Ceparano, Maria Carmela (2015) Nash equilibrium selection in multi-leader multi-follower games with vertical separation. [Tesi di dottorato]


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Item Type: Tesi di dottorato
Lingua: English
Title: Nash equilibrium selection in multi-leader multi-follower games with vertical separation
Ceparano, Maria Carmelamilena.ceparano@gmail.com
Date: 30 March 2015
Number of Pages: 121
Institution: Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II
Department: Scienze Economiche e Statistiche
Scuola di dottorato: Scienze economiche e statistiche
Dottorato: Scienze economiche
Ciclo di dottorato: 26
Coordinatore del Corso di dottorato:
Acconcia, Antonioantonio.acconcia@unina.it
Morgan, JacquelineUNSPECIFIED
Date: 30 March 2015
Number of Pages: 121
Uncontrolled Keywords: Stackelberg games; equilibrium selection; existence of solutions
Settori scientifico-disciplinari del MIUR: Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-S/06 - Metodi matematici dell'economia e delle scienze attuariali e finanziarie
Date Deposited: 10 Apr 2015 08:31
Last Modified: 12 Nov 2015 02:00
URI: http://www.fedoa.unina.it/id/eprint/10254
DOI: 10.6092/UNINA/FEDOA/10254


The aim of this thesis is twofold. On the one hand new results on the concavity and the isotonicity of the optimal solution function of a parametric maximization problem are obtained. The maximizing function is not required to be continuous and the generalized version of the notion of pseudoconcavity in terms of Dini derivatives is used. These results, together with a new fixed point theorem for set-valued maps, are used to answer to the second issue concerning a selection of Nash equilibria, called equilibrium under passive beliefs, of a multi-leader multi-follower game with vertical separation and partially observed actions. Indeed, an equilibrium under passive beliefs correspond to a fixed point of particular set-valued maps related to the sets of solutions of parametric bilevel optimization problems. Existence of equilibria under passive beliefs for significative classes of problems and conditions of minimal character on data possibly discontinuous are proved. An economic example of such interaction can be found in games of multilateral vertical contracts: competing manufacturers (the leaders) delegate retail decisions to exclusive retailers (the followers), offering a private contract.


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