign Secretary	Text-typology	tokens	years
Robin Cook	58 speeches	140,583	May 1997-June 2001
Jack Straw	144 speeches	308,570	June 2001-May 2006
Margaret Beckett	46 speeches	104,309	May 2006-June 2007

Table 3.1 Diplomatic Corpus. Total running words: 553,462

The speeches I shall be investigating are all part of official communicative settings. In other words, all the speeches were properly prepared for institutional and public purposes. It is important to point out here that transcriptions of speeches are not considered as representing real spoken discourse, because they are pre-written and, hence, some important features such as information about intonation, pauses and overlappings are omitted (Slembrouck 1992). The retrieval tools used in the research are *WordSmith Tools* (Scott 2007) and *ConCgram* (Greaves, in press) and the corpus is not annotated meaning that the analysis was entirely manual.

3.2 The contextual configuration of the diplomatic speeches

The tangible construct of the context of situation (Halliday 1985) allows us to understand what is going on in the text (field), the social relationships existing between people involved (tenor) and the way in which language is used and its medium of transmission (mode). If the *field* informs about the terminology used, the *tenor* alerts to the register employed and finally, the *mode* is important to distinguish between given and new information. As far as the British foreign ministers' speeches are concerned, one of their task is to illustrate and explain the foreign policy strategic choices made at home and abroad about topics such as European integration, terrorism, human rights and the environment (f*ield*). This aim is pursued through the critical interrogation of a range of evidence and is revealed under the form of "a ritualized monologue" (*tenor*), "delivered orally and pre-written to be read" (*mode*) (Miller 2004b: 43).

In a similar line, adopting Hymes' parameters (1971), we can trace the macro-context or context of communication of the texts under investigation. As far as the 'setting' is concerned the speeches are usually delivered in the various rooms of the Foreign Office, at the House of Commons (internal political communication) or at the Embassies abroad (inter-state political communication). The 'time' embraces the whole Blair's government. The 'channel' is not really spontaneous but texts are readout. The 'register' is formal and sometimes highly rhetorical, except for some spontaneous remarks on some local events. The 'topic' deals with the main international issues which reflect the political and social themes of the ministers' times. If Cook deals with the issue of the European integration, the question of the Euro introduction and, hence, the position of Britain in Europe, Jack Straw lived the delicate period of the terrorist attacks and the Iraqi war, therefore, most of his speeches concentrate on security issues,

counter-terrorism strategies and the future of Iraq. Finally, with her background as Minister of the Environment, Beckett concentrates mainly on the climate change issue and energy security. If it is true that these speeches are illustrated to a live audience, they are also addressed to the media to be reproduced and, eventually, being available on the web, they are addressed to the 'posterity' (Bayley 2008: 47).

3.3 Corpus-Assisted Discourse Analysis: a synergy between two approaches.

From a methodological point of view, this study is set in the recent tradition that combines corpus linguistics and discourse analysis (Koller and Mautner 2005; Miller 2007; Bayley 2008), in particular functional grammar, and starts with an essentially empirical approach in order to grasp what we are not expecting to find out or to survey the corpus "to gain a sense of the flavour of the data" (Silverman 1993: 163). Described as "theory-heavy", the SFL has a different approach to the description of language from Corpus Linguistics (henceforth CL), which is seen as "theory-light", namely free from any theoretical framework (Hunston and Thompson 2006: 2). As it has been stated (ibid.), SFL implies a set of system networks seen as mediation between the total system of language and the realisations of meanings, whereas CL "does not posit such a mediation, but regards the totality of language use (or in Hoey's terms, the totality of the individual's experience of language) as an entity in its own right, partially observable in a corpus" (ibid.). Despite this difference, both approaches share a common concern for the context starting from the language as a text or from the same assumptions insofar a text is seen as the main vehicle for the creation of the meaning (Tognini-Bonelli 2004). Furthermore, if the importance of context is highlighted in both

approaches what mainly distances them is the criterion of 'frequency', which only recently has been introduced in SFL (see Matthiessen 2006).

The interaction between these two approaches may provide the means to depict the way in which ideological discursive positions are construed globally across texts. As observed by Partington (2004: 12) "one of the fundamental questions of modern linguistics is the relationship between instance and system, between the typical and the exceptional, between signal and noise". The assumption is that browsing through corpora can reveal collocational patterns that may work as pointers to larger discursive processes, of which instances of ideological value positions are usually part. Thus, stretches of discourse identified through the use of a concordancer constitute the background for a detailed qualitative diagnosis of the instantiation enacted through the texts, in this case with the help of the analytical framework of the Appraisal Theory (Martin 2000; Martin and White 2005), whose main aim is to better understand "the interplay of interpersonal meaning and social relations in the model of language and the social we were developing, especially in the area of solidarity (i.e. resources for empathy and affiliation)" (Martin, 2000: 148). Corpus study will reveal replicable preferred ways of speaking allowing qualitative analysis of larger units of language.

Furthermore, the work here is posited as axiomatic in that "any proposal of socio-institutional behavioural norms necessarily involves the contemporaneous enactment of value orientations; hence, attitudinal resources, and in particular appraisal systems […] are considered to be the basic analytical tools" (Miller 2006: 250). There is an increasing number of contributions (Hunston and Thompson 2006; Miller 2007) attesting the problems encountered in investigating sets of events jointly rather than individually, in that both context and co-text are important and "it is

posited that patterns of ways of saying do 'count', and so may usefully be count*ed*'' Miller (2007: 160).

In this research the cotext of the word 'security' is first analysed in order to look at its collocates and study its evolution across the three ministers; this study is assumed as being preliminary to the study of the same word in its wider context, which starts by looking at the repeated associations of words which function as indicators of ideologies.

3.4 The phraseological approach

Over the last 20 years there has been an increasing interest in phraseology in English language description and significant results have been shown. In this research the term 'phraseology' is mainly used in Clear's terms of "recurrent co-occurrence of words" (1993: 277), which refer to the more-or-less fixed co-occurrences of linguistic elements. Attention in this study has been focused on continuous and discontinuous sequences of words through the introduction of a new computer-based methodology that is 'concgramming' (Warren et al 2007). The primary aim of this automatic search is the identification of the phraseological profile of a corpus and then its 'aboutness' (Phillips 1989). The idea of using *ConcGram* (in press) as software relies on the fact that some instances of word associations might be overlooked and that collocations may be also found non-contiguously. Hence, by the use of this methodology we can identify all the 'potential configurations' between 2 and 5 words including:

> the associated words even if they occur in different positions relative to one another (i.e. positional variation) and even when one or more words occur in between the associated words (i.e. constituency variation) (Cheng *et al* 2006: 413).

ConcGram allows automatic identification of phraseological variation

and aims to find all the word co-occurrences, called 'concgrams', in a text, and it is left to the user to determine from the context in which those co-occurrences are found whether or not they constitute meaningful word associations. The term 'co-occurrence' is used here to mean any word which occurs in the environment of another word and which may or may not be there by chance. An 'associated' word is one whose co-occurrence is not accidental but represents a collocate of the search word called 'origin'. Current searches for n-grams generate phrases such as *fight against terrorism*, but would miss the same phraseological pattern when realised as *fight against the crime of terrorism* (Milizia and Spinzi 2008: 327) which allows constituency variations. In *DiCo* such a piece of software discovered instances of non-contiguous collocations (e.g. *a threat to international peace and security*) where *threat* was found in a span of 5 words with respect to the search word *security*. This approach is not new in language but dates back to the *OSTI Report* in the 1970s, when Sinclair was looking for the canonical form as the prototype of a phrase with all the possible variants.

Drawing on this perspective, we have to concede that multi-word units are the norm in language and that the primary carrier of meaning is not the single word but the phrase. In this approach, collocation becomes the way of understanding meanings and associations between words which, when contiguous in their combinations, will be referred to as 'clusters' when using *WordSmith Tools* (Scott and Tribble 2007). Since words can only take on meaning relying on the context they occur in, "in order to understand the meanings of words, we have to compare them in relation to other words" (Baker 2006: 96).

3.4.1 First stage of analysis: keywords

In order to study the quality that words have in *DiCo* ("keyness") the procedure used is the one devised for use in the Keywords utility provided

by *WordSmith Tools*. This is because analysing the "reasons why a particular word appears so frequently in a corpus can help to reveal the presence of discourses, especially those of a hegemonic nature" (Baker 2006: 121). Keywords refer to words which are 'prominent' or 'stand out' in a corpus and are metaphorically compared to a 'screwdriver' which leads us to what a text is about: "What the text boils down to is its keyness, once we have steamed off the verbiage, adornment, the blah blah blah" (Scott 2006: 55-56).

The procedure here contemplates two steps of comparison against two different corpora as background. With the aim to isolate lexical items particular to diplomatic speeches the BNC as a general corpus of English was used. Results are shown in figure 3.1

Figure 3.1 Keywords - *DiCo* referenced against BNC

The keyword lists suggest lexical items which warrant further investigation because it is a measure of *saliency* (Baker 2006: 125) or to put it differently

they represent 'importance' and 'aboutness' in textuality (Scott 2001). The keyword list contains three types of words: proper nouns, 'aboutness' keywords and grammatical words which may be relevant in terms of style. As the figure shows, just as predictably, the lexical items relate to the topic of discourse under analysis (*security, Iraq, terrorism*) and the specialized field of study, that is the international setting (*international, global, world, foreign, UN*). Noteworthy is the occurrence of the first plural pronoun (*we*) and the correspondent possessive (*our*) which may be relevant at the level of style and, since the "style of a text may play some role in the discourses within it, it is recommended that such high frequency words are not discarded" (Baker 2006: 128).

A further step in this first attempt to understand the 'aboutness' of *DiCo* involves a comparison with an *ad hoc* specialized corpus containing all Blair's speeches in his ten-year government[2]. This helps to isolate those features which are peculiar to the diplomatic discourse of the three foreign ministers who are supposed to support Blair's policy. Interestingly, figure 3.2 reveals that *our* and *security* are keywords also with respect to Blair's speeches and thus relevant to the discourse of foreign policy. Furthermore, a more humanitarian discourse seems to be at work in diplomacy (*human, rights*) as well as the use of the relative pronoun *which*, the proposition *of* and of the definite article *the* might be indicative of a distinctive feature of diplomacy, namely explicitness. Further investigation through concordances will help in this direction.

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[2] The Blair Corpus used in this study is included in a larger corpus of Political speeches assembled at the faculty of Political Science at the University of Bari by Denise Milizia.

Figure 3.2 Keywords - *DiCo* **referenced against Blair's speeches**

3.4.2 Further analytical steps

Once 'security' emerged as a keyword in *DiCo* the analysis was based on the concgrams retrieved around this search word and, relying on the statistical measure of 't-score' (see chapter four), it was possible to study the collocational profile of the word across the three sub-corpora. The main aim in this second step of the analysis was to look at quantitative similarities and differences in the speeches of the three ministers to trace boundaries in the conceptualisation of 'security' by comparing and discussing the most significant concgrams in the sub-corpora. This part of the analysis draws on the concepts of 'exocentricity' and 'endocentricty' provided by Sinclair and Mauranen (2006: 24):

> *Exocentric* is the kind of relationship that is made by subject and predicate, or between a preposition and the following noun phrase; the items related

have quite different syntactic roles, and extend the expressive possibilities of the language. *Endocentric* relations are the opposite – the items involved collaborate in the construction of a single linguistic entity like a noun phrase.

If the cotext was the main focus in the second step of the analysis, then context was taken into account: in this phase the canonical one line of the concgrams emerged (e.g. *security/peace; security/prosperity; security/threat(s); security/climate*) was enlarged to be analysed in a larger context and interpreted in the light of the Appraisal Theory (see next sub-section for details). In particular the system of 'Engagement' was used to look for those semantic resources employed "to negotiate emotions, judgements and valuations, alongside resources for amplifying and engaging with these evaluations" (Martin 2000: 145). The categories of 'Appreciation' and 'Judgement' were also useful for the analysis.

An analytical category that is particularly relevant to the purpose of this research in chapter five is that of 'cause', which is fairly complex insofar it includes 'reason', 'purpose' and behalf'. Moreover, the other two categories which fall within 'cause' are 'condition' and 'concession' both labelled as 'contingency' (Thompson 2004: 110). In this study 'cause' will be treated as a semantic motif rather than as a grammatical category.

Drawing on Martin and Rose (2003: 122-132), conjunctions have two 'faces': they are 'external' if they interact with the ideational meaning, they are 'internal' if they have to do with the logical organization of discourse. External conjunctions are categorized according to four types which include sub-types: 'addition', 'comparison', 'time' and 'consequence'.
In chapter five, even though instances of 'comparison' were found in Beckett's speeches, the category of 'consequence' is the most frequent. The category of 'means' operates with resources of 'appreciation' as shown in sub-section 5.2.1; the category of 'cause' and 'condition' interact with

resources of 'valuation' and 'judgement' as illustrated in sub-section 5.2.2.

It is convenient to point out that in this phase (chapter five) the computer program was used mainly for searching and retrieving, but the analysis remains an intensive manual qualitative labour.

In the final stage of the analysis (chapter six), pronominal choices have been considered in cluster combinations to compare the use of the first personal pronouns (*I* vs. *we*) with the most recurrent verbal form in the corpus (e.g. *want*). Relying on *WordSmith Tools*, 3-word clusters having *I* as search word and then 3-word clusters having *we* as node have been retrieved. The aim is to show that frequent instances of expressions of subjectivity may help to uncover reasons underlying the shift from objective to personal position and the other way around.

3.5 The language of the Appraisal

Since the Appraisal system was used to analyse the context of the concgrams around *security*, this section deals with a description of the terminology used during the analysis with reference mainly to the system of Engagement and Attitude. The system of 'Graduation' is not considered in this study.

Engagement is an umbrella term for all those mechanisms of intersubjective positioning. As table 3.2 shows, it refers to all the resources by which a stance is taken towards the various positions referenced by the text (White 2003: 260). Engagement resources have the capacity for positioning utterances into a dialogical relationship with the past, the present and the future. In other words, written or spoken texts always reveal the influence of, or take up in some way, what others have said before. When utterances disregard the discursive background against which they are set, they are labelled 'monoglossic', otherwise they are

'heteroglossic'. Heteroglossic discourse may recognize diversity acting to dialogically 'contract' alternative voices (i.e. to 'reject', 'counter', etc.), or to 'expand' them (i.e. 'entertain', 'acknowledge', etc.). In other words, 'disclaim', 'proclaim', 'entertain' and 'attribute' are the resources of the 'engagement system'.

At the broadest level, heteroglossic utterances may 'contract' or 'expand' other alternative points of view according to whether the authorial voice recognizes or rejects them. These two main categories ('contraction' and 'expansion') include other resources, which are realized by a variety of lexical and grammatical elements. Thus, 'disclaim' and 'proclaim' are contractive mechanisms: in the case of 'disclaim', the textual voice rejects some contrary positions through 'denial', and 'concession', whereas by 'proclaiming' the authorial voice sets itself against or suppresses other voices though 'concurring', 'pronouncement' and 'endorsement'. When the textual voice presents the proposition as one of the possible alternative positions, it 'entertains' other alternatives. If it allows for dialogistic alternatives in the subjectivity of an external voice, it 'attributes' it through 'acknowledgement' or 'distance'.

Looking at how intersubjective relations of alignment and dis-alignment, agreement and disagreement, are linguistically constructed, this system provides an accompanying outlook on 'Attitude'. 'Attitude', as outlined in table 3.3 includes: 'Affect', which refers to wordings of emotional responses, 'Judgement', which refers to ethical responses, 'Appreciation' which refers to aesthetic responses. The sub-categories of 'Affect' are best summarized in table 3.3.

Let us now move on the next chapter dealing with the analysis of *security* in its short diachronic history from Cook to Beckett, starting by introducing diplomacy in its historical context.

contract
- disclaim
  - deny
    no, didn't, never
  - counter
    yet, although, amazingly, bat
- proclaim
  - concur
    - affirm: *naturally, of course, obviously etc*
    - concede: *admittedly... [but]; sure... [however] etc*
  - pronounce
    I contend, the fact of the matter are...
    indeed
  - endorse
    the report demonstrates/shows/proves that...

expand
- entertain
  perhaps, it's probable thet, this may be, must, it seems to me, apparently, expository questions
- attribute
  - acknowledge
    Halliday argues that, many Australians believe that ... it's said that, the report states
  - distance,
    Chomsky claimed to have shown that...

Table 3.2 The taxonomy of options under the category of ENGAGEMENT (adapted from Martin and White 2005).

APPRECIATION		Positive	Negative
Reaction	(impact) Did it grab me?	fascinating, exciting, captivating, dramatic	tedious, revolting, disgusting, boring
	(quality) Did I like it?	lovely, beautiful, appealing, superb, magnificent, fine, good	bad, ugly, nasty, yuk
Composition	(balance) Did it hang together?	systemic, balance, moderate, unified, harmonious	unplanned, irregular, disorganised
	(complexity) Was it hard to follow?	simple, precise, rich, pure, detailed	unclear, plain
Valuation	(significance) Was it worthwhile?	significant, crucial, deep, innovative, original, real, helpful, challenging, beneficial, advantageous, valid, appropriate	shallow, harmful, insignificant, useless, unclean, detrimental, conventional

Table 3.3 Framework of Appreciation (Martin and White 2005)

JUDGEMENT	Positive (examples)	Negative (examples)
Social Esteem		

Normality (how unusual or special)	cute, gorgeous, unique, trendy, famous, familiar, etc.	cranky, fussy, picky, peculiar, grumpy, choosy, unrealistic, etc.
Capacity (how capable is s/he?)	talented, smart, vigorous, intelligent, strong, educated, success, efficient, scrupulous, sane, learn, etc.	pedantic, foolish, ignorant, fail, incompetent, dumb, etc.
Tenacity (how determined or dependable is s/he?)	plucky, decisive, tenacious, persistent, study, insist, etc.	indecisive, wavering, soft, strong-headed, stubborn, etc.
Social Sanction		
Veracity (how truthful or honest is s/he?)	naïve, trustworthy, reliable, honest, staunch, etc.	gullible, con man, fraudulent, imposter, etc.
Propriety (how ethical or how far beyond reproach is s/he?)	moral, fair, concern, sensitive, responsible, caring, respectful, kind, generous, charitable, etc.	brutal, inhumane, corrupt, mean, barbaric, selfish, immoral, insensitive, biased, abuse, etc.

Table 3.4 Framework of Judgement from Martin and White 2005

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY

IN A CHANGING DIPLOMACY

4.1. Introduction

After the illustration of the methodology behind this work, we now start to interrogate the corpus. The main focus in this chapter is on the 'new regime of international security' (Fairclough 2007) as a hegemonic discourse by introducing, first, the broader historical context which justifies the new trends in the foreign arena. Then, a short review of the term 'diplomacy' will be provided in order to highlight its flexibility, confirmed by the 'conceptual knowledge' extracted from the corpus. Once the scenario of the changing diplomacy has been set up, I will start the investigation of the co-text of the word 'security' as 'origin' in concordances, in order to trace its diachronic development across the ten years of the British Foreign Policy history. The analysis of the concgrams around 'security' also aims to unmask the ideological discursive practices. The main idea is that a "community's value system is built up and maintained, at least partly, by the recurrent use of particular phrasings in texts" (Stubbs 2002: 166).

4.2 A historical perspective: active diplomacy for a changing world

September 11th terrorist attacks have sealed humanity's fate in every field and in the arena of foreign policy they have marked the end of the second

phase of diplomacy. Lasted for about 40 years, the first phase was characterised by a more or less stable equilibrium between the USA and the Soviet Union. Finished in the late 1980s this period also saw the formation of the European Union a process that continued in the following second phase dominated by the collapse of communism. As Williams highlights (2002), in the aftermath of the Cold War the western foreign policies have been pursued within the parameters of liberal democratic capitalism. The ideological convergence between Britain and the other European states was also supplemented by the question of European enlargement, which dominated the British foreign policy debates.

If it is true that international priority issues like fight against terrorism, the weapons of mass destruction, conflict prevention and resolution, global economy expansion, sustainable development promotion and poverty reduction are well within the traditional scope of diplomacy, nevertheless it is the wider context that is changing:

> One striking characteristic of the strategic priorities […] is that they are as much about domestic policy as about foreign policy. The *interdependence* of the two is now very strong. [emphasis added] There is almost no foreign policy issue that does not have a domestic dimension, and the reverse is true too. 90% of the heroin on the streets of Britain comes from Afghanistan: so the political stability and economic prosperity of Afghanistan – resting on crops other than the poppy – will have a profound effect on British towns and cities. Effective counter-terrorism liaison in Pakistan an Algeria will have a direct effect on security in London[1]

Communication revolution, the end of deference, the rise of the consumer-citizen have profound implications for all government departments, including the FCO which was obliged to rethink the challenges faced. Robin Cook himself, highlighted the necessity of an

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[1] From: Michael Jay, permanent under-secretary, speech delivered at London School of Economics, 27.07.2006- website: www.fco.gov.uk date of download January 24th 2007.

'interdependent' character of the foreign policy, namely not 'divorced from domestic policy' but as playing a central role in the Labour's political programme (FCO Mission Statement, May 12th, 1997). Nine years later, Jack Straw in his speech that launched the "White Paper", stressed the importance of a flexible and 'active diplomacy' so as to adapt itself to a world that is changing and also influencing the direction of that change:

> Diplomacy in the 21st century needs to be hard-edged, clear in its goals and determinedly activist: grounded in core but flexible in the face of rapid change. (Straw, 28.03. 2006)

The new era, dominated by processes of social change, such as 'globalization' or 'new capitalism', is thus said to require a more *engaged* foreign policy across a broader agenda, which in turn means a ceaseless concern for a wide range of alliances. As Edwards puts it (2004: 5) "the Labour's victory marked a decisive break with the selfish individualism of the 1980s, and a rebirth of public commitment to issues of international justice. The 'giving age' had arrived said Prime Minister Tony Blair."

Blair's administration continued his party's tradition of cultivating the respect for universal norms and values (cf. Williams 2006), but it also showed off some distinctive features such as a far stronger belief in the use of military force to encourage humanitarian purposes. It is in the military sphere that the process of Europeanization is more evident (Williams 2002), as the Prime Minister himself marked by highlighting Britain's pivotal role in realising a strong alliance with both America and Europe (Associated Press Luncheon, December 15th, 1998).

If New Labour sprang directly from socialism, however, it "explicitly downgraded the place of socialist ideas in its foreign policy" (Williams 2006: 26). Indeed, in tracing the major points of departure from the old tradition, Williams notices the stress on the concept of globalisation and on

what he calls 'moralism', namely a strong emphasis on the 'ethical dimension' of the foreign policy. At the beginning of his diplomatic service, Robin Cook announced it with the aim of putting human rights at the heart of diplomacy. In his formulation Cook resorts to the adjective *ethical* three times and two occurrences are in the same opening speech, always associated to the British foreign policy[2]:

```
(1) Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension
    and must support the demands of other peoples for
    the democratic rights on which we insist for
    ourselves. (May 12, 1997)

(2) It supplies an ethical content to foreign policy and
    recognises that the national interest cannot be
    defined only by narrow realpolitik. It aims to make
    Britain a leading partner in a world community of
    nations, and reverses the Tory trend towards not so
    splendid isolation. (May 12, 1997)
```

The 'peremptory' tone of the citation (1), due to the double use of deontic modality, aims to give the British foreign policy a new orientation in the portrayal of Britain. What we see here is the 'emergence' of a new discourse (human rights) as the facet of a strategy in response to the change in contemporary social life. The statement, which was rephrased by the media in terms of 'ethical foreign policy', is clearer in the context of the FCO Mission Statement, which refers to spreading British values in the world. The third occurrence of the adjective *ethical* is found in a context which reveals contradiction and a need for clarification of what was designated as a utopian plan, given by the contradiction between the ethical dimension and the foreign policy itself (see Gallagher 2006):

```
(3) Some people have described our new approach as an
    ethical foreign policy. I created a modest little
```

---

[2] Eight occurrences of the adjective 'ethical' were found in Straw's speeches, but none of them in association with foreign policy or variants of it.

stir last week when I pointed out that it was not a
description I had ever used myself. To me, the
phrase is too easily capable of being misunderstood
as grandstanding. (November 11, 1998)

4.2.1 New trends in the diplomatic scenario

Researchers in the field of diplomacy have pointed out the complexity of
the forms and the functions which characterize diplomacy in the era of
globalisation (Hocking 2005). These shifts in diplomacy are mainly due to
changes in the environment where diplomats operate, interacting at home
and abroad at different professional spheres. As Hocking notes (2006: 15)
diplomats work together with other ministries and they are in touch with
business people in order to promote trade and fulfil objectives of economic
diplomacy.

Increasingly, diplomacy is an activity involving a range of relations
with states and non-state actors and hence, it requires the creation of
networks where no single member has the monopoly. This means that the
traditional view of 'diplomacy' relying on the term 'negotiation' and
defining it as "…the management of relations between countries by
negotiation rather than by force" (*Oxford Learner's Dictionary*) cannot be
exhaustive. Indeed, in his work *The dynamics of diplomacy* (1990), Sir Peter
Marshall pinpoints five more different connotations of the same term. If
the focus is on the "content" of foreign affairs as a whole, diplomacy is a
synonym of foreign policy, that is the perspective of this study. Diplomacy
can be used interchangeably with "statecraft", when the "conduct" of the
policy is highlighted. If the term refers to the use of diplomats, the
connotation is more recent, in that the Foreign Ministry, as institution,
dates back to the beginning of the 17th century, when Richelieu set it up in
France and to 1782, in England, with the foundation of the first Foreign
Office (Anderson 1993: 73-87). Finally, diplomacy is the art of persuading

people to perceive things your way by combining crucial ingredients such as logic, science and the gift of proper language (cf. Abu Jaber 2001). These conceptualizations, which are linked by the underlying aim of conflict resolution, make the term 'diplomacy' a multilayered concept signifying simultaneously "content, manner, character, method and art" (Marshall 1990: 7) and show the "boundary-spanning" (Hocking 2007: 92) character of diplomacy.

In order to illustrate this multifaceted character of diplomacy and its new trends, the following examples from *DiCo,* based on *diplomacy* as search word, have been taken into account to extract more "conceptual knowledge" (Bowker and Pearson 2002: 217)[3]:

(1) We are seeing a <u>shift</u> not just in the tools of **diplomacy** but in **diplomacy** itself. (*Beckett, 20/03/07*)

(2) What we need is not so much a **diplomacy** of hindsight, but rather a <u>diplomacy of foresight</u>. (*Straw, 25/03/02*)

(3) We must recognise that **diplomacy** has expanded beyond its international sphere of inter-state relations, security treaties and trade agreements. Vital though this work remains, if I was a few minutes late I apologise because I was signing 20 treaties, but **diplomacy** now encompasses the <u>fundamentals of the lives of our peoples,</u> their jobs, their beliefs of right and wrong, even the quality of the air that they breath. (*Cook, 12/06/97*)

(4) Today **diplomacy** <u>is more than ever about 'soft power'</u> — persuading others that they have an interest in your agenda; that you and they want the same things. **Diplomacy** today means putting our values into <u>action</u>. (*Straw, 24/04/06*)

(5) A new **diplomacy:** achieving national interests through <u>common action</u> (*Beckett, 27/02/07*)

(6) Today's global challenges require us to use science as a tool of **diplomacy,** and to build the scientific consensus which is the necessary foundation for effective international <u>action</u>. (*Straw, 21/03/05*)

---

[3] "When you use a corpus analysis tool to produce a concordance for a specific search term, you will retrieve all the occurrences of that string that are found in your corpus. Some of these will contain conceptual information, while others will be less informative" (Bowker et al 2002: 217).

```
(7)  So an active **diplomacy** for a changing world means not
     only  the  still  vital  skills  of  international
     negotiation and  influence,  it  also  means  running  an
     effective service operations to millions of customers
     around the world. (*Straw, 26/04/06*)

(8)     **Diplomacy** in the 21st Century needs to be hard-
        edged, clear in its goals and determinedly activist:
        grounded in core but flexible in the face of rapid
        change. (*Straw, 28/03/06*)

(9)     It is not state to state diplomacy. It is people to
        people **diplomacy.** (*Cook, 28/03/01*)
```

A process of democratisation emerges from these instances where actors are not states but people seen as *customers* (7) with their values, their objectives and their *lives* (3). This far-reaching diplomacy (2: *diplomacy of foresight)* not only does it rely on negotiation as management of international relations but global common *action* (4, 5, 6) is also advocated, due to mutual interests and goals. What emerges matches the so called 'multistakeholder approach' to diplomacy (Hocking 2006; Kurbalija 2006) which recognizes a multiple sphere of authority (3), the development of fluid forms with open and inclusive communication patterns in a crossing domestic-international arena. Citation (4) traces a connection between diplomacy and 'soft power' considered as the ability to achieve one's own goals through attraction, in this case a sharing of interests. Soft Power arises from the appeal of some "intangible" country's elements such as culture, political ideals and policies (cf. Nye 2004).

Interestingly, the axiological orientation of this shift in diplomacy, namely engagement, is best epitomized in the clusters *diplomacy* is embedded in, as displayed in the table 4.1 below:

```
N     Cluster                    Freq.  Length
1     FOR A CHANGING               7     3
2     DIPLOMACY FOR A              7     3
3     ACTIVE DIPLOMACY FOR         7     3
4     DIPLOMACY FOR DEMOCRACY      6     3
```

Table 4.1: 3-word clusters of *diplomacy* provided by WordSmith Tools (2007)

What is worth noticing is the use of the preposition 'for' in the slogan "Active diplomacy for a changing world" at the place of 'in' which emphasises British instrumental and militant role as stated by Straw: "Our diplomacy must be active, not only adapting to a changing world but influencing the direction of its travel" (March 28th, 2006).

The key evaluative adjective *active* occurs 123 times in *DiCo* and 16% of its occurrences in the corpus are clustered with another adjective *engaged* and both depict *diplomacy* and *foreign policy* or a variant of them (*way; approach*) to refer to the policy employed on the international setting. It goes beyond the scope of this research to investigate the concordances of the adjective *active*. What is relevant to this part of the study is that the combination of these two adjectives, *active and engaged,* describes the typology of dynamic diplomacy taken and also advocated by the three foreign ministers in a world that changes continuously, as shown in the following citations (for a full list see Appendix Two):

```
(1) An active and engaged foreign policy is not
just a salve to liberal consciences. It is a
survival mechanism for our societies.

(2) We both [India and Britain] take an active and
engaged approach to the world.

(3) Over the next few weeks, in a series of
speeches both here and abroad, I shall be setting
out in more detail the reasons why the UK's
interests are best served by an active and engaged
global foreign policy, working with our allies to
push back the boundaries of chaos.
```

4.3 Identifying discourse from collocates

The aim of this section is to study the environment surrounding *security* to determine its diachronic development by pointing out the variability of its usage across the three foreign ministers' speeches. The assumption is that

words tend to co-occur so strongly that they cannot 'retain independent meanings' (Tognini-Bonelli 2001: 101). I am looking at all the words associated with *security* in that "collocation is a good guide to meaning, and when a noun is ambiguous (as many are) collocation can indicate which meaning is relevant" (Sinclair 2003: 38). Collocates contribute to a semantic analysis of a word (cf. Sinclair 1991: 115-116) and furthermore, by browsing among frequent associations of words, "we can glimpse the recurrent wordings which circulate in the social world**,** and glimpse how linguistic categories become social categories" (Stubbs 1996: 194).

The analysis starts from the keywords list displayed in the previous chapter. Once *security* has been found at the top of keywords list, it becomes the subject of concordance and collocational inquiry. Then, I am looking at the definitions from three different dictionaries and the phrases the word *security* is embedded in. If our starting point is going to be the evidence from the corpus, we have to come to terms that this does not corroborate the traditional descriptions from the dictionaries. In a further step, the concgrams will be retrieved in order to study the complete phraseological environment of *security* and to mark out the new phrases not found in the dictionaries. I shall also rely on the statistical measure of 't-score'[4] in order to confirm the lexical realisations of the search word and results will be compared and contrasted across the three sub-corpora. By and large, the analysis takes into account two mainly quantitative parameters: **word and concgrams frequency**: in that the term *security* and its semantic associations are not distributed evenly across the three foreign

---

[4] There are different types of statistical calculations to study the collocational profile of a word. Mutual Information gives prominence to the strength of attraction between the search word and its collocates but tends to score highly low frequency words. Z-score and log-log look at low frequency content words. (For more information see Baker 2006: 102-103). In Sinclair's words "The t-score is a statistical measure of the likelihood that two or more words occur together by chance. It is a popular measure in corpus linguistics because compared with other measures it gives prominence to the very common words" (2003: 179).

ministers' sub-corpora and the **collocation relationship** on the basis of statistical calculations.

4.3.1. Analysis

Figure 4.1: **Distribution of** *security* **across the three sub-corpora**

To begin with quantitative observations, figure 4.1 displays the distribution of the noun across the speeches by the three foreign ministers, showing a crescendo in the frequency of the search word from Cook (0.13%) to Beckett (0.29%) through Straw (0.25%). The highest occurrence of *security* was expected in Straw due to his tenure after the September 11th terrorist attacks, but the higher percentage in Beckett, despite her shortest service, highlights a certain relevance of the use of this word that does not appertain only to terrorism or military discourse.

The investigation of the definition of 'security' across three different dictionaries embodies very clearly the choice to give weight to the idea of 'protection' of a person or a country against crime, criminals and attacks by foreign countries, as exemplified in the following quotations:

1. "The quality or state of being secure";

   Compounds: *collective security; security blanket; security council; security*

interest; security police; social security; (Merriam-Webster online dictionary);

2. "Security refers to all the measures that are taken to protect a place, or to ensure that only people with permission enter it or leave it" (Collins Cobuild, 2004);

   <u>Compounds:</u> *security blanket; security camera; security guard; security risk;*

3. "Safety from attack, harm, or damage; connected with safety and protection"

   <u>Compounds:</u> *national/international security; tight/lax security; security blanket; security guard; security council; security risk; security service;* (MacMillan Dictionary, 2002).

A comparison between these definitions and the figure 4.2 shows that the concgrams surfaced in the list from the whole corpus such as *climate security*, *energy security* do not float up to any of the three dictionaries consulted, where we read expected phrases such as 'security council', 'security interest' and 'security service' and so on and so forth. What may be inferred at this initial stage of the analysis is that *security* lends itself to favour new companies in *DiCo*.

Figure 4.2: **Concgrams of** *security* **in** *DiCo* **provided by Wordsmith Tools (2007).**

Figure 4.2 gives us an overview of the concgrams around *security* in *DiCo*. Neglecting predictable occurrences around the cluster *security council,* (e.g. *members of the security council*) or instances which appertain to institutional practices such as *Common foreign and security policy* and *UN security council resolutions*, the table seems to indicate that *security* privileges the friendship of *threat, climate, prosperity* and *energy* differently permuted. Furthermore, it also suggests that 'security' is framed in an unfavourable picture due to the most recurrent concgram *threats to our security*.

At this step of the analysis it is crucial to look at the occurrences of these concgrams in the three sub-corpora considered individually, so as to detect any similarities or dissimilarities in their semantic usage. In the lists of selected concgrams displayed below, some criteria have been applied (a full list of concgrams is provided in Appendix Three):

-all grammar associations have not been taken into account in order to focus attention on content words which help define the borders of security in *DiCo*;

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- a list of the first one hundred concgrams has been scrutinised;

-concgrams with less than five occurrences have been disregarded;

-those concgrams which were not relevant in one sub-corpus were considered in the analysis only if they emerged as significant in the other sub-corpora and therefore useful for comparative purposes:

security/concgrams in Cook' sub-corpus			freq.
1.	security	Europe	18
2.	security	Britain	17
3.	security	European	15
4.	security	peace	15
5.	security	international	9
6.	security	prosperity	9
7.	security	world	9
8.	security	new	8
9.	security	commitment	6
10.	security	countries	6
11.	security	defence	6
12.	security	freedom	6
13.	security	people	6
14.	security	Iraq	5
15.	security	Israelis	5

security/concgrams in Straw's sub-corpus			
1.	security	prosperity	82
2.	security	international	73
3.	security	European	50
4.	security	global	50
5.	security	peace	50
6.	security	threats	49
7.	security	Europe	33
8.	security	new	30
9.	security	world	30
10.	security	Iraq	28
11.	security	development	27
12.	security	collective	26
13.	security	common	23
14.	security	terrorism	23
15.	security	threat	23

security/concgrams in Beckett's sub-corpus			
1.	security	climate	108
2.	security	energy	70
3.	security	global	37
4.	security	change	25
5.	security	international	23
6.	security	threat	17
7.	security	national	15
8.	security	people	14
9.	security	new	14
10.	security	hard	13

```
11.     security    agenda          12
12.     security    community       12
13.     security    prosperity      12
14.     security    UK              11
15.     security    world           11
```

Table 4.2: 2-word-concgrams of *security* in the three foreign ministers' speeches provided by *ConcGram*

These three lists set out the phraseology around the word *security* and these strings are valuable to study how speakers construct their discourse, in that typical ways of saying things reveal authors' messages (cf. Partington 2004). Before making inferences about data their normalisation is illustrated in table 4.3. Singular and plural forms are considered together in that, after a study of the lines, it was determined that the meanings were so similar that their combination was justified. Another point to keep in mind in this investigation is that those concgrams in the analysis which contain a forward slash are to be considered as contiguous and non-contiguous collocations, on the contrary, those which do not contain the slash are contiguous collocations:

Security/concgram	COOK	STRAW	BECKETT
Europe	9.4	4.2	1.6
European	7.8	6.4	1.6
Peace	7.8	6.4	3.2
International	4.7	9.3	7.4
Prosperity	4.7	10.5	3.9
World	4.7	3.8	3.5
New	4.2	3.8	4.5
Commitment	3.1	1.1	--
Britain	8.9	1.0	--
UK	--	1.7	3.5
People	3.1	1.9	4.5
Freedom	3.1	1.5	0.3

Iraq	2.6	3.5	1.9
threat(s)	0.5	9.2	5.5
Global	1.0	6.4	12.0
Collective	--	3.3	1.9
Development	2.6	3.4	0.9
Common	--	1.2	--
Terrorism	--	2.9	1.9
Iraqi	--	2.4	3.2
Issue(s)	--	3.2	4.2
Regional	--	2.1	--
Work	--	2.1	--
Challenge(s)	--	3.0	4.2
Responsibility	--	1.7	2.6
Climate	--	--	35.1
Energy	--	1.9	22.0

Table 4.3: Normalised data of concgrams of *security* across the three sub-corpora

What this table clearly illustrates is that Cook seems to be worried more with *European security* with respect to the other two ministers. This collocation is a clear reflection of the issues of his time. Then, interestingly, different collocations emerge in the discourse: *peace* and *prosperity* figure very prominently in both Cook and Straw's speeches, even though in the latter a more negative scenario sets in given by the already signalled associated word *threat(s),* but also by items such as *issue* and *challenge* that depict the value of security as a controversial phenomenon. *Climate* and *energy* appear as Beckett's major concerns showing a widening of the concept of 'security' with respect to its usage in the other two ministers' discourse. All the three ministers sort to the qualifier *new* to describe their strategies and to adjectives like *common, collective* and *global* to enact a pervasive sense of cooperation and consensus.

As Stubbs observes (1996: 172), "…words occur in characteristic

collocations, which show the associations and connotations they have, and therefore the assumptions which they embody". These patternings need to be validated in the light of the statistical measure of collocational significance since "a collocational profile is best read as a confirmation of observations" (Tognini-Bonelli 2001: 24). Cleaning away the expectedly encountered permutations, table 4.4 corroborates the strong attraction between *security* and the associated words indicated previously in this section in table 4.2. Reading this list of collocational relationships, we identify fully lexical collocates, which realise the 'semantic preference' (Sinclair 1996) of *security* in *DiCo* and confirm the "magnetism" with these items (for a full list of the collocational relation see Appendix Four):

N	Word	With	Relation	Texts	Total
19	**EUROPE**	security	3,415	7	11
20	**EUROPEAN**	security	3,828	8	11
29	**PROSPERITY**	security	5,961	6	8
32	**PEACE**	security	4,645	6	7
34	**COMMITMENT**	security	5,234	6	6
36	**FREEDOM**	security	5,690	5	6
39	**BRITAIN**	security	2,500	5	6
44	**NEW**	security	3,264	4	5
48	**INTERNATIONAL**	security	3,563	4	5

COOK

N	Word	With	Relation	Texts	Total
10	**PROSPERITY**	security	8,887	47	80
12	**INTERNATIONAL**	security	7,673	39	64
16	**PEACE**	security	6,519	26	44
17	**THREATS**	security	6,418	26	42
18	**GLOBAL**	security	6,298	23	42
21	**EUROPEAN**	security	5,899	17	39
27	**COLLECTIVE**	security	4,958	14	25
30	**DEVELOPMENT**	security	4,633	15	23
41	**THREAT**	security	4,253	17	19
44	**NEW**	security	4,116	19	20
47	**COMMON**	security	4,089	15	18

STRAW

N	Word	With	Relation	Texts	Total
6	**CLIMATE**	security	9,527	25	93
7	**ENERGY**	security	7,656	22	60
18	**GLOBAL**	security	4,308	11	20
19	**INTERNATIONAL**	security	4,147	12	19
22	**CHANGE**	security	3,775	9	16
28	**PROSPERITY**	security	3,442	11	12
30	**THREAT**	security	3,403	9	12
35	**HARD**	security	3,279	3	11
40	**AGENDA**	security	3,092	7	10
41	**COMMUNITY**	security	2,891	4	9
42	**PEACE**	security	2,940	8	9

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44	**ECONOMIC**	security	2,696	4	8
45	**WATER**	security	2,781	3	8
46	**PEOPLE**	security	2,534	6	8
48	**RESPONSIBILITY**	security	2,582	5	7

BECKETT

Table 4.4: Relational column based on t-score calculation provided by *WordSmith Tools*

The analysis of the concordances of the concgrams displayed in the table 4.3 has been organised around four groups: firstly, we are investigating the classifying adjectives which pre-modify *security*; secondly, all the noun-groups around the 'origin' are detected; thirdly, the negative 'neighbours' are inspected since they invade 'security' with an unfavourable halo. Finally, the cluster *climate security* and its ramifications stand separately in the analysis, since they introduce relatively new nuances to the concept of the term under investigation.

Not all the concgrams have been discussed because some of them do not represent real associates to the origin word in that constructing an 'exocentric relation'. These neglected concgrams (see Appendices 5, 6, and 7 for the concordances of all concgrams in *DiCo* which are considered in this chapter) concern words like *work* and *people*. The first item either refers to institutional engagement to carry out a project (*the UN work on development and security*) or to the effort of doing something satisfactorily (*to make collective security work*). As far as the instances of the collective noun are concerned, *people* is not syntagmatically related to *security* as in *I have discussed the link between climate and security with many people,* but it represents the recipient of this interest. Only one instance of *people* in Beckett's speeches is ambiguous in that the noun is not specified, but it is worth noticing it because it marks the respect for the 'agreement' between the citizens and the state-protector and highlights the more civic 'contour' of *security*:

```
The  first  is  that  when  people  talk  about  security
problems  they  do  so  in  terms  which  are  qualitatively
```

```
different from any other type of problem. Security is
seen as an imperative not an option. People don't obsess
over cost-benefit analyses or about opportunity cost:
they get on with what has to be done because they
understand that security goes right to the heart of the
basic contract between state and citizen. (Beckett
10.05.07)
```

4.3.2 First group: *security* and classifying adjectives

Among the concgrams including a nationality noun (*Britain; UK; Iraq*) or an adjective as pre-modifier, no 'endocentric' relation was found but they are placed as 'circumstance' in a clause as in *Those disgusting attacks showed again that the security situation in Iraq is serious*).

In the few instances where *Britain* is associated to *security*, as illustrated in the concordance 4.1, it is identified as an active agent, which has a *vital interest* in the issue, and its *commitment* and devotion are highlighted in both ministers' sub-corpora (Cook and Straw) (see also the instances of *flagged* and *contribution* in line 16). Sorting to an economic lexis, line (14) instantiates the feeling of Britishness as a nation completely dedicated to pursue security cause so as to *reap* the fruit of its labour:

```
14      And Britain will reap the full benefits - security, prosperity and strength. Which makes it hard to
15  Britain also has a vital interest in peace and security in the Gulf. UK exports to the GCC states were
16  Britain flagged our commitment to the region's security and our contribution to the five-power defence

3       end. What people want is a Europe which delivers security and prosperity to its citizens. Britain and
4        the Kashmiris. We all have a stake in greater security and prosperity in South Asia, and we in Britain
5       prosperous, there is an impact on Britain's own security and prosperity at home.  Effective global arms
6       balanced relationship, with Britain guaranteeing security and defence to the territories on the one hand;
7        and reaffirm Britain's commitment to collective security and multilateralism. It was the appalling
```
Concordance 4.1: 2-word concgram *security/Britain* in Cook and Straw.

Only *European* and *Europe* are frequently found in the vicinity of *security* even though following a 'collapse' from Cook to Beckett, as displayed in

Graph 1: *Europe* **across the three sub-corpora**

```
1      at how we can improve the decision making on the security of Europe, in order that Europe can respond more
2         important message that vital to the freedom and security of Europe is the partnership between America and
3            life. Without close Russian involvement, no security system for Europe is credible. The NATO/Russia
4              in NATO and NATO's enlargement will deepen security across all Europe. NATO's decisions at next
5         a member of the UN Permanent Membership of the Security Council, of the European Union, of the G8 and of
6         be taken on the basis of how we can enhance the security of the whole of Europe and not just the security
7      secure, with NATO as the foundation stone of our security. And we will make Europe prosperous, with the
8         in international trade talks. Our defence and security initiative will give Europe a much more effectiv
9            has delivered a prolonged period of peace and security between the peoples of Europe which is
10        European integration has been a major force for security and freedom in Europe for the last fifty years.
```

```
11     as we pursue the cause of freedom and collective security in Europe.      WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY FOR A
12         even closer. Turkey has long been key to the security of Europe as a whole. Turkey's economy is one of
13         of global order.  It has delivered peace and security in Europe, reduced national rivalries and balance
14              and the proliferation of WMD, collective security in Europe, the strengthening of the multilateral
15     shoulder a heavy burden as guardian of peace and security in Europe and beyond. Today the Alliance is
16         Gentlemen, The European Union is vital to our security and prosperity — a market for 60% of our trade,
17         Fifth is the European Union's work on global security. On data retention, the European Parliament has
18              turning Europe into an area of freedom, security and justice; acting against terrorism; launching
```

```
19     the threat that defines our generation, climate security; a Europe that is at ease with the forces of
20      expensive hydrocarbons and increase our energy security.  The European Council in two days time is due to
21     have done on its own.  Now we must make climate security one of Europe's greatest priorities.  That is why
22      well-being, from jobs and health to growth and security'.  We in Europe should be in no doubt that how
23     of carbon capture and storage.  And the energy security papers that the UK and other European countries
24      of the links between climate security and the security of our energy supplies. The forthcoming European
25         decisions on Europe's policy towards energy security and climate security. This is a major event, a
26              European Union – one which delivers security and prosperity to its citizens. And we are
27      Europe's borders. And in so doing can enhance security and stability within those borders.  Much of what
```

Concordance 4.2: 2-word concgrams *security/Europ(ean)* **in the three sub-corpora**

Cook faces up with the question of a security plan for the continent and marks its relevance: in citation (2) in concordance 4.2 the use of *vital* in marked position emphasizes the significance of the USA-UK alliance for the health of the continent. Historical events have proved the importance of *European integration* as *a major force* (10) yet, discourse signals a sort of 'deficit' in the traditional approach to it as shown from associates such as *improvement* (1), *enhances* (6; 27) *enlargement* (4) or elements of modality (*will*

58

deepen in line 4).

There is a general consensus that things like *security* and *stability* are approved of; we are entitled to them. But this notion of 'approvable' seems to be linked to that of 'absence' or to that of 'improvement', realised both at the grammatical level (3) and at the lexical level. The common thread among these different formal realisations is that *security* is a 'thing' that it is worth having, but it is not completely there. Noteworthy is the emphasis put by Cook and Straw on *Europe* as the nucleus from where to start in order to reach security and go beyond it, although an underlying tension is revealed insofar *Europe* is the subject and the object of 'security' at the same time (lines 8 and 16). In order to understand this view, we need to step outside the corpus to consider some historical information. At Cook's time, the Labour Party decided to develop a military capacity for Europe as an aspect of a common foreign policy. It is worth calling to mind UK's traditional reluctance to develop a EU military capacity, which seems to shift on a more potential role that Europe could play within the security realm. As Williams points out (2006: 61) there are two main reasons for this shift:

> First, in contrast to the previous Conservative government, Labour had clearly articulated a different UK identity that involved being at the heart of Europe. Since the UK remained outside European monetary union and on the edge of justice and home affairs issues, foreign and security policy was one of the few areas in which Blair could plausibly claim a leading role. Second, Europe's weak response to earlier crises in the region highlighted the EU's lack of an effective mechanism for formulating – let alone implementing – an agreed crisis management policy on anything but the smallest military scale.

Europe is part of a circumstantial adjunct as in lines 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 in the Straw's sub-corpus (concordance 4.2) leaving no doubt to its interpretation as the beneficiary of this interest. The European integration is an overcome question in Beckett where all the instances show exocentrically unrelated combinations, both *security/Europe* and *security/UK*

and thus not considered in the analysis.

The less frequent use of *Europ(ean)* in the last two ministers' speeches is counterbalanced by a higher frequency of items (e.g. *international; global; collective*) indicating a broader sphere of action. When *security* is combined with *collective*, the ideal of a collective European identity is emphasised.

A scan of the concordance 4.3 tells us that *collective security* is introduced as a *principle* (12) that has inspired some of *diplomacy's most noble endeavours* (19) and is equated to other values, such as the respect of *international law* (9), (13) and democracy (*freedom* 5, *democratic government* 13), which are those values British government is always committed to:

```
1      and hope that the threats will go away. Global security is our collective responsibility, and we must
2       sensitive aspect of today's global debate on security - the question of collective military action.
3   the other was the conviction that our collective security was being threatened in new ways, with an
4      I commend this Bill to the House.'COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE' (09/07/02)
5   as we pursue the cause of freedom and collective security in Europe.    WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY FOR
6   wrote that underneath all the talk of collective security could be heard 'the throbbing of the engines:
7    do as they please, in the service of collective security. It can no longer be acceptable to classify
8       for their twisted cause. And the collective security which the people of Israel, the Occupied
9      the cause of international law and collective security it is a challenge we must confront.
10         and the proliferation of WMD, collective security in Europe, the strengthening of the multilateral
11  and reaffirm Britain's commitment to collective security and multilateralism. It was the appalling
12        commitment to the principle of collective security would have amounted to words without action. For
13             democratic government, collective security and international law.  In the past, these ideas
14       no. When it came to preserving collective security within the borders of our own continent, we were
15      Europe's economic prosperity and collective security.   First, research and development. We need a
16   the continent's twin guarantors of collective security and prosperity: NATO and the European Union. Both
17    the will to back its commitment to collective security with military muscle.  CFSP  Foreign policy
18        based on a shared will to make collective security work. It has adapted in the past - with the
19  Speaker: Jack Straw   The search for collective security has been the inspiration for some of diplomacy's
20  of mass destruction threaten to make collective security a redundant concept. How can multilateral
21          and political will to make collective security work. The United Kingdom is determined to play
22  1945. So too have the threats to our collective security and well-being. The United Nations now needs to
23   states and peoples which affect our collective security. We can't have security without development, or
24   the best guarantor of collective prosperity and security.   'THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO GLOBALISATION' -
25  the EU has guaranteed collective prosperity and security for the past five decades. In an uncertain world
26   affect our collective security. We can't have security without development, or development without
27   build collective responsibility for our global security. All countries have a stake in an international
```
Concordance 4.3: 2-word concgrams *security/collective* in Straw

The representation of 'collectivity', strongly favoured by Straw (3.3% out of the total of the occurrences of *security*), is a dominant aspect and serves the purpose of aligning the audience by underlying the common objectives through different lexical realisations: *pursue the cause* (5), *shared will* (18). The grammatical presence of *our* contributes to enhance an ideal image with the inclusiveness of all the European members. Redundancy operates in the use of all these 'integrating' adjectives (*international, common, global, collective*)

echoed by other lexical elements as best exemplified in the first line of concordance 4.3, where *global, our, collective, we, all* find their placement just in one sentence. The fact that we live in a 'common society' gives people a sense of *responsibility* (27, 1): in this collective society the individual is a citizen who participates and in so doing he/she can enact change. The symbolic construction of Britishness (see the multiple instances of *committed* (11), (12), (17)) drawn on the underlying discourse of nationalism coexists with the evocation of internationalism, nationhood and globalisation and their contradictory interconnection lies at the heart of foreign policy.

From the European level we come now to including the humanity as a whole. Even though found in the Cook's sub-corpus, *international* does not pertain to *security* and for this reason its occurrence will be disregarded. The minimal turbulence introduced between *international* and *security*, as observable in the table below, includes *peace*:

```
40        Kingdom and China to promote international security and the rule of law. And I want to suggest thr
41     mass migration, the threat to international security from terrorism, state failure and WMD, and the
42 of global business; contributes to international security and stability; looks for co-operative and
43 such distinctions either in international law.   Security Council Resolution 1373 created new obligations
44  and in order to restore international peace and security on the basis of a mandate from the Security
45 constitutes a threat to international peace and security. That circumstances in which it is prepared to
46      against threats to international peace and security. We can build there on the growing understandin
47 of the modern threats to international peace and security.  And alongside that, we also need to develop a
60        the threat to international and domestic security posed by weapons of mass destruction and
61    the cause of international law and collective security it is a challenge we must confront.
```

```
1        It goes to the heart of our economic, energy security and international security agendas. Japan has
2        It is unsustainable in terms of our energy security. The International Energy Agency predicts global
3            to tackling the problems of peace and security - the international fight against crime - the
4      peace in the region and with it the wider security of the international  community as a whole. What
5  a month. I was on the cusp of launching Climate Security as a new international strategic priority for the
6      to this threat - I call it achieving climate security - a new strategic international priority for the
7            - an understanding that the global security threats which the international community faces
8  these countries to be fully reflected in the UN Security Council and other international organisations.
9   of that country, right for wider international security, and, in the final analysis, right for our own
10 us with an ever-growing threat to international security. Dealing with climate change - both adapting to
11     areas in particular.  First, international security. We have enjoyed unprecedented cooperation with
12       cooperation in four areas: * international security, * climate change, * international development,
13  are still necessary to guarantee international security. So it should not be controversial to suggest
14  our economic, energy security and international security agendas. Japan has always been our closest
15     change is a serious threat to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the
16    - that the threat to international peace and security was very real and very grave.  Madame Deputy
17 some progress on the international stage. The UN Security Council has passed a resolution on Women, Peace
18  counter-terrorism, international crime, energy security.  Climate Change  And nowhere is the need for
19  of conflict and international terrorism, energy security, jobs and growth. Get our response right to
20   to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the core of foreign policy.  All of us
21 new international strategic priority for climate security that looks at what we can do now to slow global
22   international community with huge and pressing security challenges, but, of course, we face  other such
```

Concordance 4.4: 2-word concgrams *security/international* in Straw and Beckett

Instances of 'marketing' verbs such as *achieving* (6) *promote* (40), *contribute*

(42) feature the discourse as exhortative and make it fit into that "proliferation of promotional genres" assigned to the category of "genre of governance" (Fairclough 2003). In particular, what comes into picture is the 'hortatory report', namely a description of the negative scenario with a "covert prescriptive intent" (ibid. 96) aiming to make people believe in a certain way and respond to those representations. *International security* has to be *restored* (44) and *guaranteed* (13) and this presupposes a construct in transition, an ideal potential 'product' at risk. Certain ideological implications can be clearly seen in operation: the dominant national interests are presented as the interests of humanity as a whole and this union is best served by the furtherance of moral values – more visible in the next sub-section - through the *global* community's action.

In contrast to the extremes of Thatcherite individualism, (see Donadio 2005) which rejects individual liberty, the so-called 'third-way' envisioned a society whose members have responsibilities and rights. In a globalising world foreign policy has to be guided by a more subtle blend of mutual and self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. The spread of our values makes us safer: if we can establish and spread the values of liberty, of the rule of law and respect for human rights then, that is also in our interest.

The concgram *global security* allows only constituency variation with minimal turbulence (concordance 4.5: 40, 41, 18) and it might be glossed as 'worldwide'. However, a certain semantic vagueness seems to be operating: does *global security* also refer to all the different aspects of an issue? The evidence from the corpus brings us to notice that ambiguity arises when the concgram is under the form of adjacent pair and lends itself to this double interpretation. The coupling *global security* contributes to depict the multifaceted concept of security as a global sphere, which encompasses

different layers such as *food, water* and *energy security* to cite a few (11, 18, 19):

```
31      Fifth is the European Union's work on global security. On data retention, the European Parliament has
32      we are also building our partnership on global security. We have a close dialogue on the situation in
33      most effective support that we can.      'GLOBAL SECURITY IS OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY' - STRAW (23/09/04)
34        part of the burden of regional and global security. Following 11 September, the need is more acute
35        has grown, so too has its stake in global security and global prosperity.  China's partners warmly
36      and hope that the threats will go away. Global security is our collective responsibility, and we must al
37      not in Europe, but in the challenges of global security around the world.   Today's threats affect us
38       UK. These are interlinked in a global agenda. Security is vitally important: we were much more recently
39        sensitive aspect of today's global debate on security - the question of collective military action.
40      develop tools to help maintain global peace and security. EUROPEAN DEFENCE Three years ago, Tony Blair an
41        the traditional threats to global peace and security, the UN and the world community face three risin
42      look at three areas in this global partnership: security; sustainable development; and building the
43        which helps us build global, not regional security, operating far beyond the borders of the Treaty
```

```
8       themselves potentially damaging to global security.  And then we have these new areas of practical
9       desperate necessity not only to ensure global security but to tackle the root cause of global
10      - dealing with the actual breakdown of global security. But there is a tendency for us to overlook oth
11      community we fail to build the pillars of global security: food security, water security, energy security,
12      community faces up to the big ticket global security issues, the things that hit the headlines -
13        - an understanding that the global security threats which the international community faces
14      have profound and direct implications for global security. Each of them also raises the serious prospect
15       has overridden a wider responsibility to global security.   I do not believe so and let me explain why.
16      must tackle the greatest new challenge to global security, the threat of climate change.  Nowhere is the
17        not just mean dealing with so-called global security. It also means dealing with the global insecurit
18      in doing that we will be enhancing global energy security, and therefore strengthening our economies,
19        to build the pillars of global security: food security, water security, energy security, climate
20        legislation - the Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act - that would require a National
21        other by building a global basis for climate security. This goes to the heart of the UN's mission. And
22        to the global economy, as well as to global security and to global stability.  And more than that,
23      pillars of global security: food security, water security, energy security, climate security then we are
24       in the global economy if we increase our energy security and we lead the global transition to
```
Concordance 4.5: 2-word concgrams *security/global* in Straw and Beckett

Furthermore, quite noticeable in Beckett's citations is the presence of a larger number of negatively-loaded words than in Straw's utterances (*damaging; desperate; fail*) which imbue the cluster with an 'unpleasant flavour', revealing the speaker's alarming attitude with security as a whole. The occurrence of this phrase in Beckett's speeches, (12% out of the instances of *security*), twice as much as in Straw, corroborates her steadfast concern for *global security* and a global homogenising of values and aspirations.

A search into the Bank of English[5] based on the statistical measure of t-score, showed that the adjective 'global' is frequently associated with economic matters (*warning, economy, a, market(s), fund, economic, financial, system, bond, network, trade*) and *security* is not in the collocation list. This preference, in Beckett's speeches, might be seen as echoing the numerous 'economic' associations of *global* such as global economy in citation (24). Indeed, meaning is relational and words "acquire meanings from the collocations in

---

[5] At the time of writing the *Bank of English* contains 650 million words.

which they occur in individual texts, but also from the collocations in which they frequently occur in texts of many kinds across the usage of a speech community" (Stubbs 2002: 146).

To conclude this sub-section, we can safely state that the semantic preference for 'co-involving' adjectives is very tangible in the corpus and that this pervasive sense of commonality can be realised also at the grammatical level by looking at all the instances of 'our' as in *our collective security*. These repeated associations of words with a semantic common denominator construe the discourse of a universe by mutual consent with the promise to restore an inclusive social fabric where the security 'governance' is thought for the many and not for the few.

4.3.2 Second group: delivering *prosperity, peace, freedom*

What is consistently shown in this sub-section is the strict correlation between *security* and *prosperity* which also extends to other nominalisations. This associated item reaches its peak in Straw's speeches as pictured in the graph n. 2:

Graph 2: *prosperity* across the three sub-corpora

Cook sets up 'security' at top priority in the foreign policy agenda in

order to ensure British *prosperity*:

```
1        And Britain will reap the full benefits – security, prosperity and strength. Which makes it hard
2   our geography and our history. Our culture, our security, and our prosperity, are inseparable from the
3    half a century of peace. That has provided the security and good order in which their prosperity has
4       in a modern world where our prosperity, our security and our influence depend on the health of our
5   can have a direct impact on the prosperity, the security and even the climate of countries on the other
6   majority of our exports. The prosperity and the security of our nation depend on foreign contacts.
7   It is here to accelerate. Our prosperity and our security will become increasingly interdependent. I have
8      enhances our prosperity, and reinforces our security. The second line of attack is even more speciou
9      ever to the prosperity of our economies and the security of our peoples. I cannot guarantee that our
```
Concordance 4.6: 2-word concgrams *security/prosperity* in Cook

All the lines (except n. 9) show a strict interdependence between these two nouns which is instantiated through relational processes (*are inseparable; depend on; interdependent*) that can be attributive or identifying. In these instances *security* represents the 'Token' and *prosperity* the 'Value'. As stated by Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 234) the 'Value' represents the values speakers use (and the culture they are part of) to categorize the 'Tokens' they deal with. Items such as *reap, provide, benefits*, as already pointed out in the previous sub-section, characterize *security* on the economic level so as to transform it into an asset for investment. This connection in turn depends on the *health* (4) of foreign contacts. The last citation brings *security* to a more civic layer by the phrase the *security of our peoples* and represents one of the few examples of this humanitarian connotation of security in Cook's sub-corpus. The rhetoric of 'our' – visible on the paradigmatic axis in concordances 4.6 and 4.7 - including the British people, as explicitly stated in citations (6) and (9), puts an emphasis on the building of solidarity and contributes to enact that sense of commonality of interests and goals already noticed in the previous sub-section.

The concgram *security/prosperity* is so frequent in the Straw's sub-corpus that it takes on the status of a binomial. It has been observed that although binomials are usually made up of two synonymous words, "at least a slight difference in emphasis is always there. The second term is perhaps felt to carry more weight, even semantically" (Koskenniemi 1968,

in Bugaj 2006b). According to this interpretation *prosperity* is given more emphasis and, hence, the economic dimension is highlighted as already observed in Cook's discourse. In other words, maintaining law and order at the domestic level sets up the conditions for efficient commerce.

Out of 83 occurrences of this concgram in the Straw's sub-corpus, we count 5 contiguous collocations, 50 occurrences of *security and prosperity*, 8 instances of non contiguous *security/prosperity* and 20 instances of *prosperity/security*. Regardless of numbers, the visual lay-out of the table itself clearly illustrates this strong friendship between *security and prosperity*:

```
 1      chosen an appropriate theme — the links between security, prosperity, and partnership. The European Union
 2         system and working multilaterally to promote security, prosperity and justice.  The world's largest
 3    in Iraq, today we share a commitment to bringing security, prosperity and representative government to the
 4          in Europe and beyond, and demonstrate that security, prosperity and justice are not just features of
 5    know that the common desire of all people is for security, prosperity and a say in the decisions which
 6        policy. But fundamentally we share a vision of security and prosperity based on sustainable development
 7         the Kashmiris. We all have a stake in greater security and prosperity in South Asia, and we in Britain
 8      for a system which has advanced their national security and prosperity for over 50 years.  And for
 9       EU and NATO, as the twin foundation of European security and prosperity. It will take on the internationa
10       EU is a means to an end. That end consists of security and prosperity.  The EU is on the point of
11           before.   HUMAN RIGHTS ENSURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PROSPERITY - STRAW (18/04/02) Event: 58th
12    an optional extra. They are indispensable to our security and prosperity. This is the spirit in which we
13       which we live. It is one upon which stands the security and prosperity of Europe itself. We cannot affor
14      away can have direct consequences for the UK's security and prosperity.  We have therefore written this
15       with NATO, as the twin foundations of European security and prosperity.  There are two linked challenges
16          not only of our freedom, but also of our security and prosperity.  There will be debate, and there
17       possible guarantee of sustainable, long-term security and prosperity there is.  No two full democracie
18     countries have direct repercussions on our own security and prosperity, and allow threats such as
19     we have to choose one or the other. Our future security and prosperity depend on both working together
20        with the Afghan people to build stability, security and prosperity for the benefit of Afghanistan a
21   This is because, in an interdependent world, our security and prosperity depend on our ability to influenc
22        the EU is a means to an end, consisting of security and prosperity. This is perhaps clearer than eve
23     national interests coincide. We can only build security and prosperity today on the foundation of
24      to govern in a way which provides stability, security and prosperity to the people of Zimbabwe rather
25          to provide us with certain benefits, our security and prosperity above all. But governments can no
26       state and strengthens our sovereignty. Our security and prosperity depend on it. FRANCO-BRITISH
27      Europe and the US was the cornerstone of our security and prosperity. These differences of history are
28    end. What people want is a Europe which delivers security and prosperity to its citizens. Britain and
29          world in which we live, where others' security and prosperity directly affect our own, far more
30       tensions and tackling threats to our own security and prosperity is very real. And that diplomacy
31      hopes. They seek to exploit the link between security and prosperity, and to attack the framework of
32    the continent's twin guarantors of collective security and prosperity: NATO and the European Union. Bot
33       that one of the best ways to further the security and prosperity of the United Kingdom is ensuring
34    weapons has a profound effect on international security and prosperity, and on our own well-being at
35   prosperous, there is an impact on Britain's own security and prosperity at home.  Effective global arms
36    Gentlemen, The European Union is vital to our security and prosperity — a market for 60% of our trade,
37       that we can achieve far more for our own security and prosperity through our alliance with the US.
38       to tackling the grave new threats to our security and prosperity: global terrorism, the spread of
39      EU and NATO, as the twin foundation of European security and prosperity. The EU will take on the UN-led
40       provided by the EU and NATO, we have built security and prosperity on a once war-torn and divided
41      which works is the best guarantee of our own security and prosperity.  INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY As the
42   free and prosperous lives.  The realisation that security and prosperity could be built through partnershi
43       their national governments to ensure their security and prosperity. But in many respects, this can n
44   enhanced by the strength of our alliances: our security and prosperity depend on our ability to influenc
45       remain essential to our — and the world's — security and prosperity. That is why we invest so much in
46   from the benefits of these values, or from the security and prosperity which we take for granted.
47      who have been excluded from the benefits of security and prosperity which we in Europe take for
48     in South Asia to create a virtuous circle of security and prosperity. Greater security can encourage
49      which works is the best guarantee of our own security and prosperity.  INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY As the
50    than ever since 11 September that our domestic security and prosperity depend on our willingness to
51   our membership of the EU is essential for our security and prosperity. More than 3 million British jobs
52      these lines is the best guarantee of our own security and prosperity.  This is the reason why we have
53     at any other time over the past 50 years, our security and prosperity depend on a strong transatlantic
54        and strengthening the values of justice, security and prosperity which we share, both in our own
55      clearer than ever at a time when both our security and our prosperity have come under attack. We
56   become serious partners common aims: stability, security, peace and prosperity in the region.  Let us als
57   to assume our share of responsibility for global security and global prosperity.  Our challenge today is t
58       has grown, so too has its stake in global security and global prosperity.  China's partners warmly
59   two states, Israel and Palestine, co-existing in security, peace and prosperity. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
60        is the best guarantee of our own national security and economic prosperity. I am particularly
61   paralyse and impoverish the world, so that our security, our freedoms and our prosperity decline
62      The most fundamental of these challenges is security, because it underpins our prosperity and our
63   the challenges outside our borders concerns our security. Like those to our economic power and prosperity
64         ignorance about the increased prosperity, security and strength which a larger EU will give us all.
65    the EU has guaranteed collective prosperity and security for the past five decades. In an uncertain world
66    Union better deliver to them the prosperity and security which we all seek in a rapidly-changing world?
```

```
67        Both issues are vital to our prosperity and security. And both require not just domestic but
68          importance to our future prosperity and security that the relationship between Europe and the US
69      individual lives, but on common prosperity and security beyond one country's borders.   And the gravest
70      the best guarantor of collective prosperity and security.   'THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO GLOBALISATION' -
71      show how a virtuous circle of prosperity and security can be built. Greater security encourages
72          demonstrate that national prosperity and security are more dependent than ever before on a stable
73          Europe, increasing our prosperity and our security, promoting our values, and enhancing our power.
74      circle of security and prosperity. Greater security can encourage businesses to invest for the long
75      in general: to provide prosperity, justice, security and opportunity for all citizens. It affects
76      in general: to provide prosperity, justice, security and opportunity for all citizens. It affects
77      of common commitment to prosperity, peace and security based on freedom and the rule of law.  These two
78          more jobs, greater prosperity, and greater security at home and abroad. I had to redraft my speech a
79          Europe's economic prosperity and collective security.   First, research and development. We need a
80      lives - on jobs, prosperity, crime and personal security.   Indeed the EU has not only to deliver on thes
81      power and prosperity, today's threats to our security come from outside the EU's borders: terrorism,
82      own prosperity by working for the prosperity and security of all nations. I therefore ask all of your
83      of prosperity and security can be built. Greater security encourages business to invest for the long term,
```

Concordance 4.7: 2-word concgrams *security/prosperity* in Straw

The lines from 56 to 61 display some intruding words like *global, peace* and *stability* which add no turbulence to the prototypical form that is *security and prosperity*. Line 62 shows considerable variation although a connection between the two items is still underlined by the use of the verb *underpins*. Line 63 was not counted because it was judged that in this instance the two words are not associated in the way they are in the other concordances. Overwhelmingly, this binomial is seen as a 'common desirable goal' – on the vertical axis of concordance - (2; 3; 5; 6; 10; 54; 57) from which the entire community can gain *benefits* (20; 25; 46; 47). The connection between these two frequent nominalizations is more evident in the Straw's speeches by the high frequency of items such as *link(s)* (1; 31), *partnership* (1; 42), *membership* (51), *alliances* (37) and again by instances of relational processes (e.g. *depend on*). Noteworthy is the texture of different discourses, also reflected by other nominalizations representing unquestionable 'assets', which become associates in this combination of values and interests: *justice, peace and freedom* are merged with *security and prosperity*. An involvement of humanitarian, democratic, military and legal discourses is thus clearly manifest.

A cursory look at concordances (9), (15), (20), (27), (40), (42) highlights the use of a pervasive metaphor in the corpus that is the figurative use of 'building'. Some nouns such as *foundation(s)* or *cornerstone* or the verb *build* itself, which feature prominently the discourse of security,

help to make abstract concepts more tangible. Again, in Beckett's speeches the concgram *security/prosperity* seems to strengthen a more civic and domestic dimension already found in Straw's corpus (line 28): the concgram is being constructed as a commodity to deliver (1; 3;) to the *citizens* (2; 10; 4).

```
1              — on a path that will continue to deliver security, prosperity and justice to an ever wider circle
2                     European Union — one which delivers security and prosperity to its citizens. And we are
3       diplomacy which is helping to safeguard the UK's security and prosperity.  Every month, MORI does a poll
4          our borders will be even more central to our security and prosperity here at home. We will have a
5     citizens is to put in place the conditions for security and prosperity in a crowded and interdependent
6            once again face an increasing danger to our security and prosperity, and growing calls for early and
7              Do we really want to define our future security and prosperity in terms solely of artificial or
8    undermining the very basis of the prosperity and security we are seeking to achieve. That is why we must
9            as they seek to bring peace, prosperity and security to their troubled lands.  It's within the UN th
10      that any government can provide prosperity and security to its citizens in isolation through solely
11         the very basis of our future prosperity and security. The dilemma then is that carbon-dependent
12     not at the expense of our future prosperity and security.  So far so good. Global issues - terrorism,
```

Concordance 4.8: 2-word concgrams *security/prosperity* in Beckett

In a number of occurrences of security, *development* takes the place of *prosperity* sharing the same environment and stressing the economic nuance of the concept:

```
pillars on which it was founded: development, security and human rights. Each of these goals is both
international policy — bringing development and security, as ever, together.  And in making the world less
```

The use of this noun suggests a process of change and is fused with positive meanings of progress and improvement. The high number of material verbs such as *provide, give, deliver*, show that security is qualified as a 'thing' which is 'supplied' and therefore the focus is on the transitive action. This places emphasis on the agents of the action (cf. Simpson 1993: 106) represented by the inclusive 'we' as in today *we share a commitment to bringing security, prosperity* (concordance 4.7 line 3).

The presence of a collocate like *justice* (concordance 4.8 line 1) introduces a pre-prepared package containing more values to be delivered. The discourse mirrors the liberal ideology of cooperation and the promotion of interdependence since the state-government and diplomacy are not the only 'guardians' of security (*safeguard*, concordance 4.8 line 3),

but the so called 'trans-national' society. This is in contrast with the 'realist' worldview of security, which sees it as a function of power balancing and self-help.

Another binomial is *peace and security*, which occurs less frequently going from Cook's speeches passing through Straw and then to Beckett's as seen in table 4.3. *Peace* calls to our mind an unassailable principle, which enhances the positive self-representation of the speaker as a pacifist. As was noted, *security* is an elusive term just like *peace* or *justice* which repel definition (cf. McSweeney, 1999). The concgram *security/peace*, as Van Dijk (2007: 78) notices, invokes conservative values:

> Peace and Security serves to appeal to the fears of people who feel insecure and need a strong government that will primarily satisfy the fundamental needs of security. […] to legitimate power policies and wars, it is essential to use the vague general concept that does matter for many people: feelings of (in)security.

In Cook's speeches *peace* is the 'condicio sine qua non' for achieving *security* as illustrated in the concordances below, which show *peace and security* as being the canonical form even though positional variation is allowed in the Straw's sub-corpus, as marshalled in the first two lines of concordance 4.10:

```
1         And both Hungary and Britain will have the security of being part of a Union that brings peace and
2      Council Resolutions against Iraq, but ignored Security Council Resolutions on the Middle East Peace
3    United Nations is to ensure that the peace and security, which have been enjoyed by many of our Member
4      the more partners we will have for peace and security. The more countries that obey the rule of law,
5      has delivered a prolonged period of peace and security between the peoples of Europe which is
6      Britain also has a vital interest in peace and security in the Gulf. UK exports to the GCC states were
7   of Mr Netanyahu's promise to deliver peace with security. The Israeli people know that without peace the
8           was elected on a commitment to peace with security. Most of the Israeli people, including many who
9        half a century of peace. That has provided the security and good order in which their prosperity has
10        without a just peace there will be no lasting security.  A MESSAGE OF DETERMINATION We ourselves in
11    that without peace there can be no real, lasting security. They want the peace process to go forward. They
12            peace. But the Israelis will not find true security without peace.  That is why Britain regards
```

Concordance 4.9: 2-word concgrams *security/peace* in Cook

```
1       two states, Israel and Palestine, co-existing in security, peace and prosperity. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
2      become serious partners common aims: stability, security, peace and prosperity in the region.  Let us als
3        presents the greatest threat to our national security, and to the peace of the world.  Policy makers
4       around the broad criteria for action by the Security Council against threats to international peace
5             efforts, and have taken action in the UN Security Council against those seeking to block the peace
6     of the modern threats to international peace and security.  And alongside that, we also need to develop a
7    his opinion may threaten international peace and security to the Security Council's attention. But no
8            against threats to international peace and security. We can build there on the growing understanding
9     living alongside a state of Israel in peace and security. It offers the Palestinians the opportunity to
10    is modernising the UN's approach to peace and security. We welcome the proposal for a Peacebuilding
11    that this cannot advance the cause of peace and security for Israelis any more than it can for
12       and to undermine international peace and security. If we are to confront them, then we will need a
13    who want nothing more than to live in peace and security.  Terrorism requires a firm security response.
```

```
14      most serious threats to international peace and security.  It is not only terrorism within one state whic
15       we all have an interest in seeing peace and security entrenched, because insecurity and tension,
16       or fighting terrorism and building peace and security. Ours is a modern partnership which is firmly
```

Concordance 4.10: 2-word concgrams *security/peace* in Straw

```
4            to tackling the problems of peace and security – the international fight against crime – the
5       member states have benefited too. Our peace and security has been enhanced by spreading stability and the
6         threatens all our hopes for wider peace and security in the region. Many thousands of British
```

Concordance 4.11: 2-word concgrams *security/peace* in Beckett

The other undeniable value is *freedom*. Remarkably, whereas Blair seems to prefer the use of 'liberty' (Fairclough 2006: 158), which is strongly related to the neo-liberal economic view, the three ministers sort to the larger-scale global assent given by *freedom*. The 248 occurrences of *freedom* against 11 instances of *liberty* throughout *DiCo,* speak in favour of a preponderance of a more universal humanitarian value, where democracy is assumed to be the inherent corollary. 3.1% of these occurrences are found in Cook's speeches and the percentage decreases in the other two ministers'sub-corpora:

```
1           was revolutionary. That responsibility for security, freedom and development does not belong solely
2       European integration has been a major force for security and freedom in Europe for the last fifty years.
3       which all its peoples can be united by the same security and freedom that I now call upon each of you to
4       European integration has been a major force for security and freedom in Europe for the last fifty years.
5        in the EU to make Europe an area of freedom, security and justice. The more countries of Europe join
6       important message that vital to the freedom and security of Europe is the partnership between America and
```
```
1        negation of war, but the creation of a world of security and freedom, of a world which is governed by
2         of common commitment to prosperity, peace and security based on freedom and the rule of law.  These two
3             turning Europe into an area of freedom, security and justice; acting against terrorism; launching
4       no other reason than that only freedom can make security secure.' But we do not need to look to the
5       as we pursue the cause of freedom and collective security in Europe.      WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY FOR A
6       1945, 'We must plan for freedom and not only for security, if for no other reason than that only freedom
7            not only of our freedom, but also of our security and prosperity. There will be debate, and there
8       Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 75% of th
9       Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 75% of the
10       and spreading freedom depends too on spreading security, or what President Roosevelt called the 'freedom
11          to ensure freedom and their duty to provide security. Without security, no rights can be fully
12       or freedom from tyranny and repression. Second, security — or freedom from fear. And third, the fight
```
```
1    the current challenges in the area of freedom, security and justice.  On migration we agreed that we need
```

Concordance 4.12: 2-word concgrams *security/freedom* in Cook, Straw, Beckett

As it happens for the other associations with nominalization, even in this case there is a relation of equivalence between *security* and *freedom* and thus a mergence of an interest and a value, that is more evident in The Cook's sub-corpus, where the concgram is once again binomial-like. The

two words are inextricably linked and the vicinity with *development* (1) and *prosperity* (7) grounds all freedoms in a market-based economy and open trade. Furthermore, the furtherance of moral values, in this case *freedom*, is a way of persuading the audience, in that "one must argue that a particular policy would enhance the general morality that they all share" (Roselle 2006: 10).

4.3.4 *Security* as an endangered entity

The very frequent association with words which carry a negative pragmatic load addresses the analysis of the concgrams *security/threat; security/issue(s)* and *security/challenge(s)*. The concgram *security/threat*, which occurs only once in the Cook's sub-corpus is found in 83 instances in Straw's speeches (9.2% of all occurrences):

```
1        and cultural exchanges, goes on undaunted by security threats and material hardship.  Through DfID's
2       the challenges of reform, and tackling today's security threats, is in our interests, and those of every
3     relationship is as important as ever.  The main security threats we now face – weapons of mass
4              community much sooner to the emerging security threats. The same applies to Iraq, where
5        and improving our capacity to face today's security threats. In all these areas, change is already
6       The Balkans, you are well aware of how European security can be threatened by ethnic rivalries and lack o
7      election. There are challenge ahead – above all security and the threat of terrorism and inter-communal
8     the other was the conviction that our collective security was being threatened in new ways, with an
9        around the broad criteria for action by the Security Council against threats to international peace
10          to the task of preserving our peace and security in the face of new threats.  We do not
11        is this: what would you do to protect global security from a regime which threatens regional or
12     the real and serious divide between our common security, and all those who would threaten it.   The
13    countries have direct repercussions on our own security and prosperity, and allow threats such as
14     not in Europe, but in the challenges of global security around the world.  Today's threats affect us
15    consensus on action to strengthen international security, including tackling emerging threats at an
16       to address the links between development and security; and to act more effectively on threats such as
17      those persistent conflicts which threaten the security of us all; * And fourth, that the global
18    massive scale present the greatest threat to our security today. That is why fighting terrorism and
19   no one can doubt that the primary threat to our security is now posed by groups acting formally outside
20   such weapons presents the greatest threat to our security.   Forty years ago, President Kennedy voiced the
21     one can now doubt that a primary threat to our security comes from groups which act outside states and
22             But it is not the only threat to our security today. Combating weapons proliferation is also a
23      face.  Those conflicts show how threats to our security today are often linked to a range of factors suc
24      to tackle more effectively new threats to our security – from terrorism, proliferation and internationa
25     ability to act globally against threats to our security, while building on its strength as a force for
26   also became more complex, and new threats to our security emerged. Conflicts in the dissolving Yugoslav
27     create the conditions in which threats to our security can thrive.  Ladies and Gentlemen,  I began with
28       approach aimed at combating threats to our security. We all need good and reliable partners around
29       response to the three main threats to our security: the proliferation of weapons of mass
30     foundation. Today the greatest threats to our security often come not from other functioning sovereign
31   And we would all agree that the threats to our security - from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
32     form, but about the substance, threats to our security, concern about human rights, wars, famines and
33    power and prosperity, today's threats to our security come from outside the EU's borders: terrorism,
34       or indeed other potential threats to our security. Those who seek to undermine global stability –
35     network of relationships. The threats to our security today are as likely to come from non-state actor
36       to tackling the grave new threats to our security and prosperity: global terrorism, the spread of
37   EU of the need to deal with new threats to our security.   And now we have the opportunity to establish
38       poses the greatest current threat to global security. Nowhere is the case for universal support for
39   conflicts which are a potential threat to global security.  KASHMIR A few months ago, the international
40   emerged as one of the greatest threats to global security, spreading chaos in central Africa and providing
41     There are two great modern threats to global security –international terrorism and unstable or rogue
42        tensions and tackling threat to our own security and prosperity is very real. And that diplomacy
43      early enough, we invite threats to our own security.  Japan's contribution to the economic
44     its region, for so long a threat to European security, into one of our greatest assets.   CONCLUDING
45        highlighted the new threats posed to our security by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
46     presents the greatest threat to our national security, and to the peace of the world.  Policy makers
47   terrorists and terrible threats to our national security, our response needs to be proportionate and in
```

```
48        mass migration, the threat to international security from terrorism, state failure and WMD, and the
49     terrorists and terrible threats to our national security, our response needs to be proportionate and in
50       is the three great threats to international security: global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
51     and for defeating the threats to their and our security.  In other words, realism and idealism coincide.
52    when there are major threats to international security, it cannot fail to act. I think that we will see
53     face of today's wider threats to international security. In the wake of the September 11th 2001 attacks,
54      1945. So too have the threats to our collective security and well-being. The United Nations now needs to
55     to the fact that the threats to world peace and security today are as likely to come from non-state group
56    of mass destruction threaten to make collective security a redundant concept. How can multilateral
57        the traditional threats to global peace and security, the UN and the world community face three risin
58    Article 99 to bring threats to the peace to the Security Council's attention; and we must act quickly and
59      because of the threat they posed to global security. Conflict and chaos can easily spread, and their
60     and hope that the threats will go away. Global security is our collective responsibility, and we must al
61    his opinion may threaten international peace and security to the Security Council's attention. But no
62      said poses a threat to international peace and security, is by backing our diplomacy with a credible
63     constitutes a threat to international peace and security. That circumstances in which it is prepared to
64     him a unique threat to international peace and security.   But consensus on the objective is not simply
65     pose a grave threat to international peace and security. It was in recognition of their singular menace,
66        he was a threat to peace and international security, were having actually minimal effect on the
67    a Chapter VII threat to international peace and security by its proliferation of weapons of mass
68     confront new threats. Future challenges to our security are as likely to come from terrorists and weapon
69    that tackling threats to international peace and security – including global terrorism and proliferation –
70        against threats to international peace and security. We can build there on the growing understanding
71    of the modern threats to international peace and security.  And alongside that, we also need to develop a
72     question of threats to international peace and security under Chapter VII. That was the source of the
73    face of other threats to international peace and security. The principle of non-interference has to be
74    most serious threats to international peace and security.  It is not only terrorism within one state whic
75      to combat threats to our environment and our security. And, more than just the absence of war, the EU
76     who would threaten it.   The European Union's Security and Defence Policy is an expression of this
77        the threat to international and domestic security posed by weapons of mass destruction and
78    The new threat to the US, and to international security more generally, now comes from other sources, no
79    global threats should not blind us to the real security challenges that still confront us closer to hom
80      threat. We showed our joint resolve, in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, when we
81    a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by its international obligations and
82     threat to our world in terms of stability and security, not just the environment. We must begin by
83    threaten international peace and security to the Security Council's attention. But no Secretary-General
```

Concordance 4.13: 2-word concgrams *security/threat* in Straw

From a rapid scan of the concordances it is immediately visible that *security* collocates contiguously and non-contiguously with *threat,* constructing concgrams where the semantic relation is established with the preposition *to* and the prototypical form is *threat to security,* which allows both constituency and positional variation. Two and more words intrude between *threat(s) to* and *security*, generally a possessive (*our*) or a classifying adjective (*national/international/global*) or the by now close friend *peace.* Scrolling down along the vertical line, we read how the concgram is pre-modified by adjectives, which intensify the force of threat, such as *greatest, primary* (18, 19, 20, 21), *grave* (65) *serious* (64), *unique* (74). A sort of continuity with the past is implicit in the collocate *traditional* (57) if compared to the reiteration of the 7 instances of *new* (1215 occurrences throughout the corpus) and *modern* (2 instances). The language becomes categorical and antithetical in comparing the new with the old: *new* implies that the world is changing and the challenges posed are different from the traditional ones, hence, new responses are legitimised (pro-active and pre-

emptive ideology). By the use of the adjective *common,* everybody feels threatened in their own values and life. The collocate *potential* (39) seems to make appeal to the public's anxieties in that "Political language tries to construct an ideological vision of what is desirable but also what is *undesirable* in a given culture [emphasis added] " (Bayley et al 2004: 187). A word like *threat* implies intimate knowledge of the mental state of the enemy. Bayley *et al*'s study of this lexical item has pointed out that 'threat' is a polysemous lexeme, conveying different but related meanings. In its verbal form (*threaten*) can be a verbal process, a material process, a quasi-modal, a relational process, and can also be interpreted as an ideational metaphor (Halliday 1994: 344) of an existential process (Bayley et al 2004: 190). In *DiCo* all the meanings of the nominal form *threat(s)* are related to the possibility of causing harm or danger and thus associated to material processes: *security* is represented as the 'endangered entity' as well as its collocates such as *stability, peace* and *prosperity*. The actor/threatener is given by explicitly stated external forces. Even though differently described four main dangers are outlined below which are unified under the only category of 'threat':

failing and failed states	weapons of mass destruction	terrorism	environment
-groups acting formally outside states; *-places where no state functions;* *-from places where the rule of law do not function;* *-non-state actors;* *-from places where no state functions;*	*-proliferation of WMD;* -	*-international crime*	*-climate change* *-man-made shocks*

Table 4.5 Lexical realisations of the different 'threats' in Straw

The claim that there is a *threat to security* is the crucial premise for a preventive and multilateral strategy.

As noticed (cf. Fairclough 2006: 146), there is an overstatement in the claim that the internal threat is everywhere, in the same community where we live in an 'alarmist and paranoid way'. The unfavourable environment in which *security* is embedded in Straw and Beckett's sub-corpora is broadened by instances of words like *challenge* and *issue*. According to the *Collins Cobuild Dictionary*, 'issue' is more neutral than 'challenge', in that it stresses the importance of a subject that people are arguing about. 'Challenge' on the contrary is "something new and difficult which requires great effort and determination". This is supported by corpus evidence: all the concordances below show the relevance of *security issue(s)* as a core problem in foreign policy. It is so important that it requires *strong engagement* (2) and it is encompassed in the so called *hard issues* (6). What can be argued here is a shift from 'soft' to 'hard issue', which involves a number of challenges in the female minister's corpus:

```
1        and our co-operation on so-called 'hard' security issues such as terrorism and the proliferation
2        But it does require strong engagement with security issues across the board, wherever they arise.
3    will be a discussion of major foreign policy and security issues at Seville. Following the latest terrori
4      commercial co-operation, and on political and security issues of mutual interest. The EU and Iran woul
5      and Europe can and should tackle international security issues together. Recent developments in the
6      capabilities, and that, when it comes to 'hard security'issues, there is a huge disparity between
7    the EU should play an active part in foreign and security policy issues to match its economic weight in t
```

```
1        community faces up to the big ticket global security issues, the things that hit the headlines -
2        Anyone who doesn't see climate change as a security issue today will, in my view, be treading in t
3        the recognition of climate change as a core security issue. And it demonstrated the vast majority of
4    I simply do not believe that we will solve the security issues of the day unless we address the global
5    the Middle East as an example — a classic hard security issue, and one that occupies a great deal of my
6        of those who didn't see reparations as a security issue in the 1920s.  I am optimistic that the
7    not at the expense of our future prosperity and security.  So far so good. Global issues - terrorism,
8        impacts and possible consequences to our security is invaluable.  Having raised the issue of
9    New York.  The UK had taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time — I
10   invaluable.  Having raised the issue of climate security up the agenda and having put it on the table at
11      to discuss these issues next month at the UN Security Council; because of the security challenges I
12   had taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time — I do not exaggera
13    Global issues - terrorism, climate and energy security, sustainable development - need common, global
```

Concordance 4.14: 2-word concgrams *security/issue(s)* in Straw, Beckett

More negatively loaded items feature the vicinity of the prototypical phrase *security challenge* above all in Beckett's speeches. This challenge is appraised

negatively as *pressing, huge, profound, daunting* and *greatest* against Straw's predilection for the verbal forms such as *tackle, confront* and *underpin*.

```
1    to contribute as the UN adapts to today's global  security  challenges. Our armed forces are second to none,
2        that it continues to do so, to address the  security  challenges of the next decades.    'UNITED
3       global threats should not blind us to the real  security  challenges that still confront us closer to hom
4    reduce corruption.   As part of this there is a  security  challenge too. Terrorists and extremists exploi
5    the coming months. There are other political and  security  challenges too, such as in Nepal.  But there is
6         the cause of international law and collective  security  it is a challenge we must confront.
7    to assume our share of responsibility for global  security  and global prosperity.  Our challenge today is
8    for which this institution was founded. Yes, the  security  situation presents formidable challenges.
9    match.  Having dealt with terrorism and regional  security, let me come onto the third immediate challenge
10    with NATO, as the twin foundations of European  security  and prosperity.  There are two linked challenges
11       The most fundamental of these challenges is  security, because it underpins our prosperity and our
12        to confront the greatest challenge to our  security  in the twenty first century - the spread of
13    confront new threats. Future challenges to our  security  are as likely to come from terrorists and weapo
14    not in Europe, but in the challenges of global  security  around the world.  Today's threats affect us
15    flexibility to tackle the challenges of global  security  which affect us all.   THE CHALLENGES AHEAD FO
16        Meanwhile on the many challenges ahead — on  security, on development, on building a stronger
17    election. There are challenge ahead — above all  security  and the threat of terrorism and inter-communal
18   there are serious challenges ahead for Iraq - on  security, on employment, on making a success of the
19    That posed new challenges to our stability and  security. In Europe, the breakdown of the Yugoslav
20     and specific challenges: terrorism, regional  security  and globalisation, have to be set in a broader
21   The crucial challenge for the future, alongside  security, will be to maintain the pace of liberalisation
22    the challenges of reform, and tackling today's  security  threats, is in our interests, and those of ever
23    the challenges outside our borders concerns our  security. Like those to our economic power and prosperit
24       challenge I want to speak about is regional  security. It would be wrong to pretend that this and the
```

—

```
1        international community with huge and pressing  security challenges, but, of course, we face  other such
2        all his responsibility. Madam President  The  security challenges the world faces are real. As an
3    month at the UN Security Council; because of the  security challenges I believe that they will present.
4    Or, another example, the Middle East (a classic  security challenge, if you like) - where five per cent
5       a National Intelligence Estimate to assess the  security challenges presented by the world's changing
6    warhead is indeed a warhead. There are profound  security challenges in doing that. We need to find ways
7    extremists and lay the foundations of long-term  security.  The challenge faced by the Iraqi people in
8    Iraq still faces a daunting array of political,  security and economic challenges, of a kind with which
9        to discuss these issues next month at the UN  Security Council; because of the security challenges I
10   must tackle the greatest new challenge to global  security, the threat of climate change.  Nowhere is the
11    two of the greatest challenges we face - energy  security and climate security - both demand the same
12    the current challenges in the area of freedom,  security and justice.  On migration we agreed that we n
13   challenges we face - energy security and climate  security - both demand the same solution. So what's
```

Concordance 4.15: 2-word concgrams *security/challenge(s)* in Straw, Beckett

Before moving on to the examination of the next concgrams, it is worth highlighting how in the line 20 from the above concordance, the term globalisation is categorised as a *challenge* and equated with *terrorism* and regional security. From a survey in the Bank of English of the collocational profile of *challenge*, this tendency to be negatively connotated was confirmed. Collocates such as legal, *greatest, more* amplify this negative 'aura of meaning' around challenge. What is argued here is that globalisation is also felt as a menace.

4.3.5 *Security* and the 'environment'

Not one instance of the concgram *security/climate* was found in Cook and Straw's speeches. *Climate* appears 35 in the Cook's sub-corpus, but never

associated with *security* and neither it is in the Straw's sub-corpus. The only collocation found in both ministers is *climate change* whereas in the Straw's speeches *security* is only associated to *energy* in 9 citations. Hence, in the Beckett's sub-corpus, the scenario changes and her main concern encompasses environmental threats, namely *climate* and *energy*.

Indeed, *climate* as collocate of *security* appears in the Beckett's speeches for the first time on September 13th, 2006. The minister herself recognises the newly coined cluster by stating: "A year ago, when I became Foreign Secretary, the idea of 'climate security' was an alien one – to many inside the FCO as well as outside" (May 5th, 2007) and one month later she adds "But in less than a year climate security has become accepted *doctrine* - debated in the chamber of the United Nations Security Council itself" [emphasis added] (June 6th, 2007). In the light of this assertion, one might presume that 'climate security' was not an issue before Beckett's tenure and only in the last year of Blair's government she puts it at the heart of her foreign policy. This point is clearly proved by corpus evidence.

Concordances of the concgram *security/climate* show that the prototypical form is *climate security,* which allows constituency variation in lines from 91 to 98 in concordance 4.16, setting up a linkage with another cluster that is *energy security*. Considerable turbulence is exhibited in instance 99 (*So while an instable climate has obvious hard security implications*) or in line 101 (*the recognition of climate change as a core security issue*). Despite the dilution the attraction between *security* and *climate* is still strong and they are combined in 'endocentric relation', namely they create a single semantic entity. *Energy security and climate security* are either recognised as parallel clusters combined by the conjunction *and*, as in the first eleven concordances, or they are treated as two aspects of the same issue, as in the final concordances (e.g. *climate and energy security*). Whereas Cook is engaged with promoting the

strong connection between *security and prosperity*, Beckett is mainly concerned with the connection between *energy security* and *climate security* by employing the same language resource that is the relational process as best displayed in citation (51): *energy security and climate security are now indivisible.* These two adjacent concgrams are indicators of Beckett's main concern and the negativity of their environment clearly suggests an unfavourable pragmatic load. Words like *threat, challenge* pre-modified by 'inscribed appraisals' such as *ever-growing, greatest, serious, new,* and attitudinal lexis like *issue, struggle, tackling, effort,* create an unpleasant aura around the phrases, which are described in terms of *imperatives* (9) to deal with. Prescription is implicit in the lexical choices. The word *threat* is now being used as a catch-all term to condemn a wide variety of phenomena from those which are germane to terrorism to those which are related to environmental issues. This word highlights the peremptory character of the question also emphasizing its alarming aspect. Beckett's discourse of security seems to have a core that is *global security* with multifaceted aspects all coming from the semantic sphere of the natural environment. As she explains *food, water, energy, climate* are all 'pillars' of a system that is global security, hence dealing with one of those inevitably affects the whole system. Neglecting one of them, in her metaphorical instantiation, means having a house with *extremely shaky foundations* (32). The paradigmatic axis of concordances in concordance 4.16 shows the rhetoric of 'cooperation' when speaking of *climate security* through lexical and grammatical variation: *cooperation* (3), *to meet our shared goals* (10), *collective* (30), and the numerous instantiations of *we* and *our*. As already observed, emphasis is put by Beckett on the personal sphere of human beings as shown in line 30, where the collocation with *individual* features only her speeches.

The presence of these new collocations (*climate security, energy security,*

food security) may be seen as representations which circulate at a given time or better, to use a new expression in CL, they might be seen as 'seasonal collocations' (Baker et al 2008). As Stubbs maintains (2002: 165) "it is individuals who produce individual texts, but these texts are not produced with complete freedom". Relying on Foucault (1980) not all the subjects are alive prior to being talked about, but "they are brought into existence by the discourse itself" (ibid.) hence, the topics are linked to the power of the speakers.

```
 1      security: food security, water security, energy security, climate security then we are living in a house
 2       counter-terrorism, international crime, energy security.  Climate Change  And nowhere is the need for
 3          cooperation in four areas: * international security, * climate change, * international development,
 4    these strategies reflect the reality that energy security and climate security are now indivisible. We
 5    nuclear power as the twin imperatives of energy security and climate security are factored into energy
 6    two of the greatest challenges we face - energy security and climate security - both demand the same
 7       time the false dichotomy is between economic security and climate security.  There is a feeling in som
 8      at that summit: on the linkages between energy security and climate security, on the strengthening of th
 9         decisions on Europe's policy towards energy security and climate security. This is a major event, a
10    more together to meet our shared goals on energy security and climate security. The world needs China to
11    to happen.  So understanding and flagging up the security aspects of climate change has a role in
12     - with positive effects on poverty, and energy security, as well as climate security. This project will
13    require the administration to produce a national security estimate on climate change.  But though this
14        to guarantee national security and economic security. An unstable climate will undermine the capacity
15    us with an ever-growing threat to international security. Dealing with climate change - both adapting to
16        change is a serious threat to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the
17     the recommendation, and I quote: 'The national security consequence of climate change should be fully
18    must tackle the greatest new challenge to global security, the threat of climate change.  Nowhere is the
19    a discussion at the UN Security Council on those security implications of climate change. Today, you may
20        a broad political conclusion as to the hard security implications of climate change. But to make sure
21    Security Council to table a debate there on the security implications of climate change.  Just last week
22    be an integral part of all planning for national security. In their words, climate change is a "threat
23    pillars of global security: food security, water security, energy security, climate security then we are
24    was quite a powerful moment during the recent UN Security Council debate on climate security last month.
25    Again, I was there very recently to Chair the UN Security Council debate on climate change.  California -
26    whole new approach to how we analyse and act on security. The threat to our climate security comes not
27     highlighting on the highest possible stage the security imperative for tackling climate change.  This
28              organised crime, the new economic and security threat from our changing climate, the rise of
29    is now an accepted and central part of the hard security discourse, so too must be 'climate security' -
30           effect on our collective and individual security.  There are some consequences of climate change
31       to build the pillars of global security: food security, water security, energy security, climate
32      increasingly difficult to guarantee national security and economic security. An unstable climate will
33    story in China.  Access to fresh water - water security - is already a problem across the globe. Climate
34       Tomorrow, I will chair a discussion at the UN Security Council on those security implications of climat
35    new international strategic priority for climate security that looks at what we can do now to slow global
36    German embassy was running a seminar on climate security.  So, thank you.  The "please" is just as simple
37          water security, energy security, climate security then we are living in a house with extremely
38       as Foreign Secretary I designated climate security and the transition to a low carbon economy as a
39    a lot more that we have to be doing on climate security.  We have the intellectual capacity to steer the
40    poverty, and energy security, as well as climate security. This project will also help to develop the
41       The four cross-cutting PSA targets - climate security, migration, counter-terrorism and conflict - are
42       the reality that energy security and climate security are now indivisible. We cannot have one without
43       was drawing the same links between climate security and energy security: in other words increasing
44    hard security discourse, so too must be 'climate security' - not least indeed, as I will come to later,
45       in this room do - to reinforce that climate security.  I believe that it requires a whole new approac
46    the linkages between energy security and climate security, on the strengthening of the EU's Emission
47    war of interdependence, the struggle for climate security. There will be no winners unless we all emerge
48          is between economic security and climate security.  There is a feeling in some quarters that
49          We in the UK are clear that without climate security it will become increasingly difficult to
50    have done on its own.  Now we must make climate security one of Europe's greatest priorities.  That is wh
51       other by building a global basis for climate security. This goes to the heart of the UN's mission. And
52       of the UK. And can I say that, given Climate Security only became a separate Strategic Priority for th
53    particular I want to push the agenda on climate security and energy security - not least with the Chinese
54    outweighed by the benefits - not only in climate security but also in energy security, public health,
55    As the imperative of tackling energy and climate security takes hold, a lot of that money is going to flow
56     - we are not going to be able to ensure climate security through the exercise of hard power. An unstable
57     we can keep on growing and bolster our climate security and energy security.  China is already a pioneer
58    us to do so. BECKETT: FOREIGN POLICY AND CLIMATE SECURITY (24/10/06)  Location: Berlin  Speech Date:
59     build recognition of the links between climate security and the security of our energy supplies. The
60       minister means being serious about climate security.  Because the question for foreign policy is not
61             on that basis.'  THE CASE FOR CLIMATE SECURITY (10/05/07) Location: Royal United Services
62     will cut emissions and help to achieve climate security. And it will improve our energy security: making
63    all lose out.  It's the same story with climate security. Indeed, the two are linked. Peter Mandelson, th
64    to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the core of foreign policy.  All of u
65       the Cold War, the soft power war for climate security will have to be fought simultaneously on the
66    twin imperatives of energy security and climate security are factored into energy policy across the worl
67    I became Foreign Secretary, the idea of 'climate security' was an alien one - to many inside the FCO as
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68        global market for bio-fuels. Put simply, climate security creates commercial opportunity.  And again, as
69    challenges we face - energy security and climate security - both demand the same solution. So what's
70     and act on security. The threat to our climate security comes not from outside but from within: we are
71    New York.  The UK had taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time - I d
72     of growing concerns over threats to our climate security. At the moment we all share a dilemma. We want
73     he specifically charged me with putting climate security at the heart of our foreign policy.  We will not
74    Just as it is the reason why I have made climate security such a priority of my first year as Foreign
75     And it is unsustainable in terms of our climate security. As we pump out more carbon emissions we are
76        policy towards energy security and climate security. This is a major event, a major council, dealing
77    the recent UN Security Council debate on climate security last month. The Ghanaian representative, L K
78    be it global trade and investment flows, climate security, energy security, cross-border crime, illegal
79     our shared goals on energy security and climate security. The world needs China to make that transition t
80    in the FCO too.  But in less than a year climate security has become accepted doctrine - debated in the
81    Countries starting early this year.  And climate security is almost the perfect instance of where the
82      to this threat - I call it achieving climate security - a new strategic international priority for the
83     the threat that defines our generation, climate security; a Europe that is at ease with the forces of
84     a month. I was on the cusp of launching Climate Security as a new international strategic priority for th
85    invaluable.  Having raised the issue of climate security up the agenda and having put it on the table at
86     we form a collective effort to achieve climate security. Consumers, politicians, NGOs, media,
87       I have discussed the link between climate and security with many people. Some of them are sceptical.
88          legislation - the Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act - that would require a National
89    money laundering, building climate and energy security, supporting human rights and sustainable
90    to bring the requirements of climate and energy security into alignment, for example by combining Chinese
91    Global issues - terrorism, climate and energy security, sustainable development - need common, global
92     at the moment: trade, and climate and energy security.   The WTO round seems to be stalled. If we don'
93      Anyone who doesn't see climate change as a security issue today will, in my view, be treading in the
94     better the links between climate, energy and security.  There was quite a powerful moment during the
95        The implications of climate change for our security are more fundamental and comprehensive than any
96    had taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time - I do not exaggerate
97     of the links between climate security and the security of our energy supplies. The forthcoming European
98     So while an unstable climate has obvious hard security implications, the traditional tools of hard
99      the recognition of climate change as a core security issue. And it demonstrated the vast majority of
100   and investment flows, climate security, energy security, cross-border crime, illegal migration - is
101   real determination. On climate change and energy security, we are using GOF money to bring about change in
102   same links between climate security and energy security: in other words increasing energy efficiency
103    push the agenda on climate security and energy security - not least with the Chinese and with Africa. An
104     and bolster our climate security and energy security.  China is already a pioneer in building this ne
105     An unstable climate is a direct threat to our security: but it is not one that can be met by bullets an
106   not only in climate security but also in energy security, public health, innovation and competitiveness,
107        So climate change is not an alternative security agenda. It is a broadening and deepening of our
108   UK to put climate change on the agenda of the UN Security Council last month. Even then, we were surprised
109   climate security. And it will improve our energy security: making us less reliant on increasingly
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Concordance 4.16: 2-word concgrams *security/climate* in Beckett

4.4 Is security an ambiguous concept?

Traditional definitions of 'security' as noticed in this chapter, point out the aspect of immunity from 'any' external menace, which may cause damage. The phrases from the dictionaries consulted have shown an inherently military semantic preference of the concept (risk, forces, measures, guard) whereas the non-military 'company' has been overlooked. What I have argued here is that in *DiCo security* 'marries' new collocates by the company of which it acquires new meanings. Concepts construed as non-arguable nominalizations (*peace, stability, justice, freedom, prosperity*) are its associated words in the three ministers' speeches, even though with a different frequency. The high frequency of economic company that the term seems to favour (*development, prosperity*), reflects the dominant ideology of liberalism in the international setting and the notion of the promotion of

exchange and interdependence. As observed by Buzan (2000) during the Cold War the notion of 'security' was based on the dominant role of the state and the notion of state sovereignty. Quite different is the usage of security in Beckett's corpus, where the abundance of items pertaining the natural surroundings (*climate, energy, food, water*), shifts the focus to closer environmental and personal issues.

Because of the plurality of its referents, *security* often has little definite content of its own and gives rise to semantic vagueness ascribed to the category of 'broad ambiguity' (see chapter 3, sub-section 3.3.1). For instance, we might wonder: does the concgram 'global security' have geographical implications or does it refer to the concept as a whole? This ambiguity cannot be neatly compartmentalised and it serves the function of merging the allusion to internationalism and at the same time to the concept in its totality. As illustrated, this "wholeness" includes *food, water, climate security* for Beckett but not for Cook.

After September 11th, the scenario becomes more complex: the word 'threat' seems to be a buzzword and it is found to be a strong collocate of the word *security*. The main threat comes from the ambiguous expression "failed and failing states" and from "climate change" described also in terms of "man-made shocks". The concept of 'climate security', an alien in Cook and Straw's speeches, appears as Beckett's major concern together with *energy security*. *Climate* and *energy security* acquire a sense of threat because we usually think of security against something harmful. Thus, again, do we speak in terms of 'security against deterioration in the climate due to global warming' or 'for', in the sense of protecting the climate? These ambiguous situations emerge while the meaning is in transition, which is after its adoption in language to reflect newly born realities to its adaptation and stabilization. Ambiguity is an asset and a design fault at the

same time, inevitable and indispensable, depending on what language areas it involves and on the addresser's intentions. Words are polysemic and semantic differences imply different interpretations of reality but in the case of 'climate security' ambiguity is inescapable because it derives from language adjustments. This is in line with the post-structuralist view on the proliferation and of interpretation and fluidity of meaning. As Edelman observes (1988: 95) "ambiguity and subjectivity are neither deviations nor pathologies…they constitute the political world". As Beckett herself explains the question:

> I am optimistic that the wind is beginning to change. Two years ago the debate about the science of climate change was still going on. Today that debate – as it relates to the main findings of human-induced global warming – is effectively over" […] But though this conceptual change is starting to happen, it is not happening fast enough. Just as 'energy security' is now an accepted and central part of the hard security discourse, so too must be 'climate security' – not least indeed, as I will come to later, because of the very close links between those two agendas - tackle one and you are tackling the other. (10.05.07)

4.5 Concluding remarks

Drawing on the historical studies, the first two sections of this chapter have traced the main shift towards a more *active and engaged* diplomacy, which has blurred the borders between the domestic sphere and the international fora. The extraction of "conceptual knowledge" of the term *diplomacy* from *DiCo* has shown its multifaceted nature and conceptual complexity, but above all a sort of flexibility which mirrors the changing *facto* in the international setting.

   Security is the main issue in the British foreign policy and its analysis has shown a continual evolution over these 10 years. It can be seen as a nucleus around which there is a cluster of arguments and other discourses,

identified through concgrams, such as economic (e.g. *prosperity; development*), military and political (*peace* and *security*), environmental (*climate*; *energy*) and humanitarian (*freedom and justice*). Dominant is the rhetoric of 'commonality' and 'cooperation' seen at work in the combination with 'co-involving' adjectives but also in the preponderant occurrences of the possessive pronoun 'our'. *Global* as pre-modifier features the Beckett's speeches in particular, showing her preference for the issue as a whole.

Security is undergoing a process of 'rescaling' and from its main traditional meaning linked to territorialisation, it is penetrating all levels of 'governance'. Drawing on Fairclough (2006) these discourses can be seen as claims:

-the new era where borders are fuzzy is facing new challenges which require new responses;

-the search for security involves any layers of political, social and personal life as ever before.

The discourse appears as to be 'interdiscursively hybrid' "with the strategy offering a 'bold vision', which evokes the discourse of marketing rather than that of defence policy" (Fairclough 2006: 155) (see for instance the high frequency of binomials). What has been argued is a shift from 'soft power' to 'hard power' and the "emerging nexus of strategies and associated nodal discourses around which many other discourses cluster". Figure 4.3 is an attempt to visualise the different discourses the collocates of *security* point at and the plotting links between the collocates themselves.

The ministers speak in terms of 'moral values' (the blending between national and global security and interests), which might be seen as a justification of 'imperialism' but in a new meaning that might be labelled as 'civilising mission' (Fairclough 2006: 157). Neverthless, the highest frequency of *prosperity* as a collocate shifts the emphasis from moral to

economic interests. In conclusion, the state has lost its monopoly and as a consequence the concept of security has become less state-centric and more human as the instances of *citizens* and *individual* have shown in Beckett's speeches.

Figure 4.3: Intercollocations of *security* in DiCo

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DISCOURSE OF SECURITY

5.1 From co-text to context: the 'dialogic' perspective

In the previous chapter we plunged into the analysis of the collocates of *security* pinning down its complex conceptualization and its development across ten years. Different linguistic categories have emerged which become 'social categories' (cf. Stubbs 1996): *peace and security*, *security and prosperity*, *the threat to security* and *the issue of climate security*.

Security is an interest, but the vicinity of other collocates which represent values such as *freedom* and *justice* construct it as a value, too. These positions have been instantiated co-textually through equation between collocates, often connected by the use of relational processes. Security is going through a process of re-scaling insofar it includes territorial values but also economic, political and environmental values as the occurrences of new 'seasonal collocates', mainly encompassing items semantically related to the environment (e.g. *climate security*), have demonstrated. Furthermore, lexical repetitions of items belonging to the semantic category of 'alliance' and 'cooperation' have pointed out the pervasiveness of the rhetoric of interdependency grounded on the recurrent instances of the possessive *our*.

Dominant is the oratory of internationalism and globalism which instantiates *security* as a *common* objective to achieve through a common *shared will*. The above cited 'social categories' will be now investigated in their wider context on the grounds of the 'engagement system' drawing on

the concgrams revealed in the previous chapter.

More precisely, the analysis in this chapter will explore those mechanisms by which foreign ministers take a stance towards the proposition debated and the concurring or conflicting voices. The investigation of evaluation or stance is relevant in this context of study since it functions as indicator of speakers or writers' opinion and thus expresses the value system of the speakers and their community (Hunston & Thompson 2000). This investigation is in line with White's attempt (2003) to respond to Stubbs' aim to go beyond the category of 'modality' by including all those expressions of alignment to and detachment from what is referenced in the text. Modality is intended here in Stubbs' words (1996: 202) as:

> the ways in which language is used to encode meanings such as degrees of certainty and commitment, or alternatively vagueness and lack of commitment, personal beliefs versus generally accepted or taken for granted knowledge. Such language functions to express groups membership, as speakers adopt positions, express agreement with others, make personal and social allegiances and contracts.

The point is that every propositional content encode a point of view towards it and the assumption underlying the approach adopted in this research is that the concordances work as pointers to a larger-scale discursive practices of which instances of speakers' ideological value positions are usually part.

The approach is informed by Bakhtin's notion of 'dialogism' and 'heteroglossia' ([1935] 1981; 1986), meaning that all verbal communication reveals the influence of what has been said before, setting up a dialogical relationship with other voices in the text. However, utterances may disregard the background against which they are set and in this case they are labelled as 'monoglosses'. This dialogic perspective entails that

speakers/writers establish a community of (un)shared beliefs or value with those who have previously taken a stance towards the issue focus of the debate.

In the following analysis, which considers the second research question set out in the introduction to this study, I am interested in seeing whether key propositions discussing *security* as a key issue are formulated monoglossically or heteroglossically. Then, the investigation aims to see whether the minister's point of view is dialogically 'contractive' or 'expansive'. It is worth remembering, that as White points out (2006: 39), 'attitudinal evaluations' might be observed according to a range of more explicitly stated to less explicitly articulated. Thus, if formulations carry an attitudinal value they are labelled as 'inscriptions' otherwise they are termed as 'attitudinal tokens', which may trigger or provoke negative or positive responses. I am also concerned with looking at those wordings which rely on more indirect evaluative mechanisms, namely analogy and inference.

The analysis in this chapter is carried out as follows: first, we are dealing with the identification of evaluative keys around security and its appraisal relying on the reading of concordances; second, the tendency to construe a contractive stance and the discursive strategy of the ideology of 'causation' or 'causality' will be pointed out in the light of the analysis of the concgrams *security/peace* and *security/prosperity*; third, the concgram *security/threat* will reveal the ideology of 'undesirable'. Then, the issue of *security/climate* will be considered on the basis of analogy. Finally, the analysis will focus on the ideology of nationhood which construes an image of strong commitment of the British country to the issue of security showing how this topic is also a means for ideological intent.

Before starting the analysis it is useful to keep in mind that 'Appraisal' works not on single words but its interpretation is based on the

so called "cumulative groove" the systemic counterpart for 'semantic prosody': the evaluative meaning is construed over stretches of text (Miller 2007: 164). For this reason those resources of 'attitude' that are instrumental in the analysis will be taken into account. As stated in chapter three, even though corpus-assisted the analysis in the following sections remains qualitative in its nature and the following notations are used:

-[**MP]** which stands for 'power monoglosses';

-[**MS]** is used for 'solidarity monoglosses';

-[±] indicate the negative or positive resources of 'appreciation' and 'judgements'.

-the elements in the sentence that contribute to the identification of the resources of 'engagement' are boxed in;

Finally, the items which are relevant to the analysis are underlined.

5.2 Axiology – value orientation in the discourse of security

From an evaluative perspective the discourse of *security* is primarily organized around several semantic motifs, namely points of attitudinal alignment which can be described as follows:

-**positive valuation** and **negative composition** with the latter leading to

-**concern** for the lack of security> *there is a lot more that we have to be doing on climate security;*

-**participation**> *Our future security and prosperity depend on both working together to pursue common interests.*

-**repulsion** > *they seek to paralyse and impoverish the world*;

-**support** to the Government's arguments justifying the Iraqi war;

-**pride** for Britain's actions.

Some of these orientations are not evident at the surface level of the text, they are interrelated one another and this interconnection brings about the

rhetorical effect of the discourse.

5.2.1 The 'Appraisal' of *security:* closing off any alternative

In this sub-section the appraisal of security built on the two following semantic categories is focused on:

1. 'valuation': 'security' is a crucial value, it represents self and mutual interests and, hence, it is relevant at both national and international level;

2. negative 'composition': 'security' is instantiated as a desirable and good goal, based on a network of alliances, but this goal is not completely achieved and much work has still to be done. Hence, the resource of 'composition' is construed through an ideal representation of the concept often based on assertive formulations (e.g. *the security of our nation depends on foreign contacts*). The conflation of these two evaluative positions is instantiated in the following citation, which is 'contractive' in its formulation:

> 1. JACK STRAW: **Security** is vitally <u>important</u> **[+VALUATION] [MP]:** we were much more recently reminded of how <u>important</u> **[+VALUATION]** it is to fight global terrorism by the appalling **[-REACTION]** attacks in Istanbul on 15 and 20 November **[PROJECTION].** But **security** cannot be isolated from other issues **[-COMPOSITION] [DISCLAIM: COUNTER/DENIAL].**

Here *security* is appraised in terms of positive 'valuation' (*important*) intensified by the adverb *vitally* and by the marked syntactic position of the adjective itself in the passive construction of the 'projection' (*we were reminded of*). The 'enhancement', introduced by the counter-expectational *but,* adds further information to the 'composition' of *security* by emphasising its connection to the other issues revealing an unplanned, not systemic concept of security.

Equally, relevance features Cook's discourse of security by sorting to an intertextual element from the Renaissance. "No man is an island" is called to the reader's mind in a modified and dynamically modalized version which functions as resource of 'judgement' of negative [-capacity] (*no nation can be an island*) if working in isolation. John Donne's recurring imagery of the island and the mainland[1], points out that no one man, and in our case no nation, can exist on its own, cut off from all the rest of society.

2.   ROBIN COOK: There is no higher national interest for our foreign policy than the promotion of our national **security** [DISCLAIM: DENIAL].
In the context of international **security**, no nation can be an island [DISCLAIM: DENIAL]– not even such a distinguished [JUDGEMENT: +NORMALITY] island state as Britain [DISCLAIM: DENIAL/COUNTER].

A sharp contrast between isolationism and interconnectedness is thus set up and it is further voiced through the positive 'judgement' of 'social esteem', [+normality] for Britain: *distinguished island.* Even though considered a successful and respectful country Britain, that is an island in its physical nature, cannot achieve security and thus prosperity, if it does not rely on the *security* of other countries. The speaker's assertiveness is here corroborated by the use of the comparative form, which ranks 'security' as the first priority of foreign policy and the 'contractive' formulation *There is no higher national interest* objectivises his position.

The introductory bare assertion in Beckett's citation conveys a heightened personal investment that is also evident in Beckett's attitude to security. Moreover, it evokes feeling of positive judgement [+capacity], for Britain which succeeded in the drawing the Security Council's attention to

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[1] Margaret Thatcher used the same quotation in her speech on December 18th 1979: "Today it is painfully obvious that no man – and no nation – is an island.

the issue of climate security. Indeed, in Beckett's speeches, resources of 'appreciation', worded as 'valuation', are employed to identify climate change as a *core security issue*. Neverthless, the use of a mental verb in negative polarity (*I do not exaggerate*) seems to indicate an effort to gain credibility:

3. MARGARET BECKETT: The UK had taken the issue of
   climate **security** to the Security Council for the first
   time **[MP]—** I do not exaggerate when I say that this
   was a <u>true landmark</u> **[+REACTION] [PRONOUNCEMENT].** It
   marked the recognition of climate change as a <u>core</u>
   security issue **[MP].**

4. MARGARET BECKETT: The implications of climate change
   for our **security** are more <u>fundamental</u> and
   <u>comprehensive</u> than any single <u>conflict</u> **[MP].**

In her defending the importance of the question of climate security, Beckett does not hesitate to sort to an analogy with *conflict*. The use of this 'inscription' does not leave the attitudinal position open: given the British democratic system of values any conflict is condemned and the analogy has the effect of evoking its consequences.

The other axiological orientation of combined effort and collective participation to achieve security is expressed in an assertive way and the use of monoglosses plays here a crucial role. According to White (2003: 263) the 'bare assertion' construes either 'solidarity' or 'power'. 'Solidarity monoglosses' present indisputable 'factual' versions of events, whereas in 'power monoglosses' the textual voice takes on the status of moral authority and excludes any alternatives. The point here is that the principle of 'cooperation' (which implies an opposition with 'isolation'), permeates all the acclaimed values around 'security' (e.g. interdependence between economic and political dimension; the supremacy of international law and the European integration) and is encoded through un-negotiated statements of power which reveal its unquestionable aspect:

5. ROBIN COOK: To deny that Britain is European is to deny both our geography and our history. Our culture, our **security**, and our prosperity, are <u>inseparable</u> from the continent of Europe. **[MS]**

6. ROBIN COOK: The *prosperity* and the **security** of our nation <u>depend on</u> foreign contacts. **[MP]**

7. ROBIN COOK: Promoting our values enhances our <u>prosperity</u>, and reinforces our **security**. **[MP]**

8. ROBIN COOK: Our national **security** <u>depends on</u> NATO. **[MP]**

9. ROBIN COOK: Our **security** <u>depends on</u> the strength of our alliances and safety on our streets depends on the resolve of the international community in maintaining the peace. **[MP]**

10. ROBIN COOK: European integration has been a <u>major force</u> for **security** and <u>freedom</u> in Europe for the last fifty years. **[MP]**

11. JACK STRAW: Our future **security** and <u>prosperity</u> <u>depend on</u> both working <u>together</u> to pursue <u>common</u> interests. **[MS]**

12. ROBIN COOK: The past three weeks has carried with it the very <u>important</u> message **[PROJECTION]** that <u>vital</u> to the freedom and **security** of Europe is the <u>partnership</u> between America and Europe, a partnership which goes back to the last war.

These citations set up an "undialogised" environment where the authorial voice is construed as a single voice and is highly invested. As White maintains (2003: 263), these types of declarations are typically found where:

> there is an assumption of ontological, epistemic and axiological commonality between voice and audience, where the addressee is assumed to operate with the same knowledge, beliefs and values as those relied upon by the proposition. The undialogized bare utterance typically operates when this commonality is assumed not to be at risk or in doubt.

Thus, the undeniable fact in segment number (5) is that Britain is geographically and historically part of Europe. The other monoglosses (6; 7; 11) reveal what has emerged as the critical aspect in security discourse, namely the interdependence between security and prosperity, construed only through 'relational processes'. Segment (9) enacts persuasion by

triggering alarming emotions: *the safety on our streets* implies the potential presence of danger everywhere and in so doing everybody feels involved. In example (10) the speaker is appraising the relevance of 'European integration' to the discourse of security in terms of 'valuation': the fact of being a *major force* evokes feelings of positive 'reaction' [+secure].

Moreover, the proposition is soaked with a certain degree of 'taken-for-grantedness' due to historical evidence, given by the adjunct 'for the last fifty years'. The tendency towards 'atlanticism' is 'projected' in citation (12) which, combined with the resource of 'valuation' [+importance] (*vital*), stimulates positive judgements of evaluation. As White maintains (2003: 265), the bare assertion works by itself as an unquestionable proposition and thus, 'modal' in a broad sense: what is assumed not to be at risk is the significance of security and its compositional nature, which requires a network of alliances. Sometimes the border between resources of 'valuation' and those of 'judgement' (capacity) is obfuscated, as in citation (15) for example, where the significance of alliances is worded in terms of positive 'appreciation' (advantages of partnership have been showed through history) but also 'capacity' for setting up partnership.

The following instances are other examples of the instantiation of the semantic motif of participation and cooperation through heterogloss but where different elements contribute to make them assertive:

13. ROBIN COOK: We have learnt that we can achieve more **security** for our nations by integrating our markets and our economies than we ever achieved by arming frontiers that kept us apart **[CONCUR: CONCEDE].**

14. ROBIN COOK: We have learnt that we can have greater **security** by bringing down barriers than by building walls between us **[CONCUR: CONCEDE]**

15. ROBIN COOK: Britain's alliance with the United States has of course been the anchor of our **security** for half a century **[CONCUR: AFFIRMATION].**

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16.  ROBIN COOK: Through the Stability Pact we are sharing
     with the countries of the Balkans the key lesson of
     post-war Europe - that the best formula for security
     is not arming our frontiers [DISCLAIM: DENIAL] but
     dismantling  barriers  to  trade,  mobility,  and
     cooperation [DISCLAIM: COUNTER + ENHANCEMENT].

17.  ROBIN COOK: The most positive development for our
     security over the past year has been the strengthened
     alliance between London and Washington [MP].
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I assume the utterances (13) and (14) as being 'concurring' formulations in that, by grounding the proposition on past experience, through the inclusive-we cluster *we have learnt*, the speaker sets out only one position, once again integration as the only strategy to the problem of enhancing security. The same aim is instantiated in citation (15) through the use of the contractive locution *of course,* which projects the audience as sharing the speaker's positive view that alliance (again with the USA), rooted in a half century of history, is the core of *security*. The occurrence of the attitudinal 'inscription' *anchor* triggers positive response of 'security' and 'stability' and, therefore, by giving a capacity-oriented representation of Britain, the speaker presents himself as aligned with the construed audience, as having the same knowledge and belief. This image of *anchor* [+valuation], relationally construed, reinforces the idea of security as a value achievable through integration and 'naturalises' the ideological position of 'atlanticism' via an 'inscribed' metaphor. This of course echoes Blair's governmental decision that UK interests were best served by remaining Washington's closest ally and by promoting 'US leadership'.[2]

These citations put the past in terms of lesson by using "the method of fictional realism in rhetoric" (Pehar 2000: 130) and can be interpreted as positive 'appreciation' of 'relations of means'. If we look in particular at

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[2] FCO, UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO (London: Dec. 2003)

instances (13), (14) and (15) we notice the presence of 'circumstances' introduced by the external conjunction *by*. The focus here is on 'ability': the international community will be able to integrate markets or destroy barriers. This metaphor may be interpreted as 'barriers-mean-lack-of-alliances' and *bringing down barriers* is praised positively via the criticism of the same, but missed opportunity, during WWII. Since arming frontiers brought about negative effects, therefore, the opposite is now desirable. Ideational meaning is instrumental in the construction of the evaluation: all the alliances from the past have shown their validity and thus persevering in this direction helps achieving the goal of *more security*.

The practice of the legitimation of new strategies on the basis of past experience (*lesson of post-war Europe,* segment 16) is a usual practice in diplomacy where decision-makers recur to past analogies to "make their views broadly acceptable" (Pehar 2000: 117) and hence, I would add, strongly evaluative. In this strategy, words like *lesson(s)* and the verb *learn* play a key role in that functioning as 'tokens' of evaluation. To put it starkly, the positive 'appreciation' [+beneficial] is triggered in these citations in that the alignment of the audience is ensured through the experiential value. It might also be worth noting that the rhetorical strategy of representing the British community as being keen on its past alliances is worded in terms of judgement of 'social esteem' in particular 'capacity'. The reference to past events is seen as having a persuasive function "not just as an attempt to convince the listener of the rightness of a political position or of a certain course of action, but as a legitimation strategy, involving a justification of controversial or criticised actions" (Dibattista 2004: 158) that in our case might be the American partnership.

If the citations analysed above plunge the listeners into the past to substantiate their position, the tool of analogy as setting up a comparison

by similarity is enacted in citation (18):

> 18.   ROBERT COOK: Without peace there will no be lasting **security [DISCLAIM: DENIAL].** We ourselves in Britain know from our experience in Northern Ireland how difficult **[+CAPACITY]** it can be to put aside long-standing suspicion and hostility **[AFFECT]**, and work together for a common goal of **peace [MP: PROJECTION].** The last few days have reminded us **[MENTAL PROJECTION]** that too many people are still prepared to sacrifice the common good for partisan advantage **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER].** Yet Northern Ireland also shows **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]** that you do not have to accept a stale-mate. **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**

The appeal *work together for a common goal* is another variation which instantiates the rhetoric of cooperation. Here the problem of achieving peace in the world and the same issue in Ireland, a country that has always had a prominent role in British history, invites the listener to reason inductively, namely to assume that certain things are true by grounding them on analogous past experience. The speaker is contrasting two different situations united by a common goal: peace which brings security. In so doing a high degree of 'tolerance' is shown as characterising Britain through its 'capacity' to overcome hostility for a good objective. The use of the pronoun *we,* which refers unambiguously to the British people, the occurrence of the epistemic *know* and the monoglossic formulation, leave no space for embracing a different view:

As shown, the concept of 'security as a value achievable only through networking is pervasive in the corpus and it is intensified by recurrent words from the same semantic sphere: *alliances, links, partners, network, partnership* or through material processes (*work together*). What comes into the picture, as noticed in the previous chapter, is 'overwording' (Fairclough 1989: 115) which involves nearly synonymous words and has the ideological function of repeating the crucial concept of unity against

isolation or put differently it aims to render isolationism anachronistic with reference to globalisation. Furthermore, the evidence so far illustrates a strong preference for nominal choices that, as I will show later in this chapter (sub-section 5.2.3), also invades the field of 'projection'.

Drawing on the findings displayed so far, table 5.1 is an attempt to sum up the resources used in *DiCo* to appraise the value of 'security'. Italics indicate the elements from the corpus:

Security	**Positive**	**Negative**	**Lexical realizations**
Reaction	*landmark*		
Composition	*international* *global* *collective*	Unfinished > Weak > Irregular	*more security; greater security* *promoting our values reinforces our security* *more security by integrating our markets* *more security by bringing down barriers* *will deepen* *enhance* *by dismantling barriers* *there is a lot more that we have to be doing on climate security*
Valuation	*important* *vital* *core* *strategic*		

Table 5.1 Appreciation of *security* in *DiCo* (cf. Martin 2000; 2003; 2005)

This high frequency of resources of 'appreciation' may find its reason in the inherent character of the diplomatic speeches, namely explaining the foreign policy choices depending on past failure or success. As mentioned at the beginning of this work, diplomacy is undergoing a process of change and, as instances have shown, continuity with the past is also relevant. Appraising security as *important, vital* means having fundamental consequences in social life by its implementation and this explains the focus on the 'ability' to set up alliances. Britain is therefore taken as example of the 'capacity' to achieve this purpose. Thus, far from being neutral, the speaker is going through a process of interpretation.

The last point to highlight in this section brings us back to the segment (8) (*Our national **security** <u>depends on</u> NATO.* [MP]) which enacts a connection with NATO through the usual relational process. This is another value position that is, expectedly, 'unhedged' in the discourse of security. The legally recognized existence of this institutional reference constitutes a constant yardstick in the corpus. The respect for legality and supra-national institutions is highly recognized and it is always instantiated through 'undialogized' positions as in the following instance where the first bare assertion provokes judgements of admiration for the institutional work:

> 19.   JACK STRAW: the United Nations has saved lives by the
>   million, and <u>saved millions</u> more from fear, poverty and
>   tyranny **[MS].** Without the United Nations, there could
>   have been no salvation for the people of East Timor, no
>   prospect of lasting peace in Sierra Leone, no-one to
>   help rebuild Afghanistan **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL].**

In this citation, the evaluation of the UN is construed more on experiential meaning which is instantiated through a peculiar conditional formulation where the 'premise', placed in thematic position, is the starting point of a series of realisations which, in this case, are also worded as parallelisms which contribute to the persuasive power. The positive appraisal of the UN, which can also be seen as 'token' of positive judgement of 'social esteem', and the ensured solidarity with the audience relies on the following resources: denial, un-negotiated condition, ideational meaning as positive token of evaluation. The rule of the law, predictably, is an unquestionable value in the corpus. The effects of the action of these international institutions are seen as positive and therefore a continuity of relation with them is contemplated to achieve security. Putting the emphasis on the favourable results, this finding can be also interpreted in the light of the

ideology of 'casuality' which brings us to the next sub-section.

5.2.2 Attaining *peace* to reach *security* and *prosperity*: the ideology of 'causality'

In the previous sub-section we have noticed how the circumstantial adjuncts (e.g. *by integration*) have construed interpersonal meaning through the interaction of 'appreciation'. In this sub-section we attend to another semantic category that is extensively used in *DiCo*: the cause. Let us start from the observation of the following segment which looks at *security* in association with the nominalisations found in the previous chapter. An opposition is here given by a bifurcation implicitly constructed between 'us' and 'them' voiced also as *industrialised* vs. *poor countries*:

> 20.   COOK: The <u>industrialised</u> nations have enjoyed half a century of <u>peace</u>. **[MS]** That has provided the **security** and <u>good order</u> in which their <u>prosperity</u> has advanced at a rate without precedent. **[MS]** Yet, in the same half-century, peoples elsewhere on the globe have lived through <u>violence and conflicts</u>, which have broken their human rights and <u>impoverished</u> their standard of living **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]**. It is largely <u>poor countries</u> that now experience the <u>scourge of war</u>.

Security is the pivotal element that guarantees peace, order and wealth whereas the lack of it is a source of disorder, war and poverty. The opposition is lexically and co-textually construed once again from a historical perspective:

-*industrialised nations* vs. *poor countries*;

-*order* vs. *conflicts* (namely disorder);

-*prosperity* vs. *impoverished* (poverty is the result);

-*peace* vs. *war*.

The argumentative ground given initially, security as basis for good order, is then countered in order to show the consequences of the opposed historically supported case. Such counters "are aligning rather than

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disaligning in that they construe the speaker as sharing this axiological paradigm with the reader" (Martin and White 2005: 121). The discourse of 'security' is thus legitimised through this well-built binary opposition: 'security' excludes automatically war and poverty, or better, wealth and order are the pillars to build up 'security'. Attitudinal lexis (in italics) and experiential grammar contribute to construct assumed-to-be-shared evaluation, which brings the hearers to share the empathy (cf. Miller 2004) for the western country and concern for the poor ones.

The concgram *security/peace*, more frequently used by Cook, is construed according to what I call the metaphor of the order/peace-as a-pathway-to security[3], which is worded in terms of 'disclaims'. The segment analysed is a clear example of the ideology of causality which was found to have connection with processes of change (Coffin 2000: 342). This means that the main intent is the assessment of the degree of causal force in historical events and "valuation resources are critical in meeting this purpose" (ibid.). The following utterances are formulated according to the pattern 'without X…no Y' that is 'without peace no security'. A relation of conditional causality is clearly evident and its instantiation through negative polarity closes off any alternative, namely there is no sign that these propositions operate within a continuing debate.

21.   ROBIN COOK: According to the recent opinion polls over 60% of the Israeli public want to see their government accept the current US package to break the log-jam on the peace process **[MS]**. Mr Netanyahu was elected on a commitment to peace with **security** **[MS]**. Most of the Israeli people, including many who voted for him, know that without a just **peace** there will be no *lasting* **security** **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**.

22.   ROBIN   COOK: Britain   has   long   and   strong **[+VALUATION]** ties with Israel. We have consistently **[+TENACITY]** supported the Israeli people's right to **security** **[MS]**. And it is worth remembering that they

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[3] Vasta in her cross-cultural study of the debate from the House of Commons (2004: 113) found a similar metaphorical construction: "war-as-a-pathway-to-peace".

elected the present government because of Mr Netanyahu's promise to deliver **peace** with **security**. The Israeli people know that without peace there can be no *real, lasting* **security.** [DISCLAIM: DENIAL]

23. ROBIN COOK: The Palestinians will not find a just solution on their homeland without **peace** [DISCLAIM: DENIAL]. We will not resolve the hardship of the refugees without peace. But the Israelis will not find true **security** without **peace** [DISCLAIM: COUNTER - ENHANCEMENT] That is why Britain regards itself as a friend of the Palestinians, and also a friend of the Israelis - because we are friend to peace [JUSTIFICATION].

By sorting to 'denial', the speaker is negating that the Israeli and the Palestinians will enjoy security if stability is not introduced and, in so doing, he is distancing any addressee's 'entertain' of supporting the opposite view. He does so also by using the epistemic or grammar fact *know* (21; 22) which increases the degree of 'realizability' of the cause-condition (if there is no peace). The position is also emphasised through the repetition of the same structure. Likewise, as disorder brings about insecurity for the Middle East, the same formulation is employed with reference to Europe: without a complete integration no security is conceivable. The subjectivised epistemic verb (*I believe*) introduces a feeling of 'dissatisfaction' with the current situation of cooperation with Russia and integration would be the right solution:

24. ROBIN COOK: I believe there is more to be done, not just to cooperate more with Russia, but to include that country back into the mainstream of European life [DISCLAIM: COUNTER]. Without close Russian involvement, no **security** system for Europe is *credible* [DISCLAIM: DENIAL].

25. JACK STRAW: we all have an interest in seeing **peace** and **security** entrenched, because insecurity and tension, however far away, can affect us all [JUSTIFICATION].

26. JACK STRAW: As a sovereign state, our strength is enhanced by the strength of our alliances: [MP] our

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security and prosperity depend on our ability to
influence events in the rest of our continent and the
rest of the world, not on our ability to stop others
from influencing us [DISCLAIM: DENIAL].
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The link between *security* and *prosperity* is expressed in terms of relational processes (*entrenched, depend on*) in Straw's speeches where there is a preference for resources of nominal 'affect' (*tension* and *insecurity*). The ideology of 'cause' is here expressed incongruently, namely through 'grammatical metaphor' (Halliday 1985: 321): *tension and insecurity can affect all*. This choice may be due to Straw's preference for negative nominalised lexical items which serve, as shown later, ideological purposes.

As noticed, negatives are pervasive in diplomatic discourse and this matches our finding about the strong collocational relation between *security* and *no* above all in Cook's speeches (see Appendix 4).

In denials contesting positions are addressed and set aside; their use highlights more semantic content with respect to an affirmative formulation insofar "sematically, negation belongs to the realm of the non-realized" (Miestamo 2005: 196). Indeed, the foreign ministers indicate their objectives (*security, peace, prosperity*) as non-attainable if some conditions are not achieved. By negating an event the speaker is reporting the absence of 'stability', hence a status which requires change. These 'denials' present the speaker as having expertise in this area and as intervening to adjust some misconceptions of the addressee's part (Martin and White 2005: 119).

Furthermore, studies on denials recognize "many typological similarities between negatives and other non-realized contexts, such as questions and conditionals" (Miestamo 2005: 196). Biber's research (1988: 107) considers conditionals as playing a significant role in the textual dimensions as 'overt expression of persuasion' and involved in argumentative discourse and, therefore, seen as markers of affect or stance

in relation to the beliefs being debated. Most of the conditional instances in *DiCo* are of the 'hypothetical' nature (see Taylor 1997)[4] and thus classified as 'irrealis', where other possibilities are entertained:

> 27.   ROBIN COOK: <u>If we value</u> our national security, we must work for international stability. <u>If we value</u> our prosperity, we must promote international trade and <u>if we value</u> our freedoms, we must demonstrate that by supporting the same freedoms for others **[ENTERTAIN].** We live in an internationalist age **[MS].** There is no future in that modern world for the politics of little England **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL].**

In the segment (27) Cook construes a series of truth-value protases from which the inference cannot deviate from the speaker's viewpoint: after introducing the premise, *if we value*, an effect follows. The speaker is certain that people desire those values stated in the premise and the consequences acquire validity and are expressed according to a principled guideline based on deontic modality. The parallelisms used intensify the persuasive function of the clauses. On the basis of this evidence, we might infer that Cook only apparently sorts to hypothetical formulations to entertain, because contraction is worded through the use of *must* as well as through obligation implied in the consequentiality. The parallelism is also used to persuade and to soften his tough attitude.

An interesting variation of this conditional construction is based on the comparative correlatives as shown in the following segment:

> 28.   ROBIN COOK: In that globalised world there is a hard headed national interest for that. The more countries that make the transition to democracy like Serbia, the more partners we will have for **peace** and **security**. The more countries that obey the rule of

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[4] "In a FACTUAL conditional, the content of the if-clause is presumed to be the case, whilst in a COUNTERFACTUAL the content of the if-clause is taken to be the contrary to fact. Between these categories stand the HYPOTHETICAL conditionals, in which the content of the if-cluase is entertained as a possibility, neither in accordance with reality, nor inconsistent with it." (Taylor 1997: 301)

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law, the sounder will they be as partners with us to
trade and invest in.
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What I suggest here is that the comparative pattern *the more…the more* may be seen as form of logical consequentiality which can be included in the pattern preferred in *DiCo*. The second clause instantiates the effect determined by the first part of the sentence which contains the premise. The use of the comparative *more* presupposes the fact that there are already countries which are changing their status becoming 'democracy', like Serbia, and that the number of these nations can be increased. This pattern is extensively used in the corpus and most of the instances concern the future of Britain as in the following segment:

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29.   It is in Britain's interest that we are a leading
partner in it. The stronger Europe is in the world
the stronger will be Britain. The more Europe
embraces economic reform, the more prosperous will be
Britain. The more Europe co-operates to defeat
organised crime the safer will be the streets of
Britain. The more successful Europe is in the
negotiations to halt climate change the better will
be Britain's environment. And the greater Europe's
military capacity for crisis management the stronger
will be the security of Britain [EXPANSION].
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Considering the equation between *security* and *prosperity*, the pattern is also valid for *prosperity*, occurring, in the above segment, under the adjectival form. These patterns of preference were always found in the conclusive part of the speech showing also a rhetorical function in that leaving the audience with the expectations of further developments of already implemented events. These patterns instantiate what the ideology of 'causation': once the initial premise is stated, it unchains a set of ripple-effects which imply potential developments. These patterns are summarized in table 5.2:

Patterns of preference	Instances from the corpus
Without X….no Y…..	*Without peace there can be no real, lasting security*
More X…more Y	*The more countries that make the transition to democracy like Serbia, the more partners we will have for **peace** and **security***
If X…then Y….	*If we value our national **security**, we must work for international stability.*

Table 5.2 Patterns of preference illustrating the ideology of 'causation'

5.2.3 *security/threat(s)*: the ideology of the 'undesirable':

In order to grasp the expected different scenario found in Straw's discourse on security due to his confrontation with terrorist attacks, let us start from the following citation:

> 30. JACK STRAW: By spreading *fear*, they [terrorists] seek to paralyse and impoverish the world, so that our **security**, our freedoms and our prosperity decline together. **[CONSEQUENTIALITY]**

This hypotactic formulation prefaced by a circumstance, which functions as 'means', highlights the 'ability' of the terrorists to put into practice a set of negative actions. The segment contains negative attitudinal items (*fear, paralyse, impoverish, decline*) and *terrorists* are depicted as the main responsible for the degeneration, given their position as 'actors' in the sentence. The resource of evoked 'judgement' based on 'impropriety' glosses terrorism as a menace to security and Straw constructs a pervasive emotional negative axiology enacting the emergency semantics of *fear, poverty*, and *paralysis*.

As observed in the previous chapter, the most frequent collocate of security in Straw's sub-corpus is *threat* which occurring mostly as a noun does not have a specific temporal location. A look at the concordances below shows that the concgram *threat/security* is embedded in a context of

certainty from the speaker, where patterns like *no one can doubt that* (32; 33) mark emphatic conviction and signal the truth value of the proposition which is not debatable. Likewise, in the following citations the same functional meaning is instantiated through the modalized expression *we can no longer ignore* (34), which has the same basic function of asserting the speaker's strong conviction and at the same time excluding an alternative view, with the ultimate aim of making the audience align because evidence does not allow any different position:

31. JACK STRAW: After the murder of thousands of people in the heart of Manhattan, no one can doubt that the primary **threat to our security** is now posed by groups acting formally outside states, or from places where no state functions. **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**

32. JACK STRAW: No one can now doubt that a primary **threat to our security** comes from groups which act outside states and the rules of the international community, or from places where the state and the rule of law do not function. **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**

33. JACK STRAW: The appalling lesson of 11 September is that we can no longer ignore the challenge, or indeed other potential **threats to our security**. **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**

34. JACK STRAW: Then came 9/11 **[MS]**. We saw with terrible clarity that unstable, failing states did not have to be right on our borders to be a direct danger to our security. **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]** We understood, even more clearly that tackling **threats to** international **peace and security** — including global terrorism and proliferation — relied on dealing with problems at source, as they arose, not allowing them to fester. **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**

35. JACK STRAW: This reflects a common perception that Saddam's *appetite* for WMD, when married to his willingness to use all possible means to repress his own people and intimidate his neighbours, makes him a unique **threat to** international **peace** and **security** **[PRONOUNCEMENT]**.

These patterns fall within a group of dialogically contracting meanings, labelled as 'proclamation', where the "textual voice conveys a

heightened personal investment in the viewpoint being advanced and thereby explicitly indicates an interest in advancing that viewpoint, typically against some opposed alternative" (White 2003: 269). In number (35) the wordings *we saw with terrible clarity* and *we understood* intensified by the evaluative formulations *terrible* and *even more clearly,* represent the textual voice as concurring to admit what is evident once again. Since terrorism and WMD constitute a threat to security, as shown by September 11[th] terrorist attacks, that is a historical and undeniable event, pre-emptive action (*dealing with problems at source,* segment 34) is justified. The equation is the following: WMD =failing states=terrorism > insecurity.

This sorting to 'pronouncements' shows an emphasis on the insistence to convince the hearers of the inevitability of the consequences, which imply the presence of some resistance.

An example of 'endorsement' is found in the extract (36) where the pattern *this reflects the common perception*, working retrospectively, indicates that the textual voice is corroborating the *common* view that Saddam is a *unique* threat to security. Furthermore, *appetite* here works as 'token' of attitudinal meaning: it connotes Saddam's voracity, while *repress* and *intimidate,* are categorized as processes of the "mental affection" typology[5] and thus having a persuasive function. The "cumulative effect" triggers feelings of 'impropriety' such as [-legality; -humanity; -responsibility]. Accordingly, the addressee who might dissent from this negative representation is the minority, namely at odds with the "solidarity affiliation constructed for the modelled reader" (White 2003: 277).

Similarly, segment (36) offers another example of the instantiation of

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[5] "Whereas mechanisms of convincing and conviction obviously work mainly along cognitive argumentative lines, seduction [=persuasion], instead of trusting in the truth and/or credibility of arguments, rather exploits the outward appearance and seeming trustworthiness of the persuader" (Sornig 1989: 87)

the ideology of 'legitimate use of force'[6] through the speaker's contraction which closes off the few expressions of dialogism.

> 36.   JACK STRAW: The *paradox* we face is that the only way we are going to achieve disarmament by peace of a rogue regime, **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]** that all of us know has been in defiance of this Council for the past 12 years **[COGNITIVE PROJECTION]**, the only way we can achieve their disarmament of their weapons of mass destruction, which this Council has said **[VERBAL PROJECTION]** poses a **threat to** international **peace and security**, is by backing our diplomacy with a credible threat of force **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]**. *I wish* **[AFFECT]** we lived in a different world where this was not necessary, but *sadly* we live in this world and the choice, Dominique, is not ours as to how this disarmament takes place, the choice is Saddam Hussein's. It's his choice **[MP]**. Would that it were ours because it would be so easy, **[ENTERTAIN]** but sadly it is not. **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]**

> 37.   JACK STRAW: The Security Council last night was therefore absolutely correct **[JUDGEMENT: +VERACITY]**, in calling for the unconditional release of the hostages, to reaffirm that terrorism is one of the most serious **threats to** international **peace** and **security [PROJECTION]**.

The contractive attitude is the result of the cumulative evaluative effect of the strategies altogether. But let us consider them individually. The attitudinal item which introduces the segment, *paradox,* indicates perplexity from the speaker who cancels any doubts by employing the countering *the only way* twice: he is rejecting 'alterity' and supporting his stance through the 'verbal projection' that the Council considers the weapons of mass destruction a *threat to security*. The explicit subjectivity expressing a strong desire for a different situation is substantiated by the 'modal adjunct' (*sadly*) that expresses negative 'Affect', as 'comment', and is concerned with the variable of un/happiness. The space for dialogism '*would that it were ours because it would be so easy'* is immediately sealed with a wording which

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[6] Other studies have already put forward a similar aspect, see Vasta (2004).

combines the counter-expectational *but* and the negation preceded by another occurrence of objectivised 'affect' (*sadly*). In other words, the solution manifested, namely the use of 'a credible threat of force', is introduced as the only possible answer to terrorism represented here by Saddam Hussein. The intensification which amplifies discourse and enacts emotions of self-pity (*the only way, when, sadly*), the use of the counter (*but*) uncover the speaker's cautious attitude which reverberates through the surrounding discourse.

Endorsement is also at work in citation (37) through the use of the intensified (*absolutely*) evaluative adjective *correct* [Judgement: +veracity] representing the speaker's position as generally held or as taking up what has been previously said by the Security Council and hence, safeguarding his propriety and veracity.

A less assertive attitude noticed in the citation (37) is also visible in the segment (38), which deals with the military aspect of the issue. The speaker 'entertains' dialogic 'expansion' by the use of the modal *may,* immediately followed by the formal pattern *in extremis,* which restricts the applicability of his proposition: the force (*military response*) will be used only if the situation is so difficult to require extreme methods. Even though the speaker allows dialogic space, nevertheless, the use of the modalised formulation *we would all agree that,* together with a very negatively connoted lexis, provoke a reaction that aligns the audience with the speaker in his position of stopping this 'disease'. *Contagion* in particular constitutes an attitudinal item, which causes a negative reaction in that it makes tangible the idea of global contamination:

> 38. JACK STRAW: And we would all agree that the
> **threats to our security** — from terrorism, weapons of
> mass destruction, and *chaos* and *contagion* from
> failing states — <u>may</u> <u>in extremis</u> require a military
> response. **[EXPANSION: ENTERTAIN]**

Such an intensely negative potential setting has little chance to attract the receiver (cf. Miller 2002). Citizens are manipulated into believing that society has become increasingly insecure. A firm premise of solidarity is visible in Straw's citations: he always sorts to attitudinal lexis (*menace, undermine, conflict, diseases, malaria*) and experiential material (*the displacement of people from their land*) which has the potential to provoke a negative 'reaction' in the hearer via process of inference, as in segment (39):

39. JACK STRAW: The **threat** is no less intense for being longer-term **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**. It is not just an environmental *menace*, **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]** but one which can *undermine* our **security** and our well-being **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]**. It is *a potential source of conflict* over scarce resources, from the displacement of people from their land and from the spread of tropical *diseases* such as *malaria*. **[MP]**

40. JACK STRAW: I know that many disagreed **[VERBAL PROJECTION]** with the action the British government took in joining military action against Iraq **[PROJECTION]**. But I ask them to reflect on **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]** how dangerous the world would be today if we had shown that 17 mandatory UN Resolutions over 12 years were merely empty words **[ENTERTAIN: INDIRECT QUESTION]**. The big question left unanswered by those who still disagree with our military intervention, is this **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]**: what would you do to protect global **security** from a regime which threatens regional or international stability, and places itself defiantly beyond the reach of the international system on which our **security** depends? **[EXPOSITORY QUESTION]** These are questions we and our partners must now grapple with, co-operatively and creatively. We cannot ignore them **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**. The modern world is too dangerous for that **[MP]**.

41. JACK STRAW: When we face determined terrorists **[JUDGEMENT: -TENACITY]** and terrible **threats to** our national **security**, our response needs to be proportionate **[+REACTION]** and in line with our commitments under international law, including international human rights law. When we ask others to open up their markets and sign up to international standards we can't respond to outside competition ourselves with a knee-jerk return **[JUDGEMENT: -NORMALITY]** to protectionism **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**. And when we say that we will do all that we can to help

the poorest in the world **[EVOKED JUDGEMENT:
+PROPRIETY]** we <u>must</u> honour our commitments on aid and
debt after the cameras have been switched off.
[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]

In the segment (40), wordings of judgements are mainly negative and are based on social sanction: *murder, unstable, danger, rogue regime, repression.* This condemnation is enhanced by the use of dialogically contractive values of objectivised pronouncements and counters, which are mainly employed to promote his reading of Saddam's lack of 'veracity', as the main responsible of the Iraqi war. This point is clearly illustrated when the speaker, subjectively, recognizes (*I know*) the presence of British people who do not agree with the choices made with respect to Iraq. Furthermore, in his effort to persuade them to see the opposite as true, his stance becomes 'challenging' by using the resource of direct and indirect question.

The utterance containing the question makes dialogic space for other voices and can be clearly interpreted as 'expository' (Goatly 2000 in Martin and White 2005) since it is seen as open-ended. The token of judgement (*the big question left unanswered by those who still disagree with our military intervention*) embedded in a 'countered' formulation triggers an assessment of incapacity with a vaguely expressed reference to 'those' who unexpectedly (*still*) reject the choice made. As far as solidarity is concerned, the audience backs off a little from the speaker's position and is invited to take into account another viewpoint keeping in mind that *the modern world is too dangerous.*

The last citation of *threat/security* contains an example of 'consequentiality' prefaced this time by the temporal adverb *when* which mentions the circumstances when an action will happen and not a condition, as is the case of *if.* Each parallel formulation introduces an explicit modal consequence: from necessity to impossibility to obligation.

Tellingly, the last wording contains a resource of evoked judgement (*to help the poorest in the world*) or strong emotional reaction together with a directive (*must honour*) supported by the challenging final triggered judgement of veracity (*after the cameras have been switched off*) which allows a gain in credibility.

The high numbers of 'proclamations' (see table 5.3), in particular 'pronouncements', interact with a high number of attitudinal lexis, (*paradox, danger, chaos, malaria, conflict, disease, contagion* to cite a few), verbal and nominal forms of negative 'affect' (*paralyse, undermine, fear*) and their addition creates strong evaluation to instantiate the ideological view of the 'undesirable' which can justify the choice of *backing diplomacy with a credible threat of force.*

No one can doubt that
We can no longer ignore
We saw with terrible clarity
We understood even more clearly
This reflects a common perception that
We would all agree that

Table 5.3 'Proclamations' used by Straw

5.2.4 The issue of *climate security: 'we are all our own enemies'*

The citation in the title of this sub-section comes from a speech by Beckett (Royal United Services Institute, 10.05.07) which gives an idea of her confrontational attitude towards the topic debated: the issue of climate security. Moreover, her monoglossic utterance, containing a negative judgement (-veracity) *we are all our enemies,* is another element supporting this consideration.

42. The threat to our **climate security** comes not from outside but from within **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**: we are all our own enemies **[MP]**. And what is at stake is not the relatively narrow national **security** of individual states but our collective **security** in an interdependent world **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]**. So while an unstable climate has obvious hard **security** implications, the traditional tools of hard **security** — in simple terms bombs and bullets — are not going to be able to solve that problem **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]**.

The occurrence of the adverb *but* as countering the previous assertion characterizes Beckett as opposing to some viewpoints. The association between *security* and the concessive *but* was found to be very strong in the collocational relation table (Appendix 4) in the previous chapter. The interpersonal function of a conjunct such as *but* is confirmed in literature by Thompson and Zhou (2000) and White (2003). This function is due to the fact that the presence of *but* alerts the hearers that what follows is not exactly what they expected to find.

The two 'counters' in the above segment preceded by the negation work, as Martin argues (1992: 198), as "anti modulation" in that they efface "the potentiality or obligation which would otherwise enable or determine the consequential relation between events". In so doing she advances her position to attend to climate security as a collective issue and to solve it in a way rather different from the use of *bombs and bullets*. This comparison implies criticism and thus detachment from the government's policy. The choice of the word *enemies* gives the key to understand the meta-language she has chosen to speak about the issue of climate security. The choice of the metaphor of 'war' or 'conflict', to use her terminology, mirrors her competitiveness.

In her speech on the memorial day for the death of John Smith (06.03.07), Margaret Beckett praises the qualities of a former member of the New Labour such as his pragmatism and his sense of social justice. What is relevant is not the act of praising or the words of 'affect' and

'judgements' of positive 'capacity', but the fact that the eulogy serves another scope, namely comparing and contrasting the topic of climate security:

> 43. MARGARET BECKETT: I said a little earlier that one of John's great achievements was to break down the false dichotomy between social justice and economic growth. We too must be iconoclasts: but this time the false dichotomy is between economic **security** and **climate security** **[DISCLAIM: COUNTER]**.

Relying on the indirect evaluative mechanism of attitudinal inference, the recipient is provoked to favour John Smith's approach to the issue of economic growth and is exhorted by the judgement (+normality) *we too must be iconoclasts*. The following locution counters the expectation insofar the question this time concerns the climate security issue as being part of economic security. By the use of the attitudinal lexis *false*, the speaker suggests her dissociation from those who support the view of dichotomy between the two faces of the problem. This criticism becomes explicit in segment (44) where Beckett defends her decision to use the Presidency of the Security Council to highlight the threat of an unstable climate. As foreign minister, she rejects the 'entertained' formulation worded as mental projection (*some who suggest that I would be better off*) by a resource of modalized 'judgement' in negative polarity (social sanction: -veracity): *they could be not more wrong*.

> 44.   MARGARET BECKETT: Just as it is the reason why I have made climate **security** such a priority of my first year as Foreign Secretary. **[JUSTIFICATION]** In doing that, I know full well that there are some who suggest that I would be better off concentrating instead on the 'real' **security** problems in the world **[EXPANSION: ENTERTAIN]**. They could not be more wrong. **[DISCLAIM: DENIAL]** I am as focused on and as determined to address the so-called 'hard' **security** agenda as any Foreign Secretary. **[AFFECT: +CONFIDENCE; +TRUSTING]**

Tellingly, the speaker makes different overtly attitudinal interventions into

the text to negatively characterize those who concentrate on the 'real' (the emphasis is ironic) security problems and in so doing she saves her personal credibility by means of justification (*the reason why*), the intensified epistemic verb (*I know full well*) and resources of 'affect' (*I am focused and determined*).

Determination and foresight are the two qualities that Beckett requires for a good politician and in her attempt to convince her hearers about the seriousness of the climate security issue she sorts to an inductive analogy with Winston Churchill as backdrop. In her speech entitled "Climate change The Gathering Storm" (16.04.97) the title informs in advance of its double function: praising the politician and writer's qualities and showing the topicality of the phrase at the same time. In her projection of history she says:

> 45. It was a time when Churchill, perceiving the dangers that lay ahead [**MENTAL PROJECTION**], struggled to mobilise the political will [**MENTAL PROJECTION**] and industrial energy of the British empire to meet those dangers. He did so often in the face of strong opposition and not always with success [**DENIAL**]: wasted opportunities that he subsequently referred to as 'The Locust Years' [**VERBAL PROJECTION**].
> But in the end it was his foresight and his determination to prepare for a threat which – to many – was still seemingly distant and uncertain that in the end guaranteed the liberty and indeed survival of my country and that of many others [**DISCLAIM: CONCEDE**].
> Today politicians and business leaders alike once again face an increasing danger to our **security** and prosperity, and growing calls for early and resolute measures [**MS**]. Climate change is the gathering storm of our generation [**MP**]. And the implications – should we fail to act [**ENTERTAIN**]- could be no less dire [**DENIAL**]: and perhaps [**ENTERTAIN**]- even more so [**COUNTER**].

More indirect mechanisms are preferred here by which authorial viewpoint may be indicated: the use of the mental projection *perceive* which triggers judgements of admiration for the implied far-sightedness; the choice of the verb *struggle* which highlights how people made it difficult for him to

succeed, as explicitly stated later in discourse through the expression *in the face of strong opposition*. Something implicit is intentionally left out: the speaker skips over the 'responsible' (*to many*) for the opposition and the 'reasons' for the *wasted opportunities* but, it is just the use of the adjective *wasted* that implies hard feelings for something that could have been done. From the inference of the presence of obstacles and disagreement, Beckett marks a turning-point by the use the counter-expectational *but*. The 'disclamation' and the comment adjunct *seemingly* allow the speaker to naturalise her ideological position: despite the criticism of being *distant* and *uncertain*, in the end history proved Churchill's clairvoyance.

At this point she is ready to sketch a parallelism with the current days (*today; once again*). The argumentation by analogy is founded on the main claim that the gathering storm today is climate change, a danger to our security. From two more analogous molecules (today we are facing similar hard times; we might have similar serious implications) the conclusion is obvious: (so) similar resolute measures need to be taken. The two final 'entertains', despite the initial monoglossic environment, open a break for dialogism and failure is contemplated (*should we fail to act*) soon closed down through the counter *even*. Indeed, by the use of another concession, Beckett this time introduces differences and she construes discourse through a series of arguments and counter-arguments introduced again by the counter-expectational *but*. The argumentative ground that is given initially (the analogy above explained) is then re-taken to be re-countered. Given that, in such environment where "there is often a sense that the concurrence is in some way reluctant, grudging or qualified on the part of the speaker/writer" (Martin and White 2005: 125), we can safely state that Beckett's assertiveness brings about a low degree of hesitation:

46. But while there are parallels between those two situations there are also crucial differences [DISCLAIM: COUNTER].
For a start, whereas Churchill's cause during the 1930s was one of rearmament - more guns, more planes and, in particular, more ships - we are not going to be able to ensure climate security through the exercise of hard power [DISCLAIM: DENIAL].

An unstable climate is a direct threat to our security [MP]: but it is not one that can be met by bullets and bombs [DISCLAIM: DENIAL].

Diplomacy failed in the late 1930s and force of arms took over - in this battle there is no backstop to diplomacy [DISCLAIM: DENIAL].
But we also have an advantage [DISCLAIM: COUNTER]- perhaps even a head start [ENTERTAIN]- over Churchill in the 1930s.

He sensed the intentions of Hitler, but he could not prove them [DISCLAIM: DENIAL]. He had to convince people to prepare for something which could only be a possibility.

In climate change, there is strong evidence to tell us that we are dealing with an inevitability [PROCLAMATION]. This is something that is happening and that will go on happening. Those who reject that claim [PROJECTION] - and there are some who still do [COUNTER] - are choosing this time to ignore both evidence and the massive scientific consensus as to what that evidence tells us.
But the [DISCLAIM: COUNTER], perhaps rather sad [ENTERTAIN], truth is that the international community will not move [DISCLAIM: DENIAL] with the necessary urgency or the necessary resolve if climate change [ENTERTAIN], is seen as primarily something that effects insects, animals and plants: although they may in turn hold the key to our own survival [DISCLAIM: COUNTER].

Particularly over the past year, I have discussed the link between climate and security with many people. Some of them are sceptical [JUDGEMENT - TENACITY]. They respond [VERBAL PROJECTION] that we can't prove [DISCLAIM: DENIAL] that climate change will or has lead to this or that particular event [VERBAL PROJECTION] -still [DISCLAIM: COUNTER] less that it will cause any one outbreak of violence or hostilities.
But that is to misunderstand the issue and the argument [DISCLAIM: COUNTER]. If you are looking for a simple, linear connection between climate change and a particular flash-point,[ENTERTAIN] you are only picking up a glimpse of a much wider picture [DISCLAIM: COUNTER].

```
Now it is time for us [EXHORTATIVE] to rise to our
newest and biggest challenge: to fight the first
great war of interdependence, the struggle for
climate security. There will be no winners unless
we all emerge victorious [DISCLAIM: DENIAL].
```

As noticed the 'denial+counter strategy' constructs an audience who is presumably resistant to the minister's claim of equating climate security with 'the gathering storm' and thus the "pairings occur as the writer bids to win the reader over" (Martin and White 2005: 125). She continues her argumentation drawing on the same prosaic framework as Churchill's, namely 'challenge and response' and, in so doing, she traces a line between what politicians are doing and what should be done.

In saying and criticising what they are doing, she is categorical and peremptory, as the use of 'disclamation' has shown. The hearer is thus attracted into a position of opposition to the 'those who do not act', so as to become as potentially susceptible to the 'wrong' vision of the 'scepticals'. This is conveyed by the argumentation provided and the hearer is constructed as still needing more information in order to be convinced. Some 'entertained' formulations disclose tentativeness in her disapproval of the international community's behaviour through negative 'affect' (*perhaps rather sad truth*). In this part of her discourse dogmatism takes the place through the illustration of all the potential consequences of the devastating effect of climate change and she takes on the role of a pragmatic expert (*So let's look at the effect on humans if we do nothing*).

Beckett distances herself from those who do not understand the real entity of the issue showing a passionate attitude in defending her position through the series of constructed enhancements. The 'alterity' worded as verbal projection (*they respond*) is countered and also negatively assessed insofar lacking the capacity of looking at the issue as a whole. By inference,

this means that the speaker may boast her holistic view of reality with respect to a 'simple, linear connection' between the issue and a 'flash-point'. More than asserting or denying, Beckett's rhetoric of war seems to challenge her hearers (*that is to misunderstand*) who know that, if they favour the 'other' view, they will be sanctioned as missing their capacity of looking at 'a wider context'. This challenging and exhortative attitude is worded in the introductory *it is time* that sounds like an invitation to face with this issue metaphorically described as a 'war'. In the conflict-like analogy, also the label is war-echoing (*interdependence*) and the 'reservation' to win it stands on unity *(unless we all emerge victorious)*.

A range of mechanisms is deployed: from 'bare assertions (47) to explicit subjective locution *I am in no doubt* (47) until strategies as *it is now clear that*.

> 47.   I am in no doubt – and the Prime Minister, Tony
>   Blair, was in no doubt when he asked me to take on this
>   role **[PROJECTION]-** that today being a credible foreign
>   minister means being serious about **climate security**
>   **[MP]**.
>
> 48.   MARGARET BECKETT: It is now clear that tackling
>   climate change is an imperative not a choice, **[DISCLAIM:**
>   **DENIAL]** a problem for today not tomorrow.

What is remarkable in Beckett's formulations with respect to the other two ministers is a foregrounding of the subjective involvement of the textual voice. As the summarizing table below shows, the counter-expect resources frequently interact with judgements so as to motivate them, but also to increase the social esteem towards Churchill's extraordinary sense of perception in a way to reinforce the backdrop on which to build up the contrast.

Examples	apprasial	concessive	function
We too must be iconoclast	+ normality	**But** this time the false dichotomy is between economic security and climate security	contrast
It was a time when Churchill….struggled	+capacity	**But** in the end….	contrast
		But while there are parallels there are also crucial differences	Compare to contrast
An unstable climate is a direct threat to our security	-composition	**But** is not one that can be met by bullets and bombs	Contrast /denial
Diplomacy failed in the late 1930s…	-capacity	**But** we also have an advantage	enhancement
He sensed the intentions of Hitler..	+capacity	**But** he could not prove them	denial
Those who reject that claim….	-capacity	**But** the international community will not move with the necessary urgency	Denial/criticism
The answers do not lie ..		**But** in the earnest and consistent pursuit of justice and peace	enhancement
They respond that we can't prove that climate change will cause…hostilities	-capacity	**But** that is to misunderstand	denial

Table 5.4: Summary of the concessive resources in Beckett

It can be argued that all the resources of dialogism introduced are not a way of interpreting events but are strategically used to serve the ideological purpose of pushing the climate security issue in the international agenda. Another pattern of preference is given by the conditional clauses which are used for persuasive purposes, even though in a less 'directive' function with respect to Cook. Furthermore, a break into non-negotiable approach is here more evident:

```
49. Collectively we have a responsibility to protect human
    life and a duty to defend the international
    institutions that help us as a community to achieve
    that goal [MP]. The answers do not lie in division or in
    personal attacks but in the earnest and consistent
    pursuit of justice and peace [DISCLAIM: COUNTER].
```

```
    We will not solve this problem if we do not each take
our   share   of   the   responsibility   for   tackling   it
[ENTERTAIN]. Nobody can protect themselves from climate
change [DISCLAIM: DENIAL] unless we protect each other
by  building  a  global  basis  for  climate  security
[ENTERTAIN]. This goes to the heart of the UN's mission.
And the UN must be at the heart of the solution [MS].
    To put it starkly, if we all try to free ride, we will
all  end  up  in  free  fall,  with  accelerating  climate
change the result of [CONSEQUENTIALITY] our collective
failure  to  respond  in  time  to  this  shared  threat
[ENTERTAIN].
Look just at the danger posed by rising sea levels:
potentially this could cause massive damage to some of
the  key  urban  centres  of  our  global  civilization:
London,  Shanghai,  Dhaka,  Singapore,  Amsterdam,  Cairo,
and - yes - Manhattan - all are at risk.
```

The hypothetical clauses are of the 'if-then' type mostly expressed in negative polarity are used as a linguistic device for valid and logical argumentation. The hypothetical argumentation is always preceded by a premise that in this case is the advocacy of cooperation which involves responsibility. The resolution of the problem requires collaboration and this claim is expressed in conditional terms: "we will not solve….if we do not". After opening dialogism, Beckett introduces another break by entertaining again (*unless we protect each other*). If the negative indefinite pronoun *nobody* is considered, if we take into account the 'reserve' (*unless)*, the cumulative effect is that of shifting from 'un-dialogism' to 'dialogism' and back again in a repeated way. Indeed, in the following clause introduced by the locution *to put it starkly*, in order to guarantee honesty and realism, she goes on with another 'if-then'-entertain, until her direct involvement of the audience by calling their attention through the interactive 'look'. The twisted reasoning ends with the evidence and the monoglossic utterance all *we are at risk*.

5.2.5 Construing a positive brand

One of the assumptions in this research was that ministers in their explanation of their political choices try to construe a positive image of their country. In the previous sub-sections we have noticed some examples of positive appraisals with respect to Britain, which I have summed up in the table 5.5:

Lexical realisations in *DiCo*	Appraisal resources
distinguished island	Judgement of self esteem +capacity
We ourselves in Britain know from our experience in Northern Ireland how difficult it can be to put aside long-standing common goal of peace.	judgement of self esteem: +capacity
The UK has taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time	judgement of self esteem: +capacity
We have consistently supported the Israeli people's right to security	judgement of self esteem: +tenacity
because we are friends to peace	judgement of social sanction +ethics through relational process

Table 5.5 Overview of the resources used to appraise Britain

As we notice most of the analysed instances contain tokens of 'judgements' or 'indirect invocation', which permeate the discourse of security and that are revealed as the text unfolds. The thematic position of the subject and the narration typical of recording genre (cf. Coffin 2000) give prominence to the British country and attribute to it the active role claimed by the ministers.

Cook's discourse on Britishness, which is pervasive in his speeches, is connected to that of security to serve persuasive aims but also political and economic objectives (e.g. prosperity). In order to illustrate this point a wider and longer context of the word *security* is necessary. In this extract

from a speech at the Social Market Foundation, London, Cook is persuading the eurosceptics of the fact that integration, which is vital to security, does not mean blurring the concept of national identity. He does so by demanding more confidence in the British identity in order to achieve more security at a broader level. What I argue here is that the evocation of the nationhood is re-contextualized in the discourse of security for ideological purposes:

I see every day the importance of our relations [**+VALUATION**] with foreign countries to the strength of our economy, to the *security* of our nation, to the safety of our people against organised crime, even [**DISCLAIM: COUNTER**] to the health of our environment [**PROJECTION**].
A globalised world demands more foreign contacts than even Britain has experienced in the past [**DISCLAIM: COUNTER**]
I also know that we are likely to make our way more successfully in the world [**PROJECTION**]
if we are *secure* in our British identity, and confident about its future. **EXPANSION**]
That *security* and confidence is important for the inner strength it gives us in our conduct of business with others [**VALUATION -MP**].
I want to argue the case why we can be confident about the strength and the future of British identity. Sadly, it has become fashionable for some to argue that British identity is under siege [**PROJECTION**] perhaps even in a state of terminal decline [**ENTERTAIN**].

The threat is said to come in three forms. [**PROJECTION**].
First, the arrival of immigrants who, allegedly, [**ENTERTAIN**] do not share our cultural values and who fail to support the England cricket team [**DENIAL**]. Few dare to state this case explicitly, but it is the unmistakable subliminal message. [**DISCLAIM: COUNTER**]
Second, our continued membership of the European Union, which is said to be absorbing member states into 'a country called Europe' [**ENTERTAIN — VERBAL PROJECTION**].
Third, the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which is seen as a step to the break-up of the UK [**PROJECTION**].

This evening, I want to set out the reasons for being optimistic about the future of Britain and Britishness. [**JUSTIFICATION**]
Indeed, I want to go further and argue that in each of the areas where the pessimists identify a threat, we

> should instead see developments that will strengthen and renew British identity. **[DISCLAIM:COUNTER]**

Example 50

The complex and articulated logical reasoning is based on the 'claim' that security gives confidence and this self-assurance increases reliance when in business with others.

Despite the presence of some clear 'entertain' formulations in this argumentative defence of the British identity, Cook employs 'disclamation' to counter the projections presented. First of all, his premise to his persuasive reasoning is given by the accepted view that globalisation requires strong forms of associations among countries [-composition]. In this context security is the *stone* on which to build confidence for the future, which, consequently, provides success on the economic level. At this point a resource of 'reservation' is introduced *if we are secure in our British identity, and confident about its future.* 'Reservation', that glosses 'as long as- conditions,' restricts here the scope of applicability of the statement *that we are likely to make our way more successfully in the world.*

It can be stated that this 'reservation' "deactivates possible future objections to the proposed recommendation and is a way of refuting them in advance" (Montolio 2007: 271). Righteousness and toughness feature the speaker's image and in so doing credibility is enhanced. This 'expansion', which opens dialogism, is countered by the following monogloss where the key role of security is stated through the resource of 'valuation'. In order to align his audience with his position on the 'British identity', the speaker sorts to an attitudinal emotion-oriented adverb (*sadly*). Its textual prominence puts the hearers in a position to colour the following counter-argument with a negative evaluation so as to reject it. The speaker thus takes the distance from the 'acknowledgement' (*British identity is under siege*) by using an 'ironic projection' (*it is fashionable for some to argue*), which

highlights the transiency (*fashionable*) of the adverse viewpoint. The following *topoi* of his discourse, which are however soon 'disclaimed', involve (*first*) multiculturalism, (*second*) European integration and (*third*) devolution.

The minister's argumentation develops according to an inspection: he passes in review any kind of 'entertained' positions which may blur the image of 'British identity' to object them by the means of 'disclamations', both 'denials' and 'counters'. Some examples here illustrate the structure of his logical reasoning: the 'argument' is followed by the counter-argument' substantiated by the speaker through a series of historical 'data'. From the previous complex structure we notice now a set of binary sequences which do not give the audience the time to consider another viewpoint because the speaker soon contracts the other voice:

```
The  first  element  in  the  debate  about  the  future  of
Britishness  is  the  changing  ethnic  composition  of  the
British people themselves.

The British are not a race, but a gathering of countless
different  races  and  communities,  the  vast  majority  of
which were not  indigenous  to  these  islands. [DISCLAIM:
DENIAL]
```
Example 51

In example 51, the speaker explicitly considers the argument of the debate he wants to demolish, that is the ethnic composition of the British society, which is thought to be compromising the British identity and counter-argues it by the resource of negation. In example 52, he objects against the 'pureness' of the British society by denying it at the lexical level (*fantasy*), at the grammar level (*pluralism is not a burden*) and by adding an 'enhancement' where the connective 'but' is implicit. The reiteration of the 'inscription' *false* calls to mind resources of social sanction [-veracity]:

```
The idea [PROJECTION] that Britain was a 'pure' Anglo-
Saxon society before the arrival of communities from the
Caribbean, Asia and Africa is fantasy. But if this view
of British identity is false to our past, it is false to
our future too. [DISCLAIM: COUNTER]

This pluralism is not a burden we must reluctantly
accept. It is an immense asset that contributes to the
cultural and economic vitality of our nation. [IMPLICIT
COUNTER]
```

Example 52

Example 53 again, aims to highlight the positive 'face' of multiculturalism that is a pretext to point out the flexible fabric of the British society. The resources are always the same: an argument is rejected explicitly with the view of satisfying the British pride:

```
Chicken Tikka Massala is now a true British national
dish, [MS] not only because it is the most popular,
[DISCLAIM: DENIAL] but because it is a perfect illustration
of the way Britain absorbs and adapts external influences
[ENHANCEMENT; COUNTER].

 Chicken Tikka is an Indian dish [MS]. The Massala sauce
was added to satisfy the desire of British people to have
their meat served in gravy [MS].
```
Example 53

It is evident that this type of argumentation, where disclamation from the speaker dominates, leaves no doubt to what the 'true' choice is. All this without considering the high interpersonal investment from the minister who intervenes through resources of subjectivity and 'affect' as in example 54 and where criticism is also implied:

```
I do not accept [DENIAL] that to acknowledge our European
identity diminishes our Britishness. Nor do I accept
[DENIAL] that membership of the European Union is a
threat to our national identity.

This is a debate [PROJECTION] that Britain can play a
pivotal role in shaping [EXPANSION]. But we can only do so
[COUNTER]
if we reject insular nationalism and the politics of fear
by engaging fully and confidently in Europe [ENTERTAIN]
```

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │I get impatient│ [AFFECT] when │I see│ opinion polls that │
│ ask  respondents  whether  they  feel  more  Scottish  or │
│ English than British, or more British than European, as │
│ if these choices were mutually exclusive. Identity is │not│ │
│ a  finite  substance  to  be  shared  out  between  competing │
│ loyalties [DENIAL]. It embraces numerous dimensions, each │
│ of  which  serves  to  amplify  and  reinforce  the  others │
│ [IMPLICIT ENHANCEMENT; COUNTER] │
│                                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Example 54

It is worth noticing the high number of projections which are introduced in the arguments to be rejected. They are marshalled in the table below:

Projection	
Cognitive process	*I see; I also know;*
relational	*It has become fashionable;*
noun	*unmistakable subliminal message; the idea; the view; The past three weeks has carried with it the very important message;*
passive	*which is said; which is seen;*
adverb	*allegedly;*

Table 5.6: Resources of projection in Cook's discourse of *security*

The presence of projections under nominalised or passive constructions is a clear indicator of impersonality but they serve the scope of not naming either subjects or sensers and by keeping this vagueness everybody is involved.

To sum up, it can be stated that the complex argumentation re-contextualises different discourses: ethnicity, European integration and devolution. Then it becomes simpler in its structure and each step serves the scope of cancelling any doubt to serve a clearly ideological agenda: to enhance the British self-confidence based on 'security' and not on *politics of fear* to achieve economic stability.

It is a strategy to sweep away any impediment to the full implementation of the 'global economy', where security is only a 'tool',

insofar as Flairclough underlines, the neo-liberal discourse has the power to:

```
make a contingent set of policy choices appear to be a
matter of inexorable and irreversible world change. This
work   is   remarkable   in   highlighting   the   absolute
importance   of   discourse   and   language   in   the
transformations   of   'globalization'   and   the   new
capitalism, but its impact is somewhat lessened because
they do not have the analytical resources to show how the
slippage between description and creation ('bringing into
being') is pervasively effected in contemporary policy
and other texts, or how the contingent is textually
construed as necessary(online, forthcoming).
```

5.2.6 Justification

In the analysis in this chapter we have noticed how the 'modal consequentiality' seems to feature the discourse of security above all Cook's discourse. This section wants to provide further evidence for patterns which involve 'causality'. In some examples analysed in the previous sub-sections the occurrence of 'justification' was noticed through the presence of the cluster *that is why*. This expression encodes a particular type of consequentiality, that has to do with those 'non-factual' propositions which need justification or substantiation (White 2003: 274).

Looking at the cluster *that is why* in the whole corpus it was found a great discrepancy across the three foreign ministers as far as the frequency of this expression is concerned. Speaking in terms of relative frequency the highest frequency is registered in Cook's speeches with 0.06% with respect to 0.002% for Straw and 0.03% for Beckett. What these numbers tell us is that Cook is more inclined to sort to the use of this cluster of logical meaning to make the audience to conform to his viewpoints than the other two.

The 'dispersion plot' utility provided by *WordSmith Tools* (Scott 2006: 43), which maps the textual position of this cluster, also shows that the

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cluster is not confined to the conclusion in the speech, but it is evenly distributed in the text. This means that the cluster is employed as the text unfolds as a resource to account for the speaker's positions.

Figure 5.1: Dispersion plot of the cluster *that is why* in Cook

As the figure above shows, Cook sorts to *that is why* in almost all his speeches (44 out of 58) and 26% out of all the instances of the cluster involve justifications of Britain's actions or commitments.

Only two instances pertain the discourse of security, but a cursory glance at the concordances in the whole corpus shows that Cook sorts to 'modal consequentiality' to justify his directives, his predictions, but above all 'counters'. In the examples provided we notice how 'Justification' concerns mainly *Britain* as supporter of the European enlargement, a

supporter of peace and thus the tendency to deontically justify the political strategies of a moral country. Most of the citations where Britain immediately follows the cluster come from speeches delivered abroad. This represents the textual voice as adopting an 'argumentative position' (White 2003: 274) by which Cook tries to persuade the foreign audience about the position of Britain with regard to the European enlargement. This dialogic space is only apparent if the 'contractive' retrospective formulations are taken into account.

	TEXT: Retrospective formulation	resource	conjuction	Justification
1	Enlargement is an inclusive process, and they are inside that process.	monogloss	that *is why*	Britain is a firm supporter of the European Conference for all European Union applicants and members.
2	We want a European Union that welcomes the Central Europeans back into the European family, that erases the artificial divide between East and West and restores the common European heritage.	inclination	And *that is why*	Britain is such a firm supporter of enlargement. we eagerly look forward to the day that the Czech Republic will join us round the table in Brussels.
3	But the Israelis will not find true security without peace.	Counter/ Denial prediction	that *is why*	Britain regards itself as a friend of the Palestinians, and also a friend of the Israelis – because we are friend to peace.
4	Crime knows no boundaries and the fight against crime should know no boundaries.	Denial Directive/ recommendation		we are already working with our neighbours in the EU to make Europe an area of freedom, security and justice.

Cook: Example 55

6	There are a number of distinguished members of the Asian community serving with distinction in the Foreign Office. But I want more.	Monogloss counter	That is why	I have set for the Foreign Office the target of recruiting from the ethnic minorities within Britain 10% of all our total recruitment annually for the Foreign Office.
7	It (FCO) is open to every community and I want it to be representative of every community.	monogloss		I want to end by asking for your help in getting me to meet that target I have set myself of 10% recruitment per annum from the minority ethnic communities throughout Britain
8	When this government came to power, I wanted this Department to be both business-oriented and business-like.	monogloss		I drew up a Mission statement. And it is why I set out in it that trade and investment work must be a key priority.
9	Every part of civic society has its role to play.	monogloss		I end with an invitation to the nation to join with the government in the difficult but necessary task of defending human rights wherever they are under threat.

Cook: example 56

When the first personal pronoun follows the 'justification' Cook is dealing with his concern about the renewal of the FCO and there is a high investment of the textual voice in this role of explaining the changes of the new policy. It is clear that in these cases he is speaking to the nation and a further check of the setting of these speeches has proved this consideration.

(57) BECKETT: If we don't act on climate change, we risk
undermining the very basis of the **prosperity and security**
we are seeking to achieve. **That is why** we must recognise
that talk of having either a successful economy or a
stable climate is a false choice; we must work together
to find paths for economic growth which protect our
climate.

(58) BECKETT: And, more than that, they can see that by
increasing energy efficiency and moving to renewables
they not only hit their climate goals, they are also
bolstering their **energy security** — one of their highest
national priorities.
That is why China has set itself such challenging goals
on energy efficiency. It is not rhetoric, it is a radical
restructuring of their economy.

If Straw never uses this logical conjunction with reference to the discourse of security, Beckett employs it to persuade the foreign audience of the connection between prosperity and climate. It is easy to recognize the minister's preferred patterns, namely the 'if-then' formulation in segment (57) and the implicit 'counter' in citation (58). Both contribute to her 'contractive' stance and both reveal her need to rely on evidence to persuade the audience about her position.

5.3 Concluding remarks

The main aim of this chapter was to investigate the patterns of preference through which the foreign ministers express and naturalize their ideological positions towards the topic being explained, namely security.

The 'appraisal' analysis of *security* has shown that all the three ministers evaluate security on the scale of the significance (*vitally important, vital, core issue*) and on that of negative 'composition', insofar *security* is still an entity to work on. The use of evoked negative 'appreciation', worded through 'circumstantial adjuncts', aims to focus the attention on the 'how' namely on the ability to reach the objective. In advocating cooperation to achieve security, this interest is perceived as not harmonious and still

unattainable. The significance of security is expressed mainly in a monoglossic environment which interacts which resources of positive valuation.

Different semantic motifs have been pointed out: all the three ministers are concerned with achieving more security and all the three suggest the way how to do it, namely promoting enlargement, not only at the European but also at the international level. The main thrust of discourse is given by the semantic of interdependence. The principle of cooperation is mainly expressed through 'un-dialogized' formulations where no alternative voice is contemplated and through redundant occurrences of items belonging to the same semantic category of 'link'. This semantic preference embraces different discourses from military (*alliance*) to business (*partnership*) and includes also instances of relational processes (*depend on*).

Values of 'entertain' occur with a significantly low frequency in the discourse of security whereas 'denials' play a fundamental role in the construal of a 'contractive' stance. This finding corroborates Miller's results (2002) about Bush's foreign policy. The numerous 'projections' found in the speeches feature this discourse as a kind of narrative but also as an attempt of interpreting and evaluating what said before. An evident example is Beckett's analogy with Churchill and her way of projecting mentally what the writer perceived rather than said. Furthermore, projections were also found in the other two ministers in combination with many indefinite pronouns (*many, some, groups, some of them*), which are an indicator of the tendency to avoid deliberately any precise reference. Furthermore, they contribute to increase the abstraction characterizing the ministers' speeches but above all Straw's cub-corpus.

The association *security/peace/prosperity* instantiates the ideology of

'causation: given a premise a set of potential effects are carried out in an 'irrealis' environment. Peace is the *condicio sine qua non* for security which is, in turn, a means to achieve stability and prosperity. The patterns of preference include the semantic category of consequence, mainly the 'cause'.

Working after the terrorist attacks to the twin towers, Jack Straw's speeches reflect the atmosphere of *fear* and *concern* for the potential *threats*. Foregrounding on the interaction between proclamations and resources of verbal and nominal 'affect', he instantiates the ideology of the 'undesirable'. This preference for explicit objectivised authorial interpolations put the emphasis on the insistence on the warrantability of the assertion.

Beckett's discourse of security sorts to resources of 'concession', even though 'contingency' is also used. Relying on metaphorical analogy she instantiates the comparison also at the clause level through the pattern 'denial+counter', showing a contrasting attitude but also an effort to overcome difficulties in persuading the audience on the validity of her 'holistic' view of the climate security issue.

In an attempt to sketch out the stance of the three ministers, we can safely state that all the three make use of the 'contraction' to explain political choices. Many instances of pronouncements feature in particular Straw's style, whereas Cook sorts to logical connections as the high frequency of *that is why* showed. More logical and assertive appears Cook if compared to Straw's more cautious and justifying stance and to Beckett's contrasting attitude. This diversity may find its reason in the social events of their times. Being the first Minister of the new government, Cook had to launch the new political strategies. Working after the terrorist attacks, Straw had to be more cautious due to the delicate Iraqi question, but also to resistance of those who were against the war. Finally, Beckett faces a new

issue, the climate security, and she has to fight against those who believe that it is not a question of diplomacy because still anchored to the traditional view of diplomacy as 'peace-keeping' activity. But her attitude might also be due to gender variability, but this is only a hypothesis to be tested elsewhere.

As far as the British image is concerned, what emerges is a hegemonic identity with a nurturance orientation. Britain has always been playing a relevant role in history and ministers manifest their inclination to give it a pivotal role in Europe. This comes out from the range of judgements of 'social esteem' expressed, which involve admiration, sense of tolerance (see the Irish analogy) and strong capacity. The tension between the advocacy of internationalism and the evocation of nationhood has also pointed out the speaker's manipulation of the discourse of security to enhance national identity confidence to achieve more prosperity.

<center>**Chapter Six**</center>

<center>**The voice of the ministers**</center>

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has looked at the resources foreign ministers resort to in their speeches to build a shared view on the specific multifaceted issue of security. It has been noticed how the speakers' patterns of preference mainly include resources belonging to the category of 'contractions' so as to sound assertive in their positioning. A slight diversity has been highlighted in the use of the contractive formulations chosen by the three ministers, which make the difference at the level of their stance. The investigation has also pointed out how the subjectivity of the speaker is often obscured or couched in the process of interpretation. In their intent to present an objective and credible vision of reality their institutional strategies, foreign ministers evaluate their material and claim solidarity with their audience. With the aim of building a plausible argument these speakers control the level of personality in their speeches. Hence, managing and controlling the presence of the 'I' in a text is relevant to the objectivity of the discourse. Moreover, the investigation of the different levels of the self may help to elucidate the mechanisms of alignment and disalignment through the acceptance or resistance to superimposed roles. Considering that diplomatic language shares many features with political language,[1] this

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[1] See for instance the high number of 'contractive' forms in Miller 2002; the use of the institutional 'we'

chapter takes into account some of the studies focused on similar aspects of subjectivity. For example Partington (2003) finds that the podium shifts from an institutional position (where the use of *we* is more common) to the use of *I* when a much more informal relationship[2] with his audience is established. As also Schäffner (1997) notices, politicians tend to interact as institution representatives but they are individuals with their own beliefs and consciences. Thus, the analysis of the shifts from the institutional role to the individual sphere pertains this research in that they are linked to negotiation of individual and group identity. As Goffman states "a change in footing implies a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance" (1981: 128).

Benveniste (1981) discusses meaning distinctions in utterances that contain the same verb but contrast in subject. For example, *'I'* in combination with some verbs such as *feel, believe*, and *suppose* typically express the speaker's attitude regarding a subsequent piece of discourse; nevertheless, when these same verbs are associated with the third person singular subjects 'she' or 'he', it seems that what is conveyed is descriptive or informative. In a similar line, in this chapter I will be dealing with grammatical stance marking including resources of explicit expressions in the first singular person. In order to study the characterization of subjective phenomena the first personal pronoun will be considered embedded in clusters with the most frequent verbs. Then the same clusters will be compared to those with *we* as subject in order to see the shifts of the textual voice. At the interpersonal level I shall be investigating the employment of *I* versus *we* to look at the power relations and the author-audience interaction. The focus on the two pronouns (*I* and *we*) is due to

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in Schäffner 1997 and Partington's study of the White House Press Briefings 2003.
2

their higher frequency with respect to other pronouns; the preponderance of *we* was noticed in the keyword list, (see chapter 3 section 3.4.1) but also during the analysis through the rhetoric of 'our' and some examples of subjectivity emerged in the previous chapter. The perspective of the analysis is phraseological in that, as Hopper argues (1987: 150), linguistic form, often in prefabricated chunks, is shaped by discourse use. The purpose is to determine to what extent the ministers emphasize their role as individuals within their speeches.

The analysis is carried out according to four different steps. Using the Wordsmith Tools concordancer, the three sub-corpora were searched for the first singular and plural personal pronouns to compare and contrast their frequency (first step). The cluster utility was then interrogated to look at the use of pronouns in their phraseological environment (second step). In the third step a manual investigation of the clusters was then carried out. To isolate factors accounting for the shifting from plural to the employment of explicit subjectivity, the fourth stage compares and contrasts the same clusters with the different subjects.

6.2 Analysis

As said above, the analysis here starts by looking at the frequency of the two pronouns across the three sub-corpora to highlight discrepancies among the ministers. Predictably, table 6.1 illustrates that *we,* occurs almost twice as much as *I* in all the three ministers' speeches.

Pron.	Cook	Straw	Beckett	Tot.
we	2534 – **1.80%**	4107 – **1.33%**	1714 – **1.61%**	8355
I	1067 – **0.75%**	2017 - **0.65%**	927 – **0.87%**	4011

Table 6.1 Overview of the occurrences of the pronouns in each minister

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Furthermore, Cook resorts to *we* more frequently with respect to the other two, whereas Beckett employs *I* slightly more than the others. Finally, Straw makes recourse to the two pronouns less often than all others. These data make us hypothesize that Straw employs more impersonal formulations with respect to his colleagues, or that his subjectivity is couched under other forms.

The second step in the analysis is given by the illustration of the top-list clusters around *I* marshalled in tables 6.2 and their comparison with *we*-clusters displayed in table 6.3:

	COOK		STRAW		BECKETT	
1	*I want to*	0.03	*I want to*	0.03	*I know that*	0.03
2	*I hope that*	0.01	*I know that*	0.01	*I want to*	0.02
3	*Is why I*	0.01	*I hope that*	0.01	*I do not*	0.01
4	*I know that*	0.01	*I do not*	0.01	*I was in*	0.01
5	*I will be*	0.01	*And I am*	0.008	*I am sure*	0.01

Table 6.2 Relative frequency of 3-word-clusters around *I*

	COOK		STRAW		BECKETT	
1	*We need to*	0.06	*We need to*	0.04	*We need to*	0.04
2	*We will be*	0.03	*We have to*	0.04	*We have to*	0.03
3	*We want to*	0.03	*We want to*	0.01	*That we are*	0.02
4	*If we are*	0.03	*And we are*	0.01	*We want to*	0.02
5	*That we can*	0.02	*We have seen*	0.01	*We do not*	0.02

Table 6.3 Relative frequency of 3-word-clusters around *we*

From a glance at the five most frequent 3-word clusters associated with the two pronouns the centrality of 'volition' is immediately visible around the pronoun *I*. Table 6.2 shows the strong attraction between *I* and the verb

want in Cook and Straw, whereas Beckett tends to prefer the phrase *I know that,* also shared by the other two, even though with a lower frequency. The same verb also ranks in the top list in combination with *we* as illustrated in table 6.3. Furthermore, *I hope that* features again Cook and Straw's discourse but not Beckett's where not even a single instance of this cluster was found. This increases the degree of willingness in the first two ministers. After these preliminary considerations let us move on to the investigation of the most frequent cluster (*I want to*) starting from the plural form (*we want to*) which will be compared and contrasted.

6.2.1 The central function: volition

The high occurrence of the verb *want* signals a strong desire from the speaker who oscillates between the two positions *we* and *I.* Out of the 46 instances of the cluster *we want to* in Cook's speeches, only one citation contains an inclusive *we.* Similarly, in the Straw's sub-corpus three citations, out of 56 concordances, were found as being inclusive, whereas Beckett never uses an inclusive formulation of this cluster. All the other instances are introduced by an exclusive-*we,* which indicates either the administration of the British Foreign Policy according to the different levels of action, from the national to the international arena, or the British government. A scan of the following enlarged concordances shows that the cluster in these instantiations of inclusiveness tends to be supported by the possessive 'our':

```
1. Cook: If we want to keep them that way we must
   constantly educate our young people in the evil
   of Nazism and remind them that all of society is
   diminished and corroded by the poison of
   persecution.

2. Straw: If we want to be seen to deliver justice
   and offer a stronger and better worldview than
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> that of the terrorist, we have to be seen to
> stand by <u>our</u> values and our strengths.
>
> 3. Straw: If **we want to** deliver economic prosperity,
>   a cleaner environment and safer streets for <u>our</u>
>   citizens then we should embrace enlargement, not
>   postpone it.
>
> 4. Straw: It (building close international
>   partnership) is essential to almost everything **we**
>   **want to** deliver for <u>our</u> citizens. [my adding]

Furthermore, the inclusiveness in these citations is due to the sphere of interest which, in this case, concerns people and values. Given that the speeches where this inclusive-*we* was found were delivered in international locations, we may infer that the inclusion is at the global level. In example (1), through the prescriptive formulation of deontic modality, Cook exalts assertively the value of knowledge, while Straw hopes for more democratic values and safer environment for the citizens. The character of the inclusiveness mirrors the content of the citations, namely the inclination towards a global world.

Predictably, considering the explanatory nature of these speeches, all the other instances are introduced by an exclusive-*we*, which refers to the staff of the FCO as representative of the government. Sometimes it is easy to recognise the referent because it immediately precedes the pronoun. In other cases more context is necessary as in the following citation, where, significantly, the government is represented through the formulation *firmly committed,* which grounds the proposition on self-confidence:

> 5. **Cook:** This Government is <u>firmly</u> committed to
>   embracing the changing nature of the international
>   reality as a condition of domestic success. We do
>   not want to cling to a Little England. **We want to**
>   build a Global Britain.

In order to investigate the action object of desire, the verbs following *want* were grouped according to the semantic categories indentified by

Biber *et al* (2002). Findings are marshalled in table 6.4:

Semantic categories of lexical verbs	Verbal realization (COOK)	Verbal realization (STRAW)	Verbal realization (BECKETT)
Mental verbs	see (12), ensure, preserve, remove, find out (2), take forward, engage	go further, participate, see (15), achieve (4), intensify, reinforce, reinvigorate, secure, strengthen	agree, attract, ensure, plan, look, remove, see (3), achieve,
	41.3%	**48.1%**	**41.6%**
Causative	help (2)	sustain	encourage, help
	4.3%	**1.8%**	**8.3%**
Activity verbs	build (5), catch, create (2), make (3), put, use (5), work	avoid, bring, build, deliver (3), extend (3), fight, keep off, lower, make (2), rebuild, restore, use, create,	give, build, diversify, do, invest, lessen (2), make, produce (2)
	39.1%	**33.3%**	**41.6%**
Verbs of existence or relationship	play (a role), bring responsibility, have, live,	be (2)	Be
	8.6%	**1.7%**	**4.1%**
Meta-discursive	discuss	show, welcome	
	2%	**3.7%**	**-------**
Verbs of aspect	keep	maintain (3), restart,	
	2%	**7.4%**	
modal	----------	---------	be able to
			4.1%
Tot. 21 types		Tot. 28 types	Tot. 20 types

Table 6.4 Verbs following the cluster *we want to*

A reading of this table points out that the verbs grouped as 'mental' are those more frequently found after the cluster *we want to* in Cook and Straw, whereas Beckett uses this category and the 'activity' category with the same frequency. Moreover, Beckett and Cook recourse to material verbs more often than Straw does. These data suggest that planning and desire follow 'volition' and in the Beckett's sub-corpus both planning and action-oriented perspective of desirability are instantiated. In other words, her institutional representation is more pragmatic-based with respect to the other two.

As for the mental category, the most frequent mental verb following the search cluster is *see* in all the three ministers. As concordances show, it ideally shapes the results of the actions set out for the future:

1.**We want to** see a Europe in which war is unthinkable and in which prosperity is entrenched
2.**We want to** see the European Union become more of a Europe that belongs to people.

3.**We want to** see more liberalisation…
4.**we want to** see human rights integrated more closely

5.**We want to** see a modern and adaptable policy framework…
6.**we want to** see universal suffrage introduced in Hong Kong as

Concordance 6.1: *we want to* **in Cook, Straw, Beckett.**

The higher use in particular of a verb of perception such as *see* invites the hearers to activate their visual capacity and represents the ministers, together with their government, as strongly committed to truth not only about their material processes but also in terms of what they feel. The 'desirable' here reflects moral and economic values Similarly, the occurrences of the material verbs *build* and *create* aim to make idea, plans and desire less abstract as the following concordances show:

1.   **We want to** create a European Union that secures peace and prosperity throughout Europe.
2.   ers in a positive debate about the sort of Europe **we want to** build.
3   This will be a demonstration of the inclusive Europe **we want to** build.

4.   We do not want to cling to a Little England. **We want to** build a Global Britain. A country which accepts
5.   be a demonstration of the inclusive Europe **we want to** build. We want it to be a substantive meeting, discussing
6   escribing in full the modernised partnership **we want to** create, and the action we need to take to crea
7   .They have been destroying Afghanistan; **we want to** rebuild it. There are those who say that we should halt
8   an integral part of the development agenda: **we want to** reinvigorate international negotiations on tackling global
9   successor to the Agenda 2000 agreement. **We want to** restart the World Trade Round. We have the EP

10 to be fitted with carbon capture and storage. In other words, **we want to** build a zero emissions power sector.

Concordance 6.2: *we want to* **– Cook, Straw, Beckett**

Remarkable is in Straw's citations the use of a plethora of verbs with the prefix *re-* such as *rebuild, reinforce, reinvigorate, restart, restore* which emanate the sensation of a propensity to 're-new' the state of affairs. The occurrences of these verbs were found in national diplomatic speeches where a continuous emphasis is put on the ideology of change. In the light of this evidence, the 'volitional' formulation seems to be the default way to

express the objectives of the foreign policy, the measures taken and to imagine and realize the future as potentiality.

6.2.2 From *we want to* to *I want to*

The analysis of the verbs following the cluster *I want to* reveal another scenario with respect to the same cluster in the plural form. As the table 6.5 displays there is a good number of instances where speakers sort to *I* for metadiscursive reasons or as Partington calls it, "discourse managing *I*" (2003: 77):

Semantic categories of lexical verbs	Verbal realization (COOK)	Verbal realization (STRAW)	Verbal realization (BECKETT)
Meta-discursive	Address (3), announce, begin, close, end, focus (3), identify, launch, present, put across, re-cast, set out (2), speak, spell out, start, put on record, argue (2), reach out, share (4), celebrate, bury (3), go further	Answer (2), begin, concentrate, conclude (2), deal with (3), discuss, draw, emphasise, end, examine, explain, explore, focus (6), highlight (4), identify, make the point (6), mention, offer (2), return, set out (2), sketch out, speak about (2), start (2), stress, take (2), talk (7), turn, underline, use my speech, applaud, do (2), endorse, dispel, explode, galvanise, pay tribute (4), share, thank (11);	begin, end (5), lay down, mention (3), talk about (5), touch, use, push the agenda, be clear;
	Tot. 64.7%	Tot. 71%	Tot. 76%
Mental	make sure (5), propose, reinforce, see (7), suggest;	assure, build on, see (8), suggest (5), look (3),	achieve
	Tot. 29.4%	Tot. 16.9%	Tot. 4%
Material			Make, do (2)
	------------	-----------	Tot. 12%
Verbal	Say (2), report;	Report (2), say (7);	Put a question, say;
	Tot. 5.8%	Tot. 8%	Tot. 8%

Table 6.5: Verbs following the cluster *I want to*

The mental category following *I want to* is similar to the group in table 6.4 above all the verb *see* which has the same function as signalling the desire of achieving certain goals and visualise the future. The mental group

seems to express the institutional 'footing' given by the speakers as leader of the FCO and thus by their role as minister, as explicitly stated by Beckett in citation 10 in the following concordances:

1 **I want to** make sure that the Foreign Office is giving the same first class service to British business.
2 **I want to** make the FCO's commitment to human rights irreversible.
3 **I want to** see a zone of peace, prosperity, stability and democracy from the Baltic to the Black Sea
4 During the British Presidency, **I want to** see this taken forward across the whole of Central Europe.
5 **I want to** see each applicant state with quality people, trained to the highest standards, able to apply the
6 **I want to** see a European Union that is focused on their concerns. I want a European Union that helps

7 But the EU has yet to realise its full potential as a global actor. **I want to** see the EU pulling its weight in the
8 **I want to** see an EU which delivers real benefits to its citizens. The Convention
9 So the partnership which **I want to** see developing between South Africa and the UK is not just one based o

10 It goes to the heart of what **I want to** achieve as Foreign Secretary

Concordance 6.3 *I want to + mental group* - **Cook, Straw, Beckett**

Apart from the obvious projection of an optimistic future, another concern which features Cook in particular is his constant apprehension for the image of his ministry that is a clear example of the phenomenon of 'aestheticization' of public identities (Fairclough 2003: 183).

The major difference with the cluster in the plural form is then found in the meta-discursive group. Relying on relative frequency, Beckett is the most meta-discursive of all; a slight difference distances Straw from Cook who sorts to this category less often than the other two, even though the analysis of concordances, as shown later, reveals Straw as the least meta-discursive of all.

From the analysis of this metadiscursive group two main macro functions were identified: 1) discourse-managing and 2) opinion holder:

1. the first one manages discourse by introducing the main focus of the speech;
2. the second one signals the speaker's voice;

These functions are unevenly distributed across the three ministers'

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speeches. The analysis yielded the following comparative results:

FUNCTION	COOK	STRAW	BECKETT
Discourse managing	36.5%	71.5%	64%
Opinion-holder	63.5%	28.5%	36%

Table 6.6: Distribution of the metadiscursive functions across the three ministers' speeches

As the table 6.6 seems to suggest, Cook is the minister that more often than the others makes recourse to the cluster *I want to* in order to manipulate discourse by introducing his voice, followed by Beckett and then by Straw. But let us move on the description of these functions through concordances, starting from Cook:

N Concordance
1   to other members. CURBING SMALL ARMS The second task I want to address is curbing the volume of arms in circulation. In
2   move on to the last impact from what happened in '89 which I want to address, and that is the very powerful impetus it has
3   Human Rights The last important aspect of our partnership that I want to address is human rights. We respect the different
4 assemble a UN police force to keep civil order. Today, therefore, I want to announce that Britain will follow up our Standby
5 inner strength it gives us in our conduct of business with others. I want to argue the case why we can be confident about the
6   Union. Before I turn to those European matters though, I want to begin by providing a rather wider context to the
7   I want to bury the myth that Brussels is Them. Brussels is us. I want to bury the myth that Britain can only win when Europe
8   Europe in this country. A debate based on facts, not myths. I want to bury the myth of a superstate - national identities are
9   the myth of a superstate - national identities are too strong. I want to bury the myth that Brussels is Them. Brussels is us. I
10   London Speech Date: 19/04/01 Speaker: Robin Cook Tonight I want to celebrate Britishness. As Foreign Secretary I see every
11 and invest in. And there is also an argument of human decency. I want to close by sharing with you what for me has been the
12   I want it to be representative of every community. That is why I want to end by asking for your help in getting me to meet that
13 for our work programme for the next year. This morning, though, I want to focus my remarks on the urgent challenges facing us on
14 But we have not avoided a world with too much war. That is why I want to focus my remarks today on what we must do if we are
15 a consensus. That also requires changes of substance. So now I want to focus on two issues of substance, two essential building
16   optimistic about the future of Britain and Britishness. Indeed, I want to go further and argue that in each of the areas where the
17   in their present form, but as a foundation on which to build. I want to identify four directions for the building of Europe. In three
18 our joint objectives. STRENGTHENING OUR DIALOGUE Today I want to launch that new dialogue with initiatives that will
19   We value these relationships - and we hope they do too. But I want to make sure that small and medium enterprises also
20   Office has been receiving from the CBI has been first class. I want to make sure that the Foreign Office is giving the same

```
N Concordance
41    seen as a step to the break-up of the UK. This evening, I want to set out the reasons for being optimistic about
42    of today. That it is too diverse to be meaningful. Tonight, I want to set out why I believe they are wrong. Why, far
43    of the Israelis - because we are friend to peace. Tonight I want to share with you three messages about the peace
44        intervention by the international community. Today, I want to share with you six of the principles on which we
45            EUROPE FOR A STRONG BRITAIN So with that I want to share with you the principles which guide this
46    want peace. And that brings me to the second message I want to share with you. We can overcome the obstacles
47    real hope for the Palestinian refugees. And that is why I want to speak to you tonight about what is necessary to
48    its potential stretching well into the future. This is why I want to spell out Britain's Commitment to Hong Kong. It
49    afternoon is to sell the Foreign Office in Britain to you. I want to start by stressing why it is important to you, to
50    the agenda in a wide and generous interpretation. But I want to start our discussion by sharing with you some
51        the next five years, and then make it happen. Today, I want to suggest three areas where we might
```

Concordance 6.4: Cook - *I want to*

When verbs such as *address, announce, launch* are found in the right cotext of the cluster, the function is clearly that of managing and organizing discourse. In this macro category two other sub-categories may be distinguished: the speaker as 'architecturing' his discourse, given by verbs such as *begin, close* and the speaker as 'illustrator' when verbs like *emphasize, focus* are in the left cotext of the cluster. Lines 5 and 16 emphasize the argumentative voice as a constitutive factor in the construction of discourse that in this case is Britishness. The same topic concerns concordances 7, 8, 9, which contain an interesting pattern that is unusual in everyday English: *to bury the myth*. The item *myth* is attitudinal in its meaning insofar it may refer either to a legendary story representing a hero or to an unproved or false collective belief that is used to justify something. Whereas the former is connotatively positive the latter has a negative pragmatic load. A search into the *Bank of English* of the word 'myth' has showed that this item never collocates with the verb 'bury'. It is common to speak of 'exploding', 'destroying', 'dispelling', 'debunking' the myth (collocates which were found in the Straw's sub-corpus), but not of 'burying'. The use of this formulation has to be considered idiosyncratic

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of Cook's style and hence, constituting a sign of personal deviation from the standard way of communicating in diplomacy. It is an indication of what Martin and White call 'signature' (2005: 208): "the idiolectical reconfiguration[s] of meaning-making potential by which individual authors achieve a recognisable personal style". The connotation of the verb 'bury' is commonly known and its 'fatal' nuance underlines Cook's assertiveness. The wider context of these three citations tells us that this assertiveness concerns his commitment to fight euroscepticism:

> (6) **I want to bury the myth** of a superstate - national identities are too strong. **I want to bury the myth** that Brussels is Them. Brussels is us.
> **I want to bury the myth** that Britain can only win when Europe loses, or vice versa. (Cook, 13.11.01)

As it can be noticed, Cook recurs to parallelism to give emphasis to his position to negate in a decisive way the fallacy of the belief that Britain may be self-adequate without Europe. Straw uses the same pattern but in the traditional form as shown in the following example:

> (7) But there is another **myth** about diplomacy which **I want to dispel.** Von Clausewitz's maxim that: 'War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means', has convinced many people that the reverse is also true — that international diplomacy is just a watered down version of war; a zero-sum game where each country presses its own advantage to the exclusion of all others. (Straw, 19.10.05)

Here Straw is defending the results of the work of diplomacy by rejecting the 'endorsement' of the theorist of the war and expressing opinion through the formulation *the reverse is true*. The occurrences of this type of patterns signal that these speakers evaluate on the parameter of 'true versus false'.

Again going back to Cook's concordances and moving down the

vertical axis, we note that the examples which convey a more attitudinal meaning are also instantiated through the pattern *I want to share with you* or the more diplomatic expression *I want to start our discussion by sharing with you some thoughts* that may be seen as a paraphrase of the simple epistemic verb *I think*. The speaker tends to establish a relationship with the audience to the extent of asking for their help (10). In so doing distance is cut because the speaker proposes a stance of equality with the audience. Citations 16, 41 which denote argumentation once again have to do with Britishness. This seems to suggest that when Cook takes on the opinion-holder role the British identity or the ideology of the nationhood is the main concern.

Whereas completely absent in Beckett, this strategy of interaction is used in 22.8% of the instances in Cook against only 6.25% in Straw. Like Cook, Straw appears as opinion-holder, even though less frequently, in citation 15 through the highly rhetorical formulation *what I want to do is just to offer you my thoughts* or in concordance 20 by endorsing Bush's words of praise for Russian involvement in the fight against terrorism. Most of the instances of this interactional strategy are found in national speeches and sometimes extended to interstate communication. This shows the activation of the 'policy legitimacy' (Roselle 2006: 9): the speaker must convince that he knows how to achieve the desired objectives and first, he must persuade the others from the same administration.

15   persuaded. You don't want too long a speech, but what I want to do is just to offer you my thoughts on some of the
16   European Union but rather resolutely opposed to it. What I want to do today is reach out to the genuine sceptics – the
17   for European economic and political reform. In doing so, I want to draw some parallels with the UK's experience over
18   international partnerships will play an important role. But I want to emphasise again that our most important
19   relationship between Britain and the Czech Republic – and I want to end on the same theme. We may not agree on
20   Russian Government's role in the fight against terrorism. I want to endorse that message. Russia has been a key ally

37	makers will need to take into account in the coming years. I want to look at the impact these trends may have on the
38	China's increasingly influential diplomatic and political role. I want to look ahead and map out the strategy that the UK
39	of all? The home of optimism: here in Nigeria. Today I want to look forward with you and see if that optimism is
40	assault on everything we believe in. There are five points I want to make about the principles on which I believe
41	propose today to resurrect the ideas of the 1920s. Rather I want to make the case for a pragmatic, common European
42	instability and even conflict in Europe. So this evening I want to make the case for an agenda to strengthen
43	feel comfortable with their aims. But there is a further point I want to make. If we want to be seen to deliver justice and
44	'new problems should be solved by new means.' Today I want to make the case for co-operation between the United
45	we let the terrorists spread division. The crucial point which I want to make today is this: we must stay together in
46	With apologies to those whose speeches I do not mention, I want to mention particularly those of the right hon Member
47	immigration issues. CLOSING REMARKS Before I close I want to offer a personal thank-you to all members of the
48	suddenly powerless in the face of global capital? Today I want to offer some answers to these questions by taking
49	I want to thank you for your commitment and effort. And I want to particularly highlight the personal contribution which
50	arrested or killed by their own Governments. So, tonight I want to pay tribute to the media professionals who continue
51	helping to rebuild a better Iraq. The second group to whom I want to pay tribute are those who work in our intelligence
52	the joint chair-women, Tessa Stirling and Daria Nalecz. And I want to pay a special tribute to the Committee's Honorary
53	international affairs organisations in the United States. I want to pay tribute to the work of two of the Council's most

Concordance 6.5: Straw – *I want to*

Apart from the concordance 39 where Straw involves the Nigerian audience, in all the other citations his role shifts from that of 'illustrating' the political strategies (*I want to make the case/point*) as from lines 41 to 45, where argumentation once again is instrumental in the construction of the speaker stance. Concordances from line 50 to line 53 carry out mere institutional tasks instantiated through rhetorical formulations such as *pay tribute to*. If we consider that in 13% of the metadiscursive group the verb *thank* is a right collocate, Straw is the minister who less takes on the metadiscursive role and in half of these instances the 'illustrator' position is preferred. Thus, the institutional role is more dominant in Straw rather than in the other two ministers. A more evaluative interference is noticed in context related to the alliances, both with the Arab world as in line 18 or with the USA as in the following citation. Here items like *enormous importance, indispensability* and the involving *us* mark a higher participation from the speaker:

```
(8) In this context, I want to underline the enormous
```

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importance to us — in fact, the indispensability — of
our alliance with the United States in the struggle
against international terrorism.
```

The above segment shows that the cluster *I want to* signals evaluation which is also based on the cumulative contribution from other elements in the sentence.

As seen in table 6.2 Beckett uses this search cluster less often than the other two ministers:

```
N Concordance
2      So in praising the work of this department, I want to be absolutely clear that I am praising
3      say a little more about that, if I may, later. I want to begin, however, by reminding us all of
4  conflict and instability. In the next six months I want to do even more. In particular I want to
5   to those problems. So one of the things that I want to do is to develop further the strategic
6  virtually everything that my department does. I want to end on a topic which is bound to
7      between the FCO and trade unions. And so I want to end on this point: I hope you will as
8      speak about why we promote human rights. I want to end by looking to the future and
9  we are going to go about that task. But today I want to end by putting out a challenge to all
10      and maintain an open trading system. And I want to end by talking about one of the
11  I am making this speech here today because I want to lay down that challenge to three
12      for the moment, as I have already said that I want to make some progress. The European
13      many innocent civilians. And here, if I may, I want to mention an area of work to which I
14   in the world - just 34 years. The second area I want to mention might surprise some of you:
```

Concordance 6.6: Beckett – *I want to*

The 'dispersion plot' utility shows that Beckett makes recourse to this expression at the beginning and at the end of the speech (see figure 1 below).

Concord

File Edit View Compute Settings Window Help

N	File	Words	Hits	r 1,000	persion	Plot
1	060627.txt	2.092	1	0,48	-0,069	
2	060720.txt	4.516	2	0,44	0,300	
3	060913.txt	1.549	1	0,65	-0,069	
4	061012.txt	2.799	3	1,07	0,478	
5	061024.txt	3.500	2	0,57	0,300	
6	061031.txt	2.563	1	0,39	-0,069	
7	061109.txt	3.968	2	0,50	0,300	
8	061120.txt	1.599	1	0,63	-0,069	
9	061123.txt	3.992	1	0,25	-0,069	
10	061128.txt	1.244	1	0,80	-0,069	
11	070227.txt	3.458	1	0,29	-0,069	
12	070306.txt	5.888	1	0,17	-0,069	
13	070320.txt	3.599	3	0,83	0,250	
14	070416.txt	4.071	1	0,25	-0,069	
15	070418.txt	2.201	1	0,45	-0,069	
16	070517_2.txt	4.167	2	0,48	0,300	
17	070519.txt	867	1	1,15	-0,069	

concordance collocates plot patterns clusters filenames follow up source text notes

.7   Type-in   ers to the heads of government. But I am making this speech here today because I want to lay down that challenge to three groups in parti

Figure 6.1: Beckett - dispersion plot of the cluster *I want to*

This suggests that she employs this cluster to guide her audience by illustrating what she wants to focus on and then she sorts to the cluster again at the end of her speech to cite the topic she wants to close with. But there are other instances, like line 13, where the cluster, preceded by the cautiously entertained formulation, *if I may*, stresses the topic she is strongly committed to as we read in the wider context of that citation *…which I have a particularly strong personal and professional commitment.* This less apparent assertive position visible through the use of this 'accuracy hedge' (Partington 2003: 64) is mainly due to the shifting from the discourse of terrorism in the lines coming before this citation to the discourse of climate change. Furthermore, I would add that the variable of female gender might have its influence, too. At the beginning of this speech in

Pakistan, after the usual introductory thanking, she states:

> (9) Foreign Affairs is not quite the male preserve it used to be but it is still heartening to see a woman in charge of bringing on the next generation of a country's diplomats. (27.02.07)

The fact that Beckett appears as being mainly metadiscursive than opinion-holder, like Straw, does not mean that she does not express her personal viewpoint because, the cluster under investigation ranks second in the top-cluster list (see table 6.2). Indeed, the pattern she prefers is the epistemic *I know that*.

From the reading of the only three concordances which include the plural subject before the cognitive verb *know*, we might infer that the cluster is used in an impersonal way and in a context of explanation due to the adverb 'because'.

1 It actually makes that commitment even more vital. Because in the longer term **we know that** it would be easier
2 a fertile ground for radicalisation and extremism; and because **we know that** bad human rights can lead to failed
3 that ignores human rights, then that policy will fail - because **we know that** human rights abuse provides a fertile

Concordance 6.7: Beckett – *we know that*

On the contrary through the use of the pattern *I know that* Beckett expresses her cognitive stance based on sources of evidence so as to appear an expert. This seems to put distance between the *I*-cognisant observer and the audience as in line 5 where the explicit source of knowledge also serves the scope of gaining trust and credibility:

```
N Concordance
1      in John –this is advice which he would find it easy to accept. I know that because I've asked him – well at least I think it was
2   The TUC/FCO advisory council now meets three times a year. I know that both sides find these sessions very helpful. And it is
3           Because, perhaps for more than any other audience, I know that business people are always keen to cut straight to
4   the hon. Gentleman that, on the basis of many conversations, I know that everyone wishes to see the violence diminished and
5   two jobs are not just compatible, they are mutually reinforcing. I know that from my own experience as Secretary of State for
6    to say about this aspect of the issue. One of the things which I know that generations of scientists in the UK have despaired
7   my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin)-I know that he will accept my assurance, however much he
8           Patterns of fishing and agriculture will be disrupted. I know that how China performs over the next decade is of direct
9    people in this room as partners in achieving these objectives. I know that Ian with his usual assiduousness has already
10  made a strong strategic case for Turkish membership: a case I know that is strongly supported across the House: and the
11  success, of course, goes to the  Hong Kong people. As I said, I know that it has not always been an easy ride. The relatively
12    as you know well, is to keep pushing further up it yourself. I know that Japanese business has particular concerns over
13      we expect discussion of the Middle East to take place. I know that many members of the House have a particular
14  criticism-of how deep-seated is the history of all such events. I know that many angers and anxieties have been expressed,
15     when we mark again your loss, must be difficult ones. But I know that none of you would ever want your loved ones – or
```

Concordance 6.8: Beckett – *I know that*

In some instances such as lines 2, 3, 9, 11 the role of cognisant observer and evaluator are overlapped and in so doing the speaker builds up her evaluation on knowledge. In other cases the cluster has an interpersonal function as in lines 4, 13, 14, 15 where the speaker cognitively pre-empts the audience's feelings or needs. She shifts from the more impersonal *everyone* to the interactive *you* and thus she combines cognitive stance with an inclination to pander to her audience. This function counts for almost the half of the instances that is it is visible in 40.2% of the citations.

6.3 Discussion and concluding remarks

Clusters of subjectivity are the interpretation of linguistic expressions in terms of cognisant observer, speaker representative, thinker and emoter.

In this chapter different roles behind the subjectivity have been highlighted. As far as the *we*-cluster is concerned, it occurs mainly exclusively and, thus, it may be seen as representating of the institution. Used in this way, the cluster reduces the speaker to a 'mediator' between the government and the audience and hence, the minister goes under a process of de-personalization.

The shift from *we want to* to *I want to* is determined by metadiscursive reasons due to the high frequency of organizing-discourse verbs following the search cluster. The only overlap function between the two perspectives is given by the mental verb *see* which indicates the projection towards an optimistic future. In the case of the cluster *I want to see*, the vision is shared by both the speaker as foreign minister and the individual. As Biber maintains (2006: 124) the verb 'want' followed by the infinitive form implies an indirect-directive function. So an implicit attempt to formulate a directive may be noticed in these instantiations of strong desire.

The analysis of the cluster *I want to*, which features prominently Cook and Straw, has shown that the two ministers sort to it for reasons of discourse organization but also to express their evaluation. In this case the verb 'want' is deprived of its volitional function because the emphasis is more on diplomatic expressions such as *offer my thoughts, sharing my thoughts*. In order to persuade their audience the diplomatic leaders must argue that their strategic choices will enhance the global morality that all share.

Differently from Straw, who emerges as the most institutional among the three ministers, Cook has revealed signs of 'signature' namely aspects of style (*to bury the myth*) that make him less traditional than his colleagues. Straw's more pronounced 'impersonality' may be read as a sign of strong alignment with his party but also as a sign of his difficult times.

Beckett, like the others, shifts to the first personal pronoun cluster for discourse management reasons uncovering tentativeness (*if I may*). Beckett's foreign ministry coincides with a rising in the awareness of the importance of the climate change issue in the international arena and she finds herself to fight for a challenge that appears less tangible with respect to terrorism. Nevertheless, the highest frequency of the patterns *I know that* with respect to the other two ministers shows a strong commitment to the

truth and the knowledge. If the plural form (*we know that*) is mainly used impersonally, the cluster *I know that* represents the minister as a cognisant observer or better an expert, a role that is mitigated by the interpersonal function of the same cluster, that is anticipating the audience's needs so as to set up empathy with it.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FINAL REMARKS

7. 1 Summary of the study

This research has set itself up as one primarily concerned with issues of ideology which does not refer to 'distorted consciousness' but to a system of beliefs construed as a way of comprehending the world. In particular it has taken the view that the question of ideology is the way in which social subjects position, but also are positioned, in a given culture.

When the Labour Party won the election in 1997, the incoming foreign minister Robin Cook promoted an 'ethical dimension' in his foreign policy marking a decisive break with the individualism of the previous government and announcing a different approach to international relations. The changing global setting is seen as posing *unique* and *serious threats,* from terrorism to climate change, which require global response and, therefore, diplomacy has to adapt itself to this world in transition.

In this scenario of changing diplomacy this study has explored the axiological and ideological discursive strategies through which the three foreign ministers in their speeches under the ten years of Blair's government (1997-2007) have 'naturalised' their viewpoints.

First, the study has taken a historical approach in order to define the concept of diplomacy. Then, the word *security* has been investigated co-textually and contextually. In the last part of the study the 'voices' of the ministers have been considered in order to look at the shifts from

institutional to individual roles. The main analytical approaches have been Corpus Linguistics and Appraisal Theory.

7.2 Findings

The extraction of the 'conceptual knowledge' of diplomacy from the corpus has highlighted that diplomacy, even though still based on negotiation as the core meaning of its definition, is a *flexible* concept. Moreover, it is more than *soft-power* and above all, taking an economic approach, it aims at safeguarding its *customers'* human rights.

Relying on the methodology of Corpus Linguistics, chapter four has shown an enlargement of the concept of *security*. This has been noticed through the quantitative investigation of the associated words around *security*. The quantitative analysis was conducted through *ConcGram,* a piece of software which allows the automatic identification of phraseological variation and aims to find all the word co-occurrences, called 'concgrams', in a text.

The most significant concgrams found around *security* are the contiguous and non-contiguous combinations of *security* with a set of nominalizations such as *peace*, *prosperity, freedom, justice* and *stability.* The most frequent concgrams *security/peace*, *security/threat* and *security/climate* characterize Cook, Straw and Beckett respectively. Even though with a peak in the Straw's sub-corpus, the strong association between *security* and *prosperity* features all the three ministers' speeches, emphasising the relevance of the economic aspect. The provenance of these collocates from different fields makes the discourse of security interdiscursively hybrid. The presence of *people* and *citizens* in the concordances analysed, but above all the numerous collocates such as *food, water* or *climate* (only in the Beckett's sub-corpus) covers security with a more domestic connotation,

moving it from the traditional institutional referent to focus on the needs of people. We can safely state that *security* is undergoing a process of re-scaling: from territorial denotation and protection from crime it appears closer to more immediate environmental and domestic questions.

The high occurrence of these collocations, in particular of *peace and security* and *security and prosperity*, creates an equation between an interest (*security*) and the other values (*freedom, justice, stability*) both moral and economic. Security is represented as 'commodity', which lends itself as a potential inward investment, it is an important goal but at the same time it is a means to achieve stability and economic success.

The analysis of the context of security has pointed out how the main purpose of the discourse of security is advocacy: the audience is persuaded that security is an interest and a value at the same time and that the civic society operates to protect citizens from potential dangers. From the evaluative point of view security is appraised in terms of significance, but it is still a desirable entity not fully achieved, as the wordings of negative composition have shown.

The higher presence of co-occurrences of items such as *peace, freedom* and *commitment* in Cook's discourse are clear indicators of the ideological purpose of promoting his 'ethical dimension' to foreign policy, namely a moral representation of Britain. A similar purpose concerns the belief in universal values of which international institutions are guardians (see the metaphors of *stone* or the numerous relational processes which link Britain to the NATO or to the UN).

The axiological orientations of the significance of *security* and participation and cooperation are mainly expressed monoglossically as well as the respect for the rule of law: these are prerequisites that are not subject to negotiation.

The metaphor of 'peace-as-a-pathway' to security' is worded in terms of 'disclaim' mostly through negative formulations where the role of the 'cause' has been found to be dominant. This ideology of causation is also worded through the if-clauses and through the comparative correlatives. In Cook, more particularly, it is reinforced by the use of the mechanism of 'justification' through the cluster *that is why*. Many political choices concerning Britain are thus justified in an explicit way, both at home and abroad. The pervasiveness of the causality, but also the numerous instantiations of relational processes (e.g. *prosperity depends on security*), which have given rise to the rhetoric of interdependence, leads me to suggest a new form for the ideology of causation, which I would call the ideology of 'corollary'. A set of events is posited and the effects described are the natural consequences of them. So for instance, peace is the means to reach security, but security is also a means to reach prosperity and finally, wealth creation should ultimately bring social justice. Furthermore, security is instrumental to the construction of nationhood, which in turn serves the scope of achieving security. This causal force is grammatically and textually expressed; sometimes the 'corollary' needs elucidation (*that is why*), sometimes the derivation is more evident (without X …no Y). This dominance of deontic modality, above all in Cook, goes hand in hand with his appeal to the logic of beliefs and desires. The past of humanity was caused by what people wanted and believed in, similarly, the future prosperity will be caused by our desires and beliefs. Cook's strong commitment and personal investment might be read in the light of two main aspects: the new ethical dimension of the British foreign policy, which needed a strong assertiveness, and the fight against euro scepticism to reconcile patriotism and internationalism.

When an event is set up a number of consequences is ready to be

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activated: the call for cooperation enhances a bond that is action-oriented and action is right because all the actors live within the same normative framework. This action is legitimated by the desired homogenisation of interests and values but also by *common threats*.

The threats identified in Straw come from the external world and are potentially everywhere. This is represented in language through the ideologically-oriented phenomenon of 'overwording' expressed lexically (e.g. *contagion, disease, malaria, fear*) but also through processes, which presuppose the presence of external enemies that *paralyse, impoverish* and make prosperity *decline*. The ideology of the 'undesirable' relies on the semantic of the fear, which activates a need for protection and tries to 'justify' the *use of force* backing new diplomacy. Straw's chosen 'proclaimed' formulations, which objectivise his position, the less frequent use of personal pronouns with respect to the other two ministers, make him more impersonal and thus more aligned with the governmental viewpoints.

The unfavourable connotation of *threat* invests the concgram *security/climate* which represents another big issue. This time the 'danger' is not external but *we are all our enemies*. Dealing with a more contingent topic, namely the security climate issue, Beckett is more contrasting in her stance construction (e.g. many uses of concessive formulations) and her battle, in a role for the first time in the British history covered up by a woman, foregrounds foreknowledge. The negative axiology of victimization of the external threats to security is in her speeches opposed by the axiology of responsibility: the future prosperity depends on our actions but also on our foresight. As Bell noticed in his work (1988) ideology is also passion and desire which need to be transmitted and Beckett's devotion is worded as a struggle both argumentatively and metaliguistically. Her preference for the cluster *I know that* with respect to her colleagues' commitment to promote

the image of the prosperous future Britain in an enlarged Europe (*I want to*), construes her both as pragmatic but also as inclined to perceive the audience's expectations.

Looking at the social function of ideologies as supporting group interests and the cognitive function as organizing their social representations (Van Dijk 1998: 2), evaluation in diplomatic speeches serves both by promoting Britishness and the harmony of values and interests. Britain is appraised positively as a nation that is altruistic and sympathetic but above all tolerant towards other countries such as Ireland and the Islam. Civic society is a practice within which our rights protect us from wrongful interventions. Proud of its historical past Britain still appears as having a hegemonic identity (bridge between the USA and Europe) and a nurturance orientation: the ethical call is the engine of benevolence. British national identity constitutes the primary link between the individual and society and between the society and the world.

7.3 Implications for further research

This study has given insights into the language of diplomacy as the language of the foreign ministers. The speeches studied were expected to be imbued with evaluation that is not evident at the surface level of the language and that was the case. Ideological positioning does not avert the expression of evaluations.

Avenues for further research into the nature of diplomatic speech might look, for example, at the discourse of 'human rights' which emerged as keywords in the list and focus on the ideological discursive strategies and the patterns of preference so as to compare them with the results in this research.

It has been noticed how Beckett's more detached attitude and her

subtle criticism places her in a different position with respect to the other two ministers. It would be, then, interesting to look at her speeches from the perspective of the 'gender studies' to shed light on her confrontational, almost adversarial discursive strategies, as well as her pragmatism and see if they are typical features of female politicians or dependent on the nature of the topic debated, as was the hypothesised case in this study.

A broader and a bit more ambitious project might investigate the mediatised political discourse to look at how the three diplomatic identities here represented are reconstructed in a more interactive genre, such as interviews, where speakers are expected to be more spontaneous than in the speeches analysed in this work.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

The Diplomatic Corpus (DiCo)

N.	ROBIN COOK' S SPEECHES	PLACE	DATE
1	NAZI GOLD: JUSTICE, OPENNESS AND REMEMBRANCE'	London	02.12.97
2	A NEW EUROPE FOR A CHANGING WORLD	Prague	27.11.97
3	NEW LABOUR	London	12.05.97
4	BRITAIN, POLAND AND EUROPE	Warsaw	28.11.97
5	'THE BRITISH PRESIDENCY: GIVING EUROPE BACK TO THE PEOPLE'	Dublin	03.11.97
6	PEACE AND PROSPERITY	London	12.06.97
7	HUMAN RIGHTS INTO A NEW CENTURY	London	17.07.97
8	A UNITED NATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY	New York	23.09.97
9	A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE	Budapest	26.11.97
10	BEYOND GOOD INTENTIONS - GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT	London	17.11.98
11	THE ARAB-BRITISH PARTNERSHIP	London	05.03.98
12	MAKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY WORK'	Birmingham	03.11.98
13	A NEW PARTNERSHIP	Conference London	04.02.98
14	'BOSNIA - A NEW HOPE	Bosnia	04.03.98
15	THE EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL INDUSTRY'	Birmingham	06.04.98
16	A NEW DIALOGUE WITH ISLAM	London	08.10.98
17	KEEPING HOPE ALIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST	London	09.07.98
18	THE BRITISH PRESIDENCY	Strasbourg	14.01.98
19	EUROPE AND AMERICA: THE DECISIVE PARTNERSHIP	Washington DC	15.01.98
20	HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE DIFFERENCE	London	16.10.98
21	ANNUAL FOREIGN POLICY REPORT	London	23.04.98
22	BRITISH PRESIDENCY OF THE EU, JANUARY-JUNE 1998	London	25.06.98
23	BRITAIN	London	27.11.98
24	PROSPERITY, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA	New York	24.09.98
25	HONG KONG: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE	Hong Kong	21.01.98
26	BRITAIN AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	London	15.02.99
27	WINNING INWARD INVESTMENT FOR BRITAIN	London	14.07.99
28	KOSOVO AND THE MODERN EUROPE	London	14.04.99
29	INVESTMENT IN BRITAIN: THE BEST BRIDGE INTO EUROPE	Japan	06.09.99
30	LESSONS FROM THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND THE CFSP	Brussels	19.07.99
31	WHY THE COMMONWEALTH MATTERS	London	28.10.99
32	CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE MODERN WORLD	New York	21.09.99
33	SUPPORTING BUSINESS: A TOP PRIORITY AT THE FCO	London	21.10.99
34	FOREIGN AFFAIRS	London	22.11.99
35	BRITAIN'S FUTURE IN EUROPE	London	23.11.99
36	BRITAIN PLAYING A LEADING PART IN EUROPE	London	23.11.00
37	BUILDING A COMMONWEALTH OF HOPE	London	22.09.00
38	SHAPING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE	Lisbon	06.01.00
39	LORD MAYOR'S EASTER BANQUET SPEECH	London	03.05.00
40	THE CASE FOR EUROPE	London	02.07.00
41	THE INFLUENCE OF IDEAS OF 1989 ON FOREIGN	London	13.01.00

	POLICY		
42	FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTEREST	London	28.01.00
43	EUROPE 2010	London	13.11.00
44	A BETTER UN FOR A BETTER WORLD	New York	14.09.00
45	STANDING UP FOR BRITAIN BY STANDING WITH EUROPE	Sheffield	16.11.00
46	GUIDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION	London	19.07.00
47	REFLECTING THE DIVERSE FACE OF MODERN BRITAIN IN DIPLOMACY	London	19.07.00
48	REGIONAL NEIGHBOURS IN A GLOBAL ERA	Egypt	20.01.00
49	REMEMBERING THE HOLOCAUST; LOOKING TO THE FUTURE'	Stockholm	26.01.00
50	PRIORITIES FOR THE OSCE IN THE YEAR AHEAD	Vienna	27.11.00
51	CHAMPIONING ENLARGEMENT	Budapest	25.07.00
52	STRENGTHENING BRITAIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN	London	29.06.00
53	BRINGING TODAY'S TORTURERS TO JUSTICE; SPARING TOMORROW'S VICTIMS	London	29.03.00
54	THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALISATION	London	09.03.01
55	REGULATING AND REDUCING SMALL ARMS	London	13.02.01
56	CELEBRATING BRITISHNESS	London	19.04.01
57	PREVENTING CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	London	26.03.01
58	HUMAN RIGHTS - A PRIORITY OF BRITAIN'S FOREIGN POLICY	London	28.03.01

N.	JACK STRAW'S SPEECHES	PLACE	DATE
1.	A EUROPE FOR ITS CITIZENS	London	27.07.01
2.	ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN	London	22.10.01
3.	NOT A BALANCE OF POWER BUT A BALANCE OF TRUST	Moscow	31.10.01
4.	THE TASK OF DEFEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	New York	11.11.01
5.	BALANCING PROFIT WITH RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT	London	03.12.01
6.	EUROPE AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER	London	11.12.01
7.	CHAMPIONING GREATER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN DIFFERENT FAITHS AND CULTURES	Oxford	25.01.02
8.	THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION	London	06.02.02
9.	REFORMING EUROPE: NEW ERA, NEW QUESTIONS	London	21.02.02
10.	RE-ORDERING THE WORLD	London	25.03.02
11.	PRINCIPLES OF A MODERN GLOBAL COMMUNITY	London	10.04.02
12.	HUMAN RIGHTS ENSURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PROSPERITY	Geneva	18.04.02
13.	EU-US RELATIONS: THE MYTHS AND THE REALITY	Washington	08.05.02
14.	A NEW MISSION FOR EUROPE	Berlin	27.05.02
15.	AGENDA FOR THE SEVILLE EUROPEAN COUNCIL	London	18.06.02
16.	COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE	Budapest	09.07.02
17.	PROMOTING A SECURE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	Beijing	16.07.02
18.	BRITAIN AND JAPAN: A 21ST CENTURY PARTNERSHIP	Tokyo	17.07.02
19.	BRITAIN'S MUSLIM COMMUNITIES	London	24.07.02
20.	STRENGTH IN EUROPE BEGINS AT HOME	Edinburgh	27.08.02
21.	PARTNERS IN PREVENTION	Helsingborg	30.08.02
22.	SECURITY IS NOT AN OPTION, IT IS A NECESSITY	New York	14.09.02
23.	THE UK AND THE UNITED STATES: A PARTNERSHIP FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY	Chicago	15.10.02
24.	LEADERSHIP IN EUROPE	London	17.10.02
25.	THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN POLICY	London	13.11.02
26.	DEFEATING ORGANISED CRIME	London	25.11.02
27.	ROLE OF THE FREE PRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY	London	26.11.02
28.	UK'S EDUCATIONAL AND SPORTING LINKS WITH AFGHANISTAN	London	28.11.02
29.	THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP	London	02.12.02
30.	CRITICAL DECISIONS FOR THE EU	London	05.12.02
31.	PROMOTING TRADE UNIONS AT HOME AND OVERSEAS	London	18.12.02
32.	STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY	London	06.01.03
33.	THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE MUSLIM	Jakarta	09.01.03

	WORLD		
34.	VINDICATING THE UN'S FOUNDING IDEAL	New York	20.01.03
35.	A CHALLENGE WE MUST CONFRONT	London	11.02.03
36.	REINTEGRATING IRAQ INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY - A CAUSE WITH 'COMPELLING MORAL FORCE'	London	21.02.03
37.	WE HAVE TO PUT SADDAM TO THE TEST	New York	07.03.03
38.	COMMITMENT TO THE LIBERATION AND FUTURE PROSPERITY OF IRAQ	London	01.04.03
39.	THE FUTURE OF IRAQ AND THE ROADMAP FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST	London	30.04.03
40.	SOUTH AFRICA IS MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR GOOD IN THE WORLD	Pretoria	14.05.03
41.	EUROPE IN THE WORLD	Brussels	19.05.03
42.	A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW EUROPE	London	17.06.03
43.	COMBATING TORTURE	London	26.06.03
44.	HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL REPORT 2003	London	18.09.03
45.	UN SHOULD REMAIN 'AN EFFECTIVE GLOBAL FORUM'	New York	25.09.03
46.	FAITH AND FOREIGN POLICY	London	08.10.03
47.	MAKING THE POSITIVE CASE FOR EUROPE	Chester	23.10.03
48.	PURSUING AN ACTIVE AND ENGAGED FOREIGN POLICY	London	27.11.03
49.	A NEW STRATEGY FOR A NEW ERA	London	02.12.03
50.	BRINGING EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT - OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES	London	09.12.03
51.	BUILDING A STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITISH MUSLIMS	London	10.12.03
52.	BUILDING A MODERN AND EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES	London	10.12.03. 02
53.	BRITAIN AND IRELAND: STRONG PARTNERS IN AN EXPANDING EUROPE	Dublin	16.12.03
54.	FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS 100 YEARS AFTER THE ENTENTE CORDIALE	Paris	12.01.04
55.	WE MUST BUILD STRONG PARTNERSHIPS TO COMBAT THE THREATS WE FACE	Davos	21.01.04
56.	OUR COMMITMENT TO RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ IS FIRM	Davos	21.01.04.
57.	MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AT A FORK IN THE ROAD	London	02.02.04
58.	INDIA HAS HUGE POTENTIAL TO BE A FORCE FOR GOOD IN THE WORLD	New Delhi	06.02.04
59.	BRITAIN AND INDIA: A CHANGING AND PROSPERING PARTNERSHIP	Bangalore	07.02.04
60.	A NEW ERA FOR FOREIGN POLICY	London	12.02.04
61.	PARTNERSHIPS FOR REFORM IN THE ARAB WORLD	London	01.03.04
62.	PAKISTAN AND BRITAIN: A STRONG PARTNERSHIP FOR A SAFER WORLD	Pakistan	05.03.04
63.	EUROPE MUST COME TOGETHER TO DEFEAT TERRORISM	Copenaghen	23.03.04
64.	NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY	London	30.03.04
65.	CROSS-CHANNEL CURRENTS: 100 YEARS OF ENTENTE CORDIALE	London	08.04.04
66.	WE MUST ENGAGE IN EUROPE AND IN THE	London	21.04.04

	WIDER WORLD		
67.	BUILDING AN EU THAT CAN DELIVER ON ITS CITIZENS' PRIORITIES	London	12.05.04
68.	GLOBAL SCIENCE FOR OUR COMMON FUTURE	Washington	13.05.04
69.	SHAPING A REFORMING EUROPE	London	18.05.04
70.	THE SOUTH ASIAN DYNAMIC	London	19.05.04
71.	BY ENGAGING IN EUROPE WE CAN LEAD REFORM	London	16.06.04
72.	BREAKING THE DEADLOCK IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS	London	23.06.04
73.	STRAW SPEAKS AT RECEPTION TO MARK LAUNCH OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING GUIDELINES	London	23.06.04.02
74.	THIS IS A TREATY FOR AN EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN UNION OF NATIONS	London	24.06.04
75.	THE ALLIANCE IS AS IMPORTANT AS EVER	Istanbul	28.06.04
76.	STRAW CONCLUDES COMMONS DEBATE ON IRAQ	London	20.07.04
77.	PEACE IS VITAL ABOVE ALL	Cape Town, South Africa	26.08.04
78.	WHAT IS CHANGING IN THE NEW EUROPEAN UNION?	Prague	31.08.04
79.	SHAPING A STRONGER UNITED NATIONS	London	02.09.04
80.	SUDAN	London	07.09.04
81.	WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY FOR A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION	London	09.09.04
82.	GLOBAL SECURITY IS OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY	New York	23.09.04
83.	JACK STRAW AWARDS HONORARY OBE TO PROFESSOR SURYA PRASAD SUBEDI	London	19.10.04
84.	LONDON RIGHT VENUE FOR 2012 OLYMPICS	London	21.10.04
85.	FOREIGN SECRETARY SPEAKS AT RECEPTION COMMEMORATING 300 YEARS OF BRITISH GIBRALTAR	London	25.10.04
86.	STRONGER PARTNERSHIPS TO TACKLE A COMPLEX AND GLOBAL CHALLENGE	London	28.10.04
87.	THE CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR AFGHANISTAN	London	28.10.04.02
88.	FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM	London	04.11.04
89.	JACK STRAW AWARDS HONORARY GCMG TO RYSZARD KACZOROWSKI	London	09.11.04
90.	FCO ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2004	London	10.11.04
91.	MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS	London	29.11.04
92.	A CONSTITUTION FOR OUR KIND OF EUROPE	London	07.12.04
93.	FOREIGN SECRETARY OUTLINES AGENDA FOR NEXT EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING	London	15.12.04
94.	STRAW ATTENDS 'SPECIAL ASEAN LEADERS' MEETING ON EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI	Jakarta	06.01.05
95.	SPEECH BY FOREIGN SECRETARY AT INTERNATIONAL POLICING RECEPTION	London	12.01.05
96.	UK-JAPAN: 'A SHARED COMMITMENT TO TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE'	Tokyo	19.01.05
97.	BRITAIN AND CHINA: A GROWING GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP	Beijing	21.01.05
98.	ELECTIONS IN IRAQ 'SHOULD UNITE US ALL'	London	31.01.05
99.	PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION	London	03.02.05

100.	EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY - A STRONG BRITAIN IN A REFORMING EUROPE	London	09.02.05
101.	A MODERN PARTNERSHIP FOR ENGAGEMENT AND UNDERSTANDING	Lahore	14.02.05
102.	BRINGING EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT - OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES	London	09.12.03
103.	BUILDING A STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITISH MUSLIMS	London	10.12.03
104.	BUILDING A MODERN AND EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES	London	10.12.03. 02
105.	BRITAIN AND IRELAND: STRONG PARTNERS IN AN EXPANDING EUROPE	Dublin	16.12.03
106.	FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS 100 YEARS AFTER THE ENTENTE CORDIALE	Paris	12.01.04
107.	A PARTNERSHIP FOR WIDER FREEDOM	Washington DC, Usa	18.05.05
108.	PRE-EUROPEAN COUNCIL DEBATE - OPENING SPEECH BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY	London	15.06.05
109.	60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS	London	27.06.05
110.	INDIA: THE NEXT DECADE	London	27.06.05. 02
111.	EU WHITE PAPER RELEASED ON EVE OF UK PRESIDENCY	London	30.06.05
112.	LAUNCH OF ANGLO-POLISH HISTORICAL COMMITTEE REPORT	London	04.07.05
113.	LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC BID	London	06.07.05
114.	STRENGTHENING THE EU AS A FORCE FOR GOOD IN AFRICA AND THE WIDER WORLD	Strasbourg	06.07.05. 02
115.	SECURITY IS THE KEY TO THE FUTURE OF IRAQ	Strasbourg	06.07.05. 03
116.	COMMEMMORATION OF SREBRENICA MASSACRE	Srebrenica	11.07.05
117.	OUR CHANGED AND CHANGING WORLD	New York	17.09.05
118.	EUROPEAN UNION: TURKEY AND CROATIA	London	11.10.05
119.	STRAW SPEAKS AT UK FUNDED CARIBBEAN SENIOR COMMAND TRAINING COURSE	Jamaica	19.10.05
120.	UK-US FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES	Alabama, Usa	21.10.05
121.	UNITED KINGDOM AND ISRAEL SHARE THE SAME DEMOCRATIC VALUES	Israel	02.11.05
122.	CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 'MUST BE DRIVEN BY ALL'	Bahrain	12.11.05
123.	THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO GLOBALISATION	Strasbourg	16.11.05
124.	RECEPTION TO MARK EID-AL-FITR: REMARKS BY JACK STRAW	London	22.11.05
125.	A DIALOGUE OF CULTURES	London	29.11.05
126.	STRAW OPENS PRE-EUROPEAN COUNCIL DEBATE	London	14.12.05
127.	BUILDING A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE OF PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST	London	14.12.05. 02
128.	THE CENTRAL ROLE THAT MUSLIMS PLAY IN THIS COUNTRY	London	20.12.05
129.	GLOBAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM	London	16.01.06
130.	2006 - MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES	London	17.01.06
131.	TURKEY: STRAW COMMENTS ON EU ACCESSION TALKS	Istanbul	25.01.06
132.	FOREIGN SECRETARY OPENS DAVOS	Davos	28.01.06

	DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST		
133.	'AFRICA: A NEW AGENDA' - FOREIGN SECRETARY	Abuja, Nigeria	14.02.06
134.	THE PEOPLE OF DARFUR WANT PEACE	Abuja, Nigeria	14.02.06. 02
135.	IRAN: THE PATH AHEAD	London	13.03.06
136.	BRITISH MUSLIMS: WHERE BRITAIN AND ISLAM INTERSECT	London	27.03.06
137.	EUROPEAN COUNCIL 23-24 MARCH	London	27.03.06. 02
138.	ACTIVE DIPLOMACY FOR A CHANGING WORLD	London	28.03.06
139.	VALUES WE PROMOTE AT HOME, GUIDE US ABROAD	Blackburn	31.03.06
140.	TWO KINGDOMS: FRIENDSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP	Riyad, Saudi Arabia	18.04.06
141.	STRAW SPEECH: LORD MAYOR'S EASTER BANQUET	London	26.04.06
142.	CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION	London	26.04.06. 02
143.	BRIDGING THE BOSPHORUS - TURKEY'S EUROPEAN FUTURE	London	08.09.06
144.	LOCAL QUESTIONS, GLOBAL ANSWERS	Manchester	10.09.06

N.	MARGARET BECKETT'S SPEECHES	PLACE	DATE
1.	THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN UNION	London	14.06.06
2.	SCIENCE AND GLOBALISATION	London	27.06.06
3.	BECKETT MARKS LONDON BOMBINGS ANNIVERSARY	London	06.07.06
4.	INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	Palestine	20.07.06
5.	TRADE UNION CONGRESS	Birmingham	13.09.06
6.	LAUNCH OF FOREIGN POLICY PAMPHLET	London	14.09.06
7.	CLIMATE CHANGE IS A 'TODAY PROBLEM NOT A TOMORROW ONE'	New York	21.09.06
8.	UNITED NATION	New York	22.09.06
9.	GLOBAL PRESSURES DEMAND A GLOBAL AND MULTILATERAL RESPONSE	Manchester	26.09.06
10	GLENEAGLES DIALOGUE MEETING	Mexico	03.10.06
11	DIWALI: FESTIVAL OF LIGHT	London	11.10.06
12	LAUNCH OF THE 2006 ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS	London FCO	12.10.06
13	FOREIGN POLICY AND CLIMATE SECURITY	Berlin	24.10.06
14	IRAQ DEBATE	London	31.10.06
15	TERRORISM: DEFEATING THE THREAT	London	09.11.06
16	UK-INDIA RELATIONSHIP	London	14.11.06
17	FCO REMEMBRANCE CEREMONY	London	14.11.06
18	LAUNCH OF GOF ANNUAL REPORT	London	14.11.06
19	REMARKS ON NEED FOR EU UNITY	Finnish Embassy	20.11.06
20	QUEEN'S SPEECH	London	22.11.06
21	THE MODERN FCO	London	23.11.06
22	'GOING BEHIND THE HEADLINES	London	28.11.06
23	PRE-EUROPEAN COUNCIL DEBATE	London	06.12.06
24	POST-EUROPEAN TURKEY.	London	18.12.06
25	BRAZIL CAN HAVE 'PIVOTAL ROLE' IN WORLD TRADE TALKS	London	16.01.07
26	UK FOREIGN POLICY	London	24.01.07
27	PAKISTAN: A NEW DIPLOMACY	Pakistan	27.02.07
28	JOHN SMITH MEMORIAL LECTURE	London	06.03.07
29	COMMONS TRIDENT DEBATE	London	14.03.07
30	THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE	London	20.03.07
31	UK PERSONNEL IN IRAN	London	28.03.07
32	CLIMATE CHANGE 'THE GATHERING STORM'	New York	16.04.07
33	LORD MAYOR'S EASTER BANQUET	London FCO	18.04.07
34	BECKETT PAYS TRIBUTE TO BORIS YELTSIN	London	23.04.07
35	THE CASE FOR CLIMATE SECURITY	London	10.05.07
36	ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION IN BEIJING	Beijing	17.05.07
37	UK-CHINA RELATIONS: PROMOTING A HARMONIOUS WORLD	Beijing	17.05.07
38	ENERGY EFFICIENCY: WHAT DOES GUANGDONG HAVE TO GAIN?	Guangdong	19.05.07
39	SPEECH AT THE BRITISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	Hong Kong	21.05.07
40	JAPAN AND THE UK: BECOMING TOP RUNNERS ON CLIMATE	Tokyo	22.05.07

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41	Opening remarks at a lunch with Japanese opinion formers in Tokyo	Tokyo	22.05.07
42	Towards a low carbon global economy	London	05.06.07
43	Queen's birthday	London	05.06.07
44	International Community 'Failing' Darfur	London	05.06.07
45	Iraq debate	London	11.06.07
46	We want results on disarmament	Washington	25.06.07

APPENDIX 2

Concordance: **active and engaged** in *DiCo*

(1) An **active and engaged** foreign policy is not just a salve to liberal consciences. It is a survival mechanism for our societies.

(2) We both *[India and Britain]* take an **active and engaged** approach to the world.

(3) Over the next few weeks, in a series of speeches both here and abroad, I shall be setting out in more detail the reasons why the UK's interests are best served by an **active and engaged** global foreign policy, working with our allies to push back the boundaries of chaos.

(4) Britain is more influential today because of the **active and engaged** foreign policy of this Government.

(5) I want to talk today about the need for an **active and engaged** approach to international policy, and about the important role which the UK-Pakistan relationship can play in that.

(6) Today, an **active and engaged** foreign policy does not just mean dealing with so-called global security.

(7) The Strategy explains why the UK will continue to need an **active and engaged** foreign policy, and must remain ready to use all the assets at its disposal – persuasion, advice, assistance and, if necessary, military force. It also looks at the relationships we shall need to achieve our goals.

(8) To protect the UK from threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international crime, and to promote our economic interests, we must be **active and engaged** in the world.

(9) Safety, justice and prosperity are inextricably linked to each other; and achieving our goals means working on all three in an **active and engaged** way.

(10) Those of us, like me, who believe that Britain is stronger, more prosperous and more secure as an **active and engaged** member of the European Union will be making that case to the British people.

(11) We believe in an **active and engaged** role for Britain, as part of a strong international system which is able to confront the challenges and opportunities which we all face.

(12) Since 1997, this Government has pursued the **active and engaged** diplomacy that we need in today's world.

(13) More than ever before our destiny as a confident, progressive, prosperous and secure nation state requires an **active and engaged** foreign policy.

2-word congrams of *security* in the three Foreign Ministers' speeches

2-word concgrams in COOK

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2-word concgrams
    1. security    the    240
    2. security    Of     138
    3. security    and    92
    4. security    to     89
    5. security    a      81
    6. security    Council    72
    7. security    Our    59
    8. security    in     53
    9. security    we     50
   10.     security    that  45
   11.     security    is    39
   12.     security    for   36
   13.     security    on    30
   14.     security    as    21
   15.     security    more  21
   16.     security    be    20
   17.     security    has   20
   18.     security    will  20
   19.     security    with  19
   20.     security    Europe     18  9.4%
   21.     security    Britain    17  8.9%
   22.     security    have  17
   23.     security    it    17
   24.     security    not   16
   25.     security    can   15
   26.     security    European   15  7.8%
   27.     security    must  15
   28.     security    peace 15
   29.     security    by    13
   30.     security    I     12
   31.     security    Members    12
   32.     security    permanent  12
   33.     security    This  11
   34.     security    are   10
   35.     security    which 10
   36.     security    international    9
   37.     security    member     9
   38.     security    prosperity 9   4.7%
   39.     security    reform     9
   40.     security    united     9
   41.     security    us    9
   42.     security    world 9
   43.     security    was   9
   44.     security    been  8
   45.     security    its   8
   46.     security    new   8
   47.     security    NATO  8
   48.     security    Rights     8
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49.     security    UN    8
50.     security    without    8
51.     security    at    7
52.     security    from    7
53.     security    Human    7
54.     security    resolutions    7
55.     security    REPRESENTATIVE    7
56.     security    would    7
57.     security    all    6
58.     security    commitment    6
59.     security    countries    6
60.     security    defence    6
61.     security    do    6
62.     security    freedom    6
63.     security    no    6
64.     security    people    6
65.     security    Policy    6
66.     security    there    6
67.     security    within    6
68.     security    an    5
69.     security    about    5
70.     security    But    5
71.     security    even    5
72.     security    foreign    5
73.     security    first    5
74.     security    how    5
75.     security    Iraq    5
76.     security    Israelis    5
77.     security    initiative    5
78.     security    just    5
79.     security    Japan    5
80.     security    modern    5
81.     security    make    5
82.     security    Nations    5
83.     security    other    5
84.     security    Palestinians    5
85.     security    trade    5
86.     security    their    5
87.     security    who    5
88.     security    what    5
89.     security    year    5
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2-word *concgrams* in STRAW

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2-word concgrams
  1. security    the    943
  2. security    and    612
  3. security    to    462
  4. security    of    401
  5. security    in    263
  6. security    Council    198
  7. security    our    193    0.06%
  8. security    a    191
  9. security    on    173
  10.    security    for    163
  11.    security    We    150
  12.    security    is    147
  13.    security    that    136
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14.     security    as      96
15.     security    It      86
16.     security    which 86
17.     security    prosperity 82
18.     security    are     75
19.     security    international   73
20.     security    UN      71
21.     security    with    68
22.     security    this    65
23.     security    be      62
24.     security    have    62
25.     security    by      60
26.     security    will    60
27.     security    has     59
28.     security    I       57
29.     security    But     51
30.     security    European    50
31.     security    global      50
32.     security    peace 50
33.     security    threats     49
34.     security    can     48
35.     security    not     47
36.     security    more    45
37.     security    all     42
38.     security    an      41
39.     security    Policy      40
40.     security    there 39
41.     security    was     37
42.     security    from    36
43.     security    its     36
44.     security    at      35
45.     security    Europe      33
46.     security    today 32
47.     security    their 32
48.     security    own     31
49.     security    So      31
50.     security    us      31
51.     security    EU      30
52.     security    new     30
53.     security    world 30
54.     security    Defence     29
55.     security    other 29
56.     security    resolution  29
57.     security    UNITED      29
58.     security    Iraq 28
59.     security    members     28
60.     security    development 27
61.     security    they 27
62.     security    collective  26
63.     security    Nations     26
64.     security    need 26
65.     security    such 26
66.     security    one     25
67.     security    forces      24
68.     security    now     24
69.     security    resolutions 24
70.     security    common      23
71.     security    Foreign     23
72.     security    or      23
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73.      security    terrorism  23
74.      security    threat     23
75.      security    than  23
76.      security    also  22
77.      security    no    22
78.      security    Permanent  22
79.      security    These 22
80.      security    Force 21
81.      security    last  20
82.      security    long  20
83.      security    do    19
84.      security    First 19
85.      security    Iraqi 19
86.      security    Those 19
87.      security    years 19
88.      security    action     18
89.      security    make  18
90.      security    Over  18
91.      security    should     18
92.      security    issues     17
93.      security    regional   17
94.      security    would 17
95.      security    work  17
96.      security    been  16
97.      security    because    16
98.      security    challenges 16
99.      security    two   16
100.     security    between    15
101.     security    energy     15
102.     security    Freedom    15
103.     security    Key   15
104.     security    law   15
105.     security    national   15
106.     security    only  15
security    people   15
security    states   15
security    through  15
security    who   15
security    build 14
security    future   14
security    greater  14
security    justice  14
security    must  14
security    political   14
security    responsibility   14
security    reform   14
security    UK    14
security    well  14
security    act   13
security    based 13
security    both  13
security    building    13
security    could 13
security    ever  13
security    NATO  13
security    past  13
security    some  13
security    situation   13
security    take  13
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security     together    13
security     areas 12
security     co    12
security     ensure      12
security     economic    12
security     just  12
security     needs 12
security     Strategy    12
security     state 12
security     support     12
security     up    12
security     vital 12
security     Already     11
security     Assistance  11
security     borders     11
security     face  11
security     had   11
security     If    11
security     Let   11
security     membership  11
security     second      11
security     Union 11
security     under 11
security     want  11
security     week  11
security     weapons     11
security     were  11
security     working     11
security     when  11
security     What  11
security     you   11
security     against     10
security     basis 10
security     best  10
security     help  10
security     home  10
security     out   10
security     Palestinian 10
security     stability   10
security     Asia  9
security     authority   9
security     before      9
security     better      9
security     change      9
security     commitment  9
security     citizens    9
security     come  9
security     effective   9
security     East  9
security     full  9
security     greatest    9
security     He    9
security     Israel      9
security     me    9
security     mass  9
security     provide     9
security     proliferation    9
security     region      9
security     response    9
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security    sustainable 9
security    still 9
security    terrorists  9
security    War   9
security    without     9
security    able  8
security    across      8
security    ago   8
security    am    8
security    beyond      8
security    Britain     8
security    cannot      8
security    countries   8
security    challenge   8
security    deliver     8
security    how   8
security    human 8
security    interests   8
security    issue 8
security    Intelligence     8
security    jobs  8
security    many  8
security    Middle      8
security    much  8
security    next  8
security    put   8
security    recognised  8
security    rights      8
security    too   8
security    Three 8
security    welcome     8
security    where 8
security    attacks     7
security    around      7
security    any   7
security    about 7
security    ahead 7
security    British     7
security    built 7
security    community   7
security    depends     7
security    end   7
security    few   7
security    Iraq's      7
security    including   7
security    into  7
security    improving   7
security    most  7
security    member      7
security    Multi 7
security    my    7
security    power 7
security    role  7
security    report      7
security    right 7
security    Sudan 7
security    seek  7
security    said  7
security    set   7
```

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```
security      turn  7
security      time  7
security      within       7
security      way   7
security      agenda       6
security      active       6
security      arms  6
security      agencies     6
security      Again 6
security      begin 6
security      being 6
security      bring 6
security      conditions   6
security      continue     6
security      chaos 6
security      criminal     6
security      destruction 6
security      decade       6
security      depend       6
security      did   6
security      environment 6
security      five  6
security      fully 6
security      far   6
security      good  6
security      guarantee    6
security      General      6
security      historic     6
security      hope  6
security      Iran  6
security      Kingdom      6
security      lasting      6
security      later 6
security      means 6
security      maintain     6
security      North 6
security      non   6
security      opportunity 6
security      obligations 6
security      passed       6
security      partnership 6
security      partners     6
security      President    6
security      police       6
security      part  6
security      recent       6
security      rule  6
security      serious      6
security      Secretary    6
security      strengthen   6
security      STRAW 6
security      SADDAM       6
security      side  6
security      social       6
security      see   6
security      therefore    6
security      threaten     6
security      tackling     6
security      Turkey       6
```

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```
security     tackle      6
security     tax   6
security     very  6
security     year  6
security     alongside   5
security     address     5
security     away  5
security     arrangements      5
security     Afghanistan 5
security     Africa      5
security     area  5
security     agreement   5
security     Alliance    5
security     agreed      5
security     affect      5
security     believe     5
security     bringing    5
security     conflicts   5
security     create      5
security     closely     5
security     country     5
security     consensus   5
security     course      5
security     confront    5
security     capacity    5
security     compliance  5
security     closer      5
security     concerns    5
security     Committee   5
security     December    5
security     does  5
security     direct      5
security     done  5
security     decision    5
security     domestic    5
security     decisions   5
security     engagement  5
security     ensuring    5
security     efforts     5
security     example     5
security     free  5
security     fundamental 5
security     foundation  5
security     governance  5
security     Government  5
security     get   5
security     helping     5
security     here  5
security     helped      5
security     Humanitarian      5
security     important   5
security     Iraqis      5
security     India 5
security     IAEA  5
security     know  5
security     longer      5
security     live  5
security     life  5
security     makes 5
```

```
security    modern    5
security    made 5
security    month 5
security    Minister    5
security    October    5
security    outside    5
security    others    5
security    Palestinians    5
security    posed 5
security    proposed    5
security    principle    5
security    prosperous    5
security    real 5
security    relationship    5
security    reach 5
security    reinforce    5
security    remain    5
security    since 5
security    September    5
security    strong    5
security    South 5
security    share 5
security    seen 5
security    simply    5
security    shared    5
security    signed    5
security    them 5
security    themselves 5
security    trade 5
security    third 5
security    use  5
security    unanimously 5
security    values    5
security    wider 5
security    why  5
security    whole 5
security    your 5
```

2-word concgrams *security* in BECKETT

```
 1. security    the  370
 2. security    and  209
 3. security    to   178
 4. security    of   174
 5. security    a    115
 6. security    climate    108
 7. security    in   103
 8. security    We   76
 9. security    that 73
10.     security    energy    70
11.     security    is   64
12.     security    our  61
13.     security    on   60
14.     security    Council    57
15.     security    for  48
16.     security    as   45
17.     security    it   41
18.     security    be   39
```

```
19.     security    are     37
20.     security    global          37
21.     security    I       36
22.     security    not     33
23.     security    UN      31
24.     security    will    31
25.     security    at      29
26.     security    An      26
27.     security    change          25
28.     security    with    25
29.     security    this    24
30.     security    international    23
31.     security    So      21
32.     security    there   19
33.     security    but     18
34.     security    have    17
35.     security    has     17
36.     security    threat          17
37.     security    can     16
38.     security    resolution      16
39.     security    between         15
40.     security    national        15
41.     security    was     15
42.     security    new     14
43.     security    people          14
44.     security    they    14
45.     security    all     13
46.     security    hard    13
47.     security    agenda          12
48.     security    community       12
49.     security    Do      12
50.     security    prosperity      12
51.     security    their   12
52.     security    what    12
53.     security    from    11
54.     security    more    11
55.     security    UK      11
56.     security    world   11
57.     security    also    10
58.     security    challenges      10
59.     security    Iraqi   10
60.     security    peace   10
61.     security    very    10
62.     security    by      9
63.     security    implications    9
64.     security    If      9
65.     security    month   9
66.     security    must    9
67.     security    now     9
68.     security    no      9
69.     security    one     9
70.     security    other   9
71.     security    policy          9
72.     security    too     9
73.     security    why     9
74.     security    been    8
75.     security    economic        8
76.     security    Foreign         8
77.     security    issue   8
```

```
78.     security    Just  8
79.     security    last  8
80.     security    own   8
81.     security    responsibility    8
82.     security    some  8
83.     security    which 8
84.     security    water 8
85.     security    any   7
86.     security    about 7
87.     security    because     7
88.     security    countries   7
89.     security    debate      7
90.     security    economy     7
91.     security    example     7
92.     security    first 7
93.     security    Japan 7
94.     security    many  7
95.     security    or    7
96.     security    same  7
97.     security    those 7
98.     security    then  7
99.     security    unstable    7
100.    security    well  7
101.    security    you   7
102.    security    bring 6
103.    security    collective  6
104.    security    country     6
105.    security    crime 6
106.    security    doing 6
107.    security    forces      6
108.    security    face  6
109.    security    Government  6
110.    security    increase    6
111.    security    Iraq  6
112.    security    into  6
113.    security    its   6
114.    security    need  6
115.    security    only  6
116.    security    over  6
117.    security    put   6
118.    security    should      6
119.    security    still 6
120.    security    these 6
121.    security    time  6
122.    security    two   6
123.    security    terrorism   6
124.    security    United      6
125.    security    would 6
126.    security    who   6
127.    security    year  6
128.    security    again 5
129.    security    carbon      5
130.    security    China 5
131.    security    direct      5
132.    security    dealing     5
133.    security    Europe      5
134.    security    faces 5
135.    security    goes  5
136.    security    had   5
```

```
137.    security    heart 5
138.    security    issues      5
139.    security    investment  5
140.    security    links 5
141.    security    lead  5
142.    security    moment      5
143.    security    my    5
144.    security    priority    5
145.    security    part  5
146.    security    proliferation   5
147.    security    role  5
148.    security    right 5
149.    security    strengthening   5
150.    security    strategic   5
151.    security    supplies    5
152.    security    stability   5
153.    security    table 5
154.    security    than  5
155.    security    terms 5
156.    security    up    5
157.    security    us    5
158.    security    want  5
159.    security    when  5
160.    security    wider 5
```

APPENDIX 4

Relational column based on t-score calculation in the three foreign ministers' speeches

N	Word	With	Relation	Texts	Total
1	SECURITY	security	9,561	47	194
2	THE	security	3,622	42	167
3	OF	security	3,781	37	91
4	AND	security	3,737	32	66
5	COUNCIL	security	8,647	21	65
6	TO	security	2,740	24	43
7	OUR	security	4,380	19	41
8	A	security	3,337	24	41
9	IN	security	2,698	20	28
10	ON	security	4,125	21	25
11	FOR	security	3,611	17	24
12	THAT	security	2,709	18	22
13	WE	security	2,546	18	20
14	WILL	security	3,386	15	17
15	IS	security	2,392	13	15
16	BE	security	3,152	10	13
17	WITH	security	3,259	9	13
18	PERMANENT	security	7,987	11	12
19	EUROPE	security	3,415	7	11
20	EUROPEAN	security	3,828	8	11
21	AS	security	3,072	9	11
22	MEMBERS	security	5,970	8	10
23	MUST	security	4,402	7	10
24	HAVE	security	2,583	9	10
25	UNITED	security	5,881	9	9
26	CAN	security	3,357	7	9
27	BY	security	3,359	8	9
28	MORE	security	3,806	5	9
29	PROSPERITY	security	5,961	6	8
30	WHICH	security	3,271	7	8
31	RESOLUTIONS	security	9,017	4	7
32	PEACE	security	4,645	6	7
33	BEEN	security	4,076	5	7
34	COMMITMENT	security	5,234	6	6
35	THIS	security	2,871	5	6
36	FREEDOM	security	5,690	5	6
37	NATIONAL	security	4,776	5	6
38	MEMBER	security	5,472	6	6
39	BRITAIN	security	2,500	5	6
40	INITIATIVE	security	6,946	6	6
41	AN	security	2,937	5	5
42	UN	security	4,605	5	5
43	DEFENCE	security	7,946	5	5
44	NEW	security	3,264	4	5
45	NO	security	4,568	5	5
46	NATIONS	security	4,876	5	5
47	ITS	security	3,369	5	5
48	INTERNATIONAL	security	3,563	4	5
49	REFORM	security	5,330	3	5
50	REPRESENTATIVE	security	7,394	3	5

COOK

N	Word	With	Relation	Texts	Total
1	SECURITY	security	28,001	118	788
2	THE	security	19,834	104	496
3	AND	security	19,133	108	418
4	TO	security	15,245	93	281
5	COUNCIL	security	13,816	66	193
6	OF	security	13,037	87	221
7	OUR	security	11,445	56	142
8	ON	security	9,517	66	125
10	PROSPERITY	security	8,887	47	80
11	FOR	security	7,944	52	79
12	INTERNATIONAL	security	7,673	39	64

13	A	security	7,604	52	84
14	UN	security	7,284	38	55
15	IS	security	6,660	47	63
16	PEACE	security	6,519	26	44
17	THREATS	security	6,418	26	42
18	GLOBAL	security	6,298	23	42
19	WHICH	security	6,237	41	49
20	THAT	security	6,076	31	55
21	EUROPEAN	security	5,899	17	39
22	AS	security	5,889	31	45
23	POLICY	security	5,759	22	35
24	BY	security	5,542	30	38
25	DEFENCE	security	5,234	20	28
26	RESOLUTION	security	5,052	21	26
27	COLLECTIVE	security	4,958	14	25
28	MEMBERS	security	4,789	19	24
29	WE	security	4,784	30	41
30	DEVELOPMENT	security	4,633	15	23
31	HAS	security	4,611	24	29
32	ARE	security	4,558	26	31
33	PERMANENT	security	4,447	17	20
34	RESOLUTIONS	security	4,435	17	20
35	OWN	security	4,409	16	21
36	S	security	4,394	19	23
37	WITH	security	4,384	24	28
38	WILL	security	4,332	21	26
39	NATIONS	security	4,264	19	20
40	IT	security	4,261	21	29
41	THREAT	security	4,253	17	19
42	AN	security	4,238	18	23
43	FORCES	security	4,168	12	18
44	NEW	security	4,116	19	20
45	ITS	security	4,110	18	21
46	CAN	security	4,102	19	21
47	COMMON	security	4,089	15	18
48	FROM	security	4,073	21	22
49	UNITED	security	4,062	18	19
50	BE	security	4,045	20	24

STRAW

N	Word	With	Relation	Texts	Total
1	SECURITY	security	19,005	42	363
2	THE	security	12,289	35	187
3	AND	security	11,258	38	147
4	TO	security	9,059	27	101
5	OF	security	8,921	33	98
6	CLIMATE	security	9,527	25	93
7	ENERGY	security	7,656	22	60
8	COUNCIL	security	7,229	24	53
9	IN	security	6,133	23	51
10	OUR	security	6,685	22	49
11	A	security	5,961	24	47
12	ON	security	5,260	19	33
13	THAT	security	4,647	16	33
14	FOR	security	4,976	22	30
15	UN	security	4,963	16	25
16	AS	security	4,451	11	24
17	WE	security	3,632	12	22
18	GLOBAL	security	4,308	11	20
19	INTERNATIONAL	security	4,147	12	19
20	ARE	security	3,655	12	18
21	IS	security	3,040	9	17
22	CHANGE	security	3,775	9	16
23	RESOLUTION	security	3,852	11	15
24	BE	security	3,037	9	13
25	AT	security	3,268	10	13
26	NOT	security	3,152	8	13
27	WITH	security	3,101	9	13
28	PROSPERITY	security	3,442	11	12
29	BETWEEN	security	3,348	8	12
30	THREAT	security	3,403	9	12
31	IT	security	2,622	8	12
32	NATIONAL	security	3,248	6	11
33	AN	security	2,958	7	11
34	WILL	security	2,678	6	11

35	HARD	security	3,279	3	11
36	THEIR	security	3,113	9	11
37	BUT	security	2,834	6	11
38	HAS	security	2,734	7	10
39	I	security	2,323	6	10
40	AGENDA	security	3,092	7	10
41	COMMUNITY	security	2,891	4	9
42	PEACE	security	2,940	8	9
43	ONE	security	2,510	6	8
44	ECONOMIC	security	2,696	4	8
45	WATER	security	2,781	3	8
46	PEOPLE	security	2,534	6	8
47	SO	security	2,304	4	7
48	RESPONSIBILITY	security	2,582	5	7
49	IF	security	2,377	3	7
50	IMPLICATIONS	security	2,624	5	7

BECKETT

security: 2-word concgrams - Cook

security/people

```
1        is what can we do as governments to improve the security of our people as individuals? All the assurances
2     The other issue before us that would enhance the security of our people is the decision we are being asked
3     of Mr Netanyahu's promise to deliver peace with security. The Israeli people know that without peace
4        was elected on a commitment to peace with security. Most of the Israeli people, including many who
5     countries to the strength of our economy, to the security of our nation, to the safety of our people
6             supported the Israeli people's right to security. And it is worth remembering that they elected
```

security/Britain

```
1        for crisis management the stronger will be the security of Britain.  That is why the Government believe
2     and world opinion. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Britain made its contribution to
3     Commonwealth, and is a permanent member of the Security Council. Britain has a unique opportunity to
4     built around the new proposals for a European security capacity. Britain has been very much at the fore
5     expressed your commitment to the new European Security and Defence Policy. Britain is keen that
6     of lifting sanctions, once Saddam complies with Security Council resolutions. Britain has consistently
7        peace. But the Israelis will not find true security without peace.  That is why Britain regards
8     small arms and other equipment for sale to the security forces of certain regimes. 4. Britain will
9        not shunning Europe. The Common Foreign and Security Policy also makes for a stronger Britain. It is
10    to bring human rights into the agenda of the Security Council. Last weekend, for example, Britain
11       And both Hungary and Britain will have the security of being part of a Union that brings peace and
12    Japanese investment in Britain is made in the security that Britain will continue as a leading partner
13    Japan joins Britain as a permanent member of the Security Council. This would be proper recognition of
14       And Britain will reap the full benefits - security, prosperity and strength. Which makes it hard to
15    Britain also has a vital interest in peace and security in the Gulf. UK exports to the GCC states were
16    Britain flagged our commitment to the region's security and our contribution to the five-power defence
```

security/Europe(an)

```
1     at how we can improve the decision making on the security of Europe, in order that Europe can respond more
2     important message that vital to the freedom and security of Europe is the partnership between America and
3        life. Without close Russian involvement, no security system for Europe is credible. The NATO/Russia
4        in NATO and NATO's enlargement will deepen security across all Europe. NATO's decisions at next
5     a member of the UN Permanent Membership of the Security Council, of the European Union, of the G8 and of
6     be taken on the basis of how we can enhance the security of the whole of Europe and not just the security
7     secure, with NATO as the foundation stone of our security. And we will make Europe prosperous, with the
8        in international trade talks. Our defence and security initiative will give Europe a much more
9        has delivered a prolonged period of peace and security between the peoples of Europe which is
10    their efforts even further. We have seconded a security adviser to the staff of the European Special
11    expressed your commitment to the new European Security and Defence Policy. Britain is keen that
12    opportunity to contribute to the new European security initiative. Your contribution to the military
13    programme we are now embarked on on the European Security Initiative will give us better integration of
14    built around the new proposals for a European security capacity. Britain has been very much at the fore
15    not actually opposed to human rights. EUROPEAN SECURITY However, it may be for the convenience of the
16    reform, on social inclusion, on the European security dimension. That respect within Europe gives us
17    of State have all warmly endorsed the European Security Initiative. EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT The other big
18    are essential components of a durable European security. We have made good progress in creating such a
19    I turn in detail first to the issue of European security, to which the press this week has devoted a
20    security of the whole of Europe and not just the security of the present members, or those who may be
21    in the EU to make Europe an area of freedom, security and justice. The more countries of Europe join
22    not shunning Europe. The Common Foreign and Security Policy also makes for a stronger Britain. It is
23    a member of a Europe of stability. The European Security Initiative reinforces our ability to respond to
24    of Europe and able to engage with us in building security and stability within the Balkans. There is one
25    European integration has been a major force for security and freedom in Europe for the last fifty years.
26    European integration has been a major force for security and freedom in Europe for the last fifty years.
```

Security/peace

```
1        And both Hungary and Britain will have the security of being part of a Union that brings peace and
2     Council Resolutions against Iraq, but ignored Security Council Resolutions on the Middle East Peace
3     United Nations is to ensure that the peace and security, which have been enjoyed by many of our Member
4        the more partners we will have for peace and security. The more countries that obey the rule of law,
5     has delivered a prolonged period of peace and security between the peoples of Europe which is
6     Britain also has a vital interest in peace and security in the Gulf. UK exports to the GCC states were
7     of Mr Netanyahu's promise to deliver peace with security. The Israeli people know that without peace
8        was elected on a commitment to peace with security. Most of the Israeli people, including many who
9     half a century of peace. That has provided the security and good order in which their prosperity has
10    without a just peace there will be no lasting security.  A MESSAGE OF DETERMINATION We ourselves in
11    that without peace there can be no real, lasting security. They want the peace process to go forward. They
12       peace. But the Israelis will not find true security without peace.  That is why Britain regards
```

security/International

```
1            offer solutions that recognise that national security requires international alliances and that
2              - cooperation as Permanent Members of the Security Council on international affairs, promoting
3        too long before Japan can join us again in the Security Council. We are natural partners in internationa
4           of comment; a spirit of internationalism and security for trade with any part of the world. Because we
5                of collective international efforts.  The Security Council itself needs to be more representative o
6          Iraq and the international community. The UN Security Council was united in its demand that Saddam
7        can rejoin the international community, and the Security Council can begin the process of lifting
8          is in our international interest. Our national security depends on NATO. NATO now has a common border
9          in international trade talks. Our defence and security initiative will give Europe a much more effectiv
10          international sphere of inter-state relations, security treaties and trade agreements. Vital though this
```

security/prosperity

```
1              And Britain will reap the full benefits - security, prosperity and strength. Which makes it hard to
2        our geography and our history. Our culture, our security, and our prosperity, are inseparable from the
3        half a century of peace. That has provided the security and good order in which their prosperity has
4            in a modern world where our prosperity, our security and our influence depend on the health of our
5        can have a direct impact on the prosperity, the security and even the climate of countries on the other
6        majority of our exports. The prosperity and the security of our nation depend on foreign contacts.
7        It is here to accelerate. Our prosperity and our security will become increasingly interdependent. I have
8               enhances our prosperity, and reinforces our security. The second line of attack is even more speciou
9        ever to the prosperity of our economies and the security of our peoples. I cannot guarantee that our work
```

security/world

```
1        skills and find jobs. Because the only real job security in the modern world comes from employability. Of
2            allegations of involvement by the Algerian security authorities. The world's media have a keen
3        permanent member of the Security Council. The Security Council must represent the world as it is in thi
4           of comment; a spirit of internationalism and security for trade with any part of the world. Because we
5               We need a more modern and representative Security Council. A body that represents the world of the
6           in a modern world where our prosperity, our security and our influence depend on the health of our
7        the Arab world.  QUALITY OF LIFE The question of security leads naturally into another priority of the
8             world. A small increase in the size of the Security Council would be a modest price to pay for the
9        and world opinion. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Britain made its contribution to
```

security/new

```
1        BY FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR ROBIN COOK, TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NEW YORK, THURSDAY 24 SEPTEMBER 1998 I
2            is operating in the British Sector, to the Security Council in New York, where the Czech Republic wa
3           the performance of our Common Foreign and Security Policy. The new British Government is committed
4        organisation that can properly address global security and development issues and the range of new
5        expressed your commitment to the new European Security and Defence Policy. Britain is keen that
6        opportunity to contribute to the new European security initiative. Your contribution to the military
7        there has been no new permanent member of the Security Council. The Security Council must represent the
8        built around the new proposals for a European security capacity. Britain has been very much at the fore
```

Security/commitment

```
1        the opening of the Gaza airport, and specific security commitments. * Second, practical assistance from
2           on security; and implementation of precise security commitments, complemented by an effective
3          PREVENTION The second commitment I give the Security Council is that we will make it the priority of
4          was elected on a commitment to peace with security. Most of the Israeli people, including many who
5        of a year ago, was our commitment to promote the security of the United Kingdom. The most positive
6         Britain flagged our commitment to the region's security and our contribution to the five-power defence
7            We have a firm commitment to the long-term security of the Gulf. This has been firmly shown by our
8          expressed your commitment to the new European Security and Defence Policy. Britain is keen that
```

Security/freedom

```
1           was revolutionary. That responsibility for security, freedom and development does not belong solely
2    European integration has been a major force for security and freedom in Europe for the last fifty years.
3    which all its peoples can be united by the same security and freedom that I now call upon each of you to
4    European integration has been a major force for security and freedom in Europe for the last fifty years.
5      in the EU to make Europe an area of freedom, security and justice. The more countries of Europe join
6    important message that vital to the freedom and security of Europe is the partnership between America and
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security/Iraq

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1           It was claimed that we vigorously pursued Security Council Resolutions against Iraq, but ignored
2              community. We will support within the Security Council continuing sanctions against Iraq until
3    Council Resolutions against Iraq, but ignored Security Council Resolutions on the Middle East Peace
4    for Iraq. Once Saddam complies fully with the Security Council's requirements on weapons of mass
5     Iraq and the international community. The UN Security Council was united in its demand that Saddam
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security/threat(s)

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1           form, but about the substance, threats to our security, concern about human rights, wars, famines and
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security/global

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1         organisation that can properly address global security and development issues and the range of new
2          partner in the global economy and in global security. Russia has ceased to be an opponent of the West
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security/development

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1         organisation that can properly address global security and development issues and the range of new
2            was revolutionary. That responsibility for security, freedom and development does not belong solely
3      Kingdom. The most positive development for our security over the past year has been the strengthened
4    to consult with Japan on developments within the Security Council and will continue to do so for as long a
5     of sustainable development, of opportunity, of security, and of rights.  First, to create a Commonwealth
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APPENDIX 6

security: 2-word concgrams – Straw

security/work

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1              and political will to make collective security work. The United Kingdom is determined to play
2            based on a shared will to make collective security work. It has adapted in the past – with the
3       British contingent and as mandated by the UN security council, will continue to work alongside Iraqi
4          markets. We will use our Presidency of the Security Council in October to lead work on following up
5      required to protect civilians and to provide a security environment in which the UN could work. Nor do
6      integrated more closely into the UN's work on security and development, through the proposed Human
7       in the world.  Let me start with our work on security.  As Foreign Secretary, it sometimes seems as
8          Fifth is the European Union's work on global security. On data retention, the European Parliament has
9    the transfer of power. We will work for a new UN Security Council Resolution setting out the new
10       at the centre of UN work on development and security.   Today, at 60, the UN remains the keystone of
11      leadership. Our work on implementing the EU Security Strategy is helping to bring together all the
12   oversee some of this work.  Let me now turn from security to the second area of work which I want to talk
13      are those who work in our intelligence and security agencies. Over the past seven years, I have had
14       take forward work on the Common Foreign and Security Policy aspects of defence and security. Again,
15    live, work, study or simply holiday abroad. EU SECURITY STRATEGY So we need for example to start
16       to work alongside Iraqi forces in maintaining security, while helping those forces to build the
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security/people

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1        I have discussed the link between climate and security with many people. Some of them are sceptical.
2    make? What can we do – specifically what can the security community, the people in this room do – to
3           and borrowed from it. And it is still the security community – the people in this room – who do it
4           to stretch them far beyond it.  Take food security – the ability of people to have enough to eat. I
5     nations is to no small degree predicated on the security of individuals.  When people are exposed to the
6      debate. Those decisions affect the fundamental security of this country and its people. And they involve
7    in particular to increase its ability to provide security and basic services to the Iraqi people.  The
8      extremists and lay the foundations of long-term security.  The challenge faced by the Iraqi people in
9          different from any other type of problem. Security is seen as an imperative not an option. People
10       taking complete responsibility for providing security, and governing in the interests of all the peopl
11    are most important to the British people; jobs; security; self-respect; a decent quality of life and a
12          want the best for their people: peace, security, a stable and growing economy. And the vast
13         The Afghan government and people too want security, development and good governance. The UK and the
14         The first is that when people talk about security problems they do so in terms which are
15    million people from the delta.  What the precise security ramifications of that kind of change would be ar
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security/collective

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1        and hope that the threats will go away. Global security is our collective responsibility, and we must al
2        sensitive aspect of today's global debate on security – the question of collective military action.
3    the other was the conviction that our collective security was being threatened in new ways, with an
4        I commend this Bill to the House.'COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE' (09/07/02)
5    as we pursue the cause of freedom and collective security in Europe.    WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY FOR A
6    wrote that underneath all the talk of collective security could be heard 'the throbbing of the engines:
7     do as they please, in the service of collective security. It can no longer be acceptable to classify
8        for their twisted cause. And the collective security which the people of Israel, the Occupied
9       the cause of international law and collective security it is a challenge we must confront.
10        and the proliferation of WMD, collective security in Europe, the strengthening of the multilateral
11   and reaffirm Britain's commitment to collective security and multilateralism. It was the appalling
12         commitment to the principle of collective security would have amounted to words without action. For
13           democratic government, collective security and international law.  In the past, these ideas
14        no. When it came to preserving collective security within the borders of our own continent, we
15       Europe's economic prosperity and collective security.   First, research and development. We need a
16    the continent's twin guarantors of collective security and prosperity: NATO and the European Union. Bot
17    the will to back its commitment to collective security with military muscle.  CFSP  Foreign policy
18       based on a shared will to make collective security work. It has adapted in the past – with the
19   Speaker: Jack Straw   The search for collective security has been the inspiration for some of diplomacy's
20   of mass destruction threaten to make collective security a redundant concept. How can multilateral
21        and political will to make collective security work. The United Kingdom is determined to play
22    1945. So too have the threats to our collective security and well-being. The United Nations now needs to
23    states and peoples which affect our collective security. We can't have security without development, or
24   the best guarantor of collective prosperity and security.   'THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO GLOBALISATION' -
25   the EU has guaranteed collective prosperity and security for the past five decades. In an uncertain world
26    affect our collective security. We can't have security without development, or development without
27    build collective responsibility for our global security. All countries have a stake in an international
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security/development

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1          integrated more closely into the UN's work on security and development, through the proposed Human
2          Meanwhile on the many challenges ahead – on security, on development, on building a stronger
3          The global arms trade, bringing together security and development, is just the kind of issue
4          affect our collective security. We can't have security without development, or development without
5          look at three areas in this global partnership: security; sustainable development; and building the
6          to build the conditions for long-term global security and sustainable development. Tony Blair has
7          we do;  and third, because human rights underpin security and help to make development sustainable. They
8          for themselves, through a combination of NATO's security umbrella and the development of European
9          will shape the future of our world, on energy security, climate change, development and security.  I'm
10          more effective policies for ensuring energy security.  The second theme was development, and
11          Europe's economic prosperity and collective security.   First, research and development. We need a
12          states and peoples which affect our collective security. We can't have security without development, or
13          in NATO. The second pillar of European security in the next decade should be the development of
14          policy. But fundamentally we share a vision of security and prosperity based on sustainable development
15          pillars on which it was founded: development, security and human rights. Each of these goals is both
16          international policy – bringing development and security, as ever, together.  And in making the world les
17          the political reform, economic development and security plans of the Palestinian Authority. I also hope
18          energy security, climate change, development and security.  I'm delighted that India's Prime Minister will
19          at the centre of UN work on development and security.  Today, at 60, the UN remains the keystone of
20          to address the links between development and security; and to act more effectively on threats such as
21          supports investment, development and lasting security.   So promoting democracy has to be at the heart
22          we have promoted the development of a European security and defence capability;  * and we have champione
23          priorities: economic development, governance and security. This was later firmed up at the G8 summit in
24          for Africa's development;  * to bolster the security of British and global energy supplies;  * and to
25          reduction and development, governance, peace and security. Others are new. But they all have one thing in
26          without development, or development without security.   As the Secretary-General highlighted in his
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security/regional

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1          is this: what would you do to protect global security from a regime which threatens regional or
2          generates can in turn reinforce regional security.  If such a virtuous circle can be created,
3          or bilaterally. As I have said, regional security problems may demand more regional arms control.
4          Kashmir, and in so doing enhance regional security.  But while there is progress in your north-west
5          the most immediate: they are terrorism, regional security, and globalisation.  First terrorism. Since we
6          challenge I want to speak about is regional security. It would be wrong to pretend that this and the
7          Underpinning these joint efforts on regional security is our commitment to close a defence
8          match.  Having dealt with terrorism and regional security, let me come onto the third immediate challenge
9          and specific challenges: terrorism, regional security and globalisation, have to be set in a broader
10          which helps us build global, not regional security, operating far beyond the borders of the Treaty
11          and move its focus from regional to global security. And in the years ahead, it is vital that we kee
12          and terrorists thrive, and regional and global security are at risk, because chaos spreads. Ethnic
13          part of the burden of regional and global security. Following 11 September, the need is more acute
14          the full potential of regional co-operation and security in the whole of the subcontinent – with enormous
15          for regional peace – and with it Iranian security – are greater than ever before now that they no
16          few regional organisations existed; today, the Security Council could make more use of it. The UN has th
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security/new

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1          for Europe. It will promote jobs, wealth and security in both new and existing member states. Over a
2          reduction and development, governance, peace and security. Others are new. But they all have one thing in
3          sustainable global security.  The modern security agenda demands new and wide-ranging forms of
4          to the task of preserving our peace and security in the face of new threats.  We do not
5          the other was the conviction that our collective security was being threatened in new ways, with an
6          TO PUT SADDAM TO THE TEST' (07/03/03) Event: UN Security Council Meeting  Location: New York  Speech
7          such distinctions either in international law.  Security Council Resolution 1373 created new obligations
8          Blair in October 1998 first proposed a European Security and Defence Policy – built on a new relationship
9          Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, addressed the Security Council last Thursday [3 June] in New York. He
10          be able to build long-term, sustainable global security.  The modern security agenda demands new and
11          Blair in October 1998 first proposed a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – built on a new
12          our deep engagement in Asia's security.  ASIA'S SECURITY  Later this week I will be travelling to New
13          orderly manner. I hope that we can agree a new Security Council Resolution to strengthen the UN's role i
14          Kingdom have proposed that there should be a new Security Council Resolution to facilitate the transfer of
15          Iraq. British officers are training Iraq's new Security forces and mentoring the future leaders of the
16          assessment of the situation. A decision on a new Security Council Resolution will we hope be made later
17          of Iraq. We will be seeking new UN Security Council resolutions to affirm Iraq's territorial
18          the transfer of power. We will work for a new UN Security Council Resolution setting out the new
19          into civilian life or into the new, multi-ethnic security forces. And indeed these elections are only the
20          EU of the need to deal with new threats to our security.   And now we have the opportunity to establish
21          to tackling the grave new threats to our security and prosperity: global terrorism, the spread of
22          to tackle more effectively new threats to our security – from terrorism, proliferation and internationa
23          also became more complex, and new threats to our security emerged. Conflicts in the dissolving Yugoslav
24          We will seek the adoption of new United Nations Security Council Resolutions which reaffirm Iraq's
25          highlighted the new threats posed to our security by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
26          That posed new challenges to our stability and security. In Europe, the breakdown of the Yugoslav
27          confront new threats. Future challenges to our security are as likely to come from terrorists and weapon
28          of the new Palestinian leadership to improving security arrangements in the Occupied Territories. They
29          The new threat to the US, and to international security more generally, now comes from other sources, no
30          the new Government of Iraq will face is to build security. There will be those who will continue to seek t
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security/world

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1       not in Europe, but in the challenges of global security around the world.  Today's threats affect us
2         the traditional threats to global peace and security, the UN and the world community face three risin
3           to govern themselves, to manage their own security and to prove to the world that they can lay the
4       chaos in one part of the Earth can undermine security in all parts of the world. Against that chaos we
5   supreme decision-making body, the United Nations Security Council. We have the world's fourth largest
6        presents the greatest threat to our national security, and to the peace of the world.  Policy makers
7   it means more effective common action to enhance security at home and in the wider world. I am greatly
8            instrument for protecting our peace and security. Down the other route lies a world in which
9     system and working multilaterally to promote security, prosperity and justice.  The world's largest
10              machinery.  Meanwhile, we want to see a Security Council which reflects today's world and the
11          and innovation. And we both know that our security depends on being active around the world, and on
12             news stories - Iraq.  Last month, the UN Security Council finally recognised that the world could
13   international policy - bringing development and security, as ever, together.  And in making the world les
14      planet. And our permanent membership of the UN Security Council gives us huge influence in the world's
15   Union better deliver to them the prosperity and security which we all seek in a rapidly-changing world?
16        on which I believe transatlantic foreign and security policies have to be based in this changing world
17   exist because we have put in place the physical security and the system of values which make a free world
18     the EU has guaranteed collective prosperity and security for the past five decades. In an uncertain world
19    enormous importance to the UK's and the world's security - and a priority of our foreign policy. The
20   negation of war, but the creation of a world of security and freedom, of a world which is governed by
21       remain essential to our - and the world's - security and prosperity. That is why we invest so much in
22       a better, safer, more prosperous world.  'SECURITY IS NOT AN OPTION, IT IS A NECESSITY' - STRAW
23   This is because, in an interdependent world, our security and prosperity depend on our ability to influenc
24   to the fact that the threats to world peace and security today are as likely to come from non-state group
25       we are doing together on the world stage, in security and diplomatic matters, as well as in the sphere
26       will shape the future of our world, on energy security, climate change, development and security.  I'm
27   paralyse and impoverish the world, so that our security, our freedoms and our prosperity decline
28     threat to our world in terms of stability and security, not just the environment. We must begin by
29        in the world.  Let me start with our work on security.  As Foreign Secretary, it sometimes seems as
30            world in which we live, where others' security and prosperity directly affect our own, far more
31       the world.      EU ENLARGEMENT     European security is not just dependent on increased military
32   on the world stage. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy has been a reality for a long time. But,
33       the world, because it directly affects our own security. Decisions by states which fifty years ago would
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security/Europe(an)

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1       develop tools to help maintain global peace and security. EUROPEAN DEFENCE Three years ago, Tony Blair an
2    as we pursue the cause of freedom and collective security in Europe.      WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY FOR A
3        even closer. Turkey has long been key to the security of Europe as a whole. Turkey's economy is one of
4          of global order.  It has delivered peace and security in Europe, reduced national rivalries and balanc
5          and the proliferation of WMD, collective security in Europe, the strengthening of the multilateral
6    shoulder a heavy burden as guardian of peace and security in Europe and beyond. Today the Alliance is
7      That posed new challenges to our stability and security. In Europe, the breakdown of the Yugoslav
8        with over 10,000 troops bringing peace and security to the European continent and beyond. In recent
9       the best guarantor of collective prosperity and security.   'THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO GLOBALISATION' -
10     I commend this Bill to the House.'COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE' (09/07/02)
11          created by trade and growth reinforce security. We have seen in Europe how former enemies can
12   which we live. It is one upon which stands the security and prosperity of Europe itself. We cannot affo
13   and illegal migration, and increasingly for the security of energy supplies to Europe.  Despite these
14   envisage a high-level, long-term political and security framework between the European Union and Iran, i
15     doubt that it is of direct benefit to our own security. This has strengthened Europe's security as well
16      who have been excluded from the benefits of security and prosperity which we in Europe take for
17        - they are global public goods. Today the security and economic well-being of Europe and America
18   agencies;  * and tougher rules on air transport security. And they include a common European arrest
19      the continent's twin guarantors of collective security and prosperity: NATO and the European Union. Bot
20   that the Alliance's very success in guaranteeing security has bred complacency amongst European Allies.  H
21         importance to our future prosperity and security that the relationship between Europe and the US
22   for themselves, through a combination of NATO's security umbrella and the development of European
23   chosen an appropriate theme - the links between security, prosperity, and partnership. The European Union
24   EU and NATO, as the twin foundation of European security and prosperity. It will take on the internationa
25       time for international policy. The European Security Strategy, or the formation of a High-Level Panel
26   Blair in October 1998 first proposed a European Security and Defence Policy - built on a new relationship
27      the world.     EU ENLARGEMENT     European security is not just dependent on increased military
28   The Balkans, you are well aware of how European security can be threatened by ethnic rivalries and lack
29      the Prime Minister first proposed a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - built on a close
30   our own security. This has strengthened Europe's security as well as America's. This brings me to my third
31     through the EU will be crucial. The European Security Strategy endorsed last December makes the Middle
32         it.    But history shows that European security depends on more than sound bilateral relations.
33   should constitute the third pillar of European security in the next decade.     Recent political
34   and civilian crisis management, the European Security and Defence Policy. Our experience in the Balkan
35   with NATO, as the twin foundations of European security and prosperity.  There are two linked challenges
36   Minister's decision in 1998 to launch a European Security and Defence Policy with President Chirac. We hav
37   Blair in October 1998 first proposed a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - built on a new
38     led efforts to develop an effective European Security and Defence Policy. This enables Europe to act o
39   together to establish the pillars of European security I have set out this evening, I am confident that
40     between the key institutions for European security.  Yet despite the good intentions which lie
41   - as demonstrated for example by the European Security Strategy. We now have a chance to reinforce our
42   Some countries are participating in European security and defence operations - in Macedonia and in the
43   Just a few years ago, the debate on European Security and Defence Policy revolved around the location
44   nation states. * second, a credible European security and defence policy to handle crisis management
45   the capabilities needed for NATO and European security. The UK is assisting this reform programme. We
46      in two particular areas: first, European security; second, the creation of a prosperous European
47        in NATO. The second pillar of European security in the next decade should be the development of
48   a fundamental change for the better in European security. But if the Alliance is genuinely to count for
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49        its region, for so long a threat to European security, into one of our greatest assets.   CONCLUDING
50    African Union force in Sudan. So today, European Security and Defence Policy is not just a piece of paper.
51    EU and NATO, as the twin foundation of European security and prosperity. The EU will take on the UN-led
52        between the key institutions for European security. Only a strong transatlantic ESDP will keep NATO
53      on from the fall of the Soviet Union, European security still depends on the Atlantic Alliance. NATO is
54      the case for an agenda to strengthen European security in the twenty first century. This should be
55        pillars which must form the basis of European security in the next decade. The first of these is NATO.
56    Our citizens also expect us to deliver European security. I welcome our involvement in the long haul to
57    we have promoted the development of a European security and defence capability;  * and we have champione
58    literal chill over many parts of Europe.  Energy security is becoming an ever more important issue for the
59        to American soldiers'.  The European Union's Security and Defence Policy is an expression of the
60      who would threaten it.   The European Union's Security and Defence Policy is an expression of this
61    this banquet one year ago – Europe, and global security. Let me begin with Europe. THE EU CONSTITUTION A
62    end. What people want is a Europe which delivers security and prosperity to its citizens. Britain and
63      Gentlemen, The European Union is vital to our security and prosperity – a market for 60% of our trade,
64      Fifth is the European Union's work on global security. On data retention, the European Parliament has
65        turning Europe into an area of freedom, security and justice; acting against terrorism; launching
66      in Europe and beyond, and demonstrate that security, prosperity and justice are not just features of
67    not in Europe, but in the challenges of global security around the world.  Today's threats affect us
68      in European military budgets. But given the security dilemmas we now face, this defies logic. It
69    for Europe. It will promote jobs, wealth and security in both new and existing member states. Over a
70        Europe, increasing our prosperity and our security, promoting our values, and enhancing our power.
71    and Europe can and should tackle international security issues together. Recent developments in the
72        Europe's economic prosperity and collective security.   First, research and development. We need a
73    with Europe more effectively pursuing our shared security interests, and the US working with Europe and
74        Europe and the US was the cornerstone of our security and prosperity. These differences of history are
75        European Allies.  He concludes that Europe's security is based almost entirely on US power, and that
76        Europe that generates jobs and guarantees our security. This is the direction in which we are trying to
77    Europe we are building through our initiative on security and defence. We launched this because we feel
78    Europe on its own; rather American guarantees of security helped to create the conditions where Europeans
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security/peace

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1     two states, Israel and Palestine, co-existing in security, peace and prosperity. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
2     become serious partners common aims: stability, security, peace and prosperity in the region.  Let us als
3        presents the greatest threat to our national security, and to the peace of the world.  Policy makers
4     process: for to do so would deny them lasting security and the chance to prosper in a peaceful region.
5       around the broad criteria for action by the Security Council against threats to international peace
6            efforts, and have taken action in the UN Security Council against those seeking to block the peace
7     of the modern threats to international peace and security.  And alongside that, we also need to develop a
8     his opinion may threaten international peace and security to the Security Council's attention. But no
9            against threats to international peace and security. We can build there on the growing understanding
10    living alongside a state of Israel in peace and security. It offers the Palestinians the opportunity to
11      is modernising the UN's approach to peace and security. We welcome the proposal for a Peacebuilding
12    that this cannot advance the cause of peace and security for Israelis any more than it can for
13        and to undermine international peace and security. If we are to confront them, then we will need a
14    who want nothing more than to live in peace and security.  Terrorism requires a firm security response.
15    most serious threats to international peace and security.  It is not only terrorism within one state whic
16      we all have an interest in seeing peace and security entrenched, because insecurity and tension,
17      or fighting terrorism and building peace and security. Ours is a modern partnership which is firmly
18    to the fact that the threats to world peace and security today are as likely to come from non-state group
19    see: two states living side by side in peace and security. Last year they agreed a joint declaration which
20      of common commitment to prosperity, peace and security based on freedom and the rule of law.  These two
21      with over 10,000 troops bringing peace and security to the European continent and beyond. In recent
22    face of other threats to international peace and security. The principle of non-interference has to be
23    maintain and to restore international peace and security.   Over the past 12 years, the Iraqi regime has
24    develop tools to help maintain global peace and security. EUROPEAN DEFENCE Three years ago, Tony Blair an
25      on the line to maintain and to build peace and security. And our thoughts and prayers are with the
26    pose a grave threat to international peace and security. It was in recognition of their singular menace,
27    reduction and development, governance, peace and security. Others are new. But they all have one thing in
28    in good governance, in growth, and in peace and security.  We have first of all to deliver better access
29      the traditional threats to global peace and security, the UN and the world community face three risin
30      of global order.  It has delivered peace and security in Europe, reduced national rivalries and balanc
31    said poses a threat to international peace and security, is by backing our diplomacy with a credible
32          to the task of preserving our peace and security in the face of new threats.  We do not
33    him a unique threat to international peace and security.   But consensus on the objective is not simply
34    a Chapter VII threat to international peace and security by its proliferation of weapons of mass
35    shoulder a heavy burden as guardian of peace and security in Europe and beyond. Today the Alliance is
36    two democracies living side by side in peace and security. Working to support that will be the highest
37    constitutes a threat to international peace and security. That circumstances in which it is prepared to
38    intrinsic importance to international peace and security. But it is also because of the passions which
39    and in order to restore international peace and security on the basis of a mandate from the Security
40    question of threats to international peace and security under Chapter VII. That was the source of the
41        instrument for protecting our peace and security. Down the other route lies a world in which
42    – two states living side by side in peace and security. This is the only fitting memorial to the
43    that tackling threats to international peace and security – including global terrorism and proliferation –
44    Article 99 to bring threats to the peace to the Security Council's attention; and we must act quickly and
45        he was a threat to peace and international security, were having actually minimal effect on the
46    threaten international peace and security to the Security Council's attention. But no Secretary-General
47        for regional peace – and with it Iranian security – are greater than ever before now that they no
48        to peace, set out clearly in the recent UN Security Council resolutions 1402 and 1403, with a longer
49    the peace could and should be dealt with by the Security Council under the powers enshrined in the other
50    for Peace' programme has acted as a catalyst for security sector reform, and helped with the transition to
51    peace and security.  Terrorism requires a firm security response. But I also know that a solution to the
52    peace set out in the Roadmap and endorsed by the Security Council remains elusive. But all in all we have
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security/International

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1        There are two great modern threats to global  security -international terrorism and unstable or rogue
2             democratic government, collective  security and international law.  In the past, these ideas
3      in many areas, such as our economies and our  security, are international and inter-dependent. So I wan
4        so much to building trust, cooperation and  security that international terrorists despise it so much
5     full support, and with the full support of the  security council, International Criminal Court is pursuin
6       which works is the best guarantee of our own  security and prosperity.  INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY As the
7       which works is the best guarantee of our own  security and prosperity.  INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY As the
8      a vital role in helping countries to meet their  security needs, as well as their international
9        around the broad criteria for action by the  Security Council against threats to international peace
10   conflicts which are a potential threat to global  security.  KASHMIR A few months ago, the international
11      build collective responsibility for our global  security. All countries have a stake in an international
12      to tackle more effectively new threats to our  security – from terrorism, proliferation and internationa
13     EU and NATO, as the twin foundation of European  security and prosperity. It will take on the internationa
14         monitoring missions and to the international  security back-up.  The Prime Minister, I and my colleague
15   The new threat to the US, and to international  security more generally, now comes from other sources, no
16   handed over the leadership of the International  Security Assistance Force (ISAF), our troops will continu
17        before.   HUMAN RIGHTS ENSURE INTERNATIONAL  SECURITY AND PROSPERITY – STRAW (18/04/02) Event: 58th
18      efforts to address our concerns. INTERNATIONAL  SECURITY Upholding human rights and international law are
19     face of today's wider threats to international  security. In the wake of the September 11th 2001 attacks,
20        Britain as the leader of the International  Security Assistance Force. I am delighted that Germany
21      in the political fight ahead. INTERNATIONAL  SECURITY My Lord Mayor, Let me turn now to the wider
22   Operation Enduring Freedom and the International  Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 75% of the
23   consensus on action to strengthen international  security, including tackling emerging threats at an
24    Turkey, a Muslim country, led the International  Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in the first hal
25    and democracy. In Afghanistan the International  Security Assistance Force is bringing law and order to th
26     assert that its contribution to international  security goes unrecognised, that it takes more than
27      and other soldiers from the International  Security Assistance Force in Kabul. And I am delighted
28    for the vendor, but undermines international  security. There is an obvious responsibility on arms
29     not merely of justice, but of international  security. Blatant contempt for international law can neve
30     he was a threat to peace and international  security, were having actually minimal effect on the
31   and Europe can and should tackle international  security issues together. Recent developments in the
32   Operation Enduring Freedom and the International  Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 75% of the
33     is the three great threats to international  security: global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
34   regular army or civilian life. The International  Security Assistance Force, ISAF, counts 9,500 troops from
35    weapons has a profound effect on international  security and prosperity, and on our own well-being at
36   resources necessary to expand the International  Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul in the North.  By
37    when there are major threats to international  security, it cannot fail to act. I think that we will see
38     not merely of justice, but of international  security. Let us never forget, too, that the principles o
39    a threat to its neighbours or to international  security, abiding by its international obligations and
40       Kingdom and China to promote international  security and the rule of law. And I want to suggest three
41     mass migration, the threat to international  security from terrorism, state failure and WMD, and the
42   of global business; contributes to international  security and stability; looks for co-operative and
43   such distinctions either in international law.  Security Council Resolution 1373 created new obligations
44    and in order to restore international peace and  security on the basis of a mandate from the Security
45   constitutes a threat to international peace and  security. That circumstances in which it is prepared to
46       against threats to international peace and  security. We can build there on the growing understanding
47   of the modern threats to international peace and  security.  And alongside that, we also need to develop a
48   his opinion may threaten international peace and  security to the Security Council's attention. But no
49   intrinsic importance to international peace and  security. But it is also because of the passions which
50   most serious threats to international peace and  security.  It is not only terrorism within one state whic
51   a Chapter VII threat to international peace and  security by its proliferation of weapons of mass
52      and to undermine international peace and  security. If we are to confront them, then we will need a
53   maintain and to restore international peace and  security.  Over the past 12 years, the Iraqi regime has
54   face of other threats to international peace and  security. The principle of non-interference has to be
55    him a unique threat to international peace and  security.  But consensus on the objective is not simply
56    said poses a threat to international peace and  security, is by backing our diplomacy with a credible
57    pose a grave threat to international peace and  security. It was in recognition of their singular menace,
58   question of threats to international peace and  security under Chapter VII. That was the source of the
59   that tackling threats to international peace and  security – including global terrorism and proliferation –
60        the threat to international and domestic  security posed by weapons of mass destruction and
61     the cause of international law and collective  security it is a challenge we must confront.
62   wishes of the international community, that the  Security Council will respond. I am confident that all
63    reach of the international system on which our  security depends? These are questions we and our partners
64   the idea of an international conference covering  security, and economic and political issues. We look
65      time for international policy. The European  Security Strategy, or the formation of a High-Level Panel
66    of the international community and put global  security at risk. This was never an easy task. And now
67   threaten international peace and security to the  Security Council's attention. But no Secretary-General
68   of international confidence, and from greater  security across the region. Along with my French and
69   the international community's long term energy  security. In turn the best way to ensure such long term
70      international relief; to establish credible  security conditions for the protection of the civilian
71   international policy – bringing development and  security, as ever, together.  And in making the world les
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security/commitment

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1      Underpinning these joint efforts on regional  security is our commitment to close a defence
2     non-NATO countries.  ISAF's contribution to the  security of the recent elections, a commitment made at th
3     North-South reconciliation.  Our commitment to  security in South East Asia is underpinned by the Five
4    in Iraq, today we share a commitment to bringing  security, prosperity and representative government to the
5      the will to back its commitment to collective  security with military muscle.  CFSP  Foreign policy
6    and reaffirm Britain's commitment to collective  security and multilateralism. It was the appalling
7      of common commitment to prosperity, peace and  security based on freedom and the rule of law.  These two
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 8        to me as a commitment to make a "100% effort" on security. And they recognised that such an effort is vita
 9                 commitment to the principle of collective security would have amounted to words without action. For
10         commitments. Above all that means building security both for its own people and to prevent attacks
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security/Britain

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1        environment.  As permanent members of the UN Security Council, Britain and China are in a pivotal
2        areas in turn.  As permanent members of the UN Security Council, both Britain and China base our foreign
3    end. What people want is a Europe which delivers security and prosperity to its citizens. Britain and
4      the Kashmiris. We all have a stake in greater security and prosperity in South Asia, and we in Britain
5    prosperous, there is an impact on Britain's own security and prosperity at home.  Effective global arms
6    balanced relationship, with Britain guaranteeing security and defence to the territories on the one hand;
7     and reaffirm Britain's commitment to collective security and multilateralism. It was the appalling
8            Britain as the leader of the International Security Assistance Force. I am delighted that Germany
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security/UK

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 1        the capabilities needed for NATO and European security. The UK is assisting this reform programme. We
 2      and seeks greater African membership on the UN Security Council – an aim the UK strongly supports, not
 3             as some of you will have seen, is the security and good governance of the UK's Overseas
 4   the question of broadening the membership of the Security Council itself, on which the UK has a
 5       countermeasures and vaccination, on border security and biometric identifiers. Along with UK Trade &
 6   Police for their Nigerian colleagues.  7. Energy security  The recent argument between Russia and Ukraine
 7    us and joins us as equals in strengthening the security of our continent. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND
 8     exactly the concepts at the heart of the EU's Security and Defence Policy initiative, which the UK has
 9     away can have direct consequences for the UK's security and prosperity.  We have therefore written this
10   be made later this week. The UK will call in the Security Council for clear benchmarks to be set, detailin
11   enormous importance to the UK's and the world's security – and a priority of our foreign policy. The
12    ago [on 19 May] the UK voted in favour of a UN Security Council Resolution condemning the killing of
13      Agencies.   The UK is committed to making the Security Council more representative. The issue is not
14    the UK would lose its permanent seat on the UN Security Council;  * and that Brussels would be able to
15      UK. These are interlinked in a global agenda. Security is vitally important: we were much more recently
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security/freedom

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 1        to live under the rule of gangs without the security and freedoms which we all should be able to take
 2    negation of war, but the creation of a world of security and freedom, of a world which is governed by
 3    paralyse and impoverish the world, so that our security, our freedoms and our prosperity decline
 4     of common commitment to prosperity, peace and security based on freedom and the rule of law.  These two
 5           turning Europe into an area of freedom, security and justice; acting against terrorism; launching
 6   no other reason than that only freedom can make security secure.' But we do not need to look to the
 7   as we pursue the cause of freedom and collective security in Europe.    WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY FOR A
 8         not only of our freedom, but also of our security and prosperity. There will be debate, and there
 9   1945, 'We must plan for freedom and not only for security, if for no other reason than that only freedom
10   Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 75% of the
11   Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 75% of the
12    and spreading freedom depends too on spreading security, or what President Roosevelt called the 'freedom
13       to ensure freedom and their duty to provide security. Without security, no rights can be fully
14    or freedom from tyranny and repression. Second, security – or freedom from fear. And third, the fight
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security/Iraq(i)

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 1        there.  Mr Dimitrakopolous said that ensuring security in Iraq means giving the responsibility for it t
 2        their country on the principles of justice and security.   IRAQ   Mr President   What makes Iraq so
 3    key point was the need to hand responsibility on security back to the Iraqis. On this, he and I are in
 4     Those disgusting attacks showed again that the security situation in Iraq is serious, and the past weeks
 5     Coalition will of course help with appropriate security arrangements. Meanwhile Iraqis are coming to
 6    South Asia and the war against terrorism, to UN Security Council deliberations on Iraq are reflected at
 7   you during our Presidency towards that goal.   'SECURITY IS THE KEY TO THE FUTURE OF IRAQ' - JACK STRAW
 8          community much sooner to the emerging security threats. The same applies to Iraq, where
 9       made in his opening remarks. He said that security was the key to the future of Iraq. He was right.
10   maintain and to restore international peace and security.   Over the past 12 years, the Iraqi regime has
11      background; and working for the best possible security environment.   At the Conference, Iraq's
12   We will seek the adoption of new United Nations Security Council Resolutions which reaffirm Iraq's
13       Multi-National Force who helped to maintain security around the polling stations across Iraq. Several
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14         an exchange of letters to the President of the Security Council from the Prime Minister of Iraq and the
15      importance to our permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Despite our differences on Iraq, on
16         British contingent and as mandated by the UN security council, will continue to work alongside Iraqi
17      are already 168 000 individuals in the Iraqi Security Forces. The capacity of these forces is
18              We continue to equip and train the Iraqi Security Forces. The Multi-National Force is helping the
19         evidence have been locked away by the Iraqi Security Services. There have been no interviews in the
20      is vital. Already there are over 220,000 Iraqi security personnel on the streets. We continue to equip
21      there are serious challenges ahead for Iraq - on security, on employment, on making a success of the
22       to the bravery and effectiveness of Iraq's own security forces - it was they who were in the front line.
23      between the Multi National Force and Iraq's own security forces, and state the need to reach agreement on
24         transition. The Force is helping Iraq's own security forces to build their capacity. The Iraqi police
25        for the multi-national force in Iraq is UN Security Council resolution 1546. That mandate comes to a
26      counted for nothing in respect of Iraq. When the Security Council unanimously adopted SCR 1441 last
27         outrages notwithstanding. Iraqi police and security forces, with the help of the Multinational Force
28      for the political process in Iraq based on UN Security Council Resolution 1546, and specifically for
29      conventions for ensuring that Iraq's immediate security and humanitarian needs are met. In this first
30           as the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty; security; economic revival; national unity; and preparing
31         The tragedy for the Iraqi people is that Security Council resolutions have always held out the
32       the political process in Iraq, as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1546: the drafting of a
33      the key to the future of Iraq. He was right. The security situation is serious. There is no disguising thi
34           news stories - Iraq.  Last month, the UN Security Council finally recognised that the world could
35      the new Government of Iraq will face is to build security. There will be those who will continue to seek
36         to work alongside Iraqi forces in maintaining security, while helping those forces to build the capacit
37          the rebuilding of Iraq.  Despite the difficult security situation reconstruction continues. Electricity
38       The quicker the Iraqis take responsibility for security the better - and the quicker the multi-national
39          We cannot let Iraq go on defying a decade of Security Council resolutions. If we do, we will find that
40                of Iraq. We will be seeking new UN Security Council resolutions to affirm Iraq's territorial
41      and ISAF.   IRAQ   During the negotiations over Security Council Resolution 1441 over the past few weeks,
42      to help the Iraqi people achieve for themselves security and stability and to defeat and drive out the me
43      ground in Iraq, particularly the need to ensure security;  * second, the Iraqi institutions must be
44         as the Iraqis want and as mandated by the UN Security Council, to help the people of Iraq create the
45      him, the Iraqi Interim Government and the Iraqi Security Forces all the support we can.   Security is
46      the Iraqis protect infrastructure and provide security for key Iraqi personnel.  May I remind the
47         Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. The UN Security Council supports this goal, and in October voted
48      in Iraq, today we share a commitment to bringing security, prosperity and representative government to the
49      Iraq. British officers are training Iraq's new security forces and mentoring the future leaders of the
50      Iraqi Security Forces all the support we can.   Security is vital. Already there are over 220,000 Iraqi
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Security/global

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1          is the three great threats to international security: global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
2          and specific challenges: terrorism, regional security and globalisation, have to be set in a broader
3      the most immediate: they are terrorism, regional security, and globalisation.  First terrorism. Since we
4      that tackling threats to international peace and security - including global terrorism and proliferation -
5        for Africa's development;  * to bolster the security of British and global energy supplies;  * and to
6          to tackling the grave new threats to our security and prosperity: global terrorism, the spread of
7      ravages of war. But today, we can maintain our security only by engaging globally.  It is vital theref
8        of India gaining a permanent seat on the UN security council. India's size, global reach and
9             or indeed other potential threats to our security. Those who seek to undermine global stability -
10      the best guarantor of collective prosperity and security.   'THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO GLOBALISATION' -
11         those persistent conflicts which threaten the security of us all; * And fourth, that the global
12      prosperous, there is an impact on Britain's own security and prosperity at home.  Effective global arms
13         There are two great modern threats to global security -international terrorism and unstable or rogue
14      emerged as one of the greatest threats to global security, spreading chaos in central Africa and providing
15      be able to build long-term, sustainable global security.  The modern security agenda demands new and
16      this banquet one year ago - Europe, and global security. Let me begin with Europe. THE EU CONSTITUTION A
17      to contribute as the UN adapts to today's global security challenges. Our armed forces are second to none,
18      conflicts which are a potential threat to global security.  KASHMIR A few months ago, the international
19      most effective support that we can.   'GLOBAL SECURITY IS OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY' - STRAW (23/09/04)
20      can create the long-term conditions for global security.  First, we need to be able to act earlier, as
21          part of the burden of regional and global security. Following 11 September, the need is more acute
22      is this: what would you do to protect global security from a regime which threatens regional and
23          was a product of its time. In 1972, global security was underpinned by the grim logic of mutually
24      Fifth is the European Union's work on global security. On data retention, the European Parliament has
25          its share of the responsibility for global security. That means taking every opportunity to make the
26          because of the threat they posed to global security. Conflict and chaos can easily spread, and their
27      build collective responsibility for our global security. All countries have a stake in an international
28          and move its focus from regional to global security. And in the years ahead, it is vital that we kee
29          of the Bali tragedy and strengthen global security, we will have to do more than simply mete out
30      and hope that the threats will go away. Global security is our collective responsibility, and we must al
31      and terrorists thrive, and regional and global security are at risk, because chaos spreads. Ethnic
32      extent that we assume responsibility for global security. Our strength as an independent nation derives
33      we are also building our partnership on global security. We have a close dialogue on the situation in
34          Mr President,  More than ever, global security is our shared responsibility. In the year ahead,
35      has grown, so too has its stake in global security and global prosperity.  China's partners warmly
36      to assume our share of responsibility for global security and global prosperity.  Our challenge today is t
37      to build the conditions for long-term global security and sustainable development. Tony Blair has
38      poses the greatest current threat to global security. Nowhere is the case for universal support for
39      of the international community and put global security at risk. This was never an easy task. And now
40      not in Europe, but in the challenges of global security around the world.  Today's threats affect us
41      flexibility to tackle the challenges of global security which affect us all.   THE CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR
42      UK. These are interlinked in a global agenda. Security is vitally important: we were much more recently
43      sensitive aspect of today's global debate on security - the question of collective military action.
44      develop tools to help maintain global peace and security. EUROPEAN DEFENCE Three years ago, Tony Blair an
45      the traditional threats to global peace and security, the UN and the world community face three risi
46      look at three areas in this global partnership: security; sustainable development; and building the
47         which helps us build global, not regional security, operating far beyond the borders of the Treaty
48          sustainable global security.  The modern security agenda demands new and wide-ranging forms of
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49        - they are global public goods. Today the security and economic well-being of Europe and America
50     ability to act globally against threats to our security, while building on its strength as a force for
51         The global arms trade, bringing together security and development, is just the kind of issue
52     between global science and our own safety and security are stronger than ever. We have signed with the
53        of global order.  It has delivered peace and security in Europe, reduced national rivalries and balanc
54   of global business; contributes to international security and stability; looks for co-operative and
55      global threats should not blind us to the real security challenges that still confront us closer to home
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security/common

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1       agencies;  * and tougher rules on air transport security. And they include a common European arrest
2    more countries than ever before to tackle common security problems which are of immediate concern to
3      opt-in to individual measures.  On the common security and defence policy, the Constitution fulfils our
4      the real and serious divide between our common security, and all those who would threaten it.   The
5      And we've pursued an active Common Foreign and Security Policy. At the G8 and Millennium Review Summits,
6        It states that the EU's common foreign and security policy will remain fully under the control of
7       take forward work on the Common Foreign and Security Policy aspects of defence and security. Again,
8     to increase funding for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and, in December, we will publish a
9       of decisions within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This was a Treaty which John Major
10  on the world stage. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy has been a reality for a long time. But,
11     in the last decade that a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has developed on the basis of the
12  well in directing the Union's common foreign and security policy. What it increasingly cannot do is give
13  Maastricht Treaty to take in common foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, and a single
14     we should strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy, focusing on the areas where it can have
15    Member for Devizes - the common foreign and security policy, as signed up to by the Conservatives and
16   individual lives, but on common prosperity and security beyond one country's borders.  And the gravest
17  come together again for a common purpose. As the Security Council has recognised in three resolutions,
18  become serious partners common aims: stability, security, peace and prosperity in the region.  Let us als
19  it means more effective common action to enhance security at home and in the wider world. I am greatly
20  implementation of the common African Defence and Security Policy agreed at last month's African Union
21  know that the common desire of all people is for security, prosperity and a say in the decisions which
22     of common commitment to prosperity, peace and security based on freedom and the rule of law.  These two
23      common good.  It's also why the United Nations Security Council has to take extremely seriously the
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Security/terrorism

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1     who want nothing more than to live in peace and security.  Terrorism requires a firm security response.
2        highlighted the new threats posed to our security by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
3        mass migration, the threat to international security from terrorism, state failure and WMD, and the
4    And we would all agree that the threats to our security - from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
5     to tackle more effectively new threats to our security - from terrorism, proliferation and internationa
6      is the three great threats to international security: global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
7   for our own citizens. That, of course, includes security.  FIGHTING TERRORISM  So I warmly welcome the
8      There are two great modern threats to global security -international terrorism and unstable or rogue
9       and our co-operation on so-called 'hard' security issues such as terrorism and the proliferation
10  most serious threats to international peace and security.  It is not only terrorism within one state whic
11  election. There are challenge ahead - above all security and the threat of terrorism and inter-communal
12  that tackling threats to international peace and security - including global terrorism and proliferation -
13     to tackling the grave new threats to our security and prosperity: global terrorism, the spread of
14  massive scale present the greatest threat to our security today. That is why fighting terrorism and
15     turning Europe into an area of freedom, security and justice; acting against terrorism; launching
16    power and prosperity, today's threats to our security come from outside the EU's borders: terrorism,
17  South Asia and the war against terrorism, to UN Security Council deliberations on Iraq are reflected at
18  the most immediate: they are terrorism, regional security, and globalisation.  First terrorism. Since we
19  and specific challenges: terrorism, regional security and globalisation, have to be set in a broader
20  match.  Having dealt with terrorism and regional security, let me come onto the third immediate challenge
21  peace and security.  Terrorism requires a firm security response. But I also know that a solution to the
22    or fighting terrorism and building peace and security. Ours is a modern partnership which is firmly
23  for fighting terrorism, and more widely for our security as a whole. The EU's historic achievement has
24       terrorism breeds.  This can be done by firm security action and a political agenda.  In Northern
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security/issue(s)

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1      and our co-operation on so-called 'hard' security issues such as terrorism and the proliferation o
2      But it does require strong engagement with security issues across the board, wherever they arise.
3   will be a discussion of major foreign policy and security issues at Seville. Following the latest terroris
4     commercial co-operation, and on political and security issues of mutual interest. The EU and Iran would
5    and Europe can and should tackle international security issues together. Recent developments in the
6    capabilities, and that, when it comes to 'hard security' issues, there is a huge disparity between
7   the EU should play an active part in foreign and security policy issues to match its economic weight in th
8   state the need to reach agreement on fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive
9      small arms - hits the poorest most of all. Security and poverty, on that issue as on so many others,
10  the idea of an international conference covering security, and economic and political issues. We look
11  attacks in Istanbul on 15 and 20 November. But security cannot be isolated from other issues. To fight
12  that if agreement on change is not possible, Security Council enlargement - just one issue of many-
13  Agencies.   The UK is committed to making the Security Council more representative. The issue is not
14  to fulfil that role. Over the past years, the Security Council has expanded the range of issues which
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15        literal chill over many parts of Europe.  Energy security is becoming an ever more important issue for the
16            The global arms trade, bringing together security and development, is just the kind of issue
17     by UN agencies, particularly the IAEA. But the Security Council itself has not addressed this issue for
18        verifying and resolving outstanding issues.  SECURITY COUNCIL So Security Council involvement does not
19    in other UN bodies on this issue, notably in the Security Council.  To support the UN Programme of Action,
20        extends to another issue which undermines security in the Middle East. A sixth argument about our
21  defy the final warning issued unanimously by the Security Council in Resolution 1441. I am in no doubt tha
22  veto is maintained on issues such as tax, social security, fundamental aspects of criminal law, the
23     to address the key issues of reform including security sector reform.  I therefore greatly regret the
24         outstanding issues.  SECURITY COUNCIL So Security Council involvement does not mean the end of our
25       Both issues are vital to our prosperity and security. And both require not just domestic but
26  issues such as defence, tax, EU finance, social security and criminal law; changes on energy, civil
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security/challenge(s)

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1      to contribute as the UN adapts to today's global security challenges. Our armed forces are second to none,
2         that it continues to do so, to address the security challenges of the next decades.    'UNITED
3     global threats should not blind us to the real security challenges that still confront us closer to home
4   reduce corruption.   As part of this there is a security challenge too. Terrorists and extremists exploit
5   the coming months. There are other political and security challenges too, such as in Nepal.  But there is
6       the cause of international law and collective security it is a challenge we must confront.
7   to assume our share of responsibility for global security and global prosperity.  Our challenge today is t
8   for which this institution was founded. Yes, the security situation presents formidable challenges.
9   match.  Having dealt with terrorism and regional security, let me come onto the third immediate challenge
10   with NATO, as the twin foundations of European security and prosperity.  There are two linked challenges
11      The most fundamental of these challenge is security, because it underpins our prosperity and our
12       to confront the greatest challenge to our security in the twenty first century - the spread of
13   confront new threats. Future challenge to our security are as likely to come from terrorists and weapon
14   not in Europe, but in the challenges of global security around the world.   Today's threats affect us
15   flexibility to tackle the challenges of global security which affect us all.    THE CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR
16      Meanwhile on the many challenges ahead - on security, on development, on building a stronger
17   election. There are challenge ahead - above all security and the threat of terrorism and inter-communal
18   there are serious challenges ahead for Iraq - on security, on employment, on making a success of the
19   That posed new challenges to our stability and security. In Europe, the breakdown of the Yugoslav
20   and specific challenges: terrorism, regional security and globalisation, have to be set in a broader
21   The crucial challenge for the future, alongside security, will be to maintain the pace of liberalisation
22   the challenges of reform, and tackling today's security threats, is in our interests, and those of every
23   the challenges outside our borders concerns our security. Like those to our economic power and prosperity
24      challenge I want to speak about is regional security. It would be wrong to pretend that this and the
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Security/responsibility

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1          Mr President,   More than ever, global security is our shared responsibility. In the year ahead,
2     most effective support that we can.    'GLOBAL SECURITY IS OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY' - STRAW (23/09/04)
3    and hope that the threats will go away. Global security is our collective responsibility, and we must al
4    for the vendor, but undermines international security. There is an obvious responsibility on arms
5    there.   Mr Dimitrakopolous said that ensuring security in Iraq means giving the responsibility for it
6   key point was the need to hand responsibility on security back to the Iraqis. On this, he and I are in
7   The quicker the Iraqis take responsibility for security the better - and the quicker the multi-national
8     to believe that they had responsibility. The Security Council didn't do its job, the Secretariat didn'
9      its share of the responsibility for global security. That means taking every opportunity to make the
10   extent that we assume responsibility for global security. Our strength as an independent nation derives
11  to assume our share of responsibility for global security and global prosperity.  Our challenge today is t
12   of Sudan to meet its responsibility to provide security for its people. We are now giving active
13   I feel a personal responsibility for improving security there.   Mr Dimitrakopolous said that ensuring
14   build collective responsibility for our global security. All countries have a stake in an international
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security/energy

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1     be driven by the need for Governments to ensure security of energy supplies. Paid predominantly by the
2    and illegal migration, and increasingly for the security of energy supplies to Europe.  Despite these
3    of governments' agendas - climate change, the security of our energy supplies, food safety, healthcare,
4     for Africa's development;  * to bolster the security of British and global energy supplies;  * and to
5   issues such as defence, tax, EU finance, social security and criminal law; changes on energy, civil
6   literal chill over many parts of Europe.  Energy security is becoming an ever more important issue for the
7    the international community's long term energy security. In turn the best way to ensure such long term
8   Police for their Nigerian colleagues.  7. Energy security  The recent argument between Russia and Ukraine
9      more effective policies for ensuring energy security.  The second theme was development, and
10  chunk in the last strategy document about energy security, but it has got to be an even bigger chunk this
11  use the EU's external policies to boost energy security and promote reform in other markets such as
12  the first of these three themes, which is energy security. Your centre, Stephen, has done a great deal of
13   will shape the future of our world, on energy security, climate change, development and security.  I'm
14     Atomic Energy Agency, as was required under Security Council Resolution 1441, whereby member states
15   energy security, climate change, development and security.  I'm delighted that India's Prime Minister will
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APPENDIX 7

security: 2-word concgrams – Beckett

security/work

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1            that we had no option but to return to the Security Council to resume  the work on a Security Counci
2      to the Security Council to resume  the work on a Security Council resolution, which was suspended two and
3            that work, to help Afghans to improve the security situation.   This is not about imposing a
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security/prosperity

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1            - on a path that will continue to deliver security, prosperity and justice to an ever wider circle
2                European Union - one which delivers security and prosperity to its citizens. And we are
3    diplomacy which is helping to safeguard the UK's security and prosperity.  Every month, MORI does a poll
4      our borders will be even more central to our security and prosperity here at home. We will have a
5    citizens is to put in place the conditions for security and prosperity in a crowded and interdependent
6        once again face an increasing danger to our security and prosperity, and growing calls for early and
7            Do we really want to define our future security and prosperity in terms solely of artificial or
8    undermining the very basis of the prosperity and security we are seeking to achieve. That is why we must
9        as they seek to bring peace, prosperity and security to their troubled lands.  It's within the UN tha
10    that any government can provide prosperity and security to its citizens in isolation through solely
11        the very basis of our future prosperity and security. The dilemma then is that carbon-dependent
12    not at the expense of our future prosperity and security.  So far so good. Global issues - terrorism,
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security/people

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1        I have discussed the link between climate and security with many people. Some of them are sceptical.
2      make? What can we do - specifically what can the security community, the people in this room do - to
3        and borrowed from it. And it is still the security community - the people in this room - who do it
4        to stretch them far beyond it.  Take food security - the ability of people to have enough to eat. I
5    nations is to no small degree predicated on the security of individuals.  When people are exposed to the
6        debate. Those decisions affect the fundamental security of this country and its people. And they involve
7    in particular to increase its ability to provide security and basic services to the Iraqi people.  The
8    extremists and lay the foundations of long-term security.  The challenge faced by the Iraqi people in
9        different from any other type of problem. Security is seen as an imperative not an option. People
10    taking complete responsibility for providing security, and governing in the interests of all the peopl
11    are most important to the British people; jobs; security; self-respect; a decent quality of life and a
12        want the best for their people: peace, security, a stable and growing economy. And the vast
13    The Afghan government and people too want security, development and good governance. The UK and the
14        The first is that when people talk about security problems they do so in terms which are
15    million people from the delta.  What the precise security ramifications of that kind of change would be
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security/development

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1            The Afghan government and people too want security, development and good governance. The UK and the
2        Global issues - terrorism, climate and energy security, sustainable development - need common, global
3        cooperation in four areas: * international security, * climate change, * international development,
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security/collective

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1      at stake is not the relatively narrow national security of individual states but our collective security
2      security of individual states but our collective security in an interdependent world.  So while an unstabl
3    fairly basic needs that underpin our collective security - as much within communities and societies as
4    a direct threat to our individual and collective security - was a fairly new one for many in this audience
5        effect on our collective and individual security.  There are some consequences of climate change
6      we form a collective effort to achieve climate security. Consumers, politicians, NGOs, media,
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security/new

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1            to this threat - I call it achieving climate security - a new strategic international priority for the
2      a month. I was on the cusp of launching Climate Security as a new international strategic priority for th
3      a direct threat to our individual and collective security - was a fairly new one for many in this audience
4            themselves potentially damaging to global security.  And then we have these new areas of practical
5           in this room do - to reinforce that climate security.  I believe that it requires a whole new approac
6          spotlight: during our Presidency of the UN Security Council, for example, I hosted a meeting in New
7       and bolster our climate security and energy security.  China is already a pioneer in building this ne
8   interest in the implications of the new Baghdad Security Plan for our own involvement in southern Iraq.
9      day, Friday 10th November:  In New York the Security Council was meeting to discuss the killing of
10          organised crime, the new economic and security threat from our changing climate, the rise of
11  must tackle the greatest new challenge to global security, the threat of climate change.  Nowhere is the
12     whole new approach to how we analyse and act on security. The threat to our climate security comes not
13  New York.  The UK had taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time - I d
14  new international strategic priority for climate security that looks at what we can do now to slow global
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security/world

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1        our shared goals on energy security and climate security. The world needs China to make that transition
2         all his responsibility.  Madam President  The security challenges the world faces are real. As an
3       better off concentrating instead on the 'real' security problems in the world.  They could not be more
4      helping to deal with the existing and emerging security crises around the world. The agreement for a
5    security of individual states but our collective security in an interdependent world.  So while an unstabl
6   more together to meet our shared goals on energy security and climate security. The world needs China to
7        a National Intelligence Estimate to assess the security challenges presented by the world's changing
8   partner on a wide-range of areas crucial to our security, and a bridge to the rest of the Muslim world.
9     twin imperatives of energy security and climate security are factored into energy policy across the world
10       in this room - schooled in the world of hard security - in getting involved in discussions about carbo
11        in countries across their world over energy security. Using energy more efficiently means that we can
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security/responsibility

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1       of these provinces - Basra - to the point where security responsibility can be handed over there too.  At
2       rapid progress towards the Iraqi government and security forces assuming responsibility for their own
3        that he expected that lead responsibility for security in all 18 provinces of Iraq would be handed back
4           been able to hand over responsibility for security to the Iraqi authorities in three of the four
5      has overridden a wider responsibility to global security.   I do not believe so and let me explain why.
6        forces assuming responsibility for their own security.  We share his determination: as, I have no
7        taking complete responsibility for providing security, and governing in the interests of all the peopl
8        all his responsibility.  Madam President  The security challenges the world faces are real. As an
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security/Europe(an)

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1       the threat that defines our generation, climate security; a Europe that is at ease with the forces of
2      expensive hydrocarbons and increase our energy security.  The European Council in two days time is due t
3   have done on its own.  Now we must make climate security one of Europe's greatest priorities.  That is wh
4      well-being, from jobs and health to growth and security'.  We in Europe should be in no doubt that how
5   of carbon capture and storage.  And the energy security papers that the UK and other European countries
6     of the links between climate security and the security of our energy supplies. The forthcoming Europea
7        decisions on Europe's policy towards energy security and climate security. This is a major event, a
8             European Union - one which delivers security and prosperity to its citizens. And we are
9      Europe's borders. And in so doing can enhance security and stability within those borders.  Much of
```

security/peace

```
1       some progress on the international stage. The UN Security Council has passed a resolution on Women, Peace
2          want the best for their people: peace, security, a stable and growing economy. And the vast
3          has passed a resolution on Women, Peace and Security.  And in the Beijing Platform we set out a gende
4             to tackling the problems of peace and security - the international fight against crime - the
5       member states have benefited too. Our peace and security has been enhanced by spreading stability and the
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6          threatens all our hopes for wider  peace and security in the region. Many thousands of British
7      end it. Only they ultimately can bring peace and security to Darfur. The African Union and the United
8          - that the threat to international peace and security was very real and very grave.  Madame Deputy
9       a hit of 20 per cent of total GDP. Peace and security - resources that are already stretched across th
10       as they seek to bring peace, prosperity and security to their troubled lands.  It's within the UN tha
11                peace in the region and with it the wider security of the international  community as a whole. What
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security/international

```
1           It goes to the heart of our economic, energy security and international security agendas. Japan has
2            It is unsustainable in terms of our energy security too. The International Energy Agency predicts global
3              to tackling the problems of peace and security - the international fight against crime - the
4             peace in the region and with it the wider security of the international  community as a whole. What
5      a month. I was on the cusp of launching Climate Security as a new international strategic priority for th
6       to this threat – I call it achieving climate security - a new strategic international priority for the
7                - an understanding that the global security threats which the international community faces
8    these countries to be fully reflected in the UN Security Council and other international organisations.
9      of that country, right for wider international security, and, in the final analysis, right for our own
10   us with an ever-growing threat to international security. Dealing with climate change - both adapting to
11        areas in particular.  First, international security. We have enjoyed unprecedented cooperation with
12        cooperation in four areas: * international security, * climate change, * international development,
13    are still necessary to guarantee international security. So it should not be controversial to suggest
14   our economic, energy security and international security agendas. Japan has always been our closest
15         change is a serious threat to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the
16       - that the threat to international peace and security was very real and very grave.  Madame Deputy
17   some progress on the international stage. The UN Security Council has passed a resolution on Women, Peace
18    counter-terrorism, international crime, energy security.  Climate Change  And nowhere is the need for
19   of conflict and international terrorism, energy security, jobs and growth. Get our response right to
20    to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the core of foreign policy.  All of u
21   new international strategic priority for climate security that looks at what we can do now to slow global
22      international community with huge and pressing security challenges, but, of course, we face  other such
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security/UK

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1         of carbon capture and storage.   And the energy security papers that the UK and other European countries
2     And for Japan, perhaps an investment in regional security too.  In all this, the UK and Japan are natural
3          The Afghan government and people too want security, development and good governance. The UK and the
4     also plays an integral part in the area of 'hard security' with the most direct impact here in the UK - th
5     diplomacy which is helping to safeguard the UK's security and prosperity.  Every month, MORI does a poll
6          this year, we used the UK Presidency of the Security Council to table a debate there on the security
7         We in the UK are clear that without climate security it will become increasingly difficult to
8    New York.  The UK had taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time – I
9         why the UK has put in on the agenda of the Security Council tomorrow and why, shortly after I return
10       of the UK. And can I say that, given Climate Security only became a separate Strategic Priority for th
11    UK to put climate change on the agenda of the UN Security Council last month. Even then, we were surprised
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security/world

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1     the current challenges in the area of freedom, security and justice.  On migration we agreed that we nee
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security/Iraq(i)

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1           been able to hand over responsibility for security to the Iraqi authorities in three of the four
2       that he expected that lead responsibility for security in all 18 provinces of Iraq would be handed back
3     House on 31 October, the process of transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces is
4     in particular to increase its ability to provide security and basic services to the Iraqi people.  The
5     extremists and lay the foundations of long-term security.  The challenge faced by the Iraqi people in
6     months launched a major fresh effort to restore security to Baghdad and neighbouring areas of Iraq.  In
7    interest in the implications of the new Baghdad Security Plan for our own involvement in southern Iraq.
8            security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces is well underway. Prime Minister Maliki i
9       of governance and the capacity of the Iraqi security forces; and to reduce crime and the role of the
10   it too is ready to be handed over to Iraqi lead security control. We hope this can be accomplished at som
11    rapid progress towards the Iraqi government and security forces assuming responsibility for their own
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12        to go to war in Iraq. And the Intelligence and Security Committee on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction –
13     vessel in Iraqi territorial waters in support of Security Council Resolution 1723 and of the Government of
14       the Iraqis to deliver greater and more lasting security to the capital. It is the joint judgement of the
15     and Iraq – all countries pivotal to the regional security agenda will see some of the biggest reductions i
16       Iraq still faces a daunting array of political, security and economic challenges, of a kind with which 1
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security/threat(s)

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1                organised crime, the new economic and security threat from our changing climate, the rise of
2      that the exact opposite is true.  The greatest security threat we face as a global community won't be me
3              - an understanding that the global security threats which the international community faces
4     must tackle the greatest new challenge to global security, the threat of climate change.  Nowhere is the
5      whole new approach to how we analyse and act on security. The threat to our climate security comes not
6     behind my decision to use our Presidency of the Security Council to highlight the threat of an unstable
7     be an integral part of all planning for national security. In their words, climate change is a "threat
8        An unstable climate is a direct threat to our security: but it is not one that can be met by bullets an
9        and R&D, doing more to tackle threats to our security, to our borders, and to our energy supplies. It
10      and act on security. The threat to our climate security comes not from outside but from within: we are
11      of growing concerns over threats to our climate security. At the moment we all share a dilemma. We want
12     us with an ever-growing threat to international security. Dealing with climate change - both adapting to
13        change is a serious threat to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the
14     with the high-level of threat and high-level of security that goes with that.  And I hardly need spell ou
15        poses a serious threat to America's national security'. Who authored that report? A dozen of the most
16        - that the threat to international peace and security was very real and very grave.  Madame Deputy
17      to this threat - I call it achieving climate security - a new strategic international priority for the
18     a direct threat to our individual and collective security - was a fairly new one for many in this audience
19      the threat that defines our generation, climate security; a Europe that is at ease with the forces of
20         threatens all our hopes for wider  peace and security in the region. Many thousands of British
21       Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat
22     threat we face is still not there.  Bringing the security community into this debate has two distinct
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security/terrorism

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1         The four cross-cutting PSA targets - climate security, migration, counter-terrorism and conflict - are
2      not at the expense of our future prosperity and security.  So far so good. Global issues - terrorism,
3      of conflict and international terrorism, energy security, jobs and growth. Get our response right to
4         proliferation and terrorism, but also the security of our economy, of our energy supplies as well a
5       Global issues - terrorism, climate and energy security, sustainable development - need common, global
6          to counter terrorism than ever before. The Security Service now has more front-line staff than at an
7      counter-terrorism, international crime, energy security.  Climate Change  And nowhere is the need for
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security/issue(s)

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1         community faces up to the big ticket global security issues, the things that hit the headlines -
2        Anyone who doesn't see climate change as a security issue today will, in my view, be treading in the
3        the recognition of climate change as a core security issue. And it demonstrated the vast majority of
4     I simply do not believe that we will solve the security issues of the day unless we address the global
5     the Middle East as an example – a classic hard security issue, and one that occupies a great deal of my
6          of those who didn't see reparations as a security issue in the 1920s.  I am optimistic that the
7     not at the expense of our future prosperity and security.  So far so good. Global issues - terrorism,
8          impacts and possible consequences to our security is invaluable.  Having raised the issue of
9     New York.  The UK had taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time – I d
10     invaluable.  Having raised the issue of climate security up the agenda and having put it on the table at
11      to discuss these issues next month at the UN Security Council; because of the security challenges I
12     had taken the issue of climate security to the Security Council for the first time – I do not exaggerate
13      Global issues - terrorism, climate and energy security, sustainable development - need common, global
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security/challenge(s)

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1       international community with huge and pressing security challenges, but, of course, we face  other such
2        all his responsibility. Madam President  The security challenges the world faces are real. As an
3     month at the UN Security Council; because of the security challenges I believe that they will present.   M
4      Or, another example, the Middle East (a classic security challenge, if you like) - where five per cent of
5      a National Intelligence Estimate to assess the security challenges presented by the world's changing
6      warhead is indeed a warhead. There are profound security challenges in doing that. We need to find ways
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 7        extremists and lay the foundations of long-term security.  The challenge faced by the Iraqi people in
 8        Iraq still faces a daunting array of political, security and economic challenges, of a kind with which an
 9         to discuss these issues next month at the UN Security Council; because of the security challenges I
10    must tackle the greatest new challenge to global security, the threat of climate change.  Nowhere is the
11        two of the greatest challenges we face - energy security and climate security - both demand the same
12         the current challenges in the area of freedom, security and justice.  On migration we agreed that we nee
13    challenges we face - energy security and climate security - both demand the same solution. So what's
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security/energy

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 1        be it global trade and investment flows, climate security, energy security, cross-border crime, illegal
 2        pillars of global security: food security, water security, energy security, climate security then we are
 3        particular I want to push the agenda on climate security and energy security - not least with the Chinese
 4            was drawing the same links between climate security and energy security: in other words increasing
 5         we can keep on growing and bolster our climate security and energy security.  China is already a pioneer
 6         of the links between climate security and the security of our energy supplies. The forthcoming European
 7        outweighed by the benefits - not only in climate security but also in energy security, public health,
 8        to build the pillars of global security: food security, water security, energy security, climate
 9            proliferation and terrorism, but also the security of our economy, of our energy supplies as well a
10        build recognition of the links between climate security and the security of our energy supplies. The
11        will cut emissions and help to achieve climate security. And it will improve our energy security: making
12        United States. So for those who worry about the security impact of a scramble for energy resources in
13          and R&D, doing more to tackle threats to our security, to our borders, and to our energy supplies. It
14    community we fail to build the pillars of global security: food security, water security, energy security,
15        to bring the requirements of climate and energy security into alignment, for example by combining Chinese
16              less rain.  And then there is energy security - vital not just for keeping the economies of t
17      security: food security, water security, energy security, climate security then we are living in a house
18    these strategies reflect the reality that energy security and climate security are now indivisible. We
19           policy, especially on Russia and on energy security. There has been a strong focus too on innovation
20       not only in climate security but also in energy security, public health, innovation and competitiveness,
21        will bring down prices, contributing to energy security and bringing clean affordable power to many of
22    I listed a moment ago.  It reinforces our energy security: addressing fuel poverty and reducing our
23        at that summit: on the linkages between energy security and climate security, on the strengthening of th
24          decisions on Europe's policy towards energy security and climate security. This is a major event, a
25        endorsed the setting up of a network of energy security correspondents early next year. The Spring 2007
26      in the global economy if we increase our energy security and if we lead the global transition to a
27      push the agenda on climate security and energy security - not least with the Chinese and with Africa. An
28      of carbon capture and storage.   And the energy security papers that the UK and other European countries
29    climate security. And it will improve our energy security: making us less reliant on increasingly expensiv
30        same links between climate security and energy security: in other words increasing energy efficiency
31    real determination. On climate change and energy security, we are using GOF money to bring about change in
32        and investment flows, climate security, energy security, cross-border crime, illegal migration - is
33        Global issues - terrorism, climate and energy security, sustainable development - need common, global
34        money laundering, building climate and energy security, supporting human rights and sustainable
35        counter-terrorism, international crime, energy security.  Climate Change  And nowhere is the need for
36        expensive hydrocarbons and increase our energy security.  The European Council in two days time is due
37            It is unsustainable in terms of our energy security. The International Energy Agency predicts global
38      in the global economy if we increase our energy security and if we lead the global transition to a
39        at the moment: trade, and climate and energy security.   The WTO round seems to be stalled. If we don
40      of conflict and international terrorism, energy security, jobs and growth. Get our response right to
41      - with positive effects on poverty, and energy security, as well as climate security. This project will
42        goals, they are also bolstering their energy security – one of their highest national priorities.  Tha
43      two of the greatest challenges we face - energy security and climate security - both demand the same
44      more together to meet our shared goals on energy security and climate security. The world needs China to
45      in doing that we will be enhancing global energy security, and therefore strengthening our economies,
46       nuclear power as the twin imperatives of energy security and climate security are factored into energy
47      it is not happening fast enough. Just as 'energy security' is now an accepted and central part of the hard
48        - we will also be greatly enhancing our energy security: helping to cure what President Bush famously
49          It goes to the heart of our economic, energy security and international security agendas. Japan has
50        and bolster our climate security and energy security.  China is already a pioneer in building this
51      in the global economy if we increase our energy security and if we, at the same time, lead the global
52          in countries across their world over energy security. Using energy more efficiently means that we can
53        efficiency is an investment in our own energy security. And for Japan, perhaps an investment in region
54        better the links between climate, energy and security.  There was quite a powerful moment during the
55    As the imperative of tackling energy and climate security takes hold, a lot of that money is going to flow
56           water security, energy security, climate security then we are living in a house with extremely
57           policy towards energy security and climate security. This is a major event, a major council, dealing
58        the reality that energy security and climate security are now indivisible. We cannot have one without
59      our shared goals on energy security and climate security. The world needs China to make that transition
60      the linkages between energy security and climate security, on the strengthening of the EU's Emission
61      challenges we face - energy security and climate security - both demand the same solution. So what's
62      twin imperatives of energy security and climate security are factored into energy policy across the worl
63      our economic, energy security and international security agendas. Japan has always been our closest
64      poverty, and energy security, as well as climate security. This project will also help to develop the
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APPENDIX 8

Concordance: we want to - COOK

N Concordance
1.   within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We want to bring together that responsibility, and all
2.   training centre is being established in Martinique. We want to build on this work, both in the Caribbean
3.   in a positive debate about the sort of Europe we want to build. We had a lot of ground to make up,
4.   today. BRITAIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US We want to build on a success story which has seen
5.   We do not want to cling to a Little England. We want to build a Global Britain. A country which
6.   This will be a demonstration of the inclusive Europe we want to build. We want it to be a substantive
7.   us how effective international cooperation can be. If we want to catch them, we will have to match them.
8.   Paper describing in full the modernised partnership we want to create, and the action we need to take to
9.   create jobs, fight crime and protect the environment. We want to create a European Union that secures
10.   We also pursued outreach to communities where we want to discuss and meet with leaders of the
11.   market rules applied quickly and enforced better. We want to engage the Commission and the
12.   interest in any debts taken on by British territories. We want to ensure that our position is defensible to
13.   horrific massacres at Relizane and Sidi Hammed. We want to find out how we can help. We have seen
14.   will of the people finds its most expressive voice. If we want to find ways of making sure that Europe's
15.   Date: 16/11/00 Speaker: Robin Cook Today, if we want to have a successful foreign policy at all it
16.   of Economic and Monetary Union and Enlargement. We want to help make a Union that responds to the
17.   partnership to the Palestinian people, which is why we want to help the Palestinian people develop the
18.   that are democratic, free and broadly tolerant. If we want to keep them that way we must constantly
19.   crucial that we keep thinking about the kind of world we want to live in tomorrow. THE SIZE OF THE
20.   forward work on jobs, crime and the environment. We want to make the Union efficient, so we will focus
21.   Union for the challenges of the next century. And we want to make it a more effective voice in the
22.   it any less worthwhile. TORTURE One area where we want to make a difference is to stop torture. That
23.   example by providing equipment for Gaza Airport. We want to play a fuller role in the talks on these
24.   is one of the greatest threats to the environment. If we want to preserve the planet for future generations,
25.   cooperate across borders. We must do the same if we want to put them behind bars. * And we must
26.   Parliament in producing better, simpler legislation. We want to remove barriers so that Europe can
27.   but to cooperate in their common interests. We want to see a Europe with a genuine single
28.   supporter of Czech membership for NATO. Because we want to see you inside the Alliance. We want you
29.   within a wider Europe. There are some limits where we want to see majority voting, because in those
30.   forward the debate about the shape of Europe we want to see, and helping to forge a new and
31.   important step towards building the sort of Europe we want to see by 2010. The Nice Summit is good
32.   single market that is open to the rest of the world. We want to see a Europe in which war is unthinkable
33.   and America each year. But we cannot stand still - we want to see this trade and investment grow. We
34.   recently, and gave them a very clear message. That we want to see all of them inside the Union, just as
35.   it is because we support the European Union that we want to see it modernised and reformed. THE
36.   about, whether they live in Edinburgh or Prague. We want to see the European Union become more of
37.   with Hong Kong. We also have a vision for Europe. We want to see a free association of member states
38.   the number of documents by 25 per cent next year. We want to see an end to the duplication between
39.   real concerns of the European people. That is why we want to take forward work on jobs, crime and the
40.   unequivocal stand against the death penalty. But we want to take this further. We need to use our
41.   of European cooperation more compelling than ever. We want to use the British Presidency to create an
42.   our vision of what the European Union should be. We want to use our Presidency to get it focused on
43.   co-operation between the UK and Ireland. We want to use the British Presidency to see
44.   our commitment to Europe, and our leading role. We want to use it to focus on the things that matter
45.   programme to train senior Hungarian civil servants. We want to use the British Presidency to ensure that
46.   as the right way forward by business. And we want to work with you, in partnership. In order that

Cook – I want to

N Concordance

1	CURBING SMALL ARMS The second task I want to address is curbing the volume of arms in
2	the last impact from what happened in '89 which I want to address, and that is the very powerful
3	The last important aspect of our partnership that I want to address is human rights. We respect the
4	police force to keep civil order. Today, therefore, I want to announce that Britain will follow up our
5	gives us in our conduct of business with others. I want to argue the case why we can be confident
6	Before I turn to those European matters though, I want to begin by providing a rather wider context
7	the myth that Brussels is Them. Brussels is us. I want to bury the myth that Britain can only win
8	country. A debate based on facts, not myths. I want to bury the myth of a superstate - national
9	a superstate - national identities are too strong. I want to bury the myth that Brussels is Them.
10	Date: 19/04/01 Speaker: Robin Cook Tonight I want to celebrate Britishness. As Foreign
11	there is also an argument of human decency. I want to close by sharing with you what for me
12	representative of every community. That is why I want to end by asking for your help in getting me
13	for the next year. This morning, though, I want to focus my remarks on the urgent
14	avoided a world with too much war. That is why I want to focus my remarks today on what we
15	also requires changes of substance. So now I want to focus on two issues of substance, two
16	the future of Britain and Britishness. Indeed, I want to go further and argue that in each of the
17	form, but as a foundation on which to build. I want to identify four directions for the building of
18	STRENGTHENING OUR DIALOGUE Today I want to launch that new dialogue with initiatives
19	relationships - and we hope they do too. But I want to make sure that small and medium
20	been receiving from the CBI has been first class. I want to make sure that the Foreign Office is
21	can make and are sensitive to their concerns. I want to make the FCO's commitment to human
22	companies trying to break into those markets. I want to make sure you have access to it. That is
23	on exports for at least a quarter of their turnover. I want to make sure we are doing all we can to
24	we must first traverse the foreground. Today I want to present the good news story that an
25	and trust we so urgently need. Today, I want to propose we begin a proper dialogue
26	by accepting the American package as a whole. I want to put on record my respect for his courage
27	have ever been. That is the principal message I want to put across today - that Britain and the
28	to throw the opportunity of Europe away. I want to re-cast the debate about Europe in this
29	partnership based on long understanding. And I want to reach out beyond the diplomats and
30	law and crimes against humanity. In doing so, I want to reinforce the Security Council's ability to
31	final objective of our mission statement on which I want to report to the House is the commitment
32	and asked him: 'Could I get up and say what I want to say?', to which I got the blunt and
33	of Cabinet Minister, so I can get up and say what I want to say.' I am not sure that you have quite
34	We must right the wrongs of the past century. I want to see a zone of peace, prosperity, stability
35	soon as possible. During the British Presidency, I want to see this taken forward across the whole
36	that the European Union is relevant to their lives. I want to see a European Union that is focused on
37	forward across the whole of Central Europe. I want to see each applicant state with quality
38	The European Union does a great deal, but I want to see that effort have more of an impact,
39	Speaker: Robin Cook The sort of Europe I want to see in 2010 is a Europe with which
40	of their crimes anywhere in Europe. And I want to see a Europe of strength in the world. It
41	a step to the break-up of the UK. This evening, I want to set out the reasons for being optimistic
42	That it is too diverse to be meaningful. Tonight, I want to set out why I believe they are wrong.
43	Israelis - because we are friend to peace. Tonight I want to share with you three messages about
44	by the international community. Today, I want to share with you six of the principles on
45	EUROPE FOR A STRONG BRITAIN So with that I want to share with you the principles which guide
46	And that brings me to the second message I want to share with you. We can overcome the
47	for the Palestinian refugees. And that is why I want to speak to you tonight about what is
48	stretching well into the future. This is why I want to spell out Britain's Commitment to Hong
49	is to sell the Foreign Office in Britain to you. I want to start by stressing why it is important to
50	in a wide and generous interpretation. But I want to start our discussion by sharing with you
51	next five years, and then make it happen. Today, I want to suggest three areas where we might

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1   its importance, there is much more which we want to achieve at this autumn's
2   similarity is no accident. Much of what we want to achieve in Britain is dependent,
3   wider world. And much of what we want to achieve here at home depends
4   to almost every aspect of what we want to achieve. For a long time, the
5   and seeds to grow alternative crops We want to As part ofencourage ing the
6   global as much as they are national. If we want to avoid future summits being held
7   out. It is a choice of what kind of Europe we want to be in. If we approve this
8   there is a further point I want to make. If we want to be seen to deliver justice and
9   which is, after all, the world's biggest. We want to bring it up to the level of the
10   connected with energy production. We want to build on that. This Strategy will
11   decisions about the kind of Europe which we want to create. Is it a Europe turned
12   be no military action. The choice is his. We want to deal with Iraq by the force of
13   a matter of enlightened self-interest. If we want to deliver economic prosperity, a
14   a matter of enlightened self-interest. If we want to deliver economic prosperity, a
15   leave - it is essential to almost everything we want to deliver for our own citizens.
16   former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We want to extend and deepen this
17   former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We want to extend and deepen this
18   the EU emissions trading scheme, which we want to extend to aircraft emissions.
19   participation in the global economy. If we want to fight global inequality, we
20   by 19 per cent between 1992 and 2000. We want to go further still. So this March,
21   more reliable at getting us to where we want to go. But it does still seem to
22   the UK is playing in that work; and how we want to intensify it in the years ahead.
23   some extent, on being active abroad. If we want to keep drugs off British streets,
24   reform, as Gordon Brown did yesterday. We want to lower prices for consumers
25   should they come into compliance. Third, we want to maintain the strongest possible
26   global defence market – a strength which we want to maintain – brings with it a
27   shows what can be achieved. And if we want to maintain and increase Europe's
28   give our firms cheaper access to finance. We want to make Europe the world's most
29   centres here in Bahrain and in Morocco. We want to make further progress at the
30   to opt in to those measures in which we want to participate, and stay out of
31   They have been destroying Afghanistan; we want to rebuild it. There are those who
32   families increases here at home, we want to reinforce and to raise
33   integral part of the development agenda: we want to reinvigorate international
34   to the Agenda 2000 agreement. We want to restart the World Trade Round.
35   and 'Why are you going slow on this?' We want to restore a service a quickly as
36   measurable steps along that path. Now we want to secure a fair budget. In the
37   with every single faith in the world. We want to see them fully realised
38   the course you have set for yourselves. We want to see the development of an ever
39   1559 and withdraw from Lebanon. We want to see a new government chosen
40   anywhere in the world; second, because we want to see others enjoy the same
41   it is in our national interests. We want to see more liberalisation, in
42   is centrally a matter of human rights. We want to see the values of liberal
43   patents and intellectual property rights. We want to see air services to India
44   human rights machinery is long overdue: we want to see human rights integrated
45   2012. The second emphasis which we want to see at the September summit
46   member of the international community. We want to see a sovereign, independent
47   coherent and better-coordinated way. We want to see a modernised and
48   – I reaffirm that support today – because we want to see India taking on global
49   event. Like those Heads of State, we want to see resumption of dialogue
50   UN's development machinery. Meanwhile, we want to see a Security Council which
51   letter of that warrant. In the coming year we want to see further progress: for
52   two strands reinforce one another. If we want to show people the emptiness of
53   We greatly value this partnership and we want to strengthen it.   But history
54   migration and combat illegal immigration. We want to sustain and develop this, and
55   and others in civil society. We want to use this Strategy to build
56   that is potentially rich and successful. We want to welcome it back into the

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1   case for the amendment now before the House, I want to answer four key questions. They are: 1.
2   of the intelligence to the ISC, and I duly did so. I want to answer some of the other points that
3   the skills of the most proficient administrator. I want to applaud the progress you have made so
4   of Iraqis. FUTURE PROSPERITY Today I want to assure all the Iraqi people that our belief
5   and hon. Members whose speeches I missed. I want to begin this wind-up by paying tributes to
6   has moved on to a far broader footing. I want to build on this co-operation and ensure that
7   asylum and immigration, and on Council reforms. I want to concentrate my remarks today on these
8   build the safer, better world on which we all rely. I want to conclude by suggesting that we can only
9   as we seek to tackle injustice in the world. So I want to conclude by saying how glad I am to be
10   I recognise that these concerns exist. So today I want to deal directly with those anxieties, and
11   unlike many of the self-proclaimed Eurosceptics. I want to deal with those doubts by making five
12   year, is tackling the threat from climate change. I want to deal first with two misconceptions. The
13   poverty – freedom from want – is the third theme I want to discuss today. It is a poetic
14   But there is another myth about diplomacy which I want to dispel. Von Clausewitz's maxim that:
15   You don't want too long a speech, but what I want to do is just to offer you my thoughts on
16   Union but rather resolutely opposed to it. What I want to do today is reach out to the genuine
17   economic and political reform. In doing so, I want to draw some parallels with the UK's
18   partnerships will play an important role. But I want to emphasise again that our most important
19   between Britain and the Czech Republic – and I want to end on the same theme. We may not
20   Government's role in the fight against terrorism. I want to endorse that message. Russia has been
21   about the prospect of military action. Today I want to examine six of the most commonly
22   action by the whole international community. I want to explain today the part which the UK is
23   Government's position on the draft Treaty. And I want to explode some of the myths it has
24   which I asked at the beginning of this speech. I want to explore each of them in turn, and offer
25   Let me now come to the second issue on which I want to focus today - reaffirming shared values
26   in the EU's future direction – the theme on which I want to focus my remarks today. Only four
27   of state failure. In my remarks today I want to focus on a state which has utterly failed
28   Britain and China can do together in the world. I want to focus on that theme today. But let me
29   UK-Pakistan relationship can play in that. And I want to focus especially on the importance of
30   the Muslim world as a whole and the West. I want to focus on that question today. I know it is
31   environment to peacekeeping, science and law. I want to galvanise UK-Chinese co-operation in
32   wherever they arise. The third theme which I want to highlight is the importance of building the
33   more to help deliver that. The third issue which I want to highlight today, and also a priority of
34   efforts and programmes. The second area which I want to highlight is the need to develop more
35   and this continent over the coming decade. I want to identify how we can meet those
36   – and maybe apocryphally – once asked, 'If I want to know what Europe thinks, who do I
37   need to take into account in the coming years. I want to look at the impact these trends may have
38   influential diplomatic and political role. I want to look ahead and map out the strategy that
39   The home of optimism: here in Nigeria. Today I want to look forward with you and see if that
40   on everything we believe in. There are five points I want to make about the principles on which I
41   today to resurrect the ideas of the 1920s. Rather I want to make the case for a pragmatic, common
42   and even conflict in Europe.   So this evening I want to make the case for an agenda to
43   with their aims. But there is a further point I want to make. If we want to be seen to deliver
44   should be solved by new means.' Today I want to make the case for co-operation between
45   terrorists spread division. The crucial point which I want to make today is this: we must stay
46   to those whose speeches I do not mention, I want to mention particularly those of the right hon
47   issues. CLOSING REMARKS Before I close I want to offer a personal thank-you to all members
48   powerless in the face of global capital? Today I want to offer some answers to these questions
49   to thank you for your commitment and effort. And I want to particularly highlight the personal
50   or killed by their own Governments. So, tonight I want to pay tribute to the media professionals

51   rebuild a better Iraq. The second group to whom I want to pay tribute are those who work in our
52   Tessa Stirling and Daria Nalecz. And I want to pay a special tribute to the Committee's
53   affairs organisations in the United States. I want to pay tribute to the work of two of the
54   to go there will be plenty more on the way. Today I want to report back on the outcome of the
55   to animal rights extremists – a point to which I want to return later in this speech. The links
56   which the new Europe of 25 will offer us all. I want to return to that theme in a moment. It's a
57   Ladies and Gentlemen, the first thing I want to say is simply welcome to everybody
58   will think again about this decision. And overall I want to say this - that good governance, respect
59 warmly to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I want to say a particular welcome to those
60   I turn to my main theme today, global science, I want to say something about Iraq. IRAQ Just
61 whole make year on year to our country. Tonight I want to say a little about why that second layer
62   Niblett, for their hospitality and welcome today. I want to say at the start how delighted I am to be
63   left after two years. If I may, before I conclude, I want to say something about the work which all
64   effectively on asylum and illegal immigration. I want to see these agreed in a new constitutional
65 and the Occupied Territories for over two years. I want to see UN Security Council Resolutions -
66   yet to realise its full potential as a global actor. I want to see the EU pulling its weight in the world.
67   in a speech in The Hague three months ago. I want to see an EU which delivers real benefits to
68 own interests to do so. So the partnership which I want to see developing between South Africa and
69   our relationship to a new level. Tony Blair and I want to see it develop into a strategic partnership
70   is also crucial to a more prosperous world. I want to see progress, far more than we have
71   be limited to the Council. As I said earlier, I want to see all the institutions strengthened.
72   been partners in pushing this forward. Today I want to set out my vision of the course the EU
73   we practice what we preach. So, I want to set this out as plainly as possible. This
74 common values and on our shared future. Today I want to set out how our response must match
75   in the United Kingdom will play our part. Today I want to set out how I believe Britain can offer
76   of the violent events of 11 September. Today I want to set out my thinking on the consequences
77   your biggest centre anywhere in the world. I want to set out today the case for the new EU
78   THE UK AND THE MUSLIM WORLD Today I want to share with you my thoughts on how the
79   with you and see if that optimism is justified. I want to sketch out what I see as the biggest
80 to an issue I know is of some sensitivity but one I want to speak about – that of terrorism
81   them utterly and as one. The second challenge I want to speak about is regional security. It would
82 available and supported them once deployed. But I want to start by paying tribute to the many
83   Speaker: Jack Straw Thank you all for coming. I want to start by thanking Victoria Turner and
84 strength of the international system. Throughout I want to stress how closely they are linked to
85   of the Afghan people, to formulate it. Today I want to suggest four principles on which I believe
86 in Africa, in Asia or in Afghanistan. This morning I want to suggest four principles which should
87   That shows what can be achieved. So today I want to suggest six points to guide our work for a
88   international security and the rule of law. And I want to suggest three challenges for our
89 as one who has watched Islam for many years, I want to suggest this evening that all of us have
90   rôle played by Javier Solana and Chris Patten. I want to take this opportunity to pay tribute to
91   to exploit the benefits of global science. I want to take those themes in turn, beginning with
92   this first conference of the Civility Programme. I want to talk today about why modernisation and
93   nation in the world. Ladies and Gentlemen, I want to talk today about Africa, and what Britain
94   from security to the second area of work which I want to talk about today – sustainable
95 inviting me to speak here at Peshawar University. I want to talk today about the need for an active
96   for offering this venue. Ladies and Gentlemen, I want to talk today about the emergence of
97   to speak to such a distinguished audience. I want to talk today about the Strategy for the
98 for me to address this, my third Easter Banquet. I want to talk this evening about two issues which
99   modern British society. Ladies and Gentlemen, I want to thank all those of you, from within and
100   links with other young people across the UK. I want to thank the UN Youth and Students'
101   Tetsuya Sato, and Dr David Griggs. Lastly I want to thank the team at the British Embassy
102   then address the parties themselves. Dr Salim, I want to thank you and the African Union, the
103 on a happier note – the one with which I began – I want to thank you for helping to create an
104 to commit to new ways of thinking and working. I want to thank you for your commitment and
105   honour to receive this award from you. And I want to thank the President of the High Advisory
106 introduction and your kind invitation this evening. I want to thank the Lord Mayor and the
107   towards solving the problem once and for all. I want to thank you all again for coming and I wish
108   for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. I want to thank the Chairman today for her
109 has made an important contribution to ISAF and I want to thank the Chairman today for her staunch
110 final say in a referendum. POLITICAL REFORM I want to turn now to the case for political reform in
111   Kingdom and international law. In this context, I want to underline the enormous importance to us
112   new challenges we face in international affairs. I want to use my speech to focus on the strategic

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1	at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm we want to give political momentum to
2	the difference this time around is that we want to - indeed we must - plan this
3	foundation of it. Our position is clear: we want to see universal suffrage
4	dependence on imported oil and gas; we want to diversify our supply, including
5	and consume energy more efficiently; we want to lessen our dependence on
6	We have the same interests: we want to produce and consume energy
7	world and in the markets where we want to invest. And there is another
8	and foreign affairs. However much we want to remove ourselves from the
9	dependence on imported oil and gas; we want to diversify our supply, including
10	and consume energy more efficiently; we want to lessen our dependence on
11	because we share the same interests: we want to produce and consume energy
12	capture and storage. In other words, we want to build a zero emissions power
13	and Intellectual Property Rights. And we want to ensure that the action that
14	more competitive place to do business. We want to see a modern and adaptable
15	Council will have something to say. We want to agree principles to guide the
16	reduction in energy use by 2020. And we want to make a stated ambition that
17	on our word. For other countries, if we want to encourage them down the
18	to those visitors and migrants that we want to attract to the UK, while
19	had a clear vision of the future of Iraq. We want to see a fully sovereign
20	will, I have no doubt, come a time when we want to look at the lessons we
21	And that has implications for everything we want to achieve from conflict
22	is an arduous and lengthy struggle. We want to be your partners in that
23	wish a modern nuclear power industry. We want to be able to resume

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1	has gone, others have followed. I want to talk today about one of the
2	maintain an open trading system. And I want to end by talking about one of the
3	a pivotal part in rising to the challenge I want to talk about today: how, together,
4	to talk about the threat of globalisation. I want to talk instead about the threat to
5	and Response'. That is the framework I want to use tonight. I will begin by laying
6	I want to do even more. In particular I want to push the agenda on climate
7	and instability. In the next six months I want to do even more. In particular I want
8	those problems. So one of the things that I want to do is to develop further the
9	The third and last of the three challenges I want to mention tonight is the challenge
10	innocent civilians. And here, if I may, I want to mention an area of work to which
11	the world we live in a little better. What I want to touch on this evening is how that
12	in praising the work of this department, I want to be absolutely clear that I am
13	everything that my department does. I want to end on a topic which is bound to
14	going to go about that task. But today I want to end by putting out a challenge to
15	remains serious and is increasing. Today I want to talk about how we as a
16	2003 and in its aftermath. The question I want to put to the House is not so much
17	making this speech here today because I want to lay down that challenge to three
18	for two reasons. The first reason is that I want to talk today about the changing
19	about why we promote human rights. I want to end by looking to the future and
20	world - just 34 years. The second area I want to mention might surprise some of
21	is so vital. It goes to the heart of what I want to achieve as Foreign Secretary. In
22	the FCO and trade unions. And so I want to end on this point: I hope you will
23	the moment, as I have already said that I want to make some progress. The
24	a little more about that, if I may, later. I want to begin, however, by reminding us
25	33. And there's just one other thing I want to say about this aspect of the

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1   run with it. Only last week, for example, I know that the German embassy was
2   is to keep pushing further up it yourself. I know that Japanese business has
3   Having come through Guangzhou, I know that those are very real problems
4   to the Hong Kong people. As I said, I know that it has not always been an
5   let me address China's development. I know that outside interest in China's
6   offered them over the last year. And I know that there are many British
7   make a positive difference in the world. I know that there are many
8   much you have delivered for Britain. I know that the stance we took over the
9   that'. The working time directive – and I know that there are some differences
10   which he would find it easy to accept. I know that because I've asked him –
11   - is the best way to achieve that goal. I know that this House has shown great
12   for more than any other audience, I know that business people are always
13   case for Turkish membership: a case I know that is strongly supported across
14   to understand, most hazardous. And I know that this comes at a cost – in the
15   your loss, must be difficult ones. But I know that none of you would ever want
16   and mothers in India – every year. I know that the people in this room and
17   Noon and Nat Puri are old friends. But I know that there are many others in this
18   the Hamas-run finance ministry. I know that some elements of Britain's
19   to come out of your twin presidencies. I know that you are keen to do
20   partners in achieving these objectives. I know that Ian with his usual
21   they are mutually reinforcing. I know that from my own experience as
22   fishing and agriculture will be disrupted. I know that how China performs over the
23   council now meets three times a year. I know that both sides find these
24   support. As I said at the beginning, I know that this is what the trade union
25   with the Chinese Government. I know that there are things that we do
26   to make the operation run smoothly. I know that the House is likely to
27   grateful to him for that intervention. I know that what he says is true, and
28   is the history of all such events. I know that many angers and anxieties
29   for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin)-I know that he will accept my assurance,
30   on the basis of many conversations, I know that everyone wishes to see the
31   of the issue. One of the things which I know that generations of scientists in
32   of the Middle East to take place. I know that many members of the House